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    ABSTRACT 
The problem of weak economic development in Nigeria despite a substantial inflow 
of revenues from oil exports especially from the early 1970s and other subsequent 
periods is an important issue to examine.  This outcome presents a number of 
problems for any government regime in Nigeria seeking to provide solutions to 
enable the country to escape the adverse effects of natural resource wealth. At 
present, the Nigerian government is still struggling to find solutions to tackle the 
deteriorating state of affairs, particularly in terms of unemployment, rising food 
prices and internal security.   
The main aim of this study is to help understand the dynamic relationship between 
natural resource wealth and economic development. This research study analyses 
the trajectory of economic and political development in Nigeria over the period 1960 
to 2010. This study employs historical political economy and empirical approaches in 
examining the relationship between oil wealth and economic development. This 
method distinguishes the study from others carried out in the literature, particularly 
from those on Nigeria where the common approach in this strand has been to 
examine the relationship using economic theories alone. The rationale for the 
approach employed in this study is that Nigeria has its own unique development in 
terms of politics, which has been influenced by the social structure and colonial 
history of the country and thus the impact of oil on economic growth should be 
investigated separately using a historical and empirical approach so as to capture 
time trend interactions between societal issues, politics and economic outcomes.   
First, this study examined the relationship between oil and economic performance 
using social, political and economic factors such as ethnic and regional differences, 
political instability, changes in ownership structure of the oil sector and government 
expenditure, which is largely financed by oil revenues. Next, the research empirically 
examined the impact of these factors on economic sectors such as agriculture and 
manufacturing. Afterwards, it analyses the impact of political and economic events in 
the preceding periods on the current or subsequent period that coincided with a 
return to democratic rule on major economic sectors.  
In general, the results show that the period, which marked a transition to a stable 
political regime, has no impact on economic performance from 1999 - 2010. 
Implicitly, this means that democracy in isolation is not a process that accompanies 
economic development and that a strong policy which could foster national unity and 
overcome regional and ethnic differences is needed. In order to promote sound 
economic development this policy should be dynamic, specific and directed to the 
promotion of a national agenda that will target and benefit important sectors such as 
agriculture and manufacturing through creating forward and backward linkages in a 
multiplier effect. 
Key Words: Key Words: Agriculture, Crude Oil, Economic Growth, Government 
Expenditure, Manufacturing, Multiplier Effect, Nigeria, Natural Resource Curse, 
Political Economy, Political Regime 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 NATURAL RESOURCE WEALTH AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
Nigeria is often considered the giant of Africa due to its large population and 
economy.1 With a population of about 173 million, it is the most populous 
country in Africa and accounts for 47 percent of West Africa’s inhabitants (World 
Bank 2015). Economically, Nigeria has emerged as Africa’s largest economy with 
an estimated gross domestic product (GDP) of US$1.1 trillion in 2015 following a 
statistical rebasing exercise in 2014 (Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 2016). In 
addition, Nigeria is currently classified the largest oil producing country in Africa 
and the world’s fourth largest exporter of liquefied natural gas in 2015 (Energy 
Information Agency 2016). 
The oil sector assumes particular importance in the Nigerian economy because it 
has become a leading source of income and government revenue since the 
1970s. It accounts for between 21 and 48 percent of GDP2, 95 percent of 
exports and about 75 percent of consolidated budgetary revenues.3 Over the 
years, the oil sector has become a major contributor in the share of the GDP and 
it overwhelmingly accounts for the largest portion of export and government 
revenues. At first glance, it would be expected that a country with such a strong 
source of external revenue earnings should be able to achieve strong and 
sustained economic growth.  
In particular, evidence of rising government expenditure due to increases in oil 
revenues, especially from the 1970s to finance current and capital projects in 
                                                          
1
 This large population comprised of more than 250 tribes; the most populous and politically influential are the 
Hausa/Fulani, Igbo and Yoruba. In terms of religious composition, the population is about 50 percent Muslim, 40 
percent Christian and 10 percent of ingenuous beliefs (CIA 2016).  
2
 Ross (2003b). 
3
 See World Bank (2015) and CIA (2016).  
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various sectors of administration, economic services, social and community 
services and transfers should be expected to improve economic growth in 
Nigeria. For example, in 1970 the contributions of oil revenue and non-oil 
revenues were N166 Million and N467.40 Million respectively (Central Bank of 
Nigeria (CBN) Statistical Bulletin 2010). In this period total government 
expenditure was N903.90 Million. However, the contribution of these two 
categories of government revenues changed patterns and the oil sector and non-
oil sector contributed N1016 Million and N679.30 Million respectively in 1973, 
which was just three years later and since then this has been the trend. In 1973, 
total government expenditure recorded a rising value of N1529.20 Million (CBN 
Statistical Bulletin 2010). As such, increases in oil revenues and corresponding 
rises in government expenditure in areas of internal security, national assembly, 
agriculture, construction, health, education and transport and communication 
should be expected to increase the general well-being of Nigerian citizens.  
Although real GDP is measured to have grown by 6.1% in 2015 due to sustained 
strong performance primarily in services and industry with the exception of  
agriculture and oil exploration (World Bank 2015). As a result, Nigeria has been 
ranked 21st in the world in terms of GDP (PPP)4 in 2014.5   
However, recent economic diversification shown by the performance of sectors 
such as services and telecommunications and strong growth have not created a 
significant decrease in poverty levels as over 62 percent of Nigeria’s 170 million 
people still live in extreme poverty (CIA 2016). Also, despite Nigeria’s strong 
economic base, in particular in natural resource wealth, which has witnessed 
significant improvement since the 1970s except for periods of declining 
oil prices in the 1980s and recent years 6 and rising government 
expenditure, the country has performed weakly in economic development. 
For example, during the oil boom period of 1973 to 1981 food prices rose and 
food production declined (Collier 1988). Moreover, Ross (2003b p. 2), states that 
“between 1970 and 1999, the Nigerian petroleum industry generated about 
$231 billion in rents, or $1900 for every man, woman, and child. Yet from 1970 
to 1999 Nigeria’s real income per capita fell from $264 to $250 a year”. 
                                                          
4
 Purchasing power parity (see World Bank 2016 for more details).  
5
 World Bank Development Indicators (2016) 
6
 For example, oil and gas GDP was estimated to have deteriorated by 13.1% in 2013 and 1.3% in 2014. This 
outcome is linked to severe declines in oil prices in the third quarter of 2014 and this has posed significant challenges 
to Nigeria’s external balance and public finances (World Bank 2015).   
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Due to a lack of sustained economic development and the continued domination 
of the oil sector, the country has been described by some researchers as 
representing an example of the ‘resource curse’. This has resulted in the need to 
question why Nigeria’s significant oil wealth has accomplished so little to 
increase incomes and ease poverty7  
In addition, researchers claimed that Nigeria’s economic growth has been 
strongly influenced by the abundance of natural resource in oil (Ross 2003b and 
Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian 2003). This is not surprising because Nigeria is 
considered to be one of the most oil dependent countries compared to its peers 
(Ross 2003b). As further evidence, the World Bank estimated that due to 
corruption 80 percent of oil revenues benefit only 1 percent of the Nigerian 
population (Odularu 2008). This largely shows that Nigeria has not been able to 
translate the significant oil output and income into a sustainable economic 
development.  
The reasons for this low rate of growth are unclear and arguable and any 
attempt to understand this contrast gives rise to some fundamental issues 
regarding the theoretical and empirical literature on development and growth. In 
order to place the later analysis into context a brief overview is provided. 
The theoretical and empirical literature suggests that countries with natural 
resource wealth often experience lower economic growth than countries with 
scarce natural resources (Auty 1999 and Auty and Gelb 2001).8 Auty and Gelb 
(2001), for example, stated that a developing political state is associated with 
resource poor countries, although not in general because the governments of 
such countries pursue a logical economic policy that improves social welfare. 
These countries also experience early industrialisation and adopt a competitive 
model that withstands rapid and democratic development. The reasons for this 
are tied to explanations such as extreme population pressure on scarce 
resources, which reduces the patience of the majority of the population in 
tolerating unequal distribution and predatory rent extraction. Also, such 
economies place importance on investment efficiency. However, they further 
argued that in resource-rich countries, especially in concentrated form, there are 
                                                          
7
 See for example, Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian (2003) and Ross (2003b). 
8
 This may be conditional on country characteristics, such as strong institutions that promotes the rule of law, and 
transparency and accountability which may mitigate the adverse effects of resource wealth (see, for example, Collier 
and Goderis 2008).  
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struggles for rental income that produce sectarian and predatory situations, 
which resulted in the distribution of the rental income through indirect means. 
This result in deterioration in growth and recovery may take many years (Auty 
and Gelb 2001). 
Following from this there has been substantial debate about the causes of the 
natural resource curse, either overall or in regard to specific countries or regions 
(Rosser 2006a). Early studies on the natural resource curse advocated that the 
causal mechanisms linking natural resource wealth with weak economic 
outcomes were basically economic in nature (Collier 2010). Unequivocally, it was 
claimed that natural resource exporting economies suffered from volatile export 
earnings, declining terms of trade, an enclave economic structure and/or the 
‘Dutch Disease’.9  
Despite the fact that the causal mechanisms for the lack of growth are widely 
thought to be economic in nature there is a significant body of opinion, which 
argued that a strictly economic approach is too narrow to analyse the 
relationship.10 This has led to the conclusion that natural resource curse operates 
through causal channels, which are both economic and political in nature (Collier 
2010). 
It is this view that is of particular interest for this thesis.  As it stands however 
there are significant gaps in our understanding of the nature of the political 
mechanisms that are most vital in this regard (Rosser 2006a). It is also unclear 
how they work and how they might differ between countries. 
 
1.2 AIM OF THE STUDY 
The aim of this thesis is to help understand the dynamic relationship between 
natural resource wealth and economic development and to analyse further the 
                                                          
9
 The Dutch Disease is a situation whereby a natural resource boom leads to an appreciation of the real exchange rate 
and as a result manufacturing and other tradable sectors are damaged (see, for example, Corden and Neary 1982 and 
Corden 1984).  
10
 Some studies highlighted that a number of resource endowed developing economies, specifically Botswana, Chile, 
Indonesia, and Malaysia, have performed more successfully in development terms, realising high rates of economic 
growth, poverty reduction, the avoidance of civil war and the attainment of semi-democratic rule (Auty and Gelb 2001 
and Stevens 2003). 
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theoretical literature, by using Nigeria’s lack of economic development despite 
an abundance in oil as a case study. Although there is evidence of improvement 
in terms of economic growth from 2012 and subsequent years that coincided 
with a statistical rebasing of Nigeria’s GDP, it is clear that this is not 
accompanied by a reduction in poverty levels as more than half of Nigeria’s 
population still live in extreme poverty. 
Nigeria is particularly interesting as a case study in understanding of the broader 
issues in development. The country had undergone changes economically and 
politically before and after the discovery of oil in 1956, which was four years 
away from the political independence achieved in 1960.  
These distinct economic and political changes present a valid reason to study 
Nigeria separately from other oil rich countries. 
Nigeria is also interesting to study because the lack of development despite the 
oil wealth depicts the theoretical literature, which largely suggested that 
resource-rich countries located in Sub-Saharan Africa struggle to collect rental 
income on natural resource extraction paid to the government. These struggles 
are tied to ethnic and regional rivalry, which tries to capture the government 
(see, Easterly and Levine). This in turn leads to situations that distort the 
economy and these results in a deterioration in growth. For example, it is argued 
that Nigeria’s dependence on oil exports has led to the appearance of the Dutch 
Disease effect (Olagunju 2005 and Ogunleye 2008). 
Also, the theoretical literature, which focuses on the relationship between 
natural resources and political institutions argued that countries rich in natural 
resources often depend on a system that is based on patronage and do not 
nurture a democratic system based on electoral competition, scrutiny and civil 
rights (Collier and Hoeffler 2005). This also portrays the Nigerian situation where 
there are protests at the lack of free and fair election, especially after return to a 
stable democratic rule in 1999 that was dominated by one political party until 
2015.    
As such an investigation into the response of Nigeria’s economic performance to 
its economic and political trajectory will offer an insight into the controversies 
about the lack of economic development despite an abundance of natural 
resource wealth in oil. 
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1.3 OBJECTIVES 
In order to achieve the aim of this thesis, three main objectives are proposed. 
They are: 
1. To examine the development of the political system in Nigeria; 
 
2. To examine the interplay between the oil sector and the political system in 
Nigeria; 
 
3. To empirically examine the impact of the interplay between oil and the 
political system on key economic sectors in Nigeria. 
 
The objectives are necessary to achieve the main aim of the thesis because they 
will provide an in-depth analysis of the trajectory of economic, political and 
institutional changes in Nigeria. These objectives will help to identify additional 
issues that have hindered sustainable and achievable economic development in 
the presence of significant oil revenues in the country and may help to suggest 
some possible directions to overcome the problem.     
The first objective will help to understand the way in, which the current 
problems in Nigeria and its inability to translate oil revenues into growth is partly 
path dependent and linked to a long trajectory of political outcomes. The 
analysis of the Nigerian political system will help to show the political 
institutional arrangements and their evolution over time.  
Secondly, the investigation of the interplay between the oil sector and the 
Nigerian political system will also show the interaction of these two institutions 
over time. In particular, this examination will show a two way interplay between 
the political and economic institutions, in terms of the effect of the political 
system on the oil sector and of the oil wealth on the political system. For 
example, Collier (2010, P. 1105 – 1106) stated that “the interplay is potentially 
in both directions: politics can affect the exploitation of natural assets and 
natural assets can affect politics. In principle, either of these could explain the 
resource curse, but there is a reasonable basis for thinking that both are 
important.”  
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The last objective is to empirically examine the impact of the interplay between 
oil and the political system on economic performance. This is important to 
achieve because it further shows the effect of the impact of the long trajectory 
of economic and political outcomes on key economic indicators. For example, it 
is stated that the significance of the social effects created by oil dependence 
depends on the type of pre-existing political, social and economic institutions 
available to manage oil wealth as it comes onstream and the extent to, which 
oil revenues subsequently transform these institutions in a rentier direction 
(Karl 2007).  
To achieve this third objective, a graphical and descriptive data are employed to 
illustrate the impact of changes in the political and economic landscapes on 
major development indicators such as agriculture, manufacturing, GDP per 
capita, poverty and consumer inflation. Secondly, a more rigorous analysis that 
encompasses economic, political and other institutional factors is used to 
examine the complex relationship between oil and economic development in 
Nigeria.   
 
1.4 ARGUMENT  
It is argued in this thesis that a lack of national unity due to ethnic and regional 
rivalry is one of the main reasons for lack of development in Nigeria. As such, 
this absence of national unity prior to and after the return to a stable democratic 
rule had gradually led to institutional inefficiency and waste which affected other 
key economic sectors such as manufacturing and agriculture which supports 
majority of the labour force in Nigeria.11 As a result, this has helped in producing 
adverse development outcomes in the form of increased levels of poverty, rising 
consumer inflation and imports and a decline in the value of the domestic 
currency in relation to the US dollar and British sterling which makes import 
transaction more costly. Basically, this shows that existing societal conflicts has 
hindered the benefits associated with an abundance of oil wealth. 
 
 
                                                          
11
 According to CIA (2016), the agricultural sector employs about 70 percent Nigeria’s labour force. 
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1.5 RELEVANCE OF THE STUDY 
This thesis examines the dynamic relationship between natural resource wealth 
and economic growth and it uses Nigeria as a case study due to the abundance 
of oil in the country and a lack of economic development. Nigeria is a country 
situated in West Africa and the lack of economic development in Africa has been 
a subject of intense debate in development economics. For example, studies 
such as those by Barro (1989), Sachs and Warner (1997), Easterly and Levine 
(1997), Bloom et al. (1998) and Collier and Gunning (1999) examined themes 
such as the reasons for slow growth rates in African countries.  
Some of the explanations offered by the studies above relate to the peculiar 
characteristics found in African countries in the form of colonisation, ineffective 
economic policies, autocratic or dictatorial political regimes, predominant exports 
in primary commodities, low population density, higher ethno-linguistic diversity 
and geographic and demographic characteristics which may create conditions for 
slow growth (see, for example Sachs and Warner 1997, Collier and Gunning 
1999 and Easterly and Levine 1997). For example, Easterly and Levine (1997) 
suggest that a high level of ethnic diversity is the most significant single cause of 
Africa's slow growth.  
Due to some peculiar characteristics found in African countries, this study can 
also be applied to other African countries rich in either oil or other natural 
resources. Countries like Algeria, Angola and Gabon that are rich in oil can also 
benefit from studies that examine the relationship between oil and economic 
growth. For example, Angola is a country situated in Southern Africa and rich in 
mineral resources (i.e. oil and diamonds). It has having different ethnic groups 
and a colonial history similar to Nigeria. Angola’s abundance in mineral resources 
has also been accompanied with a rise of conflicts such as the Cabinda enclave 
which is also similar to the Biafra secession and the rebellions in the Delta region 
of Nigeria (see for example, Le Billon 200). In addition, despite Angola’s 
abundance in mineral resources, it has been ranked as impoverished by the 
United Nations Development Program’s list of maximum social development 
performance (Karl 2007). 
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This study is also relevant to countries outside the African continent. Other 
developing countries rich in oil can be found in the Middle East. These include 
Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, Libya and Kuwait among others. As such, the analysis 
of the relationship between oil and economic growth conducted in an African 
country like Nigeria can be relevant to such countries. Although there may be 
differences in the arrangement of the political and social systems, the key issue 
here is that all these countries mainly rely on oil just like Nigeria for economic 
enhancement. In fact, these countries like Nigeria are also members of the 
Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries.  
 
1.6 STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
The structure of this research study is as follows. To develop a basis for 
understanding the low levels of economic development in Nigeria, Chapter 2 
provides a review of the literature on the relationship between natural resource 
wealth and economic development. 
Chapter 3 examines the history of the development of political and economic 
institutions and structures in Nigeria in relation to oil production and the impact 
on economic performance. This gives a foundation for the main argument of this 
study and helps to understand some of the background to the problems of unity 
and conflict. The trajectory of economic development in Nigeria is examined in 
different periods to identify the impact of existing societal issues such as 
religion, ethnic and regional rivalry in shaping the political landscape especially 
after the discovery of oil in 1956 and the subsequent independence achieved in 
1960. The examination also went further to trail the gradual development of the 
oil sector and its effect on the economic and political outcomes up to the period 
of return to democracy in 1999.  
Chapter 4 reinforces the main argument by examining the influence of the 
previous period prior to the achievement of political stability in 1999 on the 
current economic, political and institutional settings in Nigeria. The chapter 
further argues that these existing and continuous backgrounds have affected 
politics, economic performance and the social stability of the country especially 
in terms of internal security after the return to a stable democratic system.   
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Chapter 5 presents the methodology which is informed by the literature review 
and Chapters 3 and 4 which analyse the history of the development of political 
and economic institutions and structures in Nigeria in relation to oil production 
and the impact on economic performance. The type of data and sources 
employed as well as the justification for their use are discussed. 
Chapter 6 focuses on the presentation of hypotheses informed by Chapters 3, 4 
and 5. The chapter also provides the results from additional empirical analysis 
conducted to examine the developed hypotheses. This chapter also explains the 
meaning of the findings and whether or not they support the hypotheses.  
The conclusion of the study is provided in Chapter 7. This presents a summary of 
the main findings, the theoretical contribution, the practical relevance and policy 
implications, the limitations of the study and directions for further research.   
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents the relevant and varied theories proposed to explain the 
relationship between natural resources and economic growth. Specifically, it 
seeks to achieve two main goals. Firstly, it attempts to offer a review of the 
existing theoretical literature that seeks to link the negative effects of natural 
resource wealth on economic growth. The main aim is to describe the theoretical 
blocks on which the study is built. The second aim is to carry out a review of the 
theoretical literature that traces the major competing perspectives in order to 
establish the approach of this study.  
Different approaches have been developed within the study of the relationship 
between natural resource wealth and a lack of economic growth. The initial 
foundation is built upon a set of theories based on economic perspective such as 
the Dutch Disease, the structure of the world economy and the nature of world 
commodity markets.  
A subsequent viewpoint is that politics should also be taken into consideration in 
the study of natural resources and economic performance. As such, the second 
approach attempts to provide a more comprehensive framework in the analysis 
which points to a political economy approach in the study of the subject matter.  
In general, theories underlying the study of the relationship between natural 
resource wealth and economic growth have been drawn from two main 
approaches or disciplines, i.e., economic and political science.12 Accordingly, 
previous studies have adopted several viewpoints. Common among them include 
                                                          
12
 See, for example, Ross (1999), Rosser (2006) and Collier (2010). 
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the Dutch Disease, Commodity Price/Revenue Volatility, Conflicts and Policy 
Failure. 
Consequently the debate over the lack of development in resource-rich countries 
has generally fallen into two main schools of thought, i.e., economic and political 
centered approaches to economic development. The perspectives from both 
economic and political science approaches are presented below. 
Much of the prior work in this area has been based on the economic approach as 
the principal underlying framework. However, the nature of the relationship 
between natural resource wealth and a lack of economic development is 
complex. Therefore, in line with previous studies (e.g., Bevan et al. 1999 and 
Collier 2010) and with the recent recognition of the need to adopt a broader 
analytical framework (Rosser 2006), the study concentrates on the political 
economy approach because this is particularly important for reasons such as the 
distinct social, political and economic structures of an economy which help to 
determine the trajectory of economic development. 
Similarly, due to the return of democratic rule in Nigeria in 1999 after a 
prolonged period of political instability which was largely authoritarian as it was 
dominated by military leadership, this study further analyses a strand of 
literature on economic development in relation to democracy. Also, the 
relationship between natural resource wealth and a lack of democracy has been 
explained by the literature under the political economy approach.  As such, this 
chapter will further examine the strand of literature on the relationship between 
democracy and economic growth so as to give the analysis in Chapter 5 a basis 
for discussion and inference.  
The different approaches and their theoretical underpinning are reviewed below. 
The rest of the chapter is divided into six sections. Section 2.2 reviews the 
theoretical literature on natural resource wealth and economic growth from an 
economic perspective; Section 2.3 surveys the political economy approach; 
Section 2.4 presents some evidence from the strand of literature focusing on the 
means by which resource rich countries can escape the resource curse; Section 
2.5 examines further literature connecting democracy and economic growth; and 
Section 2.6 presents a critical observation of the literature review while Section 
2.7 summarises the chapter. 
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2.2 THE ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 
The section surveys the literature based on the economic approach under 
theoretical and empirical explanations. The former is fundamentally based on 
theory/hypothesis development while the latter attempts to survey studies that 
empirically test the proposed idea.  
Many economists recognise the opportunities that natural resource wealth 
provides for economic growth and development. For example, in the early 
1950s, some researchers suggested that natural resource wealth would help 
developing countries because they were assumed to suffer from imbalances of 
the supply of factors of production. Many of these countries have labour 
surpluses but shortages of investment capital. In this regard, developing 
countries with an abundance of natural resources could overcome such 
shortages through export surpluses and the attraction of foreign capital 
investment (Ross 1999). As a result, the governments of these resource-rich 
countries would find sources of fiscal revenues for investment in public 
infrastructure to enhance economic development (Lewis 1974). 
However, concerns with respect to the negative impact of natural resource 
wealth on economic growth and development emerged among development 
economists in the 1950s and 1960s. At first, such worries were associated with 
(Prebisch 1950, 1964) and Singer (1950). They argued that primary product 
exporting countries (the periphery) would find themselves at a disadvantage in 
trading with the developed economies (the centre) because of declining terms of 
trade which suggests that the price of exports falls relative to imports. For 
example, if a developing specializes in oil exports and on the other hand imports 
manufactured goods; a decline in the terms of trade implied that the oil 
exporting country will experience a fall in oil exports relative to the import of 
manufactured goods. In essence, this outcome means that more oil exports are 
required to purchase the same quantity of manufactured imports. Others 
scholars such as Hirschman (1958), Seers (1964) and Baldwin (1966) reinforced 
this negative evidence by suggesting that backward linkages from the supply of 
primary product exports would be limited compared to manufactured exports. In 
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contrast, some authors argued that primary products could promote economic 
growth through a linkage effect (Roemer 1970 and Lewis 1989). 
Generally this concern was focused on primary products and natural resources. 
In the 1970s attention began to centre on the experience of oil exporting 
countries following the first significant change in the oil price. The outcome gave 
rise to speculation that large oil revenues might be detrimental to the 
development prospects of the oil exporting economies (Mabro and Monroe 
1974). This saw the advent of a strand of literature particularly concerned with 
the examination of links between oil and economic development. 
Similarly, a number of scholars highlighted that world commodity markets were 
subject to unusually significant price changes. As a result, countries that depend 
on natural resource commodity exports would find these volatile effects 
transferred to their domestic economies, thereby making government revenue 
and foreign exchange supply volatile (Nurske 1958 and Gelb 1988). 
Furthermore, some researchers also argued that natural resource industries 
were not likely to stimulate growth in the rest of the domestic economy, 
especially if foreign multinational companies dominated the resource extractive 
industry and were further allowed to repatriate their profits instead of 
reinvesting in the domestic economy.13  As such natural resource exporting 
economies would be left with booming natural resource enclaves that generate 
few forward and backward linkages to other sectors of the economy.  
Since the 1950s, several economists have made a continual effort to examine 
these claims. In particular, they examined different ideas such as declining 
terms of trade in developing countries rich in natural resources, appreciation of 
the real exchange rate due to the resource boom and volatile export earnings, 
among others. 
In this regard, there were early attempts using economic approaches to explain 
why natural resource abundance in oil, natural gas, copper, gold and diamonds 
does not necessarily translate into positive economic outcomes, particularly in 
developing countries. Some of the economic explanations of the relationship 
between natural resource abundance and economic growth largely focused on 
                                                          
13
 See, for example, Baldwin (1966) 
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the decline in terms of trade (Singer 1950 and Prebisch 1959), the limited 
supply/demand linkages between the natural resource sector and the rest of the 
economy (Hirschmann 1958), the Dutch Disease effect (Corden and Neary 1982) 
and revenue volatility (Mikesell 1997 and Auty 1998). Nevertheless, none of 
these theoretical propositions mentioned above were clearly confirmed by 
empirical studies (Stevens 2003).  
In the next subsections, the theories and some of their empirical evidence are 
presented. Specifically, the Dutch Disease explanation will be first presented in 
subsection 2.2.1 and subsection 2.2.2 examines the Commodity Price/Revenue 
Volatility. 
 
2.2.1 The Dutch Disease Explanation 
Although Meade and Russell (1957) made the first contribution to the natural 
resource boom paradox, which is now considered to be the basic model of the 
Dutch Disease, explanations are also found in the influential work of Corden and 
Neary (1982) and other studies such as Corden (1984), Davies (1995) and 
Stijns (2003). In their study, Corden and Neary employed a framework of a 
small open economy producing two goods (energy and manufactures) traded at 
exogenously determined world prices   and a non-traded good14 sector (services) 
whose price changes flexibly to balance domestic supply and demand. In 
addition, they illustrated that the manufacturing sector is crowded out by the 
booming energy sector due to an appreciation of the real exchange rate value of 
the domestic currency, which makes manufacturing exports less competitive and 
thus less attractive to foreign importers (Olusi and Olagunju 2005). 
According to Larsen (2006), the Dutch Disease is linked to several effects such 
as factor movement, aggregate demand expenditure and a spillover-loss. Also 
Cuddington (1989) stated that the impact of the resource boom for resource 
allocation can be summarised through focusing on two effects of resource 
movement and demand expenditure. The former explains the reallocation of 
production factors such as capital and labour from other sectors of the economy 
to the resource sector. Moreover, the latter comes from the increased aggregate 
                                                          
14
 These are goods and services not traded internationally (See, for example, Collier, 1988). Henceforth, the word non-
tradeable used in this chapter refers to goods and services that are not traded internationally.  
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demand generated by windfall resource currency receipts, which when converted 
to domestic currency may create periods of excess demand in the domestic 
economy.  
Several economists seem to agree that the first malignant effect of natural 
resource abundance is the Dutch Disease and this explanation is purely 
economic (see for example, Collier 2010). This strand of the literature is often 
referred to as the economics of the Dutch Disease named after the experience of 
the Netherlands in the 1960s which describes the deterioration of the 
manufacturing sector after the discovery of natural gas in 1959. This forced up 
the exchange rate and increased the value of the Dutch currency (see, Corden 
1984).  The Dutch Disease model explains that natural resource wealth hinders 
growth of the industrial sector, which is assumed to be the key driving force of 
the economy (see, e.g., Corden and Neary 1982 and Benjamin et al. 1989).  
This is either through an appreciation of the real exchange rate or the absorption 
of factors of production (Corden 1984).  
Also interest in the Dutch Disease effect was propelled by a period of high oil 
prices. The basic model has been argued by some authors to be inadequate to 
address the impact of oil price volatility on the sectoral structure of oil exporting 
developing countries (see, for example, Fardmanesh 1991).   
Similarly, some explanations of the negative effect of natural resource wealth on 
economic growth have been partly considered to be symptoms of the Dutch 
Disease. For example, these issues include a decrease in savings and physical 
investment (Payrakis and Gerlagh 2007), impediments to entrepreneurship 
(Sachs and Warner 2001) and lower investment in education and human capital 
(Gylfason 2001).   
In contrast, it has been argued that the empirical evidence does not provide 
great support for the Dutch Disease hypothesis as an explanation of the negative 
effect of natural resource wealth on economic growth (Leite and Weidmann 1999 
and Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian 2003). 
The subsection below presents some evidence from the empirical literature.  
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2.2.1.1 Empirical Studies on the Dutch Disease Explanation 
The Dutch Disease perspective establishes the basis for a greater part of the 
subsequent empirical work in the literature (Stevens 2003).  There is a plethora 
of empirical studies on the Dutch Disease concept which can be grouped into 
those relating to developed countries and those to developing countries.  
 
Developed Countries 
On the developed economies, Ellman (1981) documented that, due to the 
exploitation of large deposits of natural gas in the North Sea in the Netherlands, 
the textile and clothing industries and others such as manufacturing, mechanical 
engineering, shipping, vehicles and construction industries deteriorated. 
However, there was an expansion of the services sector. Although Kremer’s 
(1986) findings corroborated that of Ellman, he reported that it is difficult to 
reconcile the economic deterioration as a result of the discovery of gas since a 
number of countries in Western Europe also experienced a similar decline 
without having an energy boom. 
Ross (1986) also observed the symptoms of the Dutch Disease in the case of the 
United Kingdom (UK). He noted that, subsequent to the commercial exploitation 
of crude oil which began in the UK in 1975, the real exchange rate appreciated 
between 51 percent and 55 percent between 1977 and 1980. This outcome led 
to a fall in manufacturing output, which rose by only 4 percent between 1973 
and 1979 but then increased to 14 percent between 1979 and 1982. In addition, 
the findings of Forysth and Kay (1980) also support the evidence of the Dutch 
Disease in the UK.  
In contrast, Jimenez-Rodriguez and Sanchez’s (2003) found mixed evidence in 
their study. Their findings indicated that, while Norway benefited from increases 
in oil prices, similar rises in the UK had a substantial negative effect on GDP. 
Another study by Brown and Yucel (1999) also provided evidence in support of 
the negative effect of an energy boom. Brown and Yucel’s study focused on the 
US economy, which is not a net oil-exporter, but they did reveal from the 
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impulse response analysis that the Dutch Disease model responds to a 
temporary oil price change resulting in a decline in real GDP. 
In addition, Stijns (2003) also provided evidence in support of the Dutch Disease 
effect. Stijns documented that, even though the core model of the Dutch Disease 
makes explicit estimates concerning the negative influence of a resource boom 
on a country’s manufacturing exports, the ensuing empirical literature has not 
visibly identified this negative effect. As a result, Stijns attributed this outcome 
to the failure of the studies to combine enough data to produce an effectively 
powerful and exogenous test. In this regard, Stijns employed the World Trade 
Database to analytically test this premise in a gravity model of trade. Oil prices 
are employed to avoid issues of endogeneity concerning primary exports. The 
findings showed that a 1% increase in oil price is expected to produce a 0.5% 
reduction on a net energy exporter’s real manufacturing exports. 
 
Developing Countries 
Focusing on the developing economies, the evidence of Dutch Disease effect on 
economic performance due to natural resource boom is also mixed. This 
outcome is illustrated in Tables 2.1 below.  In line with the Dutch Disease 
hypothesis, many prior studies have found a negative impact of natural resource 
wealth on economic performance (Fardmanesh 1991, Ogunleye 2008 and Ismail 
2010). Using different variables, such as oil price, output of agriculture and 
manufacturing, nominal and real exchange rates, consumer price index, price of 
capital goods and index for capital market openness, the results of these studies 
indicated a negative association between natural resource wealth and economic 
performance. These research studies argued that natural resource wealth leads 
to weak economic performance due to Dutch Disease effects.  Kutan and Wyzan 
(2005), for example, examined whether Kazakhstan was susceptible to the 
Dutch Disease condition. Using an extended version of the Balassa–Samuelson 
model, which includes GDP, real exchange rate and price of oil, they found 
evidence that changes in the terms of trade had a significant impact on the real 
exchange rate during 1996–2003, indicating signs of significant Dutch Disease 
effects.  
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In contrast, a second group of studies found little or no evidence of the Dutch 
Disease effect between resource wealth and economic performance (Gelb 1988, 
Cuddington 1989, Spatafora and Warner, 1995, Davis 1995 and Sala-i-Martin 
and Subramanian, 2003). Using different variables, such as oil price, agriculture 
output, manufacturing output, exchange rates, GNP per capita, life expectancy 
and infant mortality, these studies reported little or no impact of natural 
resource wealth on economic performance. In particular, Davis (1995) 
documented little corroborating evidence between a booming sector and 
economic performance indicators.  
In this respect, panel data studies find limited evidence of the Dutch Disease due 
to natural resource discovery such as oil. Gelb (1988), for example, presents a 
panel data study of the Dutch Disease effect, where the impact of a resource 
windfall was examined for a group of oil exporting countries, most of whom had 
benefitted in terms of large amounts of the oil revenue gained in the period of 
the 1973 oil price increase.  Gelb (1988) finds that Nigeria, Iran, Ecuador and 
Trinidad and Tobago experienced the Dutch Disease, largely due to deterioration 
in agriculture output in the first and second oil booms of 1973 and 1981, while 
Indonesia, Venezuela, and Algeria strengthened their non-tradeable products 
sector of services.  
Likewise, Roemer (1995) stated that the Indonesian government escaped the 
effects of the Dutch Disease using careful exchange rate management. In 
studies focusing on other developing countries including Nigeria, some 
researchers also rejected the Dutch Disease thesis, for example, Roemer (1985) 
in his study on Mexico, Nigeria, and Venezuela; Jazayeri (1986) on Nigeria and 
Iran; Looney (1988) in his study on Saudi Arabia and Looney (1991) focusing on 
Kuwait. These studies highlighted that exchange rate appreciation followed by an 
oil boom caused a contraction in industrial output. Yet, in the cases of Nigeria, 
Mexico, Kuwait, and Indonesia, the growth rate of the manufacturing sector was 
actually greater than, or equal to, that of the non-tradeable products sectors, 
i.e., services. 
Some researchers attributed the difficulty of finding evidence of the Dutch 
Disease effect to a broad range of factors, which includes conventional means 
such as small samples (most oil-exporting economies’ key macroeconomic 
variables are measured annually), difficulty in accounting for the counter-factual 
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growth of the manufacturing sector with the lack of natural resource wealth and 
measurement bias in indices of aggregate manufacturing output (Ismail 2010). 
While early empirical evidence has been mixed (Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian 
2003) for a deteriorating manufacturing sector in response to terms of trade 
changes and an appreciation of the real exchange rate, in more recent decades, 
studies confirmed the negative effects. For example, a study by Ismail (2010) 
employed detailed, disaggregated sectoral data for manufacturing to examine 
the implications of oil price changes across a wide group of countries including 
oil-exporters from 1977 to 2004. His findings confirmed the negative relationship 
shown by earlier studies.  
In addition, Brahmbhatt et al. (2010) employed tradeable goods15 sector (i.e., 
manufacturing and agriculture), using resource-rich countries in which the 
natural resource sector accounts for more than 30 percent of GDP. They found 
that the tradeable goods sector was 15 % lower than the average. Thus, the 
macroeconomic and sectoral evidence in these recent studies appears to offer 
support for the Dutch Disease effects (Van der Ploeg 2011). 
                                                          
15
 These are goods that are traded internationally (See, for example, Collier, 1988). Henceforth, the word tradeable 
used in this chapter refers to goods and services that are traded internationally. 
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Table 2.1 Empirical Evidence - Developing Countries 
Author 
(Year) 
Study 
Period 
Countries Variables Summary Results 
                      
Empirical Research Showing Negative Relationship  
Sachs and 
Warner 
(1997) 
1970 -
1990 
Resource-rich 
countries 
Real GDP, average annual growth in real GDP, share 
of primary exports in GDP, share of mineral 
production in GNP,  value of mineral production, 
population, a dummy variable for outward 
orientation, fiscal deficit, inflation rate, ratio of real 
gross domestic investment, rule of law, annual 
growth of the ratio of export to import prices, 
institutional quality, terms of trade, income inequality 
The results concluded that there is a negative 
relationship between natural resource wealth 
and economic growth 
Fardmanesh 
(1991) 
1966 – 
1986 
Algeria, Ecuador, 
Indonesia, 
Nigeria and 
Venezuela 
Output of agriculture, manufacturing and oil sectors The impact of an oil boom is significant and 
negatively associated with agricultural output 
in all countries except Venezuela. This 
supports the Dutch Disease effect. 
Usui (1998) 1970 – 
1985 
Indonesia and 
Mexico 
oil exports, nominal and real exchange rates, and 
consumer price index 
Found evidence of Dutch Disease effect in 
Mexico and no evidence in Indonesia 
Kutan and 
Wyzan 
(2005) 
1996–
2003 
Kazakhstan Real exchange rates, output, oil price and domestic 
consumer inflation 
Found evidence that changes in terms of 
trade had a significant effect on the real 
exchange rate signifying symptoms of 
considerable Dutch Disease effects  
Farzanegan 
and 
Markwardt 
(2009) 
1975 – 
2006 
Iran Real industrial GDP per capita, inflation rate, 
consumption expenditure, real imports, real effective 
exchange rate and real oil prices changes  
The results find little evidence of oil price 
fluctuations but there is evidence of Dutch 
Disease  
Harding and 
Venables 
(2010) 
1975 – 
2007 
Countries 
consisting of 
resource 
Balance of payments, resource exports, resource 
imports, net resource trade, foreign aid 
Exports of natural resources appear to have 
an adverse effect on non-resource exports  
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exporters and 
importers 
Ismail (2010) 1977–
2004 
Mineral-based 
economies 
Real output, wages, price of capital goods, index for 
capital market openness 
The results show significant evidence for the 
existence of the Dutch Disease in response to 
oil price changes 
                                   
Empirical Research Showing Little or No Relationship  
Gelb (1988)  Group of oil-
exporting 
countries 
 The results show no significant evidence of 
Dutch Disease in manufacturing sectors 
Looney 
(1988) 
1970 – 
1981 
Saudi Arabia Government expenditure, oil revenues, agriculture, 
mining, refining, non-oil manufacturing, real 
exchange rate and change in real exchange rate,  
The results indicated that in the long-run, 
effects linked with the Dutch Disease have 
been offset, leaving only short-run negative 
effects arising from appreciation of the real 
exchange rate 
Spatafora 
and Warner 
(1995) 
1965 -
1989 
Oil-exporting 
countries  
Output, consumption, investment, savings, trade 
balance 
The results indicate a positive link between 
terms of trade shocks in oil-exporting 
countries and their real exchange rate as well 
as public spending. In addition, there is no 
evidence of the Dutch Disease. 
Davis (1995) 1970 – 
1991 
Mineral-based 
developing 
countries 
GNP per capita, life expectancy, infant mortality, 
calorie supply per capita, population with access to 
safe water, population with access to sanitation, 
primary school enrolment, adult literacy rate and 
human development index  
Found little corroborating evidence between 
natural resource wealth and economic 
performance indicators 
 
Source: Author 
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Studies on Nigeria 
Focusing on Nigeria alone, prior studies examining the presence of Dutch 
Disease effect on economic performance have also found conflicting evidence. 
This is shown in Table 2.2 below. Olusi and Olagunju (2005), Ogunleye (2008) 
and Ogbonna et al. (2013) are among the researchers who reported a negative 
impact of oil exports due to the Dutch Disease effect. Olusi and Olagunju (2005), 
for example, suggested that Nigeria is suffering from the Dutch Disease effects. 
In addition, using variables, which include oil price, real effective exchange rate, 
money supply, short-term interest rate (discount rate), consumer price index 
and industrial production, Ayadi (2005) suggested that changes in oil price 
affected real exchange rates, which, again, influenced industrial production. 
However, Ayadi reported that this indirect effect of oil price changes on industrial 
output is not statistically significant.  
Omolola and Adejumo (2006), also investigated the impact of oil exports in 
Nigeria employing variables of oil price changes, real exchange rate, GDP, 
money supply and inflation rate using a Vector Autoregressive (VAR) model with 
quarterly data from 1970 – 2004. Their findings suggested that oil price changes 
significantly affected the real exchange rate, which may in turn squeeze the 
tradable sector, giving rise to the Dutch Disease.  
Furthermore, Ogunleye (2008) examined the long-run effect of oil revenues on 
GDP per capita, household consumption, infrastructural development, 
agricultural and manufacturing output using a vector error correction model 
(VECM) with annual data from 1960 to 2004. He reported that a negative 
relationship exists for GDP per capita, agriculture and manufacturing. However, 
the results further showed that even for variables with negative relationships in 
the current period, a positive relationship was established at subsequent time 
lags.  
Other studies focusing on Nigeria also documented evidence of the Dutch 
Disease effect on economic variables. Akpan (2009a), for example, examined 
the dynamic relationship between oil price changes and industrial production, 
real effective exchange rate, real government expenditure and inflation using a 
VAR model. The findings recognised a marginal impact of oil price variations on 
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industrial output growth with an observed significant appreciation of the real 
exchange rate. This reinforces the findings observed by Ayadi (2005) and 
Olomola and Adejumo (2006), which stated that oil price fluctuations may lead 
to the Dutch Disease effect.  
Subsequently, Muhammad et al (2012) further confirmed the oil price – 
exchange rate relationship using daily data over the period January 2007 to 
December 2010. In contrast to previous studies, they employed the generalised 
autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity (GARCH) and exponential GARCH 
models to examine the impact of oil price changes on the nominal exchange 
rate. Their findings suggested that an increase in oil prices led to a depreciation 
of the Nigerian Naira vis-à-vis the US dollar over the study period. 
In contrast, Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian (2003) found no evidence of the 
Dutch Disease effect in Nigeria. This latter evidence is consistent with the work 
of Spatafora and Warner (1995) who also reported no evidence of a Dutch 
Disease between oil wealth and economic performance variables among 
developing oil-exporting countries, which included Nigeria. In addition, other 
findings, i.e., Spatafora and Warner (1995), suggested that permanent terms of 
trade changes have a substantial positive effect on investment, consumption and 
non-tradeable sectors like services. This latter finding, although in a panel study, 
is also similar with that of Aliyu (2009) who suggested that oil price changes and 
an appreciation in the level of the exchange rate exerted a positive impact on 
real economic growth in Nigeria. 
However, a recent study was carried out by Akinlo (2012), which examined the 
importance of oil in the development of the Nigerian economy using a VAR 
model over the period 1960-2009 with variables of output of agriculture, 
manufacturing, building & construction, oil and services as indicators. Akinlo`s 
findings suggested that oil had a negative impact on the manufacturing sector. 
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Table 2.2 Empirical Evidence on Nigeria 
Author 
(Year) 
Study 
Period 
Methodology Variables Summary Results 
Empirical Research Showing Negative Relationship between Dutch Disease and Economic Growth 
Olusi and 
Olagunju 
(2005) 
1980 – 
2003 
VAR model Real GDP, crude oil exports, agricultural 
output, real exchange rate, inflation rate, 
short-run interest rate, long-run interest 
rate 
The results revealed that Nigeria is suffering from the 
Dutch Disease effects  
Ayadi (2005) 1980 – 
2004 
VAR model Oil price, real effective exchange rate, 
money supply, short-term interest rate 
(discount rate), consumer price index and 
industrial production 
The results indicate that oil price changes affect real 
exchange rates which, in turn, affect industrial 
production 
Ogunleye 
(2008) 
1960 – 
2004 
VEC model  Oil revenues, GDP per capita, consumption, 
infrastructural development (electricity as a 
measure), agricultural and manufacturing 
output  
The results indicate that a negative relationship exists 
for GDP per capita, agriculture and manufacturing 
Ogbonna et 
al. (2013) 
1970 – 
2011 
VEC model 
  
Agricultural commodity export, oil export 
and real effective exchange rate 
The results suggested that there is evidence of Dutch 
Disease in the long run 
Empirical Research Showing Little or No Relationship between Dutch Disease and Economic Growth 
Sala-i-Martin 
and 
Subramanian 
(2003) 
1970 – 
2000 
Regression 
model 
Rule of law, growth rates of per capita GDP, 
oil revenues, institutional quality, exchange 
rate 
The results show no evidence of the Dutch Disease due 
the real exchange rate is insensitive to oil price 
Aliyu (2009) 1986 – 
2007 
VEC model 
 
Real exchange rate and real GDP This study shows that oil price changes and appreciation 
in the exchange rate exert a positive impact on real 
economic growth in Nigeria 
Iwayemi and 
Fawowe 
(2011) 
1985 – 
2007 
VAR Model Oil price measure, government expenditure, 
inflation, real exchange rate and net exports 
The results reported that oil price volatility did not have 
a significant effect on most macroeconomic variables 
 
Source: Author 
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2.2.2 The Commodity Price/Revenue Volatility Explanation 
Another prominent explanation of the resource curse in the literature is the idea 
of revenue volatility. This explanation has been offered by several researchers 
such as Mikesell (1997) and Auty (1998) as a channel to affect economic growth 
adversely. The primary argument is that oil and other mineral revenues are very 
volatile in nature, particularly driven by fluctuations in prices over short periods 
of time. In addition, the empirical literature has provided ample evidence in 
support of this explanation. However, some studies fail to find such evidence 
established (e.g., Sachs and Warner 1995).  
Mikesell (1997) suggested that, from 1972 to 1992, countries that are largely 
depended on primary exports experienced volatile terms of trade higher than 
developed countries during the same period under investigation. Theoretically 
terms of trade volatility could cause a number of problems to primary 
commodity exporters. Volatile revenue makes it challenging to pursue a prudent 
fiscal policy (Stevens 2003 and Kilian 2010). In this respect, a variety of 
problems are created ranging from stimulating investor uncertainty to absurd 
spending policies by government.  
Another major perception of observers in booming resource rich countries is that 
export revenues would be consumed rather than invested (Sachs and Warner 
1999). However, empirical evidence challenged this view (Macbean 1966 and 
Behrman 1987). In this regard, Steven (2003) argued that revenues would be 
more likely to be saved and invested than consumed. However, Sachs and 
Warner (1997) found no such strong relationship to claim that natural resource 
rich economies have higher rates of savings.  
Furthermore, Gylfason et al. (1999) suggested that the level of domestic 
investment was inversely associated to dependence on primary commodity 
exports. In addition, Sachs and Warner (1995) did not find any significant 
relationship between terms of trade and per capita income growth.  
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2.3 RESOURCE AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: POLITICAL 
 CENTERED APPROACH 
The political science literature generally focuses on the relationship between 
natural resources and political institutions. Countries rich in natural resources 
often depend on a system that is based on patronage and do not nurture a 
democratic system based on electoral competition, scrutiny and civil rights 
(Collier and Hoeffler 2005). This strand of literature that attempts to offer an 
explanation with respect to adverse effects of natural resource wealth (i.e., oil) 
on economic growth has long been established (Stevens 2003). According to 
Stevens, the nature of this approach tends to be relatively unclear and not open 
to serious empirical work, although some scholars, such as Isham et al. (2002) 
offer evidence that resource-rich countries which are more abundant in natural 
resources, for example, resources located in a particular geographical region or 
unevenly spread across the country (i.e., oil), affects economic growth through 
its impact on political and socioeconomic institutions. 
Furthermore, the political science approach to the adverse effect of natural 
resource wealth on economic performance involves a search for generalizable 
theories of policy failure (Ross 1999). In essence, it involves the inclination of 
states to employ and sustain transparently suboptimal economic policies with 
respect to economic growth and development. According to Ross (1999), 
theories of policy failure can be categorised into three groups of cognitive, 
societal and statist theories. Ross further stated that cognitive theories blame 
policy failures on the lack of foresight of state officials, and societal theories 
attempts to explain the pernicious influence of privileged classes, interest groups 
and client networks. Statist theories find fault in a state’s institutional strength 
or weakness to extract and deploy resources, to enforce property rights and to 
resist demand from interest groups, for instance, independent business groups. 
According to Ross (2003a), these explanations are not free from criticisms put 
forward by other scholars.    
In this regard, the political approach which explains the adverse effect of natural 
resource wealth on economic growth can be categorised into three perspectives. 
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According to Ross (1999), these employ resource windfall or rents as 
independent variable and lack of economic growth as the dependent variable.  
 
2.3.1 The Cognitive Approach 
This line of argument has advocated that natural resource endowment leads to 
different types of emotional or irrational behaviour on the part of the political 
elite, thus contributing to weak economic policy-making and institutional 
capacity. It is argued, particularly, that natural resource booms induce sloth, 
myopia and over-exuberance on the part of political elites. Such arguments 
featured in the work of great economic and political thinkers such as Nurske 
(1958), Levin (1960), Walich (1960) and Watkins (1963). More lately, they have 
featured in the work of economists such as Mitra (1994) and political scientists 
such as Krause (1995) (Ross 1999). Mitra (1994, p. 295) has argued that 
natural resource booms produce a ‘tendency to optimism’ in countries that 
benefit, in turn leading to excessive government spending. Likewise, Krause 
(1995) has argued that natural resource booms lead to ‘wishful thinking’ among 
policy-makers in natural resource abundant economies (Ross 1999).  
According to Ross (1999), despite the widespread use of the cognitive approach, 
a number of problems have been linked with its effectiveness as an explanatory 
tool. The most significant problem is that it is commonly employed in an informal 
way rather than as part of an explicit and testable theory that relates variations 
in state revenues to changes in the cognitive skills of policymakers. Also, there 
appears to be little confirmation that policymakers collectively fall into wealth-
induced stupors (Ross 1999). In contrast to this claim, some authors, such as 
Shafer (1994) and Karl (1999), point to state officials who are well informed 
about the adverse effects of the natural resource booms have behaviour that is 
extremely constrained by political pressures and institutions.  
 
2.3.2 The Societal Approach 
This approach argued that natural resource wealth has adverse economic effects 
which are not due to its influences on the institutional capacity of the state or on 
the behaviour of political elites but are due to its influence on the relative power 
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of diverse social classes or groups. One group of researchers, for example, has 
claimed that natural resource wealth strengthens well-connected business 
groups and as a result increases pressure on governments to pursue economic 
policies that serve the interests of these groups rather than the common 
economic interest or the interests of the poor (Rosser 2006b). In a similar 
approach, other researchers have advocated that one of the key reasons why 
Latin America has performed less well than the East Asia region in terms of 
economic growth and poverty reduction in recent decades is the influence of the 
natural resource endowments of both regions on their industrial policies. It is 
argued that, in Latin America, natural resource wealth led to the social and 
political control of landed properties and businesses by elites that had a vested 
interest in import-substitution industrialisation (ISI), therefore inhibiting the 
progress of an externally competitive industrial sector. In East Asia, natural 
resource scarcity implied that such elites did not exist or at least did not exercise 
substantial political and social influence, so making it easier for governments to 
move away from ISI towards export-oriented industrialisation policies and the 
development of a very competitive industrial sector (Mahon 1992). 
Although scholars such as Mahon (1992) and Auty (1994) all cite Latin America’s 
hesitancy to abandon the ISI policies, each author conveys a slightly different 
story. They all advocated that Latin American manufacturers and workers who 
benefitted from subsidies constrained their governments from eliminating the ISI 
strategies. However, South Korea and Taiwan are resource-poor countries and 
fewer groups benefited from ISI.  
According to Ross (1999), there are reasons to be sceptical about generalising 
societal explanations because most authors relied on five countries (Brazil, 
Columbia, Mexico, South Korea, and Taiwan) on which to base their arguments. 
It is not obvious why they selected these countries since they are different in 
many respects beyond the commonality of an abundance of natural resources. 
In addition, it is not clear whether the same reasoning can describe weak 
economic growth in a larger set of countries.  
Furthermore, Ross stated that most societal approaches argued that the curse of 
low economic growth originates from trade barriers. Also societal explanations 
work more effectively when nonstate officials such as independent or private 
business groups have first claim on any resource rents (Ross 1999). This 
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explanation reflects the structure of ownership adopted by resource rich 
countries as explained by some authors. (Luong and Weithal 2010), for example, 
have shown for some developing oil exporting countries that the ultimate 
macroeconomic consequences of natural resource wealth critically depend on the 
underlying structure of ownership with which these countries choose to manage 
their mineral wealth. Some scholars see these cases as exceptional because, in 
almost all developing countries rich in natural resource, mineral deposits are 
particularly owned by the state, which is the first claimant on the resource rents. 
In theory, natural resource wealth should serve to support the state’s leverage 
over societal actors by giving it a nontax revenue gain that can insulate it from 
pressures coming from interest groups (Ross 1999).  
 
2.3.3 The State-Centered Approach 
Several researchers, for example, have pointed to the concerns related to the 
rentier state theory. These are economies that obtain regular and significant 
amounts of ‘unearned’ income in the form of, for example, taxes on natural 
resource exports or royalties on natural resource production (see, for example, 
Skopol 1982, Beblawi and Luciani 1987 and Vandewalle 1998). Since these types 
of states have significant amounts of unearned income to spend, they tend to 
develop larger capacity in the distributive functions, for instance, social welfare, 
health and education functions. State owned enterprise sectors are usually quite 
large in rentier states, with roles related to the regulation and management of 
the economy and domestic fiscal policy (Garaibeh 1987). 
Similarly, according to Luciani (1987 p. 74), rentier states “being independent of 
the strength of the domestic economy, does not need to formulate anything 
deserving the appellation of economic policy: all its need is an expenditure 
policy”. In support of this view, Karl (1997), Auty (2001), Auty and Gelb (2001) 
and Moore (2002, 2004) have offered similar arguments to those of rentier state 
theorists with slightly different terms and concepts. Karl (1997), for example, 
has claimed that reliance on oil revenues leads to the rise of petro-states that 
are driven towards the political distribution of rents rather than promotion of 
private investments and economic development. The evolution of petro-states, 
as suggested by Karl (1997), is mostly likely where oil`s domination of the 
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economy corresponds to the process of state formation (see also, Vandewalle 
1998).  In these circumstances, the dominance of oil gives the state a 
redistributive character in its origin, which, given the primitiveness of political 
institutions, becomes locked in to the process. Moore (2004), for example, 
argued that natural resource wealth leads to ‘bad governance’ in developing 
economies because financial autonomy of states suggests that they have little 
accountability to their citizens.  
Furthermore, the rational viewpoint depicts political actors as rational utility-
maximising individuals. As a result, they have suggested that the problem with 
natural resource wealth is not that it leads to irrational behaviour on the part of 
political actors but that instead it offers a platform to fill their own pockets by 
engaging in rent-seeking activities. Most researchers have proposed that 
members of the political elite are the major problem in this regard. Ross (2001), 
for example, suggested that when governments receive windfalls from a natural 
resource boom, rational political elites will take the opportunity to either directly 
seize the rents produced by resource booms or gain control over the right to 
allocate them by ‘rent-seizing’. In a similar argument, Ascher (1999) proposed 
that natural resource endowed economies have generally wasted their natural 
resources because political elites have a tendency to use them to pursue various 
political goals including the funding of contentious development programs, 
achieving control over resource rent allocation, providing economic benefits to 
specific groups, avoiding accountability and crafting rent-seeking prospects in 
order to secure private sector support in relation to other goals.  
In the next sub-section other explanations are reviewed, such as a lack of 
democracy, governance and ownership structure which are very relevant to this 
study.  
 
2.3.4 Natural Resource Wealth and Regime Type 
The natural resource curse literature also contains a strand of studies which 
suggest that abundance in natural resource is linked to low levels of democracy 
(see, for example, Wantchekon 2002 and Jensen and Wantchekon 2004). The 
argument with respect to the causal mechanisms linking natural resource wealth 
and regime type has focused on the relative evidence of four explanations. The 
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first reflects a state-centered perspective with specific reference to the idea of a 
rentier state and suggest that natural resource abundance impedes democracy 
because governments in these rich countries are able to use government 
spending and low tax levels to ease pressure for democratisation from the 
citizens. Lam and Wantchekon (2003), for example, have debated that the 
economic benefits of natural resource booms are usually concentrated on 
political elites, so allowing them to retain support and consolidate their power. It 
has been suggested that in authoritarian political systems there is a more limited 
possibility for democratic change (Lam and Wantchekon 2003). Similar 
arguments have been offered by Luciani (1987) and Beblawi (1987) with regard 
to oil based economies in the Middle East, Ross (2001) in regard to oil 
economies in general and by Jensen and Wantchekon (2004) with regard to 
natural resource abundant economies in Africa.  
The second explanation, which is also largely consistent with the state-centered 
perspective, argues that natural resource abundance impedes democracy by 
enabling governments in these countries to increase spending on internal 
security. With tougher internal security forces, it is asserted, governments can 
limit the possibility for opposition groups to organise and challenge them (see, 
for example, Ross 2001, Jensen and Wantchekon 2004).  
The third explanation builds on the premise of the rational actor perspective of 
the causes of civil war and concentrates on the relationship between civil wars 
and political regimes as argued by Jensen and Wantchekon (2004). The 
fundamental idea of this explanation is that natural resource abundance can help 
to consolidate particular regimes in power, so making it rational for political 
opponents to pursue power through extra-constitutional means such as war. 
Additionally, they claim, this ‘could result in a dictatorship by the opposition 
party’; however, this is contingent on the outcome of the war Jensen and 
Wantchekon (2004 p. 822).   
The last explanation offered is largely consistent with the historical-structuralist 
perspective, which argues that natural resource wealth impedes democracy by 
inhibiting the social and cultural changes that support democratization such as 
increasing education levels and occupational specialization. For instance, Ross 
(2001) has labelled this outcome as the ‘failed modernization’ effect. Clark 
(1997) and Herb (2005) have challenged this explanation, arguing that natural 
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resource wealth may in fact lead to several social and cultural changes 
consistent with modernization. This, in turn, they argue, may offset any adverse 
effects of natural resource abundance.  
 
2.3.5 Natural Resource Wealth and Governance  
Several explanations have been offered in order to explain the transmission 
mechanisms of the adverse effects of natural resource wealth, which is normally 
termed the ‘resource curse.’ According to Ascher (1999), while many of the 
disciplines contributing to the study of natural resource wealth management 
have made considerable steps over a long period of time, the political 
examination of the failure of policies to embrace these improvements has 
remained essentially underdeveloped. Asher argued that governments waste 
natural resource wealth due to ineffective governance since state officials can 
without difficulty influence its use to meet unproductive, contentious or unlawful 
goals. Furthermore, many resource-rich countries, including developed examples 
such as the United States, have wasted natural resource wealth and continue to 
do so. However, the developing countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America 
depend largely on the natural resource wealth to stimulate economic growth, to 
provide livelihoods for the poor and to preserve the environment. Since the 
stakes are high and the natural resource policy failures in developing economies 
are usually great, the forces at work that lead governments to waste natural 
resource wealth seem very easy to identify (Asher 1999).  
Scholars, such as Hartwick (1977) and Vincent et al. (1997) suggested that 
natural resource exporting countries often suffer since the investment needed to 
counterbalance the effects of imminent resource depletion are counterintuitively 
large. Vincent et al. (1997), for example, implied that exogenous changes in 
price affect the value that a small country exporting commodities needs to invest 
to sustain its consumption level over time. Wood and Berge (1997) argued that 
East Asia’s incredible development success has been closely linked to the export 
of manufactured goods, which is in contrast to the weak economic development 
process of countries, particularly in Africa, that largely depend on primary 
products. Wood and Berge further stated that this wide correlation between 
export composition and economic performance elevates some of the initial and 
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most contentious questions in the economic development literature, both about 
the causes of economic progress and about the policies for realizing it.  
In recent decades, Isham et al. (2005) also illustrated that controlling for a wide 
array of potential determinants of governance indicators in their study suggested 
that countries rich in natural resource which are concentrated in a particular 
geographical area, such as mineral, coffee and cocoa, behave relatively poorly 
across an array of governance indicators. They further argued that these 
governance indicator effects are not linked basically to operating as a natural 
resource exporting country. In contrast they argued that countries with diffuse 
natural resources, such as livestock and agricultural produce from small family 
farms, did not reveal the same effects shown by point source natural resource 
exporters and experienced more robust economic growth.  
 
2.3.6 Natural Resource Wealth and Institutional Quality 
The quality of institutions both public and private are another subset of the 
broader literature on the resource curse, which focuses more closely on 
explaining the relationship between natural resource wealth and economic 
growth. In this regard, a number of researchers have attributed the adverse 
effects of natural resources on economic growth to institutional quality such as 
institutions of private sector efficiency and institutions of public sector 
accountability, i.e., public sector institutions governing the natural resource 
sector (see, for example, Melhun et al. 2006 and Robinson et al. 2006) and the 
institutions that institute or fail to institute the rule of law (see, for example, 
Gylfason et al. 1999 and Isham et al. 2005).  
However Norman (2009) claimed that natural resource extraction rates do not 
have a significant relationship to the rule of law when stocks are controlled for.16 
Influential studies in the literature, such as that by Sachs and Warner (1999, 
2001), examined the relationship between natural resource export intensity and 
economic growth rates by means of panel data analysis. They controlled for 
political and trade characteristics and suggested that an increase in the resource 
intensity is linked with lower growth rates. This finding initiated empirical studies 
                                                          
16
 Norman (2009) differentiates between resource wealth (a stock) and the intensity of resource extraction (a flow) 
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that suggested political and economic institutions were important causal 
channels through which the curse operated to affect economic growth (Norman 
2009).  
There appears to be extensive research in the broader literature on economic 
development that emphasised the role of institutions on economic growth and 
development (see, for example, Roserberg and Birdzell 1986, North 1990, 
Hubbard 1997 and Rodrik et al. 2004). Roserberg and Birdzell (1986), for 
example, stated that it is appropriate to recognise the role of the political 
institutions of Western Europe in its rise to prosperity. Using a predominantly 
historical approach, Roserberg and Birdzell, documented that governments in 
Western Europe provided courts of law to impose trading agreements and to 
safeguard credit by making loans recoverable. In addition, they strongly defined 
and secured property rights, which are important to trade and investment, and 
also provided legal types of organisation responsible to the demands of 
enterprises. In addition, Hubbard (1997) provided an explanation within the 
transactions-cost perspective to understanding the form and part played by 
institutions as recognised by other researchers, such as North 1990. 
Subsequently, Rodrik et al. (2004) suggested that the quality of institutions 
undermines economic growth. They concluded that, once institutions are 
controlled for, traditional measures of geography have weak direct effects on 
growth, but they have a strong indirect impact by influencing institutional 
quality.  
However, Acemoglu et al. (2000) suggested that, while changes in income levels 
can be explained by the efficacy of established institutions, living conditions in 
colonial times dictated whether Europeans decided to settle in the colonies and 
set up European style institutions. According to their hypothesis, economic 
growth rests on current institutions, which hinge on past institutions that in turn 
rely on living conditions, for example, settler mortality in colonial times 
(Gylfason 2006). Acemoglu et al. (2000) also argued that, once institutions are 
accounted for in the relationship, there is no scope left for other justifications of 
economic performance with respect to economic policy or geography. In 
contrast, Gylfason (2006) suggested that dependence on natural resource 
wealth today affects current institutions in addition to macroeconomic outcomes. 
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2.3.7 Empirical Studies: The Political Economy Approach 
This subsection presents some empirical studies on the relationship between 
natural resource wealth and economic growth. Of particular interest to this study 
are the explanations by way of political instability and/or autocratic rule and 
ownership structure, because these mechanisms among others are most 
prominent features of the Nigerian economy as discussed in Chapter 4. In 
addition, recent studies, which employed a broader analytical framework that 
encompasses both economic and political approaches, reflect the recent effort to 
show why some resource rich countries are still struggling with the resource 
curse and why others have escaped it. In this regard, the section aims to also 
review some of these studies. This is important because, the Nigerian 
government after a return to democratic rule in 1999 adopted wide ranging 
reforms that will help to provide linkage between the oil sector and the rest of 
the economy.  
 
2.3.7.1 Studies on Political Regime  
According to some researchers, such as Smith (2004) and Bulte et al. (2005), 
the examination of the relationship between natural resource wealth and 
governmental characteristics remains as pertinent as ever in the area of 
contemporary world politics (Oskarsson and Ottossen 2010). Accordingly, a 
subset of the broad literature on the relationship between natural resource 
wealth and economic performance has provided empirical evidence of the link 
between natural resource wealth and political regimes. Some researchers 
questioned whether natural resource wealth hinders the transition to democracy 
(see, for example, Jensen and Wantchekon 2004, Smith 2004, Ulfelder 2007). 
However, a number of researchers, such as Oskarsson and Ottossen (2010), 
Herb (2005) find weak evidence for the idea that natural resource wealth hinders 
the development of democracy. Herb (2005), for example, provided alternative 
evidence that income, geographic region and the religious composition of a 
country’s population tended to be more effective predictors of regime type in 
resource-rich countries. In addition, Oskarsson and Ottossen (2010) 
documented that, while these findings appear convincingly, there is a basis to 
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doubt a number of the inherent theoretical and contextual underpinnings of the 
conclusion that dependence on natural resources leads to a lack of democracy or 
authoritarianism. 
Many studies in this strand of the literature have provided considerable evidence 
that natural resource wealth impedes the transition to democratic rule. A 
number of causal explanations have also been offered in this respect, which 
includes demand-side and supply-side functions (Ulfelder 2007). In this regard, 
Ulfelder denotes democracy as a good, citizens as its customers and the regime 
as its supplier. The explanations pointing to the demand-side lay emphasis on 
ways in which a country’s dependence on rental income decreases pressures for 
government accountability and that of the supply-side highlight the means by 
which resource wealth permits autocrats to counterattack demands for 
democratisation. The key studies with a range of evidence regarding the 
relationship between natural resource wealth and transition to democracy are 
shown in Table 2.3 below.  
Notwithstanding the important role that the presence of natural resource wealth 
plays in hindering the democratic process, evidence on the relationship between 
the natural resource abundance and regime type/democracy is mixed (Ross 
2001, Jensen and Wantchekon 2004, Smith 2004, Herb 2005, Collier and 
Hoeffler 2009 and Oskarsson and Ottossen 2010). Similar to this view Karl 
(2007) claimed that countries which largely depend on oil will in time become 
among the most economically troubled and the most authoritarian in the world. 
Moreover, numerous studies by economists and political scientists have 
recognised the existence of a negative association between oil export 
dependence and democracy (Tsui 2011). 
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Table 2.3 Empirical Evidence on Regime Type 
Author (Year) Study 
Period 
Sample size Variables Summary Results 
Empirical Research Showing Negative Relationship between Natural Resource Wealth and Democracy 
Ross (2001)  1971- 1997 113 countries Export value of mineral-based fuels and nonfuel ores and metals as fractions of 
GDP, natural log of per capita GDP, the Muslim percentage of the country’s 
population in 1970, dummy variable to represent countries that are members of 
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
The findings indicated that both oil and mineral 
dependence have significant negative effects on 
democratic change. 
Jensen and 
Wantchekon 
(2004) 
1970 to 
1995 
46 natural 
resource-rich 
countries in 
Africa 
Measure of political regime, GDP per capita, GDP growth, measure of natural 
resource dependence, the number of coups, the number of government crises, 
the number of demonstrations, the number of riots, the number of strikes, 
measures of governance, number of elections, total number of elections since 
independence, a measure of the total number of legislative seats held by the 
largest party in 1989, a measure of the level of political protest 
The results suggested a robust and negative 
association between natural resource wealth 
and the level of democracy in Africa. 
Smith (2004) 1960 -1999 107 developing 
countries  
Regime failure, antistate protest, internal conflicts, oil exports, changes in oil 
price in the 1970s and 1980s, per capita income, inflation, rates of economic 
growth, regime type, square of democracy score (regime coherence), past 
transitions, and dummy variables for each regime year 
The results showed that oil wealth is 
significantly associated with regime durability, 
even when controlling for repression, civil war 
and antistate protest. 
Ulfelder (2007)  19 resource-rich 
developing 
countries 
Dummy variable to mark periods when an autocracy had a new chief executive, 
competitiveness of political participation, period of authoritarian rule, gross 
national income, other mineral resources, forest resources, country’s cumulative 
experience with democracy, regime duration measure, infant mortality rate, 
dummy variable for the post–cold war period, civil liberties index, annual rate of 
change in GDP 
The result shows that autocracy is usually more 
durable in countries with considerable resource 
wealth. 
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Empirical Research Showing Weak or No Relationship between Natural Resource Wealth and Democracy 
Herb (2005) 1972 - 2000 144 countries Democracy score, rentierism, per capita GDP, Muslim share of population, mean 
democracy score for other countries in region 
The results suggested that there is a net 
negative impact of natural resource wealth on 
democracy 
Oskarsson and  
Ottosen (2010) 
1977 - 2006 132 oil-rich 
countries 
Measure of democracy, export value of mineral-based fuels (petroleum, natural 
gas and coal) and non-fuel minerals (metals and ores) as a percentage of gross 
domestic product (GDP), real per capita, GDP, measure of income inequality on 
democracy using the Gini coefficient, the percentage of the population whose 
professed religious affiliation is Muslim, dummy indicator coded 1 for 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries and 
0 for all others 
The results showed mixed findings, indicating 
weak and negative effects which are contingent 
upon the type of measure and restriction 
placed on some of the variables and period 
employed 
 
Source: Author 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
40 
 
 
The hypothesis of whether natural resource wealth, such as oil, hinders 
democracy has been supported by several cross-national empirical studies. In 
this regard, Ross (2001) used pooled time-series data from 113 countries 
between 1971 and 1997 to examine some aspects of the hypothesis that natural 
resource wealth in oil impedes democracy. Ross (2001) observed that both oil 
and mineral dependence have significant negative effects on democratic change. 
This view is supported by Jensen and Wantchekon (2004) who employed time-
series panel data from 46 countries for the period 1970 to 1995 and claimed the 
existence of a robust and negative association between natural resource wealth 
and the level of democracy in Africa. By implication, their findings suggested 
that natural resources have led to a decrease in the rate of economic growth in 
African oil-rich countries. 
In contrast to the above studies that established a negative relationship between 
natural resource wealth and democracy but in line with the rentier state theory, 
Herb (2005), employed a panel dataset and examined the relationship between 
rentier states and democracy. Herb’s results did not find consistent support for 
the idea that there is a net negative impact of natural resource wealth on 
democracy. Subsequently, Oskarsson and Ottosen (2010), employed time-series 
panel data for 132 countries from 1977 to 2006 and examined the relationship 
between natural resources and the level of democracy. Oskarsson and Ottosen 
argued that earlier claims by studies such as Ross (2001) do not stand the test 
of time. They further argued that a broader conceptual examination of the 
perception of democracy has left the theory more questionable than in earlier 
studies. However, they found some evidence in support of the negative effect 
when using data from the three last decades of the twentieth century and when 
employing only political rights as the indicator of democracy.  
Nonetheless, the literature has also provided evidence with respect to natural 
resource wealth and regime durability. For example, Smith (2004) showed that  
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oil wealth is significantly associated with regime durability.17 On the other hand, 
there is a strand of literature in political science that examines the relationship 
between economic growth and one-party rule (see, e.g., Magaloni 2008 and 
Magaloni and Kricheli 2010). Magaloni and Kricheli (2010) documented that the 
21st century have seen a record expansion of one-party autocracies. According 
to Magaloni and Kricheli, one-party regimes have become the most common 
type of authoritarian rule and have been shown to be more stable than other 
forms of authoritarianism. Based on the evidence that the Peoples’ Democratic 
Party (PDP) has been ruling Nigeria since 1999 to 2015 and has initiated 
economic reforms, particularly with respect to the oil sector, it will be interesting 
to see the impact on economic performance, for example, of the oil and other 
sectors of the economy, such as manufacturing and agriculture, which is carried 
out in Chapters 5 and 6.  
 
2.3.7.2 Empirical Studies on Institutional Quality/Rule of Law  
Several studies have examined the adverse effects of resource wealth on 
economic growth through indirect channels such as institutions and rule of law. 
Studies by Gylfason et al. (1999), Leite and Weidmann (1999) and Isham et al. 
(2005) examined the relationship between natural resource wealth and 
indicators related to institutions, investment and education. They argued that 
resource wealth extracted from one specific geographical area such as crude oil, 
which they termed point-source resources, matter for characteristics that affect 
economic growth, including the rule of law (Norman 2009). For example, Isham 
et al. (2005) analysed data based on a classification of export structure, while 
controlling a wide array of other potential determinants of governance. He 
showed that point-source resource wealth (i.e., oil) and coffee and cocoa 
exporting countries do relatively poorly across an array of governance indicators.  
In the same way, Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian (2003) suggested that, once 
the impact of natural resource wealth on institutions (with an emphasis on rule 
of law) is taking into account, natural resource wealth has no or an insignificant 
positive impact on economic growth rates of GDP per capita. Likewise, Mehlum 
                                                          
17
 There is limited available evidence regarding the impact of the return to a stable democracy in Nigeria which has 
been dominated by one ruling party. Multiple political parties exist in Nigeria but there are undertones of lack of 
transparency in elections conducted. 
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et al. (2006) suggested that countries rich in natural resources consist of both 
growth winners (Norway, Australia, Botswana, and Canada) and losers (Zambia, 
Nigeria, Angola, Sierra Leone, Venezuela, Saudi Arabia). Mehlum et al. (2006) 
further argued that the main reason for these diverse experiences is differences 
in institutional quality. In addition, Robinson et al. (2006) argued that the 
political incentives which resource endowments generate are the key to 
understanding whether or not they are a curse.  
Robinson et al. (2006) suggested that the overall impact of resource booms on 
the economy depends critically on institutions since these determine the extent 
to which political incentives map policy outcomes. Resource rich countries with 
institutions that support accountability and state capability are likely to benefit 
from resource wealth since these institutions discourage the pertinacious political 
incentives such as providing politicians with additional resources to influence the 
result of elections and escalate resource misallocation in the economy that such 
wealth creates. Resource rich countries without such institutions (i.e., political 
regimes which encourage the accountability of politicians and largely improve 
state institutions towards the use of logical and meritocratic standards in 
distributing public sector resources) may suffer from the adverse effects 
(Robinson et al., 2006). However, researchers such as Sachs and Warner (1995) 
and Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2008), claimed that institutions do not play a 
role.  
Recently, Alexeev and Conrad (2011) using panel data regressions examined the 
relationship between ‘‘point-source’’ resource abundance and economic growth, 
quality of institutions, investment in human and physical capital and social 
welfare (life expectancy and infant mortality). They suggested that, contrary to 
most literature, their findings indicated little evidence of a natural resource curse 
for all countries. Only the ‘voice and accountability’ measure of institutional 
quality is negatively and significantly affected by oil wealth. 
From the above reviewed studies, there is evidence that the institutional 
approach to the study of the relationship between natural resource wealth and 
economic performance has provided conflicting results. 
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2.3.7.3 Empirical Studies on Ownership Structure Perspective 
Empirical evidence suggested that ownership structure does matter in the 
relationship between natural resource wealth and economic growth. This 
perspective proposes that private ownership structure is more effective than 
state ownership structure (Ross 2001 and Luong and Weithal 2010) in building 
effective governance institutions because domestic and foreign investors largely 
prefer governance institutions that are sound and transparent and help to 
support accountability. Ross (2001), for example, recommended that 
privatisation may prevent the problem of rent-seizing. In particular, Luong and 
Weithal (2010) claimed that it is the ownership structure of natural resource 
wealth that determines economic outcomes in resource-rich countries rather 
than political, social or institutional structures. Most prior studies, such as those 
by Ross (1999) and McPherson (2003) that employed the ownership structure 
approach in their studies are not based on empirical analysis with the exception 
of Luong and Weithal (2010).  
The study by Luong and Weithal (2010) employed a discrete choice model where 
choice of ownership structure is the dependent variable and the major 
explanatory variables are the anticipated level of distributional conflict, the 
extent of alternative sources of revenue and foreign exchange earnings. They 
assumed that government is a sovereign maximizer and will weigh the 
consequences of each type of ownership structure with respect to the speed of 
foreign exchange collection.  
In order to support their viewpoint, Luong and Weinthal examine the different 
experiences in Soviet successor states (Russia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and 
Uzbekistan). Their findings suggested that the magnitude of outcome for a 
country in terms of natural resource wealth may occur depending upon the 
ownership structure which they choose to manage their mineral wealth and the 
endogenously determined fiscal regimes that follow the ownership decision. They 
further asserted that each approach represents a significant departure from the 
conventional literature on resource wealth and economic performance which has 
treated ownership structure as a constant across time and space and assumed 
that mineral rich economies are not capable of building or sustaining strong 
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institutions, particularly fiscal regimes. According to Luong and Weinthal (2010), 
private domestic ownership is considered most likely to triumph when leaders 
have a high level of alternative sources of export revenues at their disposal. 
One of the great strengths of the Luong and Weinthal (2010) analysis is the 
examination of the political dynamics that led to different ownership structures 
which they aligned with the assumption that political leaders are rational and 
self-interested actors whose main concern is to stay in power (Rosser 2006a). 
Particularly, Luong and Weinthal claimed that political leaders are basically 
concerned about maximising the difference between the resources which they 
possess (R) and the cost that they face in acquiring support and assuaging or 
overpowering opponents (C). Alongside this, they claimed that political leaders 
are constrained in their decision making by a number of factors. The first is the 
availability of alternative sources of export revenues and the second is the level 
of political contestation over the foundation for dispensing political power and 
economic patronage. The first defines the level of resources that political leaders 
have at their disposal (R) while the second defines the level of resources that 
political leaders need to maintain and hold on to power (C). According to Luong 
and Weinthal, when R decreases relative to C, the ability of political leaders to 
follow their ideal development plan for the natural resource sector follows a path 
of nationalisation without foreign involvement. However, this choice will be 
constrained because they must generate additional resources with which to 
appease or overthrow their opponents. As a result, these constraints translate 
into the patterns of ownership structure as mentioned above with foreign 
involvement (Luong and Weinthal 2010).  
The Luong and Weinthal (2010) arguments are noteworthy and appeared to fit 
the cases which they deliberated. However, the degree of generalisation to other 
illustrations is unclear (Rosser 2006a). According to Rosser, the argument, for 
example, that private domestic ownership is most likely to enable resource 
abundant countries to escape the negative resource impact does not help explain 
Indonesia`s circumstances. Indonesia escaped the negative resource impact 
under strong state control of the ownership of the country`s oil sector (Barnes 
1995). In addition, their assumption that political leaders are rational limits the 
effectiveness of their model in explaining circumstances such as social interests 
that have strong influence over policy making in other natural resource abundant 
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countries (Rosser 2006a). For example, rentier state scholars logically portray 
states in natural resource countries as detached from their social environments 
(Ross 2003a). However, Okruhlic (1999) claimed that the extent to which social 
forces consisted of corporate groups before oil has undeniably proven significant 
in shaping economic policies even in typical rentier states as Saudi Arabia.  
In contrast to Luong and Weithal (2010) which emphasise the role of ownership 
structure in determining economic outcomes rather than political, social or 
institutional structures, a study by McPherson (2003) argued that political 
factors such as nationalism and corruption have weakened the efficiency and 
effectiveness of national oil companies (NOCs) in many oil producing countries 
and disrupted programmes of national oil company reform. Although McPherson 
claimed that his study lacks rigorous analysis and suggested that it should be 
regarded more as testable hypotheses than research findings. In addition, 
McPherson claimed that there is a scarcity in the existing strand of literature on 
oil sector performance for countries that largely depends on oil exports for 
economic enhancement and on the role of NOCs. NOCs were established in great 
numbers across developing oil exporting countries in the 1970s in order to 
increase state intervention and ownership as mentioned above. The idea of this 
new approach is motivated by the relevance of NOCs to the economic 
performance of many client countries and by the paucity in the literature 
(McPherson 2003).  
The next section examines the literature on how resource rich countries can 
escape the resource curse. This is important because, after the return to 
democratic rule, the Nigerian government established economic reforms to 
improve the oil sector in order to provide linkages to other sectors of the 
economy. This can be seen as a way of trying to escape the resource curse. Also 
prior to democratic transition in 1999, the Nigerian government in 1971 changed 
the ownership structure of the Nigerian oil industry from foreign control to that 
of largely state control.  
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2.4 CONDITIONS TO ESCAPE THE RESOURCE CURSE 
After looking at the economic and political economy perspectives, the literature 
has been extended into a new approach of ‘escaping the resource curse’.  This 
has been triggered by evidence from countries that managed to escape the 
resource adverse effect among developing countries. For example, Chile, 
Indonesia and Malaysia have performed well in development by attaining high 
rates of economic growth and poverty reduction among other negative outcomes 
associated with natural resource endowment (Stevens 2003). These studies 
suggested that other countries have managed to escape the negative impact of 
natural resource wealth. However, they failed to focus on why some developing 
countries rich in natural resources succeeded in development terms compared to 
their counterparts (Rosser 2006a).  
According to Rosser (2006a), understanding the conditions under which resource 
abundant economies managed to escape the negative consequences of resource 
endowment is critical for two reasons. First, it can offer a superior understanding 
of the development prospects of the countries that succeeded in escaping the 
negative resource impact. Second, understanding the conditions under which 
these countries escape the negative impact of resource wealth can help to 
develop refined approaches for addressing the adverse effect of natural resource 
wealth.  
Several studies on the causes of resource impact advocated that resource 
abundant countries need to implement various policies and institutional changes 
if they are going to escape the negative impact of the resource wealth (see, for 
example, Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian 2003).  On the other hand they fail to 
provide substantial reasons as to when and how governments in these countries 
might be persuaded to make these changes (Rosser, 2006a).  Rosser further 
asserted that understanding the conditions under which resource abundant 
countries escape the negative impact of resource endowment will provide a 
superior logic to the nature of the principal levers of change and hence the 
effective policies needed for promoting change.  
Despite the lack of attention from scholars in understanding the conditions under 
which resource abundant countries are able to escape the resource negative 
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effect, a few scholars have addressed this recent question. Similar to prior 
studies in the resource impact literature in general, this new research 
emphasises causal mechanisms that are also political in nature. Bevan et al. 
(1999), for example, examined the process that yielded differing levels of 
economic prosperity in Nigeria and Indonesia for the time period from 1950 to 
1980 based on the methods of analytical economic history and political economy 
approach. They considered the issue of why Indonesia was so much more 
successful than Nigeria in economic development terms when both economies 
had substantial endowments of oil. They suggested that the differing economic 
successes of the two countries reflected variation in the nature of their economic 
policies.  They further argued that their differing economic prosperity reflected 
divergences in their ‘initial conditions’ and ‘the happenstance of events’ (see, 
Bevan et al. 1999 for further explanation of their arguments). 
The great strength of the analysis by Bevan et al. (1999) is that it recognises the 
role of political and social factors and history in determining economic 
performance which neoclassical studies often do not address (Rosser 2006a). In 
addition, Rosser criticised their analysis on the basis that Bevan et al. have 
entered into the field of comparative politics but their analysis failed to include 
any fundamental way on the theoretical frameworks associated with the field of 
comparative politics, i.e., theory of the state.   
Another study by Davis et al. (2003) focused on technical economic issues 
related to public financial management in oil producing countries and some of 
the political dimensions of the resource impact, which includes the issue of the 
political conditions that will enable resource abundant countries to escape the 
negative outcome. In this regard, Davis et al. (2003) noted that, to understand 
the economic performance in oil abundant economies, where some countries 
have performed more effectively than others, there needs to be a broader 
analytical examination that encompasses political and institutional factors. In 
conformity with this framework, several studies in this strand of the literature 
have employed the public choice method.  This is based on the neoclassical 
assumption that individuals are rational, seek to maximise their own welfare and 
are willing to organise and engage in collective action aimed at influencing policy 
elites to introduce non-market economic policies that benefit them at the 
expense of the overall society.  
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At the same time it has been argued that policy elites will succumb to this 
pressure if they are rewarded with bribes or if it increases their chances of being 
re-elected to office. Therefore, several studies in this strand of the literature 
pointed to the role of political factors in hindering governments from embracing 
market-based reforms that would enable the country to escape the adverse 
effect of the resource endowment. Daniel (2001), for example, argued that 
governments in resource abundant countries have failed to considerably utilise 
financial risk contract markets to manage the instability caused by oil price 
volatility because finance ministers in these countries have had few incentives to 
make use of them. He further asserted that the economic proceeds to their 
countries from using this financial market may be high whereas the political 
payoffs to them personally are low or undesirable.  
Likewise, Hausmann and Rigobon (2003) suggested an alternative mechanism to 
examine the resource impact hypothesis and to study its policy implications. The 
mechanism is grounded on the interaction between two building blocks of 
specialization in non-tradeables and financial market imperfections. They argued 
that if a country has a sufficiently large non-resource tradable sector, i.e., 
manufacturing, relative prices can be stable, even when the resource sector 
generates significant volatility in the demand for non-tradables. Hausmann and 
Rigobon suggested that political economy forces may inhibit government from 
pursuing economic policies that serve to ameliorate or help escape the negative 
effects of natural resource abundance.  
Nonetheless, the public choice theory which underlies the studies by Hausmann 
and Rigobon (2003) as discussed above have also been criticised based on the 
grounds that they could not offer a substantial explanation as to why policy 
elites sometimes embrace market oriented economic policies that, it is 
presumed, served the collective interest rather than those of particular interest 
groups.  Certainly, researchers operating from a public choice theory highlight 
the role of ‘wise statesmen’ or ‘outstanding leaders’ in promoting market-
oriented policy reforms (see, Harberger 1993). McPherson (2003), for example, 
recognised this when he suggested that national oil company reform 
programmes can succeed if they have support from ‘the top’ as well as from a 
‘wide range of public opinion’. However, in arguing this, studies by Harberger 
(1993) failed to recognise the rational actor assumption. In other words, it is 
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unclear why statesmen should embrace such reforms when they are not in 
conformity with their personal interests (Grindle 1989).  
In line with the literature on escaping the resource negative effect, Luong and 
Weinthal (2010) suggested that the resource impact literature should be 
revisited and they offered a new research agenda for studying the problems of 
resource rich countries that shift the focus away from the ‘paradox of plenty’ to 
a more suitable approach. This posits the proposition that concentration of 
wealth weakens the economy whereas the dispersion of wealth enriches the 
economy. Rather than political or institutional structures, they argued, it is the 
structure of ownership in natural resource wealth management that determines 
the economic outcomes in these resource abundant economies. They suggested 
that, in particular, countries which sell their natural resource sectors to domestic 
investors are more likely to escape the negative impact of resource wealth than 
countries that sell to foreign investors or maintain state control of the 
management of these sectors. According to them, different patterns of 
ownership nurture different incentives for institution building. They further 
argued that state ownership is likely to lead to relatively weak institutions and 
governance because both state elites and state enterprise bureaucrats desire 
greater discretionary power and therefore prefer weak institutions that are 
unlikely to restrain their behaviour in any meaningful way. Similarly, several 
studies have offered additional explanations of escaping from the resource curse 
(for example, Bell and Faria 2007, Heal 2007, Ross 2007 and Humphreys et al. 
2007 and Stiglitz 2007)  
For example, Stiglitz (2007) provides explanations under which natural resource 
abundant countries can escape the adverse effect under their own ownership 
structure, be it either state management or privatisation of oil rights. Stiglitz 
proposed that whatever is the approach in resource wealth management the 
target of government decisions should ensure transparency, ownership and 
fairness.  
Similarly, Rodan (2007) offered another dimension to help escape part of the 
adverse effects associated with natural resource abundance in oil and gas. 
Rodan identified key areas on which government should focus when negotiating 
and presented guidance in relation to who should be setting the issues for 
negotiation, the informational environment required and the referred time limit. 
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In addition, Rodan examined features such as contracts and other complex 
issues including accounting standards, the role of social projects, contract 
termination provisions and health and environment concerns.   
Likewise, Heal (2007) argued that most conventional statements of national 
income miscalculate the income of resource abundant countries by failing to 
account for resource depletion. Heal proposed a way that can help resource rich 
countries calculate their national income appropriately to ascertain whether oil 
exporting countries, for example, are consuming too much too quickly. Heal 
argued that the theoretical models developed in his study suggest very clearly 
that accounting for the changes in capital stock is a precondition for 
understanding the evolution of welfare in an economy. 
In addition, Sachs (2007) stated that ‘the notion that oil is a “curse” is only 
partly true’. Sachs claimed that one major explanation of the low levels of 
economic performance of oil countries is that large earnings from oil exports can 
have negative effects on other sectors of the economy, specifically those that 
can be drivers of sustained economic growth. He further claimed that the 
difficulty arises when oil export earnings are used for consumption by political 
office holders, for example, through payment of salaries and wages due to 
unnecessary increase in government size to gain votes and defeat opponents 
rather than for public investment in the provision of infrastructure such as 
electricity and roads. Hence with the correct investment approach, non-resource 
export sectors can benefit from increased oil earnings and it is possible to 
reverse the Dutch Disease. 
Furthermore, Humphreys et al. (2007) showed theoretically that the significance 
of natural resource funds lies in their effects on the incentives facing political 
players. They supported their theoretical investigation by empirical analyses of 
institutions and expenditure decisions. For natural resource funds to be effective, 
they based their arguments on regulated withdrawals which should be guided by 
clear rules and not general guidelines. Second, key decisions should be made by 
parties representing diverse political constituencies. Finally, there should be high 
levels of transparency concerning their status and operation. For example, there 
should be a unified budgetary process and public reporting of payments. 
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Karl (2007) also indicated that the resource curse is basically a political and not 
economic phenomenon. Karl further identified the main features of reliance on 
natural resource rents that create political problems.  First, Karl pointed to the 
unique value of their leading commodity which has meant extraordinarily high 
levels of external interference in shaping their affairs and capturing their 
resources by dominant states and foreign private interests. Second, petro-
states, for example, are subject to less internal countervailing pressures that 
facilitated the move to bureaucratically efficacious, authoritative, liberal and 
ultimately democratic states, specifically because they are relieved of the liability 
of having to tax their citizens. Karl claimed that several solutions commonly 
proposed fail to recognise these basic dynamics. He argued that ensuring 
fairness and transparency in the case of fiscal contract are vital.  In other words, 
a fiscal contract must produce incentives to change the rent-seeking behaviour 
of all actors, both domestic and international, involved in the oil game.  
Focusing on Nigeria, some studies have examined the conditions needed to 
escape the resource adverse effect. Sala-I-Martin and Subramanian (2003) 
investigated the effects of oil wealth on the Nigerian economy using three 
channels from natural resource wealth to growth which have been identified in 
the literature. These are the impact through terms of trade volatility, the 
overvaluation of the real exchange rate and institutional quality. Their empirical 
model has been specified to capture these three effects. In addition, Sala-i-
Martin and Subramanian argued that institutional quality will in general be 
endogenous and also subject to measurement error. Therefore, simple OLS 
estimation will be incorrect to employ for the analysis. As a result, and in line 
with (Hall and Jones 1998 and Acemoglu et al. 2001), they employed an 
instrumental variable (IV) estimation strategy, using the instruments identified 
in the literature. These included mortality rates of colonial settlers as per 
Acemoglu et al., 2001 and a fraction of the population speaking English and 
European languages as per Hall and Jones 1998. Their findings showed that 
waste and corruption from oil rather than the Dutch Disease has been 
responsible for Nigeria’s weak long run economic performance. Therefore, they 
proposed a solution for addressing this resource curse which involves directly 
distributing the oil revenues to the public. However, they recognised the 
difficulties of corruption and inefficiency which will no doubt plague the actual 
implementation of their proposal.  
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Of particular importance to this thesis, and given the initiation of oil sector 
reforms after the return to democracy in 1999 and subsequent years, Okpanachi 
(2011) examined the policies during the Obsanjo administration18 from 1999 to 
2007 in order to evaluate the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of the policies 
employed in reversing the problem of natural resource wealth. In addition, 
Okpanachi offered an understanding of the economic, political and social issues 
that drive the outcomes of the resource adverse effect. The study finds that, 
while considerable efforts were made to escape the boom and bust cycle of oil 
wealth and lower volatility by de-linking government expenditure from oil 
revenues using the ‘oil price based fiscal rule’, improvement in this area was not 
matched by progress in the other areas examined by the study. Okpanachi noted 
that there was no progress in developing the peace and safety of lives and 
oil/gas installations, environmental security and sustainability, the growth of the 
oil producing region and the need for transparency and accountability in the use 
of oil and gas revenues.  
 
2.5 DEMOCRACY AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 
The return to democratic rule in Nigeria in 1999 after several years of 
authoritarian rule was a critical political development and this also presents an 
opportunity for the transformation of the economy due to the perceived positive 
benefits attached to the impact of democracy on economic growth. In this sub-
section of the literature review chapter, an analysis of the different perspectives 
on the relationship between economic growth and democracy is presented.  
The debate on the effect of democracy on economic growth has grown 
extensively in the economic development literature. Following the prominent 
work of Lipset (1960), there is a considerable body of theoretical and empirical 
literature to the effect that democracy is a product of economic growth 
(Przeworski and limongi 1995).  
One possible characteristic that attracted considerable attention from academics 
is the effect of political regimes on economic growth, with emphasis on 
democratic institutions. Despite the widely established importance of democratic 
                                                          
18
 The Obasanjo administration is the period that marked the return of democracy to date from the unstable political 
regimes experienced since independence. 
 
 
53 
 
or effective institutions for economic performance (see, for example, Hall and 
Jones 1999, Acemoglu et al. 2000, Gerring et al 2005, Libman 2012, Piątek et 
al. 2013), the effect of democracy on economic development is not direct and 
has been a subject of much argument among researchers (Salahodjaev 2015). 
 
Democracy is seen as the process of demilitarization in developing countries in 
the late 1970s and early 1980s and the concept now is commonly recognised by 
aspects like equality, freedom, modernity and progress (Rachdi and Saidi 2015). 
Many developing economies introduced several reforms to improve democracy. 
However, Przeworski and Limongi (1995) asked the question of whether in the 
political realm democracy enhances or hinders economic growth. 
 
2.5.1 Theoretical Evidence: Democracy and Economic Growth 
Evidence from the theoretical literature is complex. A widespread view is that 
democracy requires as a precondition some level of economic development. 
However, there is no consensus on the features of development that matter and 
the reasons. Some academics are of the view that a certain level of development 
is a prerequisite for a stable democracy because prosperity weakens the amount 
of distributional conflicts; another opinion is that development creates the 
education or the communication networks that are essential in supporting 
democratic institutions, while others are of the view that it boosts the ranks of 
the middle class and supports the formation of a competent bureaucracy, among 
others (see, for example, Przeworski and Limongi 1995, Glaeser et al. 2004, and  
Przeworski 2004) . 
Furthermore, Przeworski and Limongi (1995), state that views which link 
regimes to economic growth emphasise the importance of the autonomy of 
dictators, property rights and pressures for immediate consumption. According 
to Przeworski and Limongi, while everybody appears to agree that protected 
property rights enhance economic growth, it is contentious whether democracies 
or autocracies more effectively secure these rights. They further stated that the 
key mechanism by which democracy is thought to impede economic growth is 
pressure for immediate consumption, which reduces investment. It is argued 
that only states which are institutionally protected from such pressures can 
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counterattack them and democratic states are not so safeguarded (Przeworski 
and Limongi 1995).  
Likewise, Knutsen state that there is widespread uncertainty in academia and 
policy communities concerning the relevance of democracy in developing 
countries with weak state capacity. Many researchers question the economic 
benefits of democracy in, for example, weak-capacity African economies 
(Knutsen 2013). He further documents that there is still much scepticism and 
argument on the economic impact of particular institutional arrangements and 
whether such effects are context-dependent. For example, De Mesquita et al. 
(2002) argue that institutional structures influence the type of policies that 
political leaders pursue.   
Even though democracy may motivate politicians to select a variety of sound 
policies, such as increasing the access to education (see, for example, Lake and 
Baum 2001, De Mesquita et al. 2002 and Lindert 2004), there is still the 
question of effectively implementing these policies when state capacity is weak 
(Knutsen 2013). Also, Knutsen argued further that the regime type may not 
matter for economic development in weak-capacity states. As such, some 
researchers suggest that democracy may hinder economic growth in such 
situations as it may reduce political stability and aggravate distributional 
conflicts (see, for example, Huntington 1968). 
 
 
2.5.2 Empirical Evidence: Democracy and Economic Growth 
This section reviews empirical evidence on the relationship between democracy 
and economic growth. In this respect, there seems to be an important empirical 
question on whether democracy enhances economic growth due to the 
inconclusive evidence on this relationship. In addition, the empirical studies 
offered different arguments that enhances or impedes democracy. This indicates 
there is no consensus on whether democracy enhances economic growth without 
looking at other factors tied to social or institutional structure that must be 
present to reap from the benefits of democracy. Impliedly, this means that the 
empirical findings and suggestions offered by these studies advocates that the 
relationship between democracy and economic growth is dynamic in nature. For 
example, Barro (1996) suggest the evidence of a nonlinear relationship in which 
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more democracy enhances economic development at low levels of political 
freedom and weakens growth when a moderate level has already been 
established.  
Also the need for certain institutional structures as a prerequisite reflects the 
theoretical augments discussed in the previous section. For example, one of the 
theoretical arguments state that there is widespread uncertainty concerning the 
relevance of democracy in developing countries with weak state capacity. Many 
researchers question the economic benefits of democracy in, for example, weak-
capacity African economies (Knutsen 2013). This also suggest that the 
relationship between democracy and economic growth in nonlinear as suggested 
by Barro (1996).   
In regards to the suggestion of prerequisite factors made by different theoretical 
studies, the empirical evidence on the examination of the relationship between 
democracy and economic growth gives mixed findings. For example, a study by 
Brunetti (1997) show that the relationship is inconclusive when he analysed 17 
studies and reported that 9 studies suggest no relationship, 1 study claimed a 
positive relationship and another study reported a negative finding, while 3 
studies found a weak negative relationship and another 3 reported a fragile 
positive link between democracy and economic development. This outcome 
indicates that there is no consensus on the relationship between democracy and 
economic growth among researchers. The mixed evidence provided by this 
analysis reflects the theoretical argument on the economic impact of particular 
institutional arrangements and whether such effects are context-dependent 
(Knutsen 2013).  
Further evidence of literature, which advocates prerequisite factors, such as that 
democracy requires as a precondition some level of economic development, 
Helliwell (1994) employs cross-sectional and pooled data for 125 countries over 
the period 1960-85 and examines the two-way relationship between democracy 
and economic growth. The effects of income on democracy are found to be 
robust and positive, while the impact of some measures of democracy and 
personal freedom on economic growth are evaluated in a comparative growth 
framework in which growth of GDP per adult depends negatively on initial 
income levels and positively on the rate of investment in physical and human 
capital. These findings also confirm the nonlinear relationship between 
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democracy and economic growth and in support of the importance of human 
capital. Hellmanzik (2013) argue that democracy has a significant positive 
impact on the collective artistic human capital in a country. Rodrik et al., (2004), 
Mauro (1995), Hall and Jones (1999), and Acemoglu, et al., (2001) advocate 
that countries with strong political institutions, more secure property rights and 
a well-functioning system of checks against government’s power will invest more 
in both physical and human capital and will use these factor efficiently to create 
a greater level of income. 
In support of the positive effect of democracy on economic growth, Muller 
(1995) employs cross-national data from a sample of 58 countries and examined 
the relationship between economic growth and the level of democracy with 
emphasis on the effect of income inequality. His results suggest that, as 
democracy increases, economic growth also rises, thus lowering income 
inequality in the countries employed for the analysis. Leblang (1996), employed 
time series panel data over the period 1960 to 1990 and find that political right 
as a proxy for democracy has a positive and statistically significant effect on 
economic growth. Leblang further argued that countries with political rights are 
more inclined to experience economic growth than those without these and that 
democratic states are likely to protect political rights in a more effective way 
than other types of government.  
Also, Barro (1996) studied the relationship between economic growth and 
democracy (using indices of political freedom) for a panel of about 100 countries 
from 1960 to 1999. The positive impact on growth comprise of the maintenance 
of the rule of law, free markets, low government consumer expenditure and high 
human capital investment. According to Barro (1996), once these types of 
variables and the initial level of GDP per capita are held constant, the general 
impact of democracy on economic growth is weakly negative. In conformity with 
the positive findings, Feng (1997) examined the relationship between political 
stability, democracy and economic growth, employing a three stage least-
squares method using 96 countries over the period 1960 to 1980. Findings from 
this study clearly show that democracy has a positive indirect impact on 
economic growth through its effect on the likelihood of regime and constitutional 
government changes from one ruling party to another. 
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To further support the dynamic nature of the positive benefits of democracy on 
economic growth, Tavares and Wacziang (2001), argue that democracy 
promotes economic growth by increasing the accumulation of human capital and 
by reducing income inequality. Their study employed a simultaneous equation 
framework in a panel of 65 developed and developing economies for the period 
1970 to 1989. In support of Tavares and Wacziang (2001), Knutsen (2013) 
analyses the interaction of regime type and state capacity in affecting economic 
growth. The analysis finds a positive and robust impact of democracy on 
economic growth in Sub-Saharan Africa, a continent historically characterised by 
weak-capacity states. Furthermore, Knutsen’s analysis identifies a significant 
interaction effect between democracy and state capacity on economic growth, 
both in Africa and globally; the impact of democracy on economic growth 
increases when state capacity is reduced. Democracy is likely to have a positive 
impact on economic growth in weak-capacity states but not in strong-capacity 
states. Moreover, the findings suggest that state capacity improves economic 
growth only in autocracies (Knutsen 2013). 
Recently, Rachdi and Saidi (2015), argue that democracy is important for 
investment and has a positive indirect effect on economic development. Growth 
in investment happens in an environment of liberty, free-flowing information and 
property rights secure from the arbitrary power of the state (Rachdi and Saidi 
2015). The findings and suggestions made by Rachdi and Saidi reflect the 
arguments offered by the theoretical studies, which advocates the importance of 
institutional arrangements. For example, De Mesquita et al. (2002) argue that 
institutional structures influence the type of policies that political leaders pursue. 
In contrast to those studies with positive findings, Yang (2008) examined a 
sample of 138 countries from 1968 to 2002 and finds that, in countries with high 
degrees of ethnic diversity; democracy appears to substantially lower growth 
volatility whereas in countries with low ethnic diversity such a relationship is not 
significant. Also, Collier and Hoeffler (2009) suggest that in developing 
economies the combination of natural resource rental income and democracy 
has been considerably retarded growth. Narayan et al. (2011) and Aisen and 
Veiga (2013) also confirm this negative impact of democracy on economic 
growth. Aisen and Veiga (2013), for example, employed a sample of 169 
countries for the period 1960 to 2004 and their findings indicate that higher 
degrees of political instability are accompanied with lower rates of growth 
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because uncertainty adversely affects physical and human capital accumulation. 
However, they argue that only ethnic homogeneity and economic freedom 
positively affect economic growth. This suggests that political instability, for 
instance in the form of cabinet changes within a stable democracy also affects 
economic growth Aisen and Veiga (2013). According to them, Political instability 
is likely to shorten policymakers’ horizons leading to suboptimal short term 
macroeconomic policies. It may also lead to a more frequent change of policies, 
creating volatility and as a result, negatively affecting economic performance.  
There is also a strand of literature that analysed the impact of democracy on 
economic growth using different political regimes. The impact of political regimes 
on economic development is open for reflection and research (Przeworski and 
Limongi 1993). The relationship between political factors and economic 
development was substantially studied by Lipset (1959) who examined how 
economic developments affect the political regime (Pinho and Madaleno 2015).  
Since then, research on the issue has increased making clear that the political 
environment plays a significant role in economic development (Grier and Tullock 
1989, Glaeser et al., 2004 and Acemoglu et al., 2008). In this regard, 
Przeworski and Limongi (1997) studied 135 countries over the period 1950 to 
1990 and in their analysis they observed 224 regimes of which 101 are 
democratic and 124 are authoritarian. Their findings suggest that democracy is 
not a by-product of economic development. Democracy is or is not initiated by 
political actors pursuing their goals and it can be established at any level of 
development. As such, only when democracy is initiated do economic constraints 
play a role.  
On the other hand, Papaioannou and Siourounis (2008a) examine the within 
impact of democratisation in countries that abandoned authoritarianism and 
consolidated representative institutions. The results imply that on average 
democratisations are accompanied by an increase in annual GDP per capita 
growth. The evidence supports development theories of democracy and growth 
that highlight the positive impact of representative institutions on economic 
activity (Pinho and Madaleno 2015).  According to Pinho and Madaleno, 
democratic societies are usually associated with higher levels of economic 
development than non-democratic societies. However, Robinson (2006) findings 
suggest that there is no sign of a causal relationship between economic 
development and democracy, despite the fact they are highly correlated.  
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Papaioannou and Siourounis, 2008b) in a cross-sectional study for 174 countries 
in the period 1960-2005 find that democratisation is more likely to emerge in 
affluent and especially educated societies, and that economic development and 
education are also crucial factors determining the power of democratic reforms 
and how fast democratic changes will occur. Given this outcome, should the 
belief be that a positive relationship between economic growth and 
democratization (Pinho and Madaleno 2015)? But on the other hand, Rodrik 
(1997) find no effect of democracy on economic development. Likewise, 
Przeworski et al. (2000) find no long-run differences in economic growth 
between the effect of democratic and autocratic political regimes. Similarly, 
Levine and Renelt (1992), find that democracy is not a robust determinant of 
economic development using cross-sectional regressions. Przeworski et al. 
(2000) examine annual data across a panel of countries and argue that there is 
no genuine difference in economic growth between autocrats and democrats. 
To validate this empirical consensus that democracy has either no measurable 
effect on, or actually hinders, economic growth rates, Grier and Munger 2006) 
examine a sample of 134 countries using an unbalanced annual panel data over 
the period 1950-2003 and defining dictatorship simply as a dummy variable. 
They suggest that on average non-democratic countries grow approximately 1% 
per year more slowly, holding regime duration constant, and that regime length 
has a considerable effect on economic growth that is both nonlinear and regime 
type specific. 
 
2.6 CRITICAL OBSERVATIONS OF LITERATURE ON THE NATURAL 
 RESOURCE WEALTH - ECONOMIC GROWTH PARADOX  
This sub-section presents critical observations from the literature reviewed and 
the potential contribution of the study. It identifies the limitations and the 
relevant gaps in the existing literature, particularly relating to Nigeria and 
explains the attempt of this study to partly fill these gaps. In this regard, three 
main limitations can be identified from the literature reviewed as follows.  
First, prior empirical evidence may be limited by the type of approach used in 
each study. For example, it appeared that most early studies adopted a one way 
approach and are largely based on the economic perspective, i.e., the Dutch 
Disease. The findings of such studies may not show the influence of political 
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factors discussed above and the attempts by resource-rich countries to escape 
the resource curse because their approach is purely economic in nature.   
Secondly, some researchers relied heavily on cross-country analysis, which could 
have a substantial effect on the conclusions drawn from the research findings. 
This is very significant because not all natural resource-rich countries operate in 
the same economic and political setting. Therefore analysis based on a panel 
data study and not specific to a particular country’s economic and political 
framework can affect the research findings because uniqueness in their 
economic and political trajectory are not taken into consideration. This outcome 
may not direct policy on the most effective way to escape the adverse effect of 
natural resource wealth.   
Finally, studies examining the relationship between oil and economic growth in 
Nigeria are largely based on an economic perspective which may not show why 
the country is still struggling with the resource curse. In addition, a one way 
approach will not incorporate the trajectory of economic and political 
development which will help guide policy.  
 
2.7 SUMMARY 
This chapter reviews the literature on the study of the negative relationship 
between natural resource wealth and economic growth with specific reference to 
oil. However, it also reviews studies on the relationship between democracy and 
economic growth due to the fact that Nigeria returned to a stable democratic 
rule in 1999 after a long period of unstable political regimes, especially in 
authoritarian rule.  
The chapter has been divided into sections so as to provide clarity in the 
synthesis of the literature. The first section presents the theoretical literature on 
the relationship between resource wealth and economic performance. The 
empirical evidence from studies in this section is also classified into developed 
and developing countries to show the development of the literature and for 
clarity purpose. This section also presented some literature focusing on the 
Nigerian economy. The empirical studies in this first section presented mixed 
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findings. Some indicated a negative relationship and others documented a 
positive or no relationship.  
The second section surveys the political economy perspective. This approach 
appeared more appropriate to concentrate on and to apply because of the 
subsequent development in the theoretical literature which emphasises the need 
for a broader framework due to the important role of politics in the delivery of 
the administrative tasks of an economy. In addition, the literature on Nigeria is 
relevant and has examined some theories but from the literature survey it 
appears that they are mainly contingent on the economic perspective.  
Thirdly, this chapter also reviews some studies on the recent theme in the 
literature that tries to examine the attempts by countries to escape the resource 
curse. Also, this strand of literature is contingent on a broader theoretical 
approach that incorporates social, political and economic factors which helps to 
explain the policy approach to tackle the resource curse phenomena.  
Finally, looking at the historical social and political situation and the gradual 
development of the oil sector in Nigeria, there is a significant need to adopt a 
broader analytical framework that will give room for a comprehensive analysis 
which encompasses the roles of social, political and economic factors at the 
same time. As such, a political economy methodology is employed as partly 
informed by the literature review from this and from the subsequent chapters 
that presents an analysis of the historical structure of Nigeria in relation to its 
social, political and economic transformation.  
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CHAPTER 3 
THE HISTORICAL POLITICAL ECONOMY OF NIGERIA 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
The main argument is developed in this chapter by analysing the history of 
economic and political development in Nigeria. It was already established in the 
literature review that the problem of development cannot be understood in 
economic terms in abstract from the political context.  
In the case of Nigeria the variation from a democratic standard is extreme due 
to the rivalry and divisions that have determined the context in which political 
struggles currently take place. The struggles have been largely shaped by, and 
have their foundations in its societal issues such as ethnic, religion and regional 
rivalry that become central to Nigerian politics. These societal problems are 
linked to the country’s colonial administration which amalgamated the separate 
regions to form Nigeria.  
The path of politics since independence is characterised by ethnic and regional 
rivalry and this has influenced the administration of the Nigerian economy. 
Economically, the separate regions that formed Nigeria relied on agriculture for 
income generation which also provided the Nigerian government with source of 
revenue. But the discovery of oil and its gradual importance due to rising 
external demand for oil affected the pattern of economic structure and politics in 
Nigeria. The impact of economic structure is the gradual shift of oil in becoming 
the dominant source of government revenue and this also affected the political 
structure in addition to the existing societal issues.  
The main argument is that a lack of national unity or identity due to ethnic and 
regional differences has hindered the benefits associated with the abundance of 
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oil production and that this is a key factor in understanding the weak economic 
performance and low levels of development in Nigeria.    
 
3.2 NIGERIA BEFORE INDEPENDENCE: 1914 - 1960 
Nigeria came into being in 1914 from the amalgamation of the Northern and 
Southern regions under British colonial rule.19 These separate regions have been 
shaped and influenced by different social, political and economic backgrounds. In 
orientation, for example, people from the North have been influenced by trans-
sahara trade which brought about the advent of Islam and created a political 
system before the advent of colonial rule. On the other hand, the Southern 
region also had external contact through trade with European people like the 
Portuguese who were sometimes accompanied by Christian missionaries to the 
West African Coast. This led to the different regions being influenced by different 
religion in addition to their existing communal backgrounds. The northern people 
are mainly Muslims while the Southerners are largely Christians (Lewis 2009).  
Before 1914, Nigeria did not exist. In 1914, the British colonial administration 
amalgamated the different regions which were initially administered separately 
to form the entity of Nigeria. The subsequent years were characterised by a rise 
in a nationalist movement especially among the educated elites in the Southern 
part of the country where colonial development started and was given great 
priority due to the existence of a seaport.20 Schools that taught western style 
education were first established in the south and subsequently outweighed in 
number those in the North (Falola and Heaton 2008).  
Prior to Nigeria’s political independence in 1960, anti-colonial activities emerged 
and called for increased involvement of Nigerians in the governance of the 
country. The resistance to colonial rule turned into a nationalist movement 
steered by a class of European-educated Nigerians that demanded the increased 
participation of Nigerians in government. The feelings of exploitation and 
estrangement by Nigerians paved the way for the growth of nationalist 
movements among different groups and organisations, prominent within which 
was a Nigerian Youth Movement (NYM) to argue for greater domestic 
                                                          
19
 see Nicolson (1970)  and Metz  (1991)  for more details 
20
 Nigeria is located in West Africa and its coast which is situated in the South lies on the Gulf of Guinea in the 
Atlantic Ocean. 
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involvement and control in the affairs of Nigeria both politically and 
economically. 
However, the nationalist movements that ensued during the colonial 
administration were not organised or built on national unity or a consciousness 
that could arouse and foster a national identity. Instead such nationalist 
movements that promoted the indigenisation of the British colonial government 
were transmitted into regionally based political parties which were primarily 
formed on an ethnic basis. As a result, the political independence achieved by 
Nigeria in October, 1960 was fragile (Falola and Heaton 2008).  
On 1st October 1960 Nigeria became an independent nation but was considered 
fragile. Factors such as the timing from the amalgamation of different socially 
and politically oriented regions in 1914 and the discovery of oil in 1956 in just 
one part of the Southern region were not sufficient conditions to create an 
independent nation in 1960. The timing may not have allowed a sufficient period 
for the different regions to integrate, develop and achieve sustainable 
development. For example, countries like the United Kingdom also came into 
being from the coming together of separate states such as England, Wales, 
Scotland and Northern Ireland. However, these separate units have had a long 
enough time to subsume their economic, political and social differences that 
could hinder the progress of development under one country.  
The coming together of the North and South in 1914 and the achievement of 
independence in 1960 some five decades after amalgamation, together with the 
discovery of oil in 1956 just four years before independence, have resulted in an 
aggravation of the diversities present in the country with consequences for 
economic performance in Nigeria. For example, studies by Karl (1997) and 
Vandewalle (1998) stated that the probability of the development of oil rich 
countries is low where oil dominates economic activity and also corresponds in 
time with state formation. Also, the reliance on oil provides the state with a 
distribution focus from its beginning and becomes integral during the process 
(Karl 1997). 
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3.3 NIGERIA AFTER INDEPENDENCE: 1960 – 1969 
As Nigeria emerged from British colonial rule by achieving independence in 
October, 1960, the subsequent events that followed highlighted three important 
changes in the period 1960 to 1969. These comprised of political struggles by 
the three regions, rise of the oil sector and deterioration of key economic 
sectors, especially the agricultural sector.  
The political parties that were formed before independence so as to develop the 
onset of national politics in the post independent Nigeria appeared to be built on 
regional platforms. Political parties such as the Northern People's Congress 
(NPC) and the Action Group (AG), which controlled the Northern and the 
Western regions respectively, were clearly built on a regional basis (Metz 1991). 
Also, the National Council of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC) formed in 1963 originated 
from the Eastern region and began as a nationalist party but was later forced to 
become largely an eastern region party due to pressures of regionalism (Metz 
1991). 
In the course of events, many Nigerians attempted to address these problems in 
several ways. For example, scholars, artists and some political leaders tried to 
portray a single Nigerian culture through writings, art, speeches and legislation. 
For instance, in terms of legislation, the Nigerian government adopted a federal 
system in 1963 to promote national unity. In addition, the government 
introduced a deployment policy in 1973 called the National Youth Service Corps 
(NYSC) as a means for furthering national unity. The aim of the programme was 
to deploy Nigerian graduates of higher institutions (universities and 
polytechnics) for a one year period in other states away from their home within 
the country with which they may have not been familiar (Marenin 1990). All 
these efforts were geared towards promoting a strong central government and 
an economy that was dedicated to creating and implementing development 
initiatives throughout Nigeria. These efforts were meant to bring all Nigerians 
together economically, culturally and politically in order to promote a common 
identity and discourage differences.  
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However, in the long-run all the efforts to achieve national unity in Nigeria 
failed, primarily because of the overpowering inclination of the political rulers to 
sustain power at the regional level that was based largely along ethnic and 
regional lines (see, Figure 3.1 below). Figure 3.1 illustrate the different regions 
in Nigeria from 1960 to 1963. For instance, the regional parties as mentioned 
above were built upon, and derived their support primarily from, the major 
groups in their regions. The NPC party derived its support largely from the 
Hausa/Fulani tribe which is from the North while the AG party was mainly 
supported by the Yoruba as a major tribe from the South-west. The NCNC party 
was an Igbo tribe supported party from the South-east. As a consequence, 
rigged elections, tribalism, official corruption and other public misconduct 
dominated the practice of politics in Nigeria’s First Republic from 1960 to 1966 
(Falola and Heaton 2008).  
 
Figure 3.1 Regions of Nigeria (1960 – 1963) 
 
Source: Author 
Note: The Western and Eastern regions originally made up the Southern region. Subsequent to the 
amalgamation of Nigeria in 1914, the Southern Nigeria was further divided into the Western and 
Eastern regions in April 1939 as shown in the figure above. 
 
The structure that characterised elections in Nigeria’s First Republic led to fears 
by Nigerians of domination of their region by other local areas. Northerners 
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feared domination by the South, which comprised of both the Eastern and 
Western regions (see, Figure 3.1 above). At the same time Southerners also 
feared Northern domination. For instance, the fears from the Northerners 
reflected the well-founded suspicion that the South considered the Northern 
region as backward because of the advantage the South has in terms of Western 
style education, due to the early arrival of mission schools (Bevan et al. 1999). 
This shows differences in the two regions level of education which will also give 
the Southerners more opportunities in terms of employment, especially in the 
public sector. As a result, these fears provided a platform for the conduct of 
flawed elections in 1964 and 1965 in which political malpractice was employed in 
all regions in order to achieve power and escape domination (Falola and Heaton 
2008).  
Fears of regional domination created doubt in the minds of many Nigerians. For 
example, some Nigerians believed that legislation by government such as the 
adoption of a federal system in 1963 to promote national unity was dysfunctional 
and that the Nigerian entity would cease to exist as one country. These events 
and tactics culminated directly in the overthrow of the First Republic’s 
government by military officers in 1966. This set the stage for the onset of 
political instability in Nigeria because the coup illustrated and highlighted the 
underlying regional and ethnic problems in Nigeria.21 
In just one year, there were two military coups. The first occurred in January 
1966 and the second took place in July 1966. The first overthrew a civilian 
government while the second overthrew its counterpart. The first coup witnessed 
the assassinations of prominent Nigerian leaders such as Prime Minister 
Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, Sir Ahmadu Bello as the Premier of the Northern 
region and Samuel Akintola as the Premier of the Western region among other 
victims. This coup brought in a South-Easterner by the name of Major General 
Johnson Thomas Umunnakwe Aguiyi-Ironsi as the Head of State of Nigeria from 
16th January, 1966 until he was overthrown and killed in a second coup on 29th 
July, 1966. He was succeeded by Major-General Gowon who is from the 
Northern part of Nigeria.   
                                                          
21
 Nigeria comprised of over 250 ethnic groups and of these, the Hausa-Fulani are found in the North, Yoruba in the 
South-West and the Igbo tribe in the South-East (Lewis 2009). 
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An event that amplified regional and ethnic rivalry in Nigeria is the occurrence of 
a civil war from 6 July 1967 – 15 January 1970. The war was instigated by the 
people of the Eastern region who tried to break away from Nigeria in order to 
establish a sovereign state of Biafara due to a feeling of marginalisation. 
However, the latter was able to reincorporate the seceded Eastern oil producing 
region back into the central state of Nigeria. The civil war only served to 
highlight the problems associated with the creation of national unity because the 
civil war symbolised the nationalist ambitions of the major Igbo tribe from the 
South-east of Nigeria, who felt that they could not live with the First Republic 
federal government which was largely dominated by Northerners. However the 
nature of the underlying causes of the civil war is complex (Kirk-Greene 1971). 
Prior to the first two periods of political instability and the civil war, the Nigerian 
Government under the First Republic initiated the First National Development 
Plan (FNDP) for the period 1962 to 1968. The FNDP was initiated along the lines 
of previous development plans designed by the British colonial administration. 
However, it differed from the export oriented approach of the colonial 
administration which sought to promote the agricultural sector to boost an 
export economy. Instead the FNDP focused largely on promoting manufacturing 
and other industrial activities that could fuel economic independence. 
According to some studies such as that by Falola and Heaton (2008) the FNDP 
was characterised by both success and failure. In terms of success, the Nigerian 
economy was becoming more diversified due to the boost in manufacturing and 
other industrial sector (Falola and Heaton 2008).  
To depict the claimed success of the FNDP, this study employs the total trade 
balance. The total trade balance is an important economic variable to use as the 
literature on natural resource wealth argued that resource rich countries are 
prone to declining terms of trade among other negative outcomes. For example, 
Prebisch (1950) and Singer (1950) suggested that countries relying on the 
exports of primary commodities would experience weak economic growth and 
their argument relied largely on the assumed long-run deterioration in the terms 
of trade associated with primary products (Fosu and Gyangang 2011).  
As such, the success of the FNDP can be seen in the positive changes of the 
balance of trade as shown in Figure 3.2 below, which shows the total balance of 
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trade from 1960-69. 1960 marked the year of independence and the total trade 
balance was –N54.96 million; in 1965 it improved to –N6.65 million. The total 
trade balance became positive from 1966 with a value of N27.73 million, but the 
year 1966 also witnessed two military coups. At the end of the FNDP in 1968 the 
value of the total trade balance rose to N36.94 million. However, this could be 
due to the rise in oil exports which started in the mid-1960s (see Figure 3.7 
below) and this also instigated and set the stage for political instability as two 
military coups occurred (see Figure 3.2 below). That notwithstanding, it can be 
confirmed that the positive changes in the trade balance are due to increases in 
oil exports as the subsequent years (1967-70) were characterised by a civil war 
(see Figure 3.2) which originated from the oil producing region.   
 
Figure 3.2 Total Trade Balance (1960 -1969) 
 
Source of Data: Central Bank of Nigeria (2010) 
Note: The vertical axis shows the total trade balance in Naira million, while the horizontal axis 
shows the period in years from 1960 to 1969. 
 
Similarly, Figure 3.3 shows that the oil trade balance experienced upward and 
significant movements especially from 1965 and in the years that followed. This 
can explain the positive changes in the total trade balance from 1966-69 and the 
corresponding political and social problems such as the 1966 coups and civil war. 
This can also indicate that the period 1960-69 which witnessed the FNDP 
initiated by the first civilian rule after independence was not that successful in 
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terms of promotion of non-oil sectors. However, the oil sector saw an increase in 
its trade balance during the period under discussion and this can be treated as 
exogenous because as at then the Nigerian oil sector was not nationalised. 
Impliedly, this means that the role of government was minimal as it only grants 
concessions to foreign oil companies.   
 
Figure 3.3 Trade Balance for Oil and Non-Oil Sectors (1960 -1969) 
 
Source of Data: Central Bank of Nigeria (2010) 
Note: The vertical axis shows the trade balance for oil and non-oil sectors in Naira million, while 
the horizontal axis shows the period in years from 1960 to 1969. 
 
The negative values recorded by non-oil trade balance showed that the exports 
from non-oil sectors are lower than imports and this indicates the declining 
performance of these sectors in the midst of the onset of political instability and 
civil war in Nigeria. In 1966, the first and second military coups took place and 
this led to disruptions in the FNDP as the military administration may have a 
different development agenda or even if their development plans are the same, 
the interruption may have affected public administration and exerted adverse 
effects on economic activity. From Figure 3.3 the non-oil trade balance recorded 
the highest negative value in that period. Also the subsequent years that 
followed were characterised by a civil war and with considerable negative values 
shown by non-oil trade balances except in 1968.   
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The negative non-oil trade balance was an indication of weak economic 
performance. The deterioration in economic activity which can be further linked 
to political instability is demonstrated here using the output of the agricultural 
sector. The agricultural sector is employed because of its significant contribution 
to GDP as shown below in Figure 3.4 which illustrates the percentage share of 
agriculture, manufacturing, oil and other components of Nigeria’s GDP from 
1960-69. 
 
Figure 3.4 Output of Oil, Manufacturing and Agriculture: 1960 -1969  
 
Source of Data: Central Bank of Nigeria (2010) 
Note: ‘Others’ signify other components of Nigeria’s GDP which includes building and construction, 
wholesale and retail trade, services and other industrial activities. 
 
The deterioration in the agricultural sector can be seen from Figure 3.5 below 
which shows that agricultural output was higher than oil and manufacturing 
output but it displayed a decline under the period of the FNDP from N1, 742.20 
million in 1965 to N1, 581.80 million, N1, 358 million and N1, 338 million in 
1966, 1967 and 1968 respectively. The year 1966 witnessed two military coups 
which meant another sudden disruption in the administration of Nigeria due to 
continued existence of political struggles tied to societal issues such as regional 
and ethnic differences.  
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The decline in agriculture during the period of political upheavals and the onset 
of a new independent Nigeria was not helpful as agriculture provided most 
Nigerians with income to sustain survival. Also from Figure 3.4 above and 3.5 
below it is clear that agricultural output is significantly higher than 
manufacturing and oil and this showed that agriculture was the mainstay of 
economic activity in Nigeria.  
Furthermore, the extensive promotion of manufacturing and other industrial 
activities by the FNDP which could lead to economic independence appeared to 
result in a deterioration of the agricultural sector between 1965 and 1968. This 
type of approach came too early for a country in its early stage of political 
independence where agriculture used to be the main source of economic 
enhancement during the colonial administration and with a population that 
largely depended on it as a source of income.  
It can be seen from Figure 3.5 that deterioration in agriculture occurred during 
periods of political instability and civil war. The literature on political economy 
also suggests that natural resource dependence, especially on oil and other 
minerals, have significant negative effects on democracy (Ross 2001 and Jensen 
and Wantchekon 2004). Jensen and Wantchekon (2004), for example, suggested 
that an abundant supply of natural resources led to a decrease in the rate of 
economic growth in African oil-rich countries.  
Also, studies by Collier and Hoeffler (2002) and Ross (2004) suggest that oil 
wealth is causally associated with civil conflict through various mechanisms. For 
instance, Ross (2004) identified these mechanisms as comprising of grievances 
from the population of the resource-rich area, oil wealth weakens the state's 
bureaucratic capacity and resource wealth if located in a country's area inhabited 
by an ethnic minority, will give local people a financial motivation to establish a 
separate state. This also depicts the Nigerian situation where the oil producing 
region populated by a large ethnic minority attempted to secede from Nigeria.  
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Figure 3.5 Outputs of Oil, Manufacturing and Agriculture (1960 -1969) 
 
Source of Data: Central Bank of Nigeria (2010) 
Note: The vertical axis shows the output of the three sectors (agriculture, manufacturing and oil) 
in Naira million, while the horizontal axis shows the period in years from 1960 to 1969.  
 
Likewise, the deterioration of agriculture as the main economic activity also 
portrays the findings and arguments made by some studies in the literature, 
especially the studies that adopt the political economy framework in their 
analysis. Karl (1997), for example, argued that reliance on oil revenues leads to 
the rise of petro-states which are driven towards the political distribution of 
rental income rather than the promotion of economic development. The 
development of petro-states, as advocated by Karl (1997), is most likely where 
oil domination of the economy corresponds to the process of state formation. 
It also appeared that the government failed to incorporate the historical nature 
of Nigeria especially in its economic dependence on agriculture in its FNDP and 
instead applied its development plans to make Nigeria more independent of 
foreign domination. For example, emphasis was given to the promotion of 
industrialisation through increased government spending on sectors such as 
transport and communication to support it as shown in Figure 3.6 below rather 
than the agricultural sector despite the regional dependency on farming even 
during the colonial period. In essence, it can be argued that the beginning of oil 
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sector contribution in financing a part of government expenditure was tilted 
towards the promotion of sectors other than agriculture so as to support the 
main source of income of the majority of the populace that resides in rural 
areas. Agricultural exports used to be the mainstay of the Nigerian economy 
before the 1970s (Oyejide 1986).  
 
Figure 3.6 Government Recurrent Expenditure (1961-1969) 
 
Source of Data: Central Bank of Nigeria (2010) 
Note: The vertical axis shows the value of government expenditure on four sectors (education, 
agriculture, construction and transport and communication) in Nigerian local currency (Naira), 
while the horizontal axis shows the period in years from 1961 to 1969.  
 
Societal issues seem to have influenced government spending behaviour coupled 
with rising oil exports (Figure 3.7 below) which translated to rising oil revenue 
for the government. For example, it is reported that the NPC leaders situated 
capital projects in the Northern part of Nigeria and this resulted in a charge of 
regional bias in resource allocation and public investment by opposition parties 
(Lewis 2009).  This in turn can exacerbate the effects of oil exports on the 
agricultural sector through the Dutch Disease or the enclave structure of the oil 
industry as established in the extant literature (see, Hirschmann, 1958; Corden 
and Neary, 1982).  
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Figure 3.7 Oil Exports (Million US Dollars) 
 
Source of Data: OPEC Statistical Bulletin (2010) 
Note: The vertical axis shows the values of petroleum exports in million US dollars, while the 
horizontal axis shows the period in years from 1960 to 1969.  
 
Each region prior to independence relied on agriculture and yet after 
independence the Nigerian government did not focus attention through 
increased government spending on the agricultural sector. Instead there appears 
to be cuts, for example, in 1964 and 1968 which could indicate that regional bias 
in resource allocation was prioritised on non-agricultural projects that may not 
have a wider impact on the population. Instead this could have opened an 
avenue for rent seeking through project/contract allocations.  
In support of the above outcome, Ross (2001), for example, argued that, when 
governments receive windfalls from natural resources, rational political elites will 
take the chance to either directly seize the rental income or gain control over the 
right to allocate the revenues by ‘rent-seizing’. In a related argument, Ascher 
(1999) suggested countries rich in natural resources have wasted their natural 
resources because political elites have an inclination to use them to pursue 
political goals such as the funding of contentious development programs, 
achieving control over resource rent allocation and providing economic benefits 
to specific groups.  
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The increases in government expenditure on sectors like construction to the 
detriment of agriculture can be tied to regional rivalry which also pressurised 
regional governments for projects to be cited within its domain. A prominent 
example is the decision made in 1964 to divide the iron and steel industry into 
two sections, one to be located in the East, another in the North. The industry 
could have been divided into three parts to include the Western region, but at 
that time its political power was weak (Bevan et al., 1999).  
The behaviour of government expenditure showed that other sectors were given 
more importance than agriculture and this led to an expansion of the Nigerian 
economy during 1960-65. Sectors like crude oil and natural gas, manufacturing, 
building and construction, public utilities, wholesale and retail trade, health and 
education observed a higher growth than the agricultural sector which was 
beginning to show a decline. The growth rates in these sectors in comparison 
with agriculture are depicted in Figures 3.8, 3.9 and 3.10 below. 
 
Figure 3.8 Annual Growth Rate of Agriculture in Comparison with other 
Economic Sectors (1961 – 1969) 
 
Source of Data: Central Bank of Nigeria (2010) 
Note: The vertical axis shows the annual growth rate of the four sectors (agriculture, crude oil and 
natural gas, manufacturing and building & construction), while the horizontal axis shows the period 
in years from 1961 to 1969.  
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Figure 3.9 Annual Growth Rate of Agriculture in Comparison with other 
Economic Sectors (1961 – 1969) 
 
Source of Data: Central Bank of Nigeria (2010) 
Note: The vertical axis shows the annual growth rate of the four sectors (agriculture, wholesale 
and retail trade, transport and communication), while the horizontal axis shows the period in years 
from 1961 to 1969.  
 
Figure 3.10 Annual Growth Rate of Agriculture in Comparison with other 
Economic Sectors (1961 – 1969) 
 
Source of Data: Central Bank of Nigeria (2010) 
Note: The vertical axis shows the annual growth rate of the four sectors (agriculture, utilities, 
health and education), while the horizontal axis shows the period in years from 1961 to 1969.  
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It is clear from Figures 3.8 to 3.10, that the annual growth rate of agriculture 
experienced a decline especially from 1964-66. The regional rivalry created a 
government spending behaviour tilted towards provision of infrastructure largely 
in the urban centres or where not needed because politicians used the FNDP as 
means for making promises in order to win elections (Bevan et al. 1999). For 
example, in terms of promotion of economic independence, the location of 
projects had also led to the deterioration of the agricultural sector in Nigeria. 
Agricultural activities which are largely subsistence and located in rural areas did 
not benefited from infrastructural facilities that can deliver or store farm produce 
which could in turn add to manufacturing activities that are largely based in the 
urban centers.  
Prior to independence, emphasis was given to agriculture which led to research 
and development and the introduction of new farming techniques through 
extension of services and the provision of infrastructural facilities such as 
railways by the colonial administration. This development accompanied the 
expansion of agricultural exports, especially in crops in the late 1950s and early 
1960s but in the late 1960s, major agricultural programmes on domestic food 
crops were considered unnecessary (Oyejide 1986).  
 
3.4 NIGERIA AFTER INDEPENDENCE: 1970 – 1999 
As Nigeria emerged from the early periods of political instability, civil war and 
witnessed the establishment of the FNDP’s, issues of political rivalry, ethnic and 
regional divisions continued to dominate the scene. These outcomes began to 
define a new phase after a decade of achieving political independence. The 
continued lack of national unity exhibited itself in politics. Political instability 
continued and the military dominated the scene.  
Nigeria has developed extensively but, due to the rapid growth of the oil sector 
in the 1970s, oil production which is located in the one region of the Niger Delta 
gradually became Nigeria’s main export and transformed the country into the 
wealthiest nation in the African continent in the 1970s. However, rather than the 
oil sector contributing to the general development of the key sector of 
agriculture that provided employment opportunities to the majority of the 
Nigerian population, the output of the agricultural sector declined from 56.66% 
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of total output over 1960 – 1969 to 30.01% for the period 1970 – 1979 as 
illustrated in Figure 3.11 below. In contrast the output of the oil sector which is 
claimed to employ only a few of the educated population recorded an increase 
from 3.14 % of total output from 1960 to 1969 to 19.32% for the period 1970 to 
1979. Manufacturing output showed a minimal increase from 6.59% achieved 
over 1960 to 1969 to 6.90% for the period 1970 -1979. This could be due to the 
policies of the FNDP that targeted industrialisation (see Bevan et al. 1999).  
 
Figure 3.11 Outputs of Oil, Manufacturing and  Agriculture 
 
Source of Data: Central Bank Nigeria (2010) 
Note:  
(1). Others mean other components of Nigeria’s GDP and these include building and construction, 
wholesale and retail trade, services and other industrial activities. 
 (2). The output of oil, manufacturing and agriculture are comparisons between the periods 1960-
69 and 1970-79. The vertical axis shows percentages of annual averages covering 10 years for 
each period.  
 
Similarly, oil production and exports increased in the 1970s and 1980s, as 
shown in Figure 3.12 below. For example, oil exports in 1960, 1965 and 1970 
were $12 million, $191 million and $178 million respectively. In the 1970s, a 
period that coincided with rising world oil prices, the value of oil exports grew to 
$3,049 million, $8,997 million, $7,744, $9,444 and $11,561 million in 1973, 
1974, 1975, 1976 and 1977 respectively, giving more revenue for the 
government as shown in Figure 3.13 below. 
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Figure 3.12  Oil Exports (Million US Dollars) 
 
Source of Data: OPEC Statistical Bulletin (2010) 
Note: The vertical axis shows the values of oil exports in Nigeria in million US dollars, while the 
horizontal axis shows the period in years from 1960 to 2010. 
 
Figure 3.13  Oil Revenue (1970 -1980) 
 
Source of Data: Central Bank of Nigeria (2010) 
Note: The vertical axis shows the value of oil revenue in Nigerian local currency (Naira), while the 
horizontal axis shows the period in years from 1970 to 1980.  
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illustrate the percentage share of oil, manufacturing and agricultural output from 
1960 - 1969 and from 1970 - 1980 respectively. The figures depicting the 
development of the Nigerian oil industry and other economic sectors revealed 
that manufacturing and agriculture outweighed oil in Table 3.1 below.  
 
Table 3.1 Output of Oil, Manufacturing and Agriculture in Nigeria      
  (1960-69) 
Year Oil Manufacturing Agriculture     
 
  Others 
 1960 0.44% 4.58% 64.27%  30.71% 
1961 0.93% 5.10% 62.12% 31.85% 
1962 1.12% 5.64% 61.82% 31.42% 
1963 1.16% 6.02% 61.50% 31.31% 
1964 1.76% 6.14% 58.74% 33.36% 
1965 3.71% 7.02% 55.36% 33.91% 
1966 5.89% 7.28% 51.95% 37.32% 
1967 5.42% 7.52% 53.73% 33.33% 
1968 2.40% 7.88% 52.60% 37.12% 
1969 7.19% 8.17% 47.45% 37.19% 
CBN Statistical Bulletin (2010) 
Note: The values in percentages of oil, manufacturing and agriculture represents share in total 
GDP and others mean other components of Nigeria’s GDP and these include building and 
construction, wholesale and retail trade, services and other industrial activities. 
 
However, over time the output of agriculture began to decline and the oil sector 
appreciated in comparison to the others. For example, the oil boom years of the 
1970s affected Nigeria’s manufacturing sector and its output declined as a 
percentage of GDP from 7.53 percent in 1970 to 4.37 percent in 1975 (see Table 
3.2 below and Figure 3.14 below). Figure 3.14 depicts the output of the oil, 
manufacturing and agricultural sector from 1970 to 1980.  
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Table 3.2 Output of Oil, Manufacturing and Agriculture in Nigeria  
  (1970-80) 
Year  Oil Manufacturing Agriculture Others 
1970  11.04% 7.53% 44.74% 36.69% 
1971  13.94% 6.53% 42.10% 37.44% 
1972  15.89% 7.79% 38.04% 38.28% 
1973  16.63% 8.90% 34.06% 40.41% 
1974  21.31% 7.42% 22.98% 48.28% 
1975  21.24% 4.37% 28.11% 46.28% 
1976  23.94% 5.02% 23.46% 47.57% 
1977  22.44% 5.38% 23.48% 48.70% 
1978  21.31% 7.42% 22.98% 48.28% 
1979  25.50% 8.68% 20.15% 45.67% 
1980  21.41% 11.05% 20.61% 46.93% 
Source of Data: CBN Statistical Bulletin (2010) 
Note: The values in percentages of oil, manufacturing and agriculture represents share in total 
GDP and others mean other components of Nigeria’s GDP and these include building and 
construction, wholesale and retail trade, services and other industrial activities. 
 
FIGURE 3.14  Output of Oil, Manufacturing And Agriculture  
 
CBN Statistical Bulletin (2010) 
The vertical axis shows the output of the three sectors (oil, manufacturing and agriculture) in 
percentage terms, while the horizontal axis shows the period in years from 1970 to 2010.  
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Deterioration of output in the manufacturing and agricultural sectors, especially 
in the 1970s, indicated the evidence of the Dutch Disease which led to an 
appreciation of the domestic currency and as a result this leads to a 
deterioration of the domestic manufacturing sector as lower-cost goods are 
imported in and export becomes more expensive (Corden and Neary 1982).  The 
observed deterioration of agriculture, in particular in the 1970s also indicated 
deterioration of economic performance due to the significant contribution of the 
agricultural sector in total GDP as shown Tables 3.1 and 3.2 above.  
To further examine the effect of oil on economic performance due to the 
significant contribution of agriculture, the GDP per capita growth rate is 
employed. Studies in the literature which adopt the political economy approach 
such as those by Ross (2001), Jensen and Wantchekon (2004) and Oskarsson 
and Ottosen (2010) employ this economic indicator in their analysis of the 
relationship between natural resource wealth and economic growth. The weak 
performances of manufacturing and agriculture observed in the 1970s may help 
to explain the low and negative annual growth of GDP per capita in the 1970s as 
shown in Figure 3.15 below.  
In addition, from Figure 3.15 it can be seen that the period from 1970-80 was 
characterised by both key economic and political events. Increases in the oil 
price and nationalisation of oil production was externally motivated and tied to 
political motives. For example, the oil price increase in the early 1970s was the 
result of an oil embargo by OPEC as a response to American involvement in the 
Yom Kippur war between Egypt and Israel. Moreover, the 1970s also witnessed 
two military coups. This indicated continued political instability in Nigeria in the 
face of rising oil revenues and the growing importance of the oil sector from its 
contribution to GDP.  
From the analysis of the period 1960-69 which was six years after independence 
and ten years after oil discovery, political instability occurred in 1966. The 
subsequent year was accompanied by a civil war which also corresponded with a 
rising oil trade balance and a negative non-oil trade balance. As such, the events 
in the period 1960-69 also repeated themselves or continued to exist in the 
following years from 1970-80 as military coups continued.  
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Figure 3.15 Annual GDP Per Capita Growth Rate in Nigeria 
 
Source of Data: World Bank Development Indicators (2014)  
The vertical axis shows the annual growth rate of GDP per capita, while the horizontal axis shows 
the period in years from 1970 to 1980.  
 
The continuity of the previous period scenarios serves to highlight the arguments 
made in the political economy literature. One major argument is that natural 
resource wealth in oil hinders democracy (Wantchekon 2002, Jensen and 
Wantchekon 2004 and Tsui 2011). For example, Collier (2010, p. 1-2) states 
that “although the initial explanation for the resource curse, Dutch disease, was 
purely economic, it has gradually become evident that the key issues are 
political. The political economy of natural resources is about the interplay 
between politics and valuable natural assets. The interplay is potentially in both 
directions: politics can affect the exploitation of natural assets, and natural 
assets can affect politics. In principle, either of these could explain the resource 
curse, but there is a reasonable basis for thinking that both are important”. 
In recognition of the literature, the deterioration in economic performance as 
revealed by the agricultural and manufacturing sectors and the annual growth 
rate of the GDP per capita can also be the result of continued political instability 
after the first two coups in 1966 and also again in 1975 and 1976. Political 
instability also meant sudden changes in the administration of Nigeria and 
existing economic policies may be terminated by the government in power.  
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The coups between 1966 and 1976 were all military led and as such the period 
was characterised by extended military leadership. For example, in July 1975 the 
leaders of the coup installed a Northerner, General Murtala Mohammed, as the 
head of the Nigerian federation.  However, this regime was short lived as the 
General was assassinated in February 1976 after only six months in office. The 
leaders of the military coup then installed Lieutenant General Olusegun 
Obasanjo, a South-Westerner, as the head of state.  
As such, the decline in economic performance revealed by economic indicators 
such as agricultural output and GDP per capita can be linked to unstable 
government policies brought about by political instability. For example those 
policies targeted for boosting industrial development in transport, 
communication and utilities were mostly located in urban centers. This has led to 
the expansion of other economic sectors such as the service sector due to 
increases in oil revenues in the early 1970s (see Figure 3.16 below) as 
government can afford to pay wages and salaries. Most of the services 
subsectors such as education, health, rail and air transport, telecommunications 
and post, electricity and water are state owned.  
 
Figure 3.16  Output of Services  
 
Source of Data: CBN (2010) 
The vertical axis shows the output of the service sector (i.e., transport, communication, utilities, 
finance and insurance, among others) in Nigerian local currency (Naira) and in millions, while the 
horizontal axis shows the period in years from 1970 to 1980.  
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The expansion of the services sector which is illustrated using its output marked 
the beginning of fast increases in off-farm income earning opportunities and the 
neglect of agriculture by many of the rural dwellers to migrate to urban cities in 
search of jobs in the expanding service sector.22 In 1970, the annual growth rate 
in agriculture was 23.34% and that of services was 31.67%. This means a 
difference of 8.33% between the two sectors. However, looking at previous 
years like 1962, the services sector recorded a growth rate of 5% while 
agriculture recorded 3.35%. This shows a difference of 1.65% which is smaller 
compared to 1970. This information also revealed that introduction of some 
policies like expansion of public services and the introduction of universal basic 
education in the 1970s has also helped in bringing sectoral changes. According 
to (Oyejide 1986) this development heightened the rate of rural-urban migration 
at the detriment of agricultural sector (Oyejide 1986).  As such policies 
introduced by the government have also brought about sectoral imbalances 
which resulted in labour shortages that can have adverse effects.   
Beside the continued rise of the oil and services sectors and continued decline of 
the agricultural sector, the 1970s also witnessed the establishment of the 
Second National Development Plan (SNDP) (1970-74) launched by General 
Yakubu Gowon who was the Nigerian military president at that time. The SNDP 
was similar to the FNDP but it also embraced transformation of the whole society 
as one of its main objectives. It saw the use of planning as a means for social 
change by rectifying weaknesses in existing social relations in different areas of 
production, distribution and exchange (Ekundare 1971). However, despite the 
establishment of the SNDP, there appeared to be deterioration in agricultural 
and manufacturing production as discussed above.   
The SNDP was also seen as a post-war development plan which was centred on 
the reconstruction and the promotion of economic and social development. This 
may have triggered the pattern of the different categories of government 
expenditure where capital expenditure is higher than recurrent expenditure23 as 
shown in Figure 3.17 below. Despite rising capital expenditure, economic 
                                                          
22
 The unavailability of data from off-farm income earnings resulted in the employment of the output of the services 
sector to depict its expansion. The services sector also comprises of wide and varied sub-sectors like transport, 
communication, utilities, hotel and restaurant, finance and insurance, public administration, education and health (see 
CBN Statistical Bulletin 2010 for more details of what the services sector entails in Nigeria’s GDP).  
23 Capital expenditure in Nigeria is payments for the non-financial assets used in production for more than one year 
while recurrent expenditure is payments for transactions within one year (CBN Statistical Bulletin 2010). 
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performance in terms of GDP per capita and agriculture deteriorated which 
depict continued misallocation of capital investment that could be tied to rent 
seeking that is aggravated by continuing social divisions and oil rental income 
(Karl 1997, Auty 2001, Auty and Gelb 2001 and Moore 2002, 2004). Karl 
(1997), for example, argued that reliance on oil leads to the political distribution 
of rental income rather than promotion of private investment and economic 
development. Also Karl (2007) claimed that countries which largely depend on 
oil will in time become among the most economically troubled and the most 
politically authoritarian in the world. Since 1966, Nigeria has witnessed several 
military coups and civilian rule was not actualised until 1979.  
 
Figure 3.17  Oil Revenue, Non-Oil Revenue, Recurrent and Capital  
   Expenditure (Naira million) 
 
Source of Data: Central Bank of Nigeria (2010)  
Note: The vertical axis shows the value of oil revenue, non-oil revenue, recurrent and capital 
expenditure in Nigerian local currency (Million Naira), while the horizontal axis shows the period in 
years from 1970 to 1980.  
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from another region, especially the oil producing area if they felt marginalised. 
Ross 2002 and Collier and Hoeffler (2002) for example describe some 
hypotheses about the mechanisms that link natural resources and civil war. For 
example, resource wealth increases the probability of civil war by causing 
grievances and by giving residents in resource-rich areas an incentive to form a 
separate state. This outcome has been demonstrated by the outbreak of civil 
unrest in the oil producing region. Also factors such as economic, political and 
ethnic contributed in the outbreak of the Biafran civil war (Khan 1994). 
Additionally, the outbreak of the civil war (1967-70) which originated from the 
oil producing region was an additional factor which led to the nationalisation of 
oil production after Nigeria OPEC in 1971. The oil sector was an exclusive 
domain of the international oil companies (IOCs). This outcome reflects another 
development plan or policy that is also tied to political motives, in addition to the 
economic effects attached to such a programme.24 
The nationalisation of the oil sector located in the South-East of Nigeria brought 
about more intervention and control by the Nigerian government in the 
administration of the sector through its oil company, Nigerian National Oil 
Corporation (NNOC).25 The increase in intervention and control also led to the 
establishment of the Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR) as a regulatory 
body and the empowerment of the initial oil company in to the Nigerian National 
Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) in 1977 so as to take part in both upstream and 
downstream activities that was originally the domain of the IOCs. The IOCs were 
left to operate but with lesser power. The nationalisation of the oil industry 
subsequently brought about the establishment of several institutions to regulate 
the oil industry (see Table 3.3 below). However, the Nigerian state and its 
regulatory powers have gradually viewed the oil industry related institutions, 
especially the NNPC and the DPR, as bodies for extracting political and economic 
benefits (Gboyega 2011). This can be explained by reasons such as the need to 
appease the region that is in control of central government through increasing 
                                                          
24
 For example, in Mexico, one of the first countries to nationalise its oil industry, the choice to nationalise was 
justified by decreasing oil revenues, which the state blamed on the international oil companies (IOCs). Likewise, the 
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) was formed just a month after Standard Oil of New Jersey 
(now Exxon-Mobil) announced a reduction of fourteen cents a barrel (about 7 percent) in the posted price for Middle 
Eastern crude oil (See, Griffin and Teece 1982). 
25
 A decree was approved that required state ownership of at least 60 percent share in all foreign businesses and the 
state oil company would manage the ownership stake (Gboyega 2011). 
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employment of its people and a change of management to suit the government 
in power. 
 
Table 3.3 Some Nigerian Oil Industry Regulators  
Organisation Year of 
Establishment 
Function on Behalf of Nigerian 
Government 
Department of Petroleum Resources 1970 Supervision of oil industry 
operations 
Nigerian National Oil Corporation 1971 Managing of commercial operations  
Nigerian National Petroleum 
Corporation 
1977 oil refining, transportation and 
marketing 
Pipelines and Product Marketing 
Company 
1988 sourcing and distribution of refined 
oil products 
Source: Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (2016) 
 
The increased intervention of the Nigerian government in the oil industry from 
1971 appeared to have changed the importance of the oil industry and this can 
be due to both exogenous and endogenous factors. Exogenously, the early 
1970s witnessed the increases in world oil prices and this development 
translated to higher revenues for oil exporting countries. Endogenously, the 
government established bodies like the NNPC to participate in both upstream 
and downstream production activities of the oil industry. The increase 
importance of the oil sector which is largely in terms of revenue generation 
started to provide the different government regimes with more revenue at their 
disposal without waiting for tax from the public for source of income. This 
development is illustrated in Figure 3.16 above where oil revenue is higher than 
non-oil revenue.  
The size of the oil windfall in the 1970s was significantly large and this provided 
a platform for the country’s consumer identity to take over due to lack of 
absorptive capacity of infrastructure, for instance, the lack of investment 
institutions (Khan 1994).  This evidence helps to show that increases in oil 
revenue has also reduced the political and economic importance of the 
taxpayers, thereby eliminating a form of political pressure which might have 
helped to control the rising government expenditure (Forrest 1995). The rise in 
government expenditure may have been exacerbated by existing ethnic and 
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regional rivalries that were shown in political instability as societal struggles for 
the oil rental income. For example, the annual rate of change in total 
expenditure from 1961 to 1962 was 2.18% and this increased to 62.51% in 
1970 and by 1975 the figure rose to 116.84%.   
Similarly, the establishment of additional organisations for oil industry regulation 
highlighted the gradual complexity in the administration of key economic sectors 
in Nigeria which is intensified by societal rivalry. This also indicated another 
source of expansion of the public sector due to increases in oil rental income. 
The creation of oil industry regulators was also accompanied by the provision of 
additional refineries in the country. Between 1978 and 1989, NNPC constructed 
oil refineries in Warri, Kaduna and Port Harcourt and acquired the 35,000-barrel 
Shell refinery established in Port Harcourt in 1965. The Shell refinery was 
Nigeria's first oil refinery, constructed in Alesa Eleme near Port Harcourt by Shell 
Oil Company which commenced operations in late 1965 with a capacity of 
38,000 barrels per day, enough to meet domestic demand at that time. 
Production was later expanded to 60,000 barrels per day after the civil war; 
however the increase in production failed to satisfy the demands of a rapidly 
growing economy (Metz 1991). 
The provision of refined oil products such as diesel, petrol and kerosene which 
are among the main source of energy in Nigeria started to experience a 
significant decline especially in the 19990s despite the existence of the four 
refineries in Nigeria. The scarcity of refined oil products are hindrances to 
economic activities such as the transportation of agricultural products from the 
farm to the market place. Also the scarcity affected manufacturing activities due 
to continuous shortages of electricity supply and businesses and households had 
to rely on diesel to power their imported generators.  
All the above factors can add up to distort the production and distribution of 
agricultural and manufacturing products in Nigeria and with adverse 
consequences on the main source of income for many Nigerians. This 
development also started to highlight the negative impacts of nationalisation of 
the oil sector on the Nigerian economy.   
As time progresses with the nationalisation of oil production and continued 
importance of the oil sector which was initially below the agricultural sector, the 
political situation in Nigeria continued. The upheavals between the military 
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dominated the political landscape as they exchanged the leadership of Nigeria 
without being able to diversify the economy away from oil dependence. In the 
period from 1966 to 1999, the military only handed power to a civilian 
government from 1979 to 1983. In 1983, the president of the second republic 
was overthrown by a military regime and was succeeded by Major General 
Muhammadu Buhari from 31st December 1983 to 27th August 1985. This military 
administration lasted for two years and was overthrown in 1985 by General 
Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida. Babangida promised to install a democratic rule 
but that did not happened as he ruled the country for ten years amidst rising oil 
revenues and dwindling performance in the annual growth rate of the 
manufacturing and agriculture sectors as depicted in Figure 3.18 and 3.19 
respectively as shown below.  
 
Figure 3.18  Oil Revenue (1985 – 1993) 
       
Source of Data: Central Bank of Nigeria (2010)  
Note: The vertical axis shows the value of oil revenue in Nigerian local currency (Million Naira), 
while the horizontal axis shows the period in years from 1985 to 1993.  
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Figure 3.19 Annual Growth Rates of Manufacturing and Agriculture  
 
Source of Data: Central Bank of Nigeria (2010)  
Note: The vertical axis shows the annual growth rate in the output of the manufacturing and 
agriculture sectors in Nigerian local currency (Million Naira), while the horizontal axis shows the 
period in years from 1985 to 1993.  
 
During Babangida’s tenure he lifted the ban on political activity in 1989 and the 
government established a two political party platform in preparation for a 
democratic handover. The National Republican Convention (NRC) and Social 
Democratic Party (SDP) were established. The subsequent years also witnessed 
political unrest as the presidential election was postponed until 12th June 1993. 
It was claimed that Mashood Kashimawo Olawale Abiola a South-Westerner won 
the presidential election under the SDP and defeated his Northern counterparts 
despite ethnic, regional and religious divisions but this election was annulled by 
Ibrahim Babangida who is from the North (see, Ajani 2012).  
In 1993 Ibrahim Babangida handed power to Ernest Shonekan in a move 
towards democracy but two months later Shonekan was overthrown by a 
military officer General Sani Abacha who was from the North. Abacha ruled 
Nigeria until 1998 when he died during his campaign for a continuation of 
leadership under a civilian rule. The death of Abacha brought the end of military 
rule in Nigeria and brought civilian administration in 1999. After Abacha’s death 
General Abdulsalam Abubakar took over and prepared Nigeria to a democratic 
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rule from June 1998 to May 1999. It was during Abdulsalam’s rule Nigeria 
implemented a new constitution which provided for a multiparty political 
platform, in contrast with Babangida’s regime which allowed only two. 
After a long period of military government, the political scene that characterised 
the years after independence changed in 1999. The restoration of democracy 
marked the beginning of political stability which has been absent since 1966. 
The return to democratic rule brought in Olusegun Obasanjo a former Nigerian 
army general to power under the People’s Democratic Party on 29th May 1999 as 
the Nigerian president. Obasanjo was a president during the military regime of 
1976-79 and from the South-West of Nigeria.26 The return to democratic rule 
also highlighted a change from the Northern region’s dominance in terms of 
power prior to 1999. All the presidents (1979 to 1998) were from the North.  
The Obasanjo’s regime established a number of economic reforms to move the 
Nigerian economy forward. For example, there were reforms targeted at the oil 
sector due to evidence of inefficiency, in particular the scarcity of refined oil 
products and issues of lack of transparency and accountability (Gboyega 2011). 
Although, Obasanjo’s economic policies are said to be a continuation of the 
Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP)27 measures in so many ways (Falola 
and Heaton 2008). Also, Obasanjo’s regime policies included reducing Nigeria’s 
external debt, privatisation of the public utilities, and attraction of foreign direct 
investment (FDI). 
 
3.5 SUMMARY    
Prior to independence, Nigeria came into existence in 1914 from an 
amalgamation of the Northern and Southern regions by the British colonial 
administration. Subsequently, nationalist movements originated largely in the 
more developed southern region and led to political independence in October 
1960. After this, Nigeria witnessed changes in both its political and economic 
structures.   
                                                          
26
 Obasanjo was convicted in 1995 of coup plotting and was sentenced to prison for 15 years but was released after 
Abacha’s death on 8 June 1998 (Berkeley Center for Religion, Peace and World Affairs 2013).   
27
 SAP was introduced primarily for two years (July 1986-June 1988) and was the key response to the declining oil 
resources, macroeconomic policy distortions and the growing need to diversify the productive base of the Nigerian 
economy. The implementation of SAP was conducted under General Ibrahim Babangida’s administration. 
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Politically, the nationalist movements that resulted in independence turned into 
political parties which set the stage for national politics that were basically 
formed around regional and ethnic pillars. The formation of political parties 
based on regional and ethnic identities culminated in a growing fear among 
Nigerians of domination of their local areas. This outcome led to the struggle for 
regional and central power and resulted in the onset of official corruption in 
Nigerian elections.  
Economically, Nigeria relied on agriculture which was widely spread across the 
regions for economic enhancement. Agriculture provided Nigeria with a source of 
foreign earnings from exports of agricultural commodities. The heavy reliance on 
agriculture was evident before independence and this also continued some years 
after. In the late 1960s and subsequent years, economically Nigeria came to 
depend on oil production and exports located in the southern part of the country. 
The oil sector also provides employment opportunities but only for small part of 
the educated labour force which is in sharp contrast with the agricultural sector 
that employs most Nigerians both educated and illiterate. This outcome 
appeared to be the result of the onset of weakening economic activity especially 
in agriculture which was the mainstay of the Nigerian economy. 
The resultant changes in economic and political structures appeared to affect the 
performance of the Nigerian economy despite national development plans 
initiated because the manufacturing and agricultural sectors witnessed 
deterioration some years after independence. This continued in the subsequent 
periods except for the oil sector which has come to dominate economic activity 
and benefit a privileged few.  
The formation of political parties based on regional and ethnic platforms also 
coincided with oil discovery and subsequent reliance on it by various Nigerian 
governments for financing a larger part of government expenditure. Also, 
political instability which occurred with the domination of military regimes was 
also attributed to a fear of regional and ethnic domination in the governance of 
Nigeria. This intensified as oil revenues become the dominant source of 
government income. This could also illustrate the use of the oil industry and its 
institutions for political motives.   
Before and after independence, the Nigerian oil industry was an exclusive 
domain of the IOCs until 1971 when Nigeria joined OPEC and nationalised the oil 
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sector according to OPEC policy requirements. However, before nationalisation of 
the oil sector the political upheavals due to regional identities appeared to have 
had a significant impact. A civil war that emerged in the oil producing region due 
to a feeling of marginalisation and other factors also affected the economy 
socially and economically as lives and properties were lost. This period also 
coincided with rising oil revenues and the occurrence of political instability in the 
1960s, 1970s and subsequent years until 1999 when democracy was restored. 
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CHAPTER 4 
NIGERIA AND OIL POST RETURN TO DEMOCRATIC RULE: 
1999 – 2010 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter examined and showed how regional and ethnic differences 
were built into Nigeria since its formation and also how the subsequent rise of 
the oil sector changed the economy. The continuing development of this sector 
was influenced by political and economic changes and which subsequently 
influenced their trajectory up to 1999 when a stable democratic landscape was 
achieved. The prevalence of ethnic and regional differences which resulted in a 
lack of national unity and the use of oil industry institutions for economic and 
political payoffs dominated the scene and this also appeared to continue even 
after the return of democratic rule in 1999.  
This chapter now shows how this trajectory helps in understanding why Nigeria 
has failed to develop despite a change in the political landscape and continual 
expansion in oil revenues.  Also it shows how this failure can be understood in 
terms of the interaction between social and political factors such as tribal, 
regional and religious rivalry in addition to political instability which may have 
promoted rent seeking, change in ownership structure and institutional 
weakness. Although basic economic concepts such as Dutch Disease, oil price 
volatility and declining terms of trade matter, they alone cannot fully explain the 
lack of economic growth in Nigeria. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
97 
 
 
4.2 RETURN TO DEMOCRATIC RULE AND THE IMPACT ON POLITICS 
The ethnic and religious backgrounds that precipitated the civil war and political 
instability due to constant military take-over continued to be a major factor after 
the return to democracy. Prior to the transfer of power to civilian control the 
interim government in power introduced a multi-party system in 1998 in 
preparation for a democratic handover to mark the end of political instability 
dominated by military administration. After the elections in 1999, the People’s 
Democratic Party (PDP) won the presidential office with a president from the 
South-West region and a North-Easterner as the vice president. However, the 
outcome of the 1999 elections was only possible with the coming together of 
political leaders from different regions under the PDP as one political party. The 
republic in 1999 appeared to have changed the established norm which was 
largely regional and tied to ethnic and religious backgrounds.  
Subsequently, the PDP has continued to win the various elections held in 2003, 
2007 and 2011 and also won the majority of the political seats in both the house 
of senate and house of representatives as shown in Table 4.1 below. Yet many 
Nigerians and the outside world see their success as falsified. For example, the 
election that took place in 2011 was also seen as corrupt as violence erupted in 
some parts of the country (The Economist 2014). As such, many thought that 
the PDP achieved its dominance and breakthrough via the manipulation of the 
Nigerian political system which was fragile due to continued ethnic, religion and 
regional issues.  
This dominance amidst many political parties may have been exacerbated 
because of existing and underlying ethnic and regional disparities coupled with a 
dominating and rising source of external rental income from oil export that does 
not require the government to rely on tax income from the population. Basically 
this outcome may have failed to promote the gains of democracy associated with 
enhanced and sustained economic development. For example, Easterly and 
Levine (1997) suggested that ethnic division28 stimulates rent-seeking behaviour 
                                                          
28 Nigeria is highly ethnic divided with three major ethnic groups dominating. These are the Hausa/Fulani, Yoruba 
and Igbo. 
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that promotes the implementation of growth-retarding policies and inhibits 
unanimity on investment in growth-promoting infrastructure.  
 
Table 4.1 Political Parties and Share of Seats in the National Assembly 
 
Parties 
 
 
House of 
Representatives 
 
Senate 
seats % seats % 
                                                   2007 Election 
Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) 260 72.63 85 77.98 
All Nigeria Peoples Party (ANPP) 62 17.32 16 14.68 
Action Congress (AC) 32 8.94 6 5.5 
Progressive Peoples Alliance 3 0.84 1 0.92 
Labour Party (LP) 1 0.28   
Accord   1 0.92 
                                                     2011 Election 
Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) 180 50 62 56.88 
All Progressive Congress (APC) 165 45.83 43 39.45 
Labour Party (LP) 8 2.22 3 2.75 
Accord 4 1.11   
Democratic People’s Party 1 0.28   
CAN 1 0.28   
PPN 1 0.28   
All Nigeria Peoples Party (ANPP)   1 0.92 
Source of Data: National Assembly of Nigeria (2014) and Inter-Parliamentary Union (2014) 
 
Furthermore, continued societal issues can be shown and justified using Table 
4.2 below. Table 4.2 below depicts some examples of societal violence and 
conflicts in Nigeria prior and after democratic return. It is important to show the 
period before return to a stable democratic rule in order to demonstrate the 
existence of social and political issues in Nigeria. Due to unavailability of data 
from past periods, only data from 1997 - 1999 is provided. Also, four years data 
are taken to represent return to a stable democratic period.   
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Table 4.2 Examples of Some Societal Violence in Nigeria 
Prior to Stable Democratic Return  
Year Event Type Actor Incidence  
1997 Battle with no change of 
territory and 
Violence against civilians 
Ethnic  militia29  47 
Muslim militia 1 
Communal militia 4 
Political group militia 1 
 
1998 Battle with no change of 
territory and 
Violence against civilians 
Ethnic  militia30 38 
Muslim militia 3 
Communal militia 4 
Political group militia 3 
 
1999 Battle with no change of 
territory and 
Violence against civilians 
Ethnic  militia31 61 
Muslim militia 2 
Communal militia 7 
Political group militia 1 
Shiite Islamic Militia 1 
Oodua People's 
Congress (OPC) 
9 
 
Return to Democracy  
2000 Battle with no change of 
territory and 
Violence against civilians 
Ethnic  militia 52 
Muslim militia 2032 
Communal militia 4 
Political group militia 233 
Shiite Islamic Militia  
Oodua People's 
Congress (OPC) 
1034 
Movement for the 
Survival of the Ogoni 
People (MASOP) 
1 
Movement for the 
Actualization of a 
Sovereign State of 
Biafra (MASSOB) 
2 
 
2003 Battle with no change of 
territory and 
Violence against civilians 
Ethnic  militia 36 
Muslim militia 6 
Communal militia 3 
Political group militia 2535 
Oodua People's 
Congress (OPC) 
1 
Movement for the 
Actualization of a 
Sovereign State of 
Biafra (MASSOB) 
2 
 
2007 Battle-No change of 
territory and 
Violence against civilians 
Ethnic  militia 1 
Muslim militia 3 
Political group militia 636 
                                                          
29 
With high number of incidence from Ijaw ethnic group which is found in Delta State in the oil producing region 
30
 High incidence from Ijaw ethnic group  
31
 High incidence from Ijaw ethnic group  
32 
Mostly conducted in Kaduna State in the Northern part of Nigeria 
33 
By People’s Democratic Party  
34
 Occurred in places like Lagos and Kwara States which are located in the South-West of Nigeria  
35
 By Alliance for Democracy (AD), All Nigerian People’s Party (ANPP) and People’s Democratic Party (PDP) but  
largely carried out by PDP with 18 out of 5 incidence 
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Movement for the 
Emancipation of the 
Niger Delta (MEND) 
2737 
 
2010 Battle-No change of 
territory and 
Violence against civilians 
Ethnic  militia 64 
Muslim militia 18 
Christian militia  10 
Political group militia 1038 
Boko Haram 3539 
Kala Kato militia 2 
Movement for the 
Actualization of a 
Sovereign State of 
Biafra (MASSOB) 
3 
Movement for the 
Emancipation of the 
Niger Delta (MEND) 
13 
Source: Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project 2015 
Note:  
(1) Ethnic and communal militias largely consist youths who fight for the perceived social 
injustices and political marginalisation of their people 
(2) According to ACLED cord book (2016) an ethnic militia is linked to a direct ethnic 
community.  
 Communal militia are violent acts between and across non-state groups.  
 Boko Haram is categorised by ACLED as a local and ethnically bounded group that operate 
as armed and violent wing of a religious organisation. It is also associated with a defined region.  
 
It can be see that ethnic, communal, religion and political group militia appear 
throughout this period. It is observed that political group militia increased in 
2003 and religious sect militias appeared significantly in 2010. There is evidence 
of both Muslim and Christian conflicts in 2010. Also the appearance of violence 
from other claimed Muslim groups such as Boko Haram and Kala Kato are 
apparent in 2010. Moreover, other communal groups such as Oodua People's 
Congress (OPC), Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MASOP) and 
Movement for the Actualization of a Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB) are 
conflicts that highlight the feelings of marginalisation by people from the oil 
producing region in Nigeria. 
The incidences of societal conflicts as shown in Table 4.2 vary across the period 
studied. Ethnic militia has shown a higher rate of incidence, especially in 1999 
which marked the year to democratic transition and in 2010 which was one year 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
36
 By PDP 
37
 Conducted in Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Delta and Rivers States which are located in the South-East of Nigeria and the 
oil producing region 
38
 Largely carried out by PDP with 8 out of 10 incidences 
39 
Carried out in Borno, Bauchi, Katsina, Plateau and Yobe States located in Northern Nigeria. Most of Boko Haram’s 
violence are carried out in Borno State  
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away from another political election. Also the incidence of Christian conflict 
appeared in 2010 which also corresponded with the high occurrence of Boko 
Haram’s violence that also claims allegiance to Islam.  Also, since the late 
1980s, the issue of ethnicity has assumed troubling and different dimensions 
(Anugwom 2000). According to Anugwom, the critical concerns are that of 
marginalisation and agitations by ethnic minorities in Nigeria. This also shows 
the rise of ethnic militia from minority tribes like the Ijaw, Ekori, Urhobo, Gindiri, 
Berom and Isekiri.    
Likewise, the return of a stable democracy in 1999 and the subsequent years 
that followed under Obasanjo’ administration witnessed the continuance of 
ethnic and religious tensions that often erupted into violence (Berkeley Center 
for Religion, Peace and World Affairs 2013). These continued tensions did not 
allow Obansajo’s ambition in changing the constitution to allow him serve for a 
third tenure as president and he stepped down in 2007.  
 
4.3 RETURN TO DEMOCRATIC RULE AND THE IMPACT ON 
 INSTITUTIONS 
A number of studies in the literature such as Gylfason et al. (1999), Isham et al. 
(2002) and Collier and Hoeffler (2005) use the role of political and 
socioeconomic institutions in explaining why some resource rich countries failed 
to develop. For example, Collier and Hoeffler (2005) argued that countries rich in 
natural resources often depend on a system that is based on patronage and do 
not nurture a democratic system based on electoral competition, scrutiny and 
civil rights.  
In the case of Nigeria, the previous chapter shows how societal conflicts such as 
ethnic and regional rivalries and the rise of the oil sector affected political and 
economic institutions. It appeared that economic and political institutions in 
Nigeria have not been stable and strong and with return to a stable democratic 
environment, institutional stability may be expected. However, it is important to 
remember from the previous chapter that political and economic institutions 
appeared to be deteriorating in their post-independence developmental stages 
which were tied to societal rivalry and reliance on the oil sector. It can be argued 
that the presence of these outcomes cannot guarantee a mature democratic 
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landscape that can ensure the efficient functioning of political and socioeconomic 
institutions without which economic development is not sustainable. Moore 
(2002, 2004), for example, claimed that natural resource wealth leads to weak 
governance in developing economies because financial autonomy of states 
suggests that they have little accountability to their citizens. Also, Rosser 
(2006b) argued that the nature of state institutions in resource-rich economies 
is often influenced by existing social arrangements and forces at work, especially 
in situations where resource wealth reliance of the economy ensued after the 
state formation.  Moreover, Okruhlic (1999) suggested that the degree to which 
social forces comprised of corporate groups before oil has been recognised to 
influence economic policies even in typical ‘rentier’ states40 as Saudi Arabia. This 
can be argued in the Nigerian context where ethnic and regional rivalries formed 
a greater part of social forces before oil discovery and this has assisted shaping 
the institutional setting in Nigeria.  
To achieve the gains of democracy, the ruling PDP party initiated reforms that 
could help establish and strengthen institutions such as those concerned with 
law enforcement, corrupt practices and transparency and accountability. The aim 
was to achieve a clean break from the existing and weak institutional 
environment that has been characterised with corrupt practices like money 
laundering by government officials, weak governance and lack of transparency 
and accountability, especially in public offices.  Some of the institutions 
established are the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), the 
Independent Corrupt Practices Commission (ICPC) and the Nigerian Extractive 
Industries Transparency Initiative (NEITI). For example, EFCC is an organisation 
established in 2003 to investigate financial crimes such as money laundering, 
advance fee fraud and bank malpractices.  
Evidence to substantiate the argument that the presence of weak and inherited 
political and socioeconomic institutions coupled with continued reliance on the oil 
sector cannot provide a strong platform for new institutional reforms to take 
over is shown below. An example is that the existence of new government 
institutions has not prevented the issues of money laundering by many 
government officials as there were evidences of lack of transparency and 
                                                          
40
 Rentier States are countries that largely depend on external rents and these rents are usually generated from the 
exploitation of natural resources. Also these rents are seen as largely unearned (see, for example, Moore 2004 for 
more explanation).   
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accountability especially in the oil sector and malpractices in the banks.41 For 
instance, before the return to democratic rule in 1999 there were claims that the 
oil sector has been plagued with numerous problems. These included a lack of 
accountability and transparency. This applied to the national oil company (NNPC) 
and of other oil companies operating within the oil sector. This was also 
accompanied by lack of local employment, heavy environmental pollution and 
inefficiency in the downstream sector especially in the sale of refined oil products 
among other problems42. In addition, the ruling party also tried to target the 
NNPC due to the entrenched and corrupt practices known within the company 
(Gboyega 2011).  
One example to illustrate that the institutions established to provide 
transparency and accountability  have not performed in a democratic setting is 
the issue of unaccounted funds amounting to nearly $50 billion by the NNPC 
which has been reported by Sanusi Lamido Sanusi who is the former suspended 
central bank governor of Nigeria to the government in 2013. After Sanusi alleged 
that the NNPC failed to remit $49.8 billion as constitutionally required, the value 
was subsequently reduced to $20 billion by the former central bank governor 
after reconciliation of the amounts (Premium Times 2014). The former governor 
was suspended from office in early 2014 by the Nigerian President Goodluck 
Jonathan for purported financial recklessness; Sanusi and several Nigerians 
believe he is being punished for revealing the practice of fraud in the NNPC 
(Premium Times 2014). 
The adverse effects of natural resources on economic growth has been examined 
by the literature and some studies relate the issue to institutional quality such as 
institutions of private sector efficiency and institutions of public sector 
accountability, specifically, public sector institutions governing the natural 
resource sector (see, for example, Melhun 2006 and Robinson et al. 2006). This 
strand of the literature provides an insight of the Nigeria situation because the 
public institutions managing the oil sector have failed in their duties for not 
remitting and disclosing public revenue from the oil sector.  
                                                          
41
 This development called for a reform of these institutions by the new government in 2015 which is headed by a 
president from the All Progressive Congress party (see Ayansina 2015).  
42
 See, Gboyega (2011) and Sayne et al. (2012) for more explanation. 
. 
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In addition, allegations of a disconnection between the financial institutions and 
the ‘real’ economy have been reported as a major problem. This is also another 
form of institutional weakness depicted by the financial sector. For example, the 
former governor of the Nigerian Central Bank, Sanusi Lamido Sanusi, in a BBC 
interview stated that malpractices in the banking sector such as fraud, bad loans 
and lack of disclosure have helped to exacerbate the weak state of economic 
development in Nigeria.43 Total lending issued by commercial banks to small and 
medium enterprises (SMEs) declined at an exponential rate between 2003 and 
2012 and recorded a value of only 0.14 percent of total commercial banks loans 
in 2012 (Business Day 2013). This evidence can be partly substantiated in 
Figure 5.1 below which illustrates the value of loans issued by commercial banks 
to small scale enterprises. From Figure 4.1 it is clearly evident that a significant 
decline started from 2003 until 2006 and a decrease was also recorded in 2008 
and 2010.  
Likewise, from Figure 4.2 below, the decline in loans as a percentage of total 
credit extended to small scale enterprises is confirmed but other loans appeared 
to be on the increase. This outcome depicts the weak capacity of the commercial 
banks to issue loans to small scale businesses which started in 1992 (Central 
Bank of Nigeria Statistical Bulletin 2010) and a further disconnection between 
the real sector and the financial sector.  
The disconnection between the real sector and the financial sector in a 
democratic setting also gives rise to debate in the literature. For instance, an 
explanation of the negative effect of natural resource wealth on economic 
growth from the economic perspective includes impediments to entrepreneurship 
(Sachs and Warner 2001).  This reflects the Nigerian situation as there appeared 
to be less promotion of small scale entrepreneurial activities from the above 
discussion.    
On the other hand, when one looks at the impact of the return to democracy on 
the financial institutions, this outcome also reflects the suggestions of some 
studies in the political economy literature on democracy and economic growth. 
Some researchers are of the view that a certain level of development is required 
for a stable democracy because affluence weakens the amount of distributional 
conflict (Przeworski et al. 1995). In the Nigerian situation, declining loans to 
                                                          
43 
Sanusi (2011) 
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small scale businesses which may be owned by less affluent people could deter 
the establishment of a stable democracy. This has been evidenced in the few 
years after independence and even in the democratic period there are examples 
of many types of conflict as shown in Table 4.2 above.  
From Figures 4.1 and 4.2 below, it can be seen that, despite a return to 
democratic rule in 1999 and other subsequent political elections in 2003 and 
2007 together with the institutional reforms observed, loans to small businesses 
continued to decline. Many developing economies introduced several reforms to 
improve democracy (Rachdi and Saidi 2015). This is also the case in Nigeria as 
several reforms were initiated. However, Przeworski and Limongi (1995) 
considered the issue of whether the political realm of democracy enhances or 
hinders economic growth. 
 
 Figure 4.1 Commercial Bank Loans to Small Scale Enterprises  
 
Source: Central Bank of Nigeria (2010) 
Note: The vertical axis shows the value of commercial bank loans issued to small scale enterprises 
in Naira million, while the horizontal axis shows the period in years from 1999 to 2010.  
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Figure 4.2 Commercial Banks Loans to Small Scale Enterprises and  
  Other Businesses 
 
Source: Central Bank of Nigeria Statistical Bulletin (2010) 
Note:  
(1) The vertical axis shows the percentage of commercial banks loans issued to small scale   
enterprises and others, while the horizontal axis shows the period in years from 1999 
to  2010.  
(2) Others means other forms of loans issued by commercial banks in Nigeria 
(3) The abolition of mandatory banks' credit allocations of 20% of its total credit to small 
scale enterprises wholly owned by Nigerians took effect from October 1, 1996 (Central 
Bank of Nigeria Statistical Bulletin 2010) 
(4) Small Scale Enterprises started in 1992 (Central Bank of Nigeria Statistical Bulletin 
2010) 
 
Problems in the Nigerian banking sector despite existence of institutions put in 
place like EFCC and ICPC also called for reform when the former central bank 
governor Sanusi Lamido Sanusi came into office in June, 2009. Some senior 
bank executives were dismissed due to issues of fraud, giving loans to 
companies based on personal interest, lending to fake businesses and 
collaborating with stockbrokers to boost share prices in the Nigerian stock 
market (This Day Live 2013). It could be further argued that issues of fraudulent 
activities in the banking sector may help explain part of the significant and 
sustained increase in domestic credit provided by the banks from 2006 to 2009 
as shown in Figure 4.3 below. After 2009 there was a decline in domestic credit 
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which may possibly explain the effect of the banking reforms. For example, in 
2010, the governor stated that banks will only give credit to local SMEs in as 
much as the Nigerian government gives appropriate attention to the provision of 
infrastructure (Business Day 2013).  
 
Figure 4.3 Domestic Credit as % of GDP 
 
Source of Data: World Bank Development Indicators (2015) 
Note: The vertical axis shows the value of domestic credit as a percentage of GDP, while the 
horizontal axis shows the period in years from 1999 to 2010.  
 
Apart from the analysis of the effect of the return to democracy on the financial 
sector, this chapter also further examines other sectors such as the oil and 
manufacturing sectors in Nigeria to which the political economy literature 
reflects. In addition, the establishment of these economic institutions also 
marked a critical change in Nigeria’s economic and political development.  
To support the analysis of other institutions established in Nigeria, another 
section of the literature focuses on issues related to the rentier state theory. This 
explanation point to economies that obtain regular and significant amounts of 
unearned income in the form of, for example, taxes on natural resource exports 
or royalties on natural resource production (see, for example, Karl 1997 and 
Vandewalle 1998). State owned enterprise sectors are usually quite large in 
rentier states, with roles related to the regulation and management of the 
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economy (Garaibeh 1987). In the case of Nigeria, the state owned oil company 
(NNPC) is also large with several subsidiaries attached. It has been observed 
that any regime that comes to power makes a number of changes, including top 
management in the name of managing the oil sector. This has been evidenced 
by the PDP administration, especially during Obasanjo’s administration where 
additional oil industry regulations were established such as NEITI in 2007, 
Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory Agency (PPPRA) and deregulation of the 
downstream sector in 2003.   
The expansion of NNPC and establishment of more public offices in the form of 
reforms can be argued to be tied to the rentier and patronage system that allow 
political leaders to create more public institutions and distribute income to suit 
their political ambitions without being subject to much public scrutiny as 
institutions concerned with that are weak. Since the oil money seems to be 
distributed largely among the few educated elites that know somebody in 
government like through job appointment or award of contract, this allow 
political leaders in office to go away with such acts.   
Thereby, institutional reforms initiated by the previous governments and the PDP 
ruling party may have failed because the rentier system coupled with ethnic and 
regional rivalry still exists as Nigeria continues to rely on oil revenues and this 
may have provided a vehicle for power to be either seized or secured and 
maintained by those who have access to rental income like the PDP. In addition, 
the issues of ethnic and regional conflict may have created a myopia among 
Nigerians who could not understand that a coming together in order to elect the 
right leaders was necessary to promote widespread economic development in 
Nigeria.  
To support the above outcome, Easterly and Levine (1997) state that an 
understanding of cross-country differences in growth rates entails not only a 
knowledge of the relationship between growth and public policies but also an 
understanding of the reasons why countries choose different public policies. 
Their analysis shows that ethnic diversity helps explain cross-country differences 
in public policies and other economic indicators. In particular, they argued that 
in Sub-Saharan Africa, economic development is linked to political instability, low 
schooling, high government deficits, an underdeveloped financial system and 
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insufficient infrastructure. They further argued that Africa’s high ethnic 
fragmentation explains a significant part of these outcomes.   
To further depict the arguments of the studies of Easterly and Levine (1997), 
this chapter also shows the impact of government policy such as increasing 
expenditure on internal security which has become a problem in Nigeria due to 
the many occurrences of conflict as documented in Table 4.2 above.  Also, the 
choice of government expenditure is important in this analysis to show the 
contribution of oil to the improvement of the standard of living of Nigerians. Oil 
has been a dominant source of income and government revenue (CIA 2016) and 
oil accounts for about 75 percent of Nigeria’s consolidated budgetary revenues 
(World Bank 2016).  
In support of the choice of government expenditure as a variable for analysis in 
this chapter, it is well documented that economists have long been concerned 
with the examination of the relationship between public expenditure and national 
income (see, for example, Peacock and Wiseman, 1961 and Landau, 1983). 
Government expenditure is seen as an exogenous factor, which can be used as a 
policy instrument to influence economic development and is also seen as an 
endogenous factor and not a cause of growth in national income. The former 
hypothesis is allied to that of Keynes and the latter to that of Wagner (Ansari et 
al. 1997).  
 
Turning back to our analysis, the changing political landscape in 1999 and the 
subsequent periods that have been possible due to the existing regional and 
ethnic diversities coupled with institutional weakness and rising oil income as 
depicted by rising government expenditure particularly on internal security as 
shown in Figure 4.4 below did not appear to improve the security of life and 
property in Nigeria. The issue of insecurity has become a dominant feature as 
militants from the oil producing region felt marginalised and neglected. They 
sought to solve their problems using illegal means such as vandalisation of oil 
pipelines in order to have access to oil that they could sell illegally to generate 
income and the kidnapping of oil workers, especially foreigners, to collect 
ransom for their release (see, for example, Akpan 2010).  
The anti-social behaviour of people from the oil producing region has also been 
depicted in the political economy literature. For example, Collier and Hoeffler 
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(2004) suggest that primary commodities of all types including oil, minerals, and 
agricultural goods are associated with the onset of conflict. They further 
advocate that explanations for civil wars fall into two types, namely, those that 
focus on the grievances of insurgents groups and those that focus on their 
funding. The major funding sources for rebels tend to come from exportable 
natural resources: if insurgents can extract and sell resources, or extort income 
from traders, then they are more likely to engage in conflicts (Collier and 
Hoeffler 2004).  
Likewise, issues of insecurity also emerged in the north-east of Nigeria as 
religious sects undermine the peace and tranquillity that used to exist in the 
region. This has hindered business activities, especially farming which is carried 
out on the outskirts of villages and towns. Explosions and kidnapping had 
become rampant in the North-East of Nigeria and this could have a 
psychological, economic and political impact on the country for a very long time. 
From Figure 4.4 below, spending on internal security has risen in contrast with 
that on agriculture which has shown cuts over the period under examination 
(2000 – 2010). In addition, spending on internal security appeared to rise from 
2000 to 2010 which should have provided the means to avoid further 
kidnapping. For example, in 2014, 230 school girls were abducted by Boko 
Haram44 from a secondary school in Chibok, North-East Nigeria (Mark 2014). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
44
 Boko Haram is an Islamic extremist group based in the north-eastern Nigeria (see, Country Reports on Terrorism 
U.S. Department of State 2013). 
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Figure 4.4 Government Expenditure  
 
Source of Data: CBN Statistical Bulletin (2010) 
Note: The vertical axis shows the values in Naira million of different categories of recurrent 
government expenditure, while the horizontal axis shows the period in years from 2000 to 2010.  
 
Increases in government spending on internal security and education also 
coincided with a democratic period as elections took place in 2003 and 2007 as 
shown in Figure 4.4 above. This outcome was expected to result in improved 
economic and social outcomes. However, the reverse was the case and it 
showed that democracy and increases in government expenditure were not a 
guarantee of improved development. For example, arguments that relate 
political regimes to economic growth focus on the importance of the autonomy 
of dictators, property rights and pressures for immediate consumption (see, for 
example, Przeworski and Limongi 1995). Przeworski and Limongi stated that the 
key mechanism by which democracy is thought to impede economic growth are 
pressures for immediate consumption, which reduce investment. It is argued 
that only states which are institutionally protected from such pressures can 
counterattack them and democratic states do not have such safeguards 
(Przeworski and limongi 1995). Nigeria may not be institutionally protected due 
to the ethnic and regional rivalry that has characterised Nigerian politics from 
inception and reflects the colonial past that amalgamated the separate regions.  
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In support of the above, Acemoglu et al. (2000) argued that Europeans 
implemented very different colonisation strategies in different countries, with 
different associated institutions. The choice of colonisation policy was, at least in 
part, determined by whether Europeans could settle in the colony. They stated 
that, in places where Europeans were confronted with a high mortality rates, 
settlement was not possible and the probability was that they set up inferior 
(extractive) institutions which have persisted to the present. 
Also, the literature on the state-centred approach highlights the behaviour of oil 
dependent states in the sense that they tend to develop larger capacity in the 
distributive functions, for instance, social welfare, health and education 
(Garaibeh 1987). This behaviour can be supported with Figure 4.4 above as 
expenditure kept growing over the years but without having the anticipated 
changes on the economy as evidenced by worsening internal security. In 
addition, when years prior to democratic return and after are compared as 
illustrated in Figure 4.5 below it was observed that spending increased 
significantly from 1999 especially on social and community services, internal 
security and education. In contrast spending on agriculture saw a sharp decline 
in 2000.   
Beblawi and Luciani (1987) also argued that the independency of rentier states 
of their domestic economy gives them the power to formulate policies that does 
not justify the promotion of economic development. This was also the case in 
Nigeria even though the democratic government initiated socioeconomic reforms 
but this only resulted in higher government spending that did not translate into 
positive socioeconomic outcomes. For example, lack of security surfaced and this 
showed negative effects, especially in the educational sector as children were 
kidnapped from their school.  
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Figure 4.5 Government Expenditure  
 
Source of Data: CBN Statistical Bulletin (2010) 
Note: The vertical axis shows the values in Naira million of different categories of recurrent 
government expenditure, while the horizontal axis shows the period in years from 1994 to 2005.  
 
A lack of national unity due to ethnic and regional differences has also provided 
a platform for a seizure of power by a group of Nigerians with a common agenda 
that is not reflecting the voice of all Nigerian citizens and which has in turn 
further affected the behaviour of government spending in terms of security and 
administration. For example, from Figure 4.6 below it is clearly evident that from 
1999 recurrent expenditure on defence has fallen which could have allowed the 
start of terrorist activities. It can be seen from Figure 4.6 that the start of Boko 
Haram’s activities in 2002 occurred after a period of declining expenditure on 
defence. However, recurrent expenditure on internal security and national 
assembly which caters for the well-being of the legislative arm45 of the Nigerian 
government appears to have risen prior to, and after the start of, Boko Haram’s 
activities in 2002. Growing extremism may have led to a violent uprising in July 
2009 and this period also corresponded with rising expenditure on internal 
                                                          
45
 The Nigerian National Assembly, which is the legislative arm of government, comprises of two chambers and these 
are the House of Senate (the upper chamber) and the House of Representatives (the lower chamber). These two 
chambers are the supreme institution concerned with law making in Nigeria and served as check on the executive arm 
of government (see National Assembly of Nigeria 2016 for further explanation).   
0.00
20,000.00
40,000.00
60,000.00
80,000.00
100,000.00
120,000.00
140,000.00
160,000.00
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
7
1
9
9
8
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
5
Internal Security
 Agriculture
 Transport &
Communication
  Education
  Health
Social and Community
Services
 
 
114 
 
security as illustrated in Figure 4.6 below. Yet, rising expenditure on internal 
security has not helped to curtail violence.  
 
Figure 4.6 Federal Government Recurrent Expenditure and Boko Haram 
  Activities 
 
Source of Data: Central Bank of Nigeria (2010) 
Note: The vertical axis shows the value of current expenditure on defence, internal security and 
national assembly in Nigeria’s local currency (Million Naira) while the horizontal axis shows the 
period in years from 1999 to 2010.  
 
From Figure 4.6 above, it appears that political elections have taken place in 
2003 and 2007. This also showed that there has been a stable democracy since 
1999 as there was evidence of elections after a four year period. However, some 
of these elections have been characterised with vote buying and violence in the 
political campaigns (Bratton 2008). Bratton (2008), suggest that, in a 
democratic setting, an election campaign is supposed to be a peaceful and open 
discourse of persuasion.  
Also Narayan et al. (2011), state that democracy is occasionally associated with 
the right to vote but they define it more extensively than a country having 
elections. They follow the definition offered by Rivera-Batiz and Rivera-Batiz 
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and guarantees, freedom of the press and the absence of censorship, clear and 
effective judicial and legal structures, incumbent term limits, and transparency, 
openness and citizen input in policymaking” (Narayan et al. 2011, p. 900). 
From the above analysis, it is clear that there were elections in Nigeria but the 
democratic setting has not given room for a peaceful campaign. From Figure 4.6, 
periods of elections in 2003 and 2007 were seen to be largely followed by rising 
expenditure on the national assembly and internal security. This outcome depicts 
arguments in the political economy literature focusing on democracy and 
economic growth. Keefer and Khemani (2005), for example, state that one way 
in which governments can improve economic growth is through their choice of 
public expenditure. When allocated appropriately, public expenditure can 
overcome market failures that exacerbate poverty. Yet distortion and 
misallocation of expenditure are common and often undermine development 
(Keefer and Khemani 2005). 
Government expenditure covers wage bills for large state administrations, public 
projects with limited public usefulness and farm subsidies absorbed by the 
wealthiest farmers, all at the expense of quality public services (Keefer and 
Khemani 2005). A significant fraction of voters in many countries have low 
incomes and democratisation might be expected to benefit these voters. 
However, policymakers in poor democracies regularly misallocate public 
expenditure away from types of spending that most benefit the poor, either 
directly or indirectly (Keeper and Khemani 2005). 
Thus, a rise in government expenditure on the Nigerian national assembly and 
internal security in the presence of political elections can also mean a 
misallocation of public expenditure as a lack of insecurity appeared to be on the 
increase despite rises in such expenditure. According to Nurudeen and Usman 
(2010), government performs two functions and this includes protection and 
security and provisions of certain public goods. However, the provision of 
security is low in Nigeria.  
Also increased expenditure on the national assembly which houses the legislative 
arm of government46 can result from political influence, such as the need to 
                                                          
46
 The Nigerian National Assembly is the nation's highest legislature, whose power to make laws is summarized in 
Chapter 1, Section 4 of the 1999 Nigerian Constitution. The National Assembly is a bicameral legislature. It 
comprises of a Senate with 109 members corresponding to the 109 senatorial districts in the country. Senatorial 
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represent diverse ethnic groups, especially the minority tribes in the country’s 
political affairs. According to Keeper and Khemani (2005, P. 23) “the effects of 
increasing the political power of minority groups provide some indication that 
both problems of inter-group hostility and of credible commitments in political 
competition undermine public policy in polarized countries”.  
The structure of the Nigerian national assembly depicts a mandated political 
representation (see, for example, Pande 2002).  According to Pande (2002) 
there are a number of essential principles concerning the scope and functioning 
of a representative democracy. “First, that citizens' group identity is informative 
of their policy preferences. Second, those members of disadvantaged groups 
often fail to have a voice in the political process. Third, that increasing political 
representation for members of these groups enhances their voice in the policy 
process, while having no other untoward effects on their overall policy influence. 
And finally, that increased group voice in the policy process translates into 
improved policy outcomes for members of that group” (Pande 2003, P. 2). 
Pande (2003) suggest that mandated reservations in state legislatures resulted 
in increased public sector job quotas for scheduled minority groups in the public 
sector but significantly lower resources were allocated to education. The findings 
of Pande (2003) may also be similar with the pattern of government expenditure 
(Figure 4.7 below) in Nigeria where the representative democracy includes 
minority tribes. In Figure 4.7, government expenditure after the return to 
democratic rule appeared to be on the increase for all sectors, especially on 
general administration which is higher than education and health. Rising 
expenditure on general administration could mean rising wage bills for state 
administrations which may have resulted from increased public sector job 
quotas. This is evident in Nigeria through the Federal Character Commission. 
The Commission has been established to ensure justice and equity in the 
distribution of public offices among the federated units of Nigeria.   
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Districts are evenly distributed among the thirty six states in Nigeria.  Each state has three senatorial districts while the 
Federal Capital Territory (FCT) Abuja has just one senatorial district. Also, there are 360 members in the House of 
Representatives representing the 360 Federal Constituencies, into which the country is divided based on population. 
The structure is modelled after the Federal Congress of the United States and is supposed to guarantee equal 
representation of the 36 states in the country irrespective of size in the Senate and proportional representation of 
population in the House. 
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Figure 4.7 Government Expenditure  
 
Source of Data: Central Bank of Nigeria (2010) 
Note: The vertical axis shows the value of current expenditure on national assembly, education 
health and general administration in Nigeria’s local currency (Million Naira) while the horizontal 
axis shows the period in years from 1999 to 2010.  
 
The analysis above shows the economic and institutional reforms after the return 
to democratic rule in 1999 and the evidence of a stable democracy through 
elections conducted in 2003 and 2007. These events corresponded with a rise in 
government expenditure as illustrated in the figures above to improve economic 
growth. However, from Figure 4.8 below, the outcome is contrary to that 
expected in a democratic setting as economic growth represented by GDP per 
capita growth recorded low levels except in 2003 and 2004 which coincided with 
increases in world oil prices (see, for example, Hamilton (2011) for an analysis 
of historical oil price changes). Also, Narayan et al (2011) suggest that, of the 
components of democracy, changes in the nature of the legislature, as a 
fundamental political institution, are likely to have the largest effect on long-run 
economic growth path. 
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Figure 4.8 GDP Per Capita Growth (Annual %) 
 
Source: World Bank Development Indicators (2014) 
Note: The vertical axis shows the annual growth rate of GDP per capita in Nigeria, while the 
horizontal axis shows the period in years from 1999 to 2013.  
 
The weak economic growth observed using the GDP per capita levels indicates 
that democracy which was accompanied by reforms and large representation in 
the Nigerian legislature did not result in improved economic performance in the 
country and this also reflects some findings in the literature. For example, 
Przeworski and Limongi (1995) asked the question of whether the political realm 
of democracy enhances or hinders economic growth. Also researchers question 
the economic benefits of democracy in, for example, weak-capacity African 
economies (Knutsen 2013). 
On the other hand, all the above problems could be largely linked to a failure to 
transform the rentier and patronage system that was built on fractured lines of 
ethnic and regional differences to help policies and reforms work as expected. 
Instead, various Nigerian governments, both military and civilian, have initiated 
policies and reforms without giving due consideration to the historical facts of 
the political, social and economic development of Nigeria. The reforms and 
policies initiated only provided employment opportunities to the highly educated 
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expansion of the civil service and other government departments which is 
evidenced through rising recurrent expenditure. As a result, the public sector 
has become a burden on a government that largely depends on external rent 
which fluctuates with the demand for, and supply of, oil or other forms of energy 
within different countries. For example, the discovery of shale oil in the United 
States, which used to be a major importer of Nigerian oil, has reduced the level 
of demand and thus the level of oil exports. In fact, Nigeria did not export oil to 
the United States for the first time in July 2014 after a record of continuing oil 
export since 1973 (Blas 2014).   
In this context any reforms/policies initiated to move Nigeria forward would not 
bring material benefits in the long-run and instead the country will continue to 
deteriorate economically, politically and socially. Reforms in 1999 and the 
subsequent periods may have only succeeded in creating a larger government 
that heavily depends on fluctuating external rental income which cannot be 
guaranteed to sustain the Nigerian economy for many years to come. This is 
depicted in Figure 4.9 below which illustrates the pattern of government 
expenditure and also the rising and fluctuating oil revenue that is largely 
attributed to changes in world demand and supply. 
 
Figure 4.9 Total Government Expenditure and Oil Revenue (1999-2010)  
 
Source of Data: Central Bank Nigeria (2010) 
Note: The vertical axis shows the value of total government expenditure and oil revenue in Naira 
million, while the horizontal axis shows the period in years from 1999 to 2010.  
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According to the literature, volatile oil revenue makes it challenging to pursue a 
prudent fiscal policy and this resulted in a variety of problems ranging from 
stimulating investor uncertainty to illogical spending policies (Stevens 2003 and 
Kilian 2010). Another explanation is that volatile oil revenues would be 
consumed rather than invested (Sachs and Warner 1999). From the above 
discussion and illustrations it is observed that recurrent and total government 
expenditure kept rising over the years despite fluctuating oil revenues. To 
examine further, it is observed in Figure 4.10 below that recurrent expenditure 
is higher than capital expenditure and this show that government revenue which 
is largely financed by volatile oil rental income (see, trend in Figure 4.11 below) 
is more consumed rather than being invested in public projects.  
 
Figure 4.10  Recurrent and Capital Expenditure (1991-2010)  
 
Source of Data: Central Bank Nigeria (2010) 
Note: The vertical axis shows the value of total government expenditure and oil revenue in Naira 
million, while the horizontal axis shows the period in years from 1991 to 2010.  
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Figure 4.11 Categories of Government Revenue (1991-2010)  
 
Source of Data: Central Bank of Nigeria (2010) 
Note: The vertical axis shows the value of total government revenue, oil revenue and non-oil 
revenue in Nigeria’s local currency (Million Naira) while the horizontal axis shows the period in 
years from 1991 to 2010.  
As a result, the reforms may have succeeded in creating larger government 
spending. Each period of reform or policy usually comes with a requirement for 
establishing a government agency or department to help monitor and deliver the 
programmes. One significant feature in the process of employment in 
established public offices in Nigeria is the consideration of ethnic and regional 
backgrounds to ensure equity among the various regions without placing priority 
on competence that could help promote the intended aims and objectives of 
such public organisations. This resulted in the establishment of a Federal 
Character Commission in Nigeria by Act No 34 of 1996.47 This agency has been 
established to implement and ensure justice and equity in the distribution of 
socioeconomic infrastructures and public offices among the federating units that 
made up Nigeria.   
For instance, reforms targeted at the oil sector from 1999 came with the 
establishment of government agencies such as the NEITI begun in 2007 and 
charged with the responsibility for the development of a framework for 
transparency and accountability in the reporting and disclosure by oil companies 
                                                          
47
 See Federal Character Commission of Nigeria (2014). 
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of revenue due or paid to the Nigerian government. NEITI has 59 staff48 whose 
salaries are paid by the Nigerian government. However, despite NEITI’s 
existence, there are indications that the NNPC has not accounted for almost $50 
billion in revenue from oil exports which should have been remitted to the 
Nigerian government under law (Brock 2013). 
The Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory Agency (PPPRA) is also a government 
agency in Nigeria established in 2003 and charged with the responsibility to 
monitor and regulate the supply, distribution and the prices of refined oil products. 
Its staff are also paid by the Nigerian government. Despite PPPRA’s existence, 
there are claims of fuel scarcity and the rising cost of fuel which is higher than 
the official rate. For example, there are reports by the media such as BBC Radio 
(Hausa service)49 in April, 2015 of fuel scarcity and long queues at filling 
stations. The price has significantly risen to between N105 and N155 per litre of 
petrol compared to the official rate of N55 fixed by the government. 
However, despite the establishment of these various government agencies to 
help monitor and manage the oil sector, there is still a scarcity of refined 
petroleum products, unabated gas flaring, oil spillage and low domestic content 
in the oil industry among other problems. These unsatisfactory outcomes may 
show that there was inefficiency in the administration of government institutions 
established to enhance economic growth and development. It may also indicate 
evidence of rent seeking as large sum of money is expended yearly by 
government to cater for the continuity of these agencies.  
Democracy may motivate politicians to select a variety of sound policies (see, for 
example, Lake and Baum 2001, De Mesquita et al. 2002 and Lindert 2004) but 
there is still the question of effectively implementing these policies when state 
capacity is weak (Knutsen 2013). Also, Knutsen argued further that the regime 
type may not matter for economic development in weak-capacity states. As 
such, some researchers suggest that democracy may hinder economic growth in 
such situations as democracy may reduce political stability and aggravate 
distributional conflicts (see, for example, Huntington 1968). Weak state capacity 
                                                          
48 
See NEITI (2015) 
49 
This is radio news by BBC in Hausa language. The Hausa language is branch of the Afrosiatic language spoken in 
some parts of the Sahel region in Africa. It is largely spoken in Nigeria (See Heine and Nurse 2000) 
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in Nigeria may explain the lack of efficiency in the above policies established as 
there is evidence of unsatisfactory outcomes.  
 
Likewise, the continuation and implication of regional and ethnic diversity 
coupled with the rentier system may be reflected in the rapid implementation of 
policies without due consideration given to concerns of accountability and 
transparency. A significant part of the problems of governance regarding 
transparency, accountability and corruption in Nigeria is revealed in the most 
important sector of the Nigerian economy, i.e. oil, and specifically within the 
downstream production activity. For example, the most problematic sector over 
the years has been the downstream area, which is the distribution link with the 
final consumers of refined oil products in the domestic economy (Odulari 2008). 
This has further undermined other sectors of the economy, such as 
manufacturing and transport which requires energy to function efficiently. The 
transportation sector, for example, is vital to agriculture which is predominantly 
located in the rural areas in Nigeria and needs to deliver farm produce in a 
timely form to the market place. However, most of the farm produce has been 
left to rot and consumers tend to pay high prices because of food shortages.  
In addition, it can be seen that beside the issue of Dutch Disease which the 
literature explained as the deterioration of the manufacturing sector by the 
booming natural resource sector due to an appreciation of the real exchange 
rate value of the domestic currency, which makes manufacturing exports less 
competitive and thus less attractive to foreign importers (see, Corden and Neary 
1982) there other factors intensifying the resource curse. This signifies that the 
Dutch Disease explanation alone cannot fully show the reason behind the lack of 
growth as there were also institutional and governance problems in the oil sector 
that possibly exacerbated the adverse effects of oil production on other 
economic sectors. There was supposed to be easy access and availability of 
energy to help promote economic activity.  
The above outcome can further confirm the evidence of the weak capacity of the 
Nigerian state as suggested by the literature (see, for example, Knutsen 2013). 
Also Easterly and Levine (1997) argued that ethnic diversity affect economic 
performance and most of this effect works indirectly through public policies, 
political instability and other economic factors.   
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To argue further reform programmes within the oil sector of Nigeria have largely 
focussed on the state control of economic policy prescriptions with a lack of 
attention given to the institutional provisions, political realities and conditions 
faced by the beneficiaries prior to implementing the programmes. In other 
words, a lack of appropriate apparatus for governance, transparency and 
accountability that could help deliver the intended goals of nationalisation has 
hindered the benefits. As such the outcomes show that the effects have not been 
particularly successful.  
In addition, the shift to state intervention which started in 1971 and subsequent 
government reforms especially from 1999 seems to be plagued with several 
problems within the oil sector. This has resulted in an unsatisfactory set of 
consequences. For example, the government has had to subsidise the price of 
imported refined oil products due to the inefficient functioning of the state 
owned domestic refineries. The fuel subsidy has become an unbearable burden 
on the Nigerian government because it announced its removal in December 2015 
due to falling government revenue and fraud in the scheme (Ibekwe 2015). 
Moreover, it has resulted in a ceaseless crisis in the supply of refined oil products 
which is acute in some parts of the country, particularly in the north. This 
problem has culminated in the decision by the government in 2003 to deregulate 
the downstream oil sub-sector. However, the style of its implementation has 
been contentious because it ignores the economic (Odulari 2008) as well as the 
political realities in Nigeria. 
 
4.4 RETURN TO DEMOCRATIC RULE AND THE IMPACT ON 
 ECONOMIC SECTORS 
To illustrate further the impact of the return to a stable political system in 1999, 
major economic sectors are examined. The significant contribution of these 
sectors (agriculture, manufacturing and oil) to GDP as illustrated in Figure 4.12 
below are used as measures of economic performance. For example, using 
Figure 4.13 below, it is clearly evident that the period of reforms from 1999 to 
2010 did not show significant changes in the annual growth rate of oil, 
manufacturing and agricultural output. Figure 4.13 illustrates the output of the 
oil, manufacturing and agricultural sectors in Nigeria.  
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Figure 4.12  Output of Oil, Manufacturing, Agriculture and      
   Other GDP  
 
Source of Data: Central Bank of Nigeria (2010) 
Note: Other GDP mean other components of Nigeria’s GDP and these include building and 
construction, wholesale and retail trade, services and other industrial activities. 
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Figure 4.13 Periods of Economic Reforms (1999 – 2010)  
  
Source of Data: CBN (2010) 
Note: (1). The vertical axis shows the changes (annual rate) of oil, manufacturing,  
  agricultural and other components of GDP output, while the horizontal axis shows 
  the period in years from 1960 to 2010.  
(2). Other GDP mean other components of Nigeria’s GDP and these include building and 
 construction, wholesale and retail trade, services and other industrial activities. 
 
Other explanations of a lack of growth as shown in the current period after 
democratic return could be due to Dutch Disease, declining terms of trade and 
oil price volatility effects. However, they alone cannot explain the low levels of 
growth as there were institutional and governance issues and it can be argued 
that lack of a common sense of national unity tied to ethic and regional 
backgrounds may have produced these unsatisfactory outcomes. For example, 
the literature has subsequently point to the adoption of a political economy 
approach which encompasses both economic and political assumptions in the 
investigation between natural wealth and economic growth (Bevan et al. 1999, 
Collier 2010 and Luong and Weinthal 2010).  For instance, Bevan et al. (1999) 
suggested that social forces were considerable determinants in influencing the 
economic policies and hence economic outcomes in Nigeria and Indonesia. 
Another explanation that could support the argument is that there is a 
disconnection between initiated development plans and economic sectors despite 
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increases in government expenditure due to short sightedness by political 
leaders in their struggle for power. In other words, development plans or policies 
are not initiated in the interest of the general population but to appease 
supporters and interest groups that largely come from one region of the country.  
This type of outcome has been supported by studies reviewed in Chapter Two. 
For example, Ross (1999) stated that cognitive theories blame policy failures on 
a lack of foresight of the politicians and societal theories try to explain the 
pernicious influence of the privileged classes. 
Furthermore, the literature on the effects of democracy on economic growth has 
shown that improved economic growth is not necessarily seen in a democratic 
regime (Przeworski and Limongi 1995). Also, Collier and Hoeffler (2009) suggest 
that in developing economies, the combination of natural resource rental income 
and democracy has been considerably growth-retarding. Narayan et al. (2011) 
and Aisen and Veiga (2013) also confirm this negative impact of democracy on 
economic growth. 
 
4.4.1 Impact on Gross Domestic Product 
We now turn to the aggregate performance of the economy using the GDP. The 
annual growth rates of GDP and GDP per capita in Nigeria from 1999 to 2010 are 
shown in Figure 4.14 below. It can be seen that from Figure 4.14 below there 
were sharp increases and declines in GDP and GDP per capita recorded between 
2002 and 2005. Prior to and after these years the annual rates of growth of GDP 
and GDP per capita did not record such a trend. The literature also reported that 
natural resource booms are sometimes accompanied by declining GDP per capita 
(Sachs and Warner 1999). 
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Figure 4.14 Annual Growth Rate of GDP and GDP Per Capita  
 
Source: World Bank Development Indicators (2014) 
Note: The vertical axis shows the annual growth rate of GDP and GDP per capita in Nigeria, while the 
horizontal axis shows the period in years from 1999 to 2010.  
 
Also looking at previous years before 1999, decreases in GDP were recorded in 
1986 (Figure 5.15 below) which coincided with a falling world oil price as shown 
in Figure 4.16 below. This illustrates the trend of annual imported crude oil 
prices in US$ per barrel in nominal and real price. Implicitly, it also means that, 
due to a neglect of the non-oil sectors, the Nigerian economy is affected by the 
vagaries of oil prices which in turn affects oil revenue that largely finance 
government expenditure and the resulting negative consequences on other 
sectors.   
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Figure 4.15 Annual Growth Rate of GDP and GDP Per Capita  
 
Source of Data: World Development Indicators (2015) 
Note: The vertical axis shows the annual growth rate of GDP in Nigeria, while the horizontal axis 
shows the period in years from 1960 to 2013.  
 
Figure 4.16 Annual Imported Crude Oil Price (Dollars per Barrel) 
 
Source of Data: Energy Information Agency (2014)  
Note: The vertical axis shows the price (nominal and real) of imported crude oil, while the 
horizontal axis shows the period in years from 1960 to 2012.  
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The above outcome may help explain the rise in GDP witnessed in the early 
2000s and can be claimed that was not tied to real economic activities like 
manufacturing and agriculture but to oil price increases. To substantiate this 
argument further it was evident that despite increases in oil revenues (Figure 
4.17 below) and the return to democratic rule in 1999, the living standard of the 
majority of Nigeria citizens had not improved as shown by the poverty gap 
indicators in Figure 4.18 below. From Figure 4.18, it was clear that the poverty 
gap at $1.25 and $2 earnings per day appeared to have risen over time from 
1986 to 2010 except for the year 2004. Focusing on the reform period which 
started in 1999 with the return of democratic rule under the leadership of the 
PDP, the poverty gap at $1.2550 and $251 earnings per day in 2004 meant that 
26.89 percent and 44.67 percent of the Nigerian population was living on less 
than $1.25 and $2 respectively. In 2010, the percentage of Nigerian population 
living on less than $1.25 and $2 a day was 27.46 percent and 44.79 percent 
respectively. This means that the Nigerian population living on less than $1.25 
and $2 a day has increased.  
 
Figure 4.17 Nigeria’s Oil Revenue and Non–Oil Revenue  
 
Source of Data: Central Bank of Nigeria (2010) 
Note: The vertical axis shows the value of Nigeria’s oil revenue and non-oil revenue in Naira 
million, while the horizontal axis shows the period in years from 1999 to 2010.  
                                                          
50
 Nigerian population earning below $1.25 a day indicates the percentage of the population living on less than $1.25 a 
day at 2005 international prices (World Bank 2014) 
51
 Nigerian population earning below $2 a day signifies the percentage of the population living on less than $2.00 a 
day at 2005 international prices (World Bank 2014) 
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Figure 4.18 Poverty Gap Indicators in Nigeria 
 
Source of Data: World Bank Development Indicators (2015) 
Note: The vertical axis shows the poverty gap in percentage terms, while the horizontal axis shows 
the period in years from 1985 to 2010. It is also observed that there are missing data points in the 
series.  
 
There are also doubts that the increase of the oil prices recorded in recent years 
has allowed the government to use such windfalls to modernise infrastructure, 
create employment and improve social indicators (World Bank 2013). This is 
because, according to the World Bank, the year 2010 recorded the continuation 
of double-digit inflation (13.8 percent), the depletion of the remaining Excess 
Crude Account (ECA) reserve, and an outstanding balance of payments deficit, 
notwithstanding the strengthening of crude oil prices. Furthermore, gross 
monetary foreign reserves decreased from US$ 42 to 32 billion during the year. 
In addition, the draw-down of the ECA in 2010, regardless of the economic 
recovery and stronger crude oil prices, exposed weaknesses in the rules 
surrounding the management of the fund, motivating the government to 
establish the Sovereign Wealth Fund in 2011 with the rationale of adopting 
stronger rules for the responsible management of the country’s oil wealth. 
Issues surrounding the management of resource funds in Nigeria also portray a 
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(2007) showed theoretically that the significance of natural resource funds lies in 
their effects on the incentives facing political players. They supported their 
theoretical investigation by empirical analyses of institutions and expenditure 
decisions. For natural resource funds to be effective, they based their arguments 
on regulated withdrawals which should be guided by clear rules and not general 
rules. Second, key decisions should be made by parties representing diverse 
political constituencies. Finally, there should be high levels of transparency 
concerning their status and operation. For example, there should be a unified 
budgetary process and the public reporting of payments. 
The claim by World Bank (2013) also reflects the argument made in the 
literature which states that volatile oil revenues would be consumed rather than 
invested (Sachs and Warner, 1999). In this case, periods of rising oil prices have 
given the Nigeria more revenue but instead some economic indicators 
deteriorated.  
The deterioration in economic indicators like GDP per capita in the face of rising 
oil prices which means more oil revenues and period of a stable democracy 
means that other factors are hindering the progress of economic growth. For 
example, a significant feature of Nigeria is ethnic and regional diversity which 
this study also based its argument on. Yang (2008), for example, finds that in 
countries with high degrees of ethnic diversity, democracy appears to 
substantially lower growth and in countries with low ethnic diversity such a 
relationship is not significant. 
In addition, the living standard of Nigerians may have deteriorated because of 
the weak performance of non-oil revenues in comparison with oil revenue as 
shown in Figure 4.17 above. The non-oil sectors (i.e., manufacturing and 
agriculture) that form part of the GDP have been neglected and these support 
the majority of the Nigerian labour force, in particular agriculture. In other 
words, the apparent neglect of the non-oil sectors has led to weak performance 
and low revenue for the government. This in turn has led to a loss of 
employment and the promotion of rent seeking in Nigeria as some unemployed 
people will strive to have access to government contracts that are not 
necessarily executed efficiently due to lack of strong governance and institutions 
that ensures law and order, accountability and transparency so as to minimise 
corrupt practices. This type of development have further weaken the non-oil 
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sectors which will help intensify the resource curse as people tend to look for 
cheap means of making money through access to oil rental income that finances 
government contracts.  
The above outcome reflects the explanation in the literature which states that 
reliance on oil leads to deterioration of manufacturing/agricultural sectors due to 
the appearance of the Dutch Disease. In the case of Nigeria, the Dutch Disease 
effect cannot fully explain the low levels of non-oil revenue in comparison to oil 
revenue because there is apparent short-sightedness by most of the political 
regimes (military or civilian) in the administration of Nigeria. This short-
sightedness linked to societal rivalry was also evident in the citizens where they 
elected leaders based on communal identity and the elected politicians are also 
Nigerians with the same psychological bearing tied to ethnic and regional rivalry. 
As such, societal rivalry provided a channel for the appearance of economic 
symptoms of the adverse effects of oil production such as Dutch Disease which 
can appear in various forms. For example, the literature stated that the 
symptoms of Dutch Disease include a decrease in savings and physical 
investment (Payrakis and Gerlagh 2007).  
Also the initiations of economic policies that were largely based on raising 
government expenditure, most especially recurrent as evidenced from the 
preceding analysis dominate government administration. This type of 
government spending behaviour can be linked to societal rivalry where 
promotion of a common national goal was absent. The combination of these 
factors helped in weakening the non-oil sectors as public investment that can 
help move the traditional sector (i.e., agriculture) was lacking in the needed 
areas where its activities were largely carried out.    
The issue of lack of foresight by political actors has also been discussed in the 
literature under the cognitive approach. This perspective argued that natural 
resource wealth leads to various types of emotional or irrational behaviour on 
the part of the government and this outcome leads to weak economic policy-
making and institutional capacity (Ross 1999). Mitra (1994) suggested that 
natural resource booms create an inclination to optimism in countries that 
benefit, in turn leading to excessive government spending. Also, Krause (1995) 
argued that natural resource booms lead to ‘wishful thinking’ among policy-
makers in natural resource abundant countries.  
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In support of the previous discussion, the neglect of the non-oil sector can be 
attributed in terms of cuts and low levels in capital expenditure as shown in 
Figure 4.19 below. This includes spending on the construction of infrastructural 
facilities such as roads, bridges, dams, electricity production etc that could 
support sectors such as manufacturing, agriculture, health, communication, 
transport and education. For example, there are claims that most infrastructural 
facilities in Nigeria have deteriorated and have led to the closure of 
manufacturing firms (Gboyega 2011). However, recurrent expenditure appears 
to be rising over time despite changes in total federal revenue as shown in 
Figure 4.19 below. This may indicate an increase in government size over time 
as wages and salaries of public sector workers are financed by recurrent 
expenditure. 
 
Figure 4.19 Federal Revenue, Total Expenditure, Recurrent Expenditure 
  and Capital Expenditure  
 
Source of Data: Central Bank of Nigeria (2010)  
Note: The vertical axis shows the value of Nigeria’s total federally collected revenue, total 
government expenditure, recurrent expenditure and capital expenditure in Naira million, while the 
horizontal axis shows the period in years from 1999 to 2010.  
 
It can be clearly seen that the performance of the agricultural and oil sectors are 
higher than that of manufacturing throughout the period under observation as 
shown in Figure 4.20 below. This should have resulted in a greater injection of 
capital expenditure into the Nigerian economy that can support manufacturing 
activities in the country. As such it can be further agued that reforms which 
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included diversification of the Nigerian economy through promotion of the 
private sector especially of small and medium scale enterprises will improve 
manufacturing activities if capital expenditure on infrastructural activities had 
not experienced cuts over time. 
 
Figure 4.20  Output of Oil, Manufacturing and Agriculture (1999-2010) 
 
Source of Data: Central Bank of Nigeria (2010) 
Note: The vertical axis shows the value of outputs of oil, manufacturing and agriculture in Naira 
million, while the horizontal axis shows the period in years from 1999 to 2010.  
 
The deterioration of manufacturing activities have resulted in low levels of 
manufactured exports and high levels of manufactured imports as illustrated in 
Figure 4.21 below. For example, manufacture imports as a percentage of 
merchandise imports was 71.88 percent in 2006 while manufactured exports as 
a percentage of merchandise exports was 1.34 percent in 2006. In fact there 
were further declines in manufacture exports from 6.66 percent in 2010 to 2.55 
percent in 2011 when years outwith the study period are taken into 
consideration which also coincided with a period of democratic rule under the 
administration of the PDP. Rising manufacture exports will improve employment 
opportunities and living standards of Nigerian citizens because of the forward 
and backward linkages that manufacturing activities provide in an economy.  
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Researchers such as Hirschman (1958), Seers (1964), and Baldwin (1966) 
stated that linkages from manufacturing exports are more value adding 
compared with primary product exports. This could be contextualised using the 
Nigerian economy which largely depends on export of primary commodities, 
especially in crude oil as evidenced by the rising oil revenue in comparison with 
non-oil revenue as shown in Figure 4.17 above. 
 
Figure 4.21 Manufacture Exports and Imports  
 
Source of Data: World Bank Development Indicators (2014)  
Note: The vertical axis shows the value of manufactured exports and imports as percentage of 
merchandise exports and imports in Nigeria, while the horizontal axis shows the period in years 
from 1999 to 2013. It is also observed that there are missing data points (2004 and 2005) in the 
series. 
  
Likewise, the reform agenda from 1999 also targeted the Nigerian oil industry 
due to problems particularly in terms of transparency and accountability. 
However, the oil sector experienced declining performance over the period under 
study as shown in Figure 4.20 above. In 2005 the output value stood at N136, 
345.54 million but in 2010 the value declined to N122, 957.87 million. In terms 
of oil rental income shown in Figure 4.22 below, the trend observed is also 
similar to that of oil output shown in Figure 4.20 above. The decline observed in 
the oil sector coupled with changes in world oil prices and the rising population 
in Nigeria as illustrated in Figure 4.23 below may have also resulted in the weak 
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performance of the annual growth rates of GDP and GDP per capita as shown in 
Figure 4.14 above.  
 
Figure 4.22 Oil Rental Income (percentage of GDP) 
 
Source of Data: World Bank Development Indicators (2015) 
Note: The vertical axis shows the value of oil rental income as a percentage of GDP, while the 
horizontal axis shows the period in years from 1999 to 2013.  
 
Figure 4.23 Population in Million 
 
Source of Data: World Bank Development Indicators (2015) 
Note: The vertical axis shows the figures of Nigeria’s population in million, while the horizontal axis 
shows the period in years from 1999 to 2012.  
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According to Sachs and Warner (1997) countries will have a higher per capita 
growth if the working population (between ages 15 and 65) is growing faster 
than the whole population. According to them, this variable is employed to 
control for such demographic effects on measured economic growth and this 
demographic influence accounts for an economically significant part of the 
overall difference in economic growth rates between Africa and East Asia. 
To depict Sachs and Warner’s analysis, the growth rate of the total population 
and the working population (ages 15-64) of Nigeria is illustrated in Figure 4.24 
below. From Figure 4.24, it is clear that the whole population is growing faster 
than the working population and this could be the reason for the low growth rate 
in GDP and GDP per capita observed in Figure 4.14 above. 
 
Figure 4.24  Total and Working Population (Growth Rate) 
 
Source of Data: World Bank Development Indicators (2015) 
Note: The vertical axis shows the figures of Nigeria’s population in million, while the horizontal axis 
shows the period in years from 1960 to 2013.  
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deterioration of non-oil sector and low growth rate of working population may 
also have resulted in higher levels of food imports compared with food exports 
as shown in Figure 4.25 below in the midst of rising population.  
 
Figure 4.25  Food Exports and Imports plus Fuel Exports and Imports  
 
Source of Data: World Bank Development Indicators (2015) 
Note: the vertical axis shows the value of food exports, food imports, fuel exports and fuel imports 
as percentages of merchandise trade, while the horizontal axis shows the period in years from 
1999 to 2013. It is also observed that there are missing data points in the series for 2004 and 
2005.  
 
Similarly, the declining performance of the oil sector as shown in Figures 4.20 
and 4.22 above may have resulted in declining fuel exports especially from 2007 
as observed from Figure 4.25 above. Also there was a rise in fuel imports in 
2003, 2011 and 2013. The summation of these different outcomes can result to 
periods of higher inflation especially in 2001 (18.87 percent) and 2005 (17.86 
percent) as shown in Figure 4.26 below. It can be argued that the nature of 
government spending which appears to favour recurrent expenditure with a 
rising population and volatile oil rental income and declining oil output may have 
helped in aggravating rising poverty levels and the high level of consumer price 
inflation as shown in Figure 4.26. 
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Figure 4.26  Inflation in Consumer Prices (annual % increase) 
 
Source of Data: World Bank Development Indicators (2015) 
Note: the vertical axis shows the value of inflation (consumer prices), while the horizontal axis 
shows the period in years from 1999 to 2014.  
 
A rise in fuel imports can partly be attributed to the inefficiency of the existing 
four oil refineries in Nigeria which could have provided the country with enough 
fuel in terms of diesel, petrol and kerosene that are among the main source of 
energy in Nigeria beside firewood that is mostly use for cooking. As such, this 
has resulted in rising fuel import and imported refined oil products are 
subsidised by the government which means additional burden. The government 
should have invested the subsidy to improve the existing refineries or build 
additional ones across the country due to the concentration of the refineries in 
the Southern part of the country. Out of the four refineries, three are located in 
the South and only one in the North. Refined fuel like petrol and diesel is 
transported to the North by tankers due to the unstable operational activity by 
the Kaduna Refinery and Petrochemical Company (KRPC) which is sometimes 
caused by continual repairs and oil pipeline sabotage.52 According to Premium 
Times (2015), KRPC which has a daily refining capacity of 11,000 barrels of 
crude oil restarted production after closure for months.   
                                                          
52 
See Premium Times (2016)  
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The scarcity of fuel due to inefficiency of refineries and other factors like oil 
pipeline sabotage leads to higher cost of transaction, especially in terms of 
transportation and communication and this leads to rising selling prices of 
produced goods and services. Impliedly this means that producers and 
consumers have to pay more for the goods and services they need and that 
translates to a cut in their disposable income and this affect their savings if they 
have any to close the gap in their planned purchases.  
Moreover, it can be suggested that the nature of government expenditure which 
is largely focused on rising recurrent expenditure have resulted in the almost 
stagnant level of the unemployment rate as shown in Figure 4.27 below in the 
midst of rising population growth as shown in Figure 4.23 above. 
 
Figure 4.27 Unemployment Rate in Nigeria (% of Total Labour Force)   
  
Source of Data: World Bank Development Indicators (2015) 
Note: the vertical axis shows the level of unemployment as a percentage of total labour force 
(modelled ILO estimate)53, while the horizontal axis shows the period in years from 1999 to 2013.  
Stagnant levels of unemployment, which may have been tied to the pattern of 
government spending, indicated that a large part of the oil revenue was 
allocated to consumption rather than investment. For example, increased capital 
spending on infrastructural facilities, especially where they were needed, will 
                                                          
53
 ILO is the International Labour Organisation and the estimate is based on ILOs’s methodology 
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have boosted private sector small and medium scale enterprises and this will in 
turn create job opportunities for the local people in that area. The literature 
suggests that the key mechanism by which democracy is thought to impede 
economic growth are pressures for immediate consumption, which reduce 
investment (Przeworski and Limongi 1995). In the case of Nigeria, this argument 
can be seen through rising recurrent expenditure. It is argued in the literature 
that only states which are institutionally protected from such pressures can 
counteract them and democratic states do not have such safeguards (Przeworski 
and limongi 1995). As such, a stagnant level of unemployment during a 
democratic period in Nigeria meant that many people will remain unemployed as 
the rate has not declined to show further absorption of those not working.  
Another factor that can contribute to rising inflation and unemployment is 
electricity instability. Power generation received by firms declined as recorded 
outages in a typical month increased in  number from 25.2 in 2007 to 36.4 in 
2014 (World Bank Development Indicators, 2015). This outcome affects business 
activities such as manufacturing and agriculture that employs many of the 
Nigerian population. This could be one of the reasons for the higher levels of 
imports compared with exports in manufactures as shown in Figure 4.21 above 
and declining foreign direct investment as illustrated in Figure 4.28 below. 
Foreign investors may not want to invest in Nigeria because of a lack of 
sufficient and constant electricity generation needed for companies to operate.  
It is clear that beside Dutch Disease and oil price volatility that can hinder 
manufacturing and agricultural activities, the inefficient manner of delivering 
public goods and services, especially energy in a country rich in oil is an obstacle 
to growth and development. 
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Figure 4.28  Foreign Direct Investment, Net Inflows (% of GDP)   
 
Source of Data: World Bank Development Indicators (2015) 
Note: the vertical axis shows the value of foreign direct investment (net inflows) as a percentage 
of GDP in Nigeria, while the horizontal axis shows the period in years from 1999 to 2013. 
 
Also, this affect Nigeria’s balance of trade as imports of manufactures are part of 
non-oil exports. This can be seen in Figure 4.29 below which depicts Nigeria’s 
trade balance in oil and non-oil exports. The non-oil balance of trade declined 
over time and recorded a negative trend, indicating a trade deficit. This outcome 
is also supported by the literature on economic approach which states that 
declining terms of trade is a problem to countries that produce and export 
primary commodities like oil and agricultural products. For example, Prebisch 
(1950, 1964) and Singer (1950) argued that primary product exporting 
countries are at a disadvantage in trading with the developed economies 
because of declining terms of trade which suggests that the price of exports falls 
relative to imports. 
It is also clear from Figure 4.29 below that since the return to stable democratic 
rule in 1999; the non-oil trade balance appears to decline over time and that of 
oil increases. This shows that economic reforms targeted at the non-oil sector do 
not help to promote exports of goods which could help provide income and 
employment opportunities due to external and domestic demand. The stable 
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democratic regime achieved from 1999 appeared not to have promoted the 
gains of democracy in other economic sectors and instead the oil sector which 
brings rental income to the government and meagre employment opportunities 
to the few educated citizens seems to benefit from this regime. 
 
Figure 4.29 Nigeria’s Balance of Trade – Oil and Non-Oil 
 
Source of Data: Central Bank of Nigeria (2010) 
Note: the vertical axis shows the value of balance of trade in Nigeria’s local currency (Million Naira) 
while the horizontal axis shows the period in years from 1999 to 2010. 
 
It can also be argued that a negative non-oil trade balance and rising 
merchandise imports as shown in Figure 4.30 below may have resulted in a 
falling exchange rate for the naira as shown in Figure 4.31 below. This may have 
adversely affected the cost of importation and other foreign transactions 
especially with the fall of world oil prices in some years and towards the end of 
2014. This has led to a fall in the value of the Naira against foreign currencies 
such as the US dollar and the pound sterling. This outcome may have further 
fuelled inflation especially in 2000, 2002, 2005 and 2010 as shown in Figure 
4.32 below.     
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Figure 4.30  Merchandise Imports (current US$) 
 
Source of Data: World Bank Development Indicators (2015) 
Note: the vertical axis shows the value of merchandise imports in current us dollars, while the 
horizontal axis shows the period in years from 1999 to 2013. 
 
Figure 4.31 Official Exchange Rate (Naira per US$, period average) 
 
Source of Data: World Bank Development Indicators (2015) 
Note: the vertical axis shows the value of the official exchange rate in the naira per US dollar, 
while the horizontal axis shows the period in years from 1999 to 2013. 
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Figure 4.32 Inflation, GDP Deflator (annual %) 
 
Source of Data: World Bank Development Indicators (2015) 
Note: the vertical axis shows inflation as measured by the annual growth rate of the GDP implicit 
deflator54 which depicts the rate of price change in the Nigerian economy, while the horizontal axis 
shows the period in years from 2003 to 2013. 
 
The above evidence provides a good illustration of why the assumptions of 
economic perspective such as Dutch Disease, oil price volatility, lack of forward 
and backward linkages and declining terms of trade produces an inadequate 
analysis when political approach which is largely underpinned by societal, 
institutional and governance explanations is ignored. It can also be inferred and 
argued that continued issues of regional and ethnic diversities coupled with 
institutional weakness that resulted in a change in the politics of Nigeria after 
the return to democratic rule in 1999 has hindered the benefits expected to be 
achieved from democracy and rising oil revenues. Instead, poverty in terms of 
food, energy and insecurity among others appeared to be on the increase. 
In addition, the literature also suggests that ethnic diversity is positively related 
with underdeveloped financial systems, distorted exchange rates, low schooling, 
and lack of infrastructure (Esterly and Levine 1997). Also it is argued that in 
                                                          
54
 The GDP implicit deflator is the ration of GDP in Nigeria’s local currency to GDP in constant local currency 
(World Bank 2015). 
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factional and predatory states, growth deteriorate in spite of the prominence of 
peasant farming with its diffuse socio-economic linkages that should support 
economic development (Auty and Gelb 2001). This also depicted the Nigerian 
situation where it was clearly evident that the financial system was characterised 
by malpractice, the value of the domestic currency had also declined and lack of 
infrastructure adversely affected sectors like agriculture and manufacturing. In 
addition, despite the importance of the agriculture in Nigeria, which had been 
widely practiced even before oil discovery and ethnic issues had not impeded it 
progress.  However, it showed that ethnic divisions do matter after oil discovery 
and this resulted in growth deterioration as shown above which also portrayed 
some of the suggestions in the literature.  
Furthermore, some studies such as those by Easterly and Levine (1997) and 
Narayan et al. (2011) stated that a number of reasons have been offered for 
weak economic performance in Sub-Saharan African countries and these include 
high population growth (see Figure 4.23 above), inadequate export performance 
(see Figure 4.21, 4.25, 4.29 and 4.30 above), low levels of investment in human 
capital (Nigeria largely depends on non-refined oil exports for source of income), 
inefficiencies in the public sector (evidenced by, for example, a lack of refined 
energy despite an abundance in oil and gas) and ethnic conflicts (see, Table 4.2 
above). 
The above suggestions made by some studies in the literature have also been 
observed in the Nigerian situation. It can also be inferred that oil revenues have 
been wasted as they have not been translated into sustainable economic growth 
as evidenced by the analysis above. For example, Ascher (1999) argued that 
natural resource-rich countries have generally wasted their resources because 
political elites have a tendency to use them to pursue various political goals 
including the funding of contentious development programs, achieving control 
over resource rent allocation, providing economic benefits to specific groups, 
avoiding accountability and crafting rent-seeking activities.  
Also, Sala-I-Martin and Subramanian (2003) argued that waste and corruption in 
the oil sector rather than the Dutch Disease has been responsible for Nigeria’s 
weak long run economic performance. Also, despite a return to democracy and 
increases in oil revenue, there is still evidence of weak economic performance. 
 
 
148 
 
Cheung (1998), for example, put forward a third argument that corruption is 
more likely to flourish under a democracy than in a dictatorship.  
 
4.5 SUMMARY    
As democracy was restored, one party (PDP) amidst others won the various 
elections conducted until 2015. However, the PDP’s dominance was associated 
with political misconduct in elections. This outcome showed that the political 
landscape has somewhat changed as the PDP was not basically formed as a 
regional party because of its constituents. People from the different regions in 
Nigeria formed the PDP. This served to highlight that a lack of national unity and 
gradual dependence on the oil sector may have given an opportunity for some 
politicians with common interests to come together and take control of the 
affairs of the country that is not in the interest of the general population.  
The PDP’s administration introduced economic reforms to revive the economy 
from a dwindling state. For example, the reforms targeted the oil, manufacturing 
and agriculture sectors in order to improve diversification of the Nigerian 
economy and curtail the resource curse effects. In addition, institutions that will 
strengthen law and order and minimise corrupt practices such as money 
laundering were established. It is evident that the problems of the resource 
curse which can be explained in terms of economic concepts of the Dutch 
Disease effect, oil price volatility and declining terms of trade has appeared to 
have affected economic sectors adversely. But they alone cannot be blamed for 
the resource curse as diversity in ethnic and regional factors may have 
influenced the change in ownership structure of the oil industry to state control 
which gives more access and power to political leaders and the negative 
consequences on economic sectors are evident, especially in terms of energy 
provision. The change in ownership structure appeared to have promoted rent 
seeking as more government agencies were established in the name of 
monitoring the oil sector and most of them are headed by political associates.  
The PDP until May 2015 was also viewed as a rent seeker especially in the last 
administration of the party as complaints of a lack of accountability and 
transparency are reported in the institutions governing the oil industry, 
particularly the NNPC due to lack of efficiency in the provision of energy and the 
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issue of accounted funds expected to be remitted into government account in 
the Nigerian Central Bank. These various outcomes showed that the issues of 
Dutch Disease, rent seeking, institutional and governance failures and taking 
advantages of the state ownership structure of the oil industry persist even 
under the PDP’s administration.      
Also rising oil revenues from the 1960s which appear to have boosted 
government expenditure in previous administrations before the return to 
democratic rule in 1999 did not show a positive impact on economic 
performance. This seems to be the same during the period of democratic rule as 
rising government expenditure did not correspond with rising economic 
performance when key sectors like manufacturing and agriculture are 
considered. This outcome points to institutional weakness which may have been 
inherited from previous regimes. Institutions such as the legislative arm of 
government appeared not to be concerned with a lack of connectivity between 
expenditure and economic performance. 
Furthermore, despite the reforms by the PDP government the economic situation 
continued declining and poverty and unemployment heightened as key sectors 
such as oil, manufacturing and agriculture deteriorated. Observed growth in GDP 
and GDP per capita was only recorded in periods of rising world oil prices which 
in turn meant rising oil revenues but in reality this was accompanied with weak 
economic performance. This could point to the underlying issues of rent seeking 
which had been prevalent due to the continuing and growing reliance on the oil 
sector which provided easy access to money that could help support the 
activities of political leaders in power. Programmes or policies intended for 
reforming the Nigerian economy appeared to be ways of having access to oil 
rental income as government spend money to execute contracts which may not 
necessarily support economic activities. In addition, government subsidises 
refined oil products but there appeared to be scarcity and rising cost of energy. 
Instead of seeing positive changes in the economy the resource curse tended to 
manifest itself more and more over time as various avenues kept developing and 
made the situation complex for any policy to work effectively.  
Also, it appears that a lack of national unity associated with the amalgamation of 
different regions across different political and social backgrounds coupled with a 
neglect of agriculture and the discovery of oil in one region have transformed the 
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political and economic conditions in Nigeria. These various outcomes appeared to 
have hindered the benefits associated with an oil rich economy. The neglect of 
agriculture and the subsequent reliance on the oil sector which became the 
dominant provider of government revenue appeared to have boosted 
government expenditure; however there appears to be little multiplier effect on 
the rest of the economy. As such, the changed economic and political landscapes 
appeared to have created an avenue for a new political order which is not based 
solely on regional aspects after the return to democratic rule.   
In conclusion it is evident that the continuity of several factors such as ethnic 
conflicts, regional rivalry, reliance on the oil sector and stable democratic rule 
has adversely affected the level of economic performance in the country, 
particularly key sectors of oil, agriculture and manufacturing. For example, oil 
has gradually become the leading sector and the dominant generator of income 
for the government but has not been able to provide employment opportunities 
for Nigerian citizens due to low domestic content and could not support sufficient 
refined oil products for domestic use despite existing refineries. The performance 
of the oil sector has dwindled over time and as such could not provide the 
forward and backward linkages needed to improve the performance of key 
sectors like agriculture and manufacturing despite rising oil revenues and 
government expenditure.  
In addition, the Nigerian government has established several institutions to 
deliver the intended economic objectives of its nationalisation program and to 
minimise money laundering and corrupt practices especially after the return to 
democratic rule in 1999 due to the dwindling performance of the oil sector and 
other sectors but there appears to be no significant improvement as issues of a 
lack of efficiency, transparency and accountability are being reported by 
academics, government officials and the media.  
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CHAPTER 5 
METHODOLOGY 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
This Chapter presents the methodological approach employed in this study. From 
the literature review discussed in Chapter 2 and the analysis of the trajectory of 
political and institutional changes in terms of economic outcome in Nigeria as 
shown in Chapters 3 and 4, this chapter further discusses the empirical methods 
employed in this research. For example, the recent literature on the resource 
curse and development indicated that, for resource-rich countries to break free 
from the problems associated with an abundance in natural resources, scholars 
and policy makers should take into account the multifaceted and interconnecting 
problems of politics in addition to examining the various economic variables 
(see, for example, Acemoglu et al. 2000, Auty 2001, Davis et al. 2003, Melhun 
et al. 2006, Luong and Weithal 2006). As such, the literature on natural resource 
wealth and economic development acknowledged that the problem of a lack of 
development in resource rich countries is more than an economic issue and 
requires a more comprehensive look at the role of politics and its function in 
delivering economic outcomes. In other words, to see the problem of a lack of 
economic development as purely economic is too simplistic and academics have 
highlighted the importance of aspects of the political economy, such as the 
developmental stages of the political state to initiate a sustained, rapid and 
equitable economic development (Auty 2001).  
The basic building block behind the methodology of this thesis is adapted from 
the study by Bevan et al. (1999) which combined an “analytical economic 
history” and a “political economy” approach. In their comparative study between 
Indonesia and Nigeria titled “The Political Economy of Poverty, Equity and 
Growth”, they provide a critical examination of the economic history of the two 
developing economies from 1950 to 1985.  The study examine the processes 
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that produced different levels of growth, poverty and equity in in Indonesia and 
Nigeria, which are conditioned on each country's initial resource endowment and 
economic structure and policies, forms of economic organization and national 
institutions using a historical narrative and an insightful explanation of how and 
why events occurred. Bevan’s et al study also tries to detect the role of ideology 
and interest groups in influencing policy in these two countries. 
For example, in order to explain the events that happened in Nigeria, Bevan et 
al. (1999) examines themes such as the colonial period from political 
independence to chaos, civil war and reconstruction, the first oil cycle, the 
second oil cycle, economic growth and living standards, factor and product 
market, government finance and the political economy of public policy.  They 
also explained the outcomes which the historical evolutions of these events have 
helped to shape the trajectory of economic performance. 
 
The following sections below describe the empirical methodology, time period 
selected, data description and model specification. 
 
5.2 EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY 
This study employs two methods of empirical analysis. These are descriptive and 
econometric methods. The descriptive method summarises the data through the 
use of a visual summary in the form of tables and graphs.  The reason for this is 
to provide a basis for a more extensive empirical analysis which employs an 
econometric model using time series that uses secondary and qualitative data in 
the form of dummy variables. 
Empirically there are several ways to analyse the relationship between natural 
resource wealth and economic performance but this study will apply a 
quantitative method which adopts an econometric model against other empirical 
methods in the form of a vector autoregression (VAR) model as a methodological 
tool which also allows the quantitative analysis of a dynamic relationship over 
time using secondary data. The VAR econometric model is employed in order to 
test the hypotheses derived and informed by Chapters 4 and 5 which examines 
the historical political economy of Nigeria in relation to oil production and 
economic performance.  While many models may potentially be able to account 
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for this type of relationship, there are at least two reasons why a VAR model is 
the most compelling. Firstly, Stock and Watson (2001) suggest that since VAR 
models include current and lagged values of multiple time series, they capture 
comovements that cannot be detected in univariate or bivariate models 
(Farzanegan 2011). Secondly, many causal assumptions have been proposed in 
the resource impact literature. For example, as is well documented, the increase 
in the role of indirect effects such as government action and institutional quality, 
as opposed to direct effects such as revenue volatility and Dutch Disease, point 
towards a gradual evolution process in the political economy approach to 
underpin several causal assumptions (see, for example, Luong and Weithal 
2004, 2010 and Collier, 2010 for more details). Thirdly, causal issues in the 
impact of natural resources are complex and recent studies responded in 
applying a broader framework. For example, academics have examined the 
structure of ownership over mineral resources, the importance of strong 
institutions and the relative influence of domestic versus international factors 
(see, for example, Luong and Weithal 2004).  
A VAR is an n-equation, n-variable model and this provided a new macro-
econometric framework that has great capacity (Stock and Watson 2001). VAR 
models have been used to study the relationship between oil price changes and 
economic growth (see, for example, Hamilton 1983, Baumeister and Peersman 
2013a, 2013b). Blanchard (1989) employed the VAR model based on a 
traditional Keynesian model involving an aggregate demand equation, Okun’s 
law, a price-setting equation, the Phillips curve and a monetary policy rule for 
the US economy. In addition, Bernanke and Mihov (1998) modelled the market 
for bank reserves as part of a study of U.S. monetary policy using a semi-
structural VAR framework. They jointly analyse a vector of policy indicators 
rather than a single indicator. Their approach allows for changes in the operating 
procedures of the Federal Reserve Bank of the USA over time. In the spirit of the 
above-mentioned studies, this study will also employ the VAR model to examine 
the relationship between oil and economic performance in Nigeria.  
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5.3 TIME PERIOD SELECTED FOR THE STUDY 
The period of study considered in the examination of oil and economic 
development in Nigeria is from 1960 to 2010. This period is selected because 
during this time Nigeria had experienced changes in its economic and political 
systems. In relation to the former, Nigeria had undergone a transition from a 
largely market based economy to that of more state controlled system. Nigeria 
also shifted its economic dependence from agriculture which is widely spread 
across the country to that of oil which is basically situated in one region of the 
country. The changes in the economic system also reflected changes in economic 
policy from that of a colonial administration to one of indigenisation after 
Nigeria’s independence in 1960. This was followed by a gradual liberalisation of 
some economic sectors such as telecommunications and a part of the 
downstream sector of the Nigerian oil industry in the 2000s.   
Focusing on the political system, Nigeria had undergone many changes, 
especially in the political regimes (military and civilian) that governed the 
country since independence. Table 5.1 below illustrates the different political 
regimes in Nigeria from 1960 – date. 
In addition, Nigeria had undergone changes in its regional structure after 
independence in 1960. For example, there was a regional system which later 
evolved into a state system and the gradual creation of more states from 1967-
1976 (12 States), 1976-1987 (19 States), 1987-1991 (21 States), 1991-1996 
(30 States) and 1991 – Date (36 States). Before and after independence, 
Nigeria comprised of three regions of Northern, Western, and Eastern. The 
creations of states serve to highlight the role of government policy in trying to 
unite Nigeria and bring about an equal distribution of wealth, especially for 
minority ethnic groups who felt marginalised. Moreover, Nigeria instituted a 
federal system in 1963 as against its British colonial legacy practised prior to 
1963. This system serves to highlight Nigeria’s move towards a framework that 
will cater for the ethnic and regional background upon which the country was 
formed before independence.   
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Table 5.1 Political Regimes in Nigeria since Independence  
Political Regimes Period 
Civilian 1960 – 1966 
Military 1966 – 1979 
Civilian 1979 – 1983 
Military 1983 – 1998 
Civilian 1999 – Date 
Source: Created by author based on historical information of Nigeria in Metz (1991), Khan (1994), 
Falola and Heaton (2008) and Lewis (2009). 
 
Changes in the political structure in Nigeria help to illustrate the extent to which 
political factors could influence the stable functioning of government and 
development plans or policies implemented with consequences for various 
institutions such as the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC), the 
Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR) and the Pipelines and Products 
Marketing Company Limited (PPMC). These had been established to deliver the 
various goals of the nationalisation of the Nigerian oil industry that could help 
promote growth and reduce poverty.  
Similarly, political regime changes also reflected a lack of political stability in 
Nigeria after achieving independence. The periods of political instability are 
reflected in the theoretical underpinning of the literature on oil production and 
economic growth in developing countries. Capturing periods of political instability 
in Nigeria is significant in order to see whether such phenomena had any effect 
on Nigeria’s economic growth. 
The next section below presents a discussion of the secondary data employed in 
order to achieve the aim and objectives of this study with reference to the 
development of the Nigerian political economy.  
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5.4 DATA DESCRIPTION 
This study reveals the use of different data series, length of time and 
methodology to examine the relationship between oil and economic performance 
in Nigeria. This country is selected based on its dependency on oil as a natural 
resource as well as its exposure to other economic and political problems 
associated with oil in the literature.  This study will be contrasted with earlier 
studies, particularly those focusing on Nigeria, by including more variables in 
order to adopt a wider theoretical framework of the political economy as 
indicated by the recent literature.  
The data employed are annual series for the period 1961 – 2010 to 
quantitatively examine the main aim of this study. However, there are 
exceptions in the graphical descriptive statistics where data is employed from 
1960 and beyond 2010 for the purpose of illustration. This length of time for the 
quantitative analysis is similar to that of a study by Ogunleye (2008) but is 
extended from 2006 to 2010 for this research. The length of time also depends 
on the start date and end date of the variables. The year 1961 is chosen 
because the variables of recurrent and capital expenditure starts from 1961 and 
those of oil, manufacturing and agriculture start from 1960. But they all have 
the same end date as sourced from the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) Statistical 
Bulletin (2010). The economic and social performance data were obtained from 
CBN and World Bank Development Indicators and are quoted in Nigerian local 
currency (Naira) with minor exceptions.  
In terms of variables for the quantitative analysis, this study employs the output 
of the oil, manufacturing and agricultural sectors, and government expenditure 
which comprises of recurrent and capital expenditure. These variables are in real 
prices and the first three are components of real Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP)55 in Nigeria. The variables have also been transformed into logarithmic 
form. The plot of the variables in their log levels is illustrated below in Figure 5.1 
below which shows the evolution of the output of the oil, manufacturing and 
agricultural sectors, and government spending (capital and recurrent) in Nigeria.  
 
                                                          
55 At constant 1990 basic prices (CBN Statistical Bulletin 2010). 
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The transformation into logarithm form is based on the fact that many economic 
variables usually have an underlying rate of growth, which may or may not be 
constant over time; for instance, GDP, consumer price index or money supply 
tend to grow at an annual rate (Dimitrious and Hall 2011). The three series 
representing oil, manufacturing and agricultural output in this study are 
components of the GDP in Nigeria. The series are annual and this means that 
they tend to grow at an annual rate. Also most macroeconomic variables follow a 
trend pattern and largely not stationary as the mean continues to rise. The issue 
of a continually rising mean prevents the data from being stationary no matter 
the amount of differentiation conducted. The non-stationarity of the data gives 
rise to one of the major reasons for taking the logarithm of data before applying 
formal econometric analysis (Dimitrious and Hall 2011).   
 
 
Figure 5.1 Transformed Variables into Logarithms 
 
Source of Data: CBN Statistical Bulletin (2010) 
Note: The vertical axis shows the evolution of the output of the oil, manufacturing and agricultural 
sectors, and government spending (capital and recurrent) in Nigeria, while the horizontal axis 
shows the period in years from 1961 to 2010. 
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5.4.1 Justification of the Economic Variables 
The reason for the choice of these variables is due to their major roles in the 
Nigerian economy. At one time in the trajectory of economic development, these 
variables have become important sources of income or have been given special 
attention by the government through economic policies to help move such 
sectors forward.  
In the next sub-sections we look at the importance of these variables separately 
so as to give a clearer justification behind their selection. This will be drawn both 
from the literature and their importance in the Nigerian economy.  
 
5.4.1.1 Oil Output Variable 
Oil production has gradually become the main source of revenue for the Nigerian 
government from the start of exports in 1960 and has also taking a leading role 
over all sectors especially from the 1970s to date in terms of revenue generation 
and composition of exports. As such, oil has also been a dominant source of 
income and government revenue (CIA 2016) and oil accounts for about 75 
percent of Nigeria’s consolidated budgetary revenues (World Bank 2016). 
In 1960, oil exports accounted for about 2.6 percent of export earnings but the 
contribution of oil to exports surged, especially in the 1970s as it accounts for 
about 60 percent in 1970 and about 83 and 93 percent in 1973 and 1974 
respectively. That notwithstanding, the oil contribution to total exports continued 
to rise in the subsequent decades. For example, as of 2000, the oil sector 
accounted for more than 98 percent of exports, as well as generating about 33% 
of Nigeria’s GDP (see Figures 5.2 and 5.4 below). 
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Figure 5.2 Oil and Non-Oil Exports 
 
Source of Data: CBN Statistical Bulletin (2010) 
Note: The vertical axis shows the evolution of oil and non-oil exports in Nigeria, while the 
horizontal axis shows the period in years from 1960 to 2010. 
 
In summary, the contribution of the oil sector in terms of total exports is 
illustrated in Figure 5.2 above. It is clear that from 1970 oil exports surpassed 
other non-oil exports in the Nigerian economy.  The trend shows a substitution 
role of oil for other exports.  
In addition, the contribution of the oil sector is evident in government revenue. 
For example, oil revenue accounted for about 27 percent of government revenue 
while non-oil revenue accounted for about 74 percent. However, this trend 
changes from 1972 when the oil sector recorded a contribution of almost 55 
percent and non-oil accounted for about 46 percent. This development continued 
since the early 1970s and oil has contributed significantly to government 
revenue in Nigeria (see Figure 5.3 below). 
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Figure 5.3 Oil and Non-Oil Revenues 
 
Source of Data: CBN Statistical Bulletin (2010) 
Note: The vertical axis shows the evolution of oil and non-oil revenues in Nigeria, while the 
horizontal axis shows the period in years from 1970 to 2010. 
 
 
The selection of the oil variable in this study is also motivated by the literature 
as reviewed in Chapter 2. In this chapter, one of the early and major views in 
the economic perspective is commodity price volatility which can affect the 
terms of trade. Vagaries in the oil price and the effects on economic growth have 
been a subject of intense debate among academics. This type of analysis has not 
been limited to oil exporting countries but also to importing countries due to the 
importance of oil as a major source of world energy.  
The analysis between oil price changes and economic performance has received 
considerable attention from academia and other stakeholders such as the media 
and government policy makers due to the importance of oil, especially 
developing economies like Nigeria. Many of these developing countries rich in oil 
have limited diversified economies and as such any significant changes in the oil 
price affects their economic performance through several channels such as the 
Dutch Disease which leads to an appreciation of their domestic currency (see, 
Corden and Neary 1982) volatile revenue which makes it challenging for their 
governments to pursue a prudent fiscal policy (Stevens 2003 and Kilian 2010). 
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Other political channels of effect have also been presented by the political 
economy literature. These are not direct in their impacts such as economic 
means; they are indirect and are linked to political factors as drivers, such as 
ethnic diversity which is common in African economies (see Easterly and Levine 
1997). This brings about political instability or impedes democracy (Wantchekon 
2002, Jensen and Wantchekon 2004), leads to weak governance and conflicts 
(Collier and Hoeffler, 1998, 2004 and 2005),  
From Figures 5.2 and 5.3 it is clear that Nigeria will be affected by changes in oil 
prices due to the dependence of the country on oil as a leading export 
commodity and a major source of government revenue. Changes in oil price 
which Nigeria alone cannot determine as there are other large producers like 
Saudi Arabia, Russia, Iraq, Venezuela, Algeria, Norway, United States and United 
Arab Emirates, will affect the country’s economy.  
Several studies in the literature have also examined the effects of oil wealth on 
the Nigeria economy. Various studies by Bevan et al. (1999), Sala-i-Martin and 
Subramanian (2003), Mehlum et al. (2006), Ogunleye (2008), Iwayemi and 
Fawowe (2011) and Akinlo (2012) have adopted several key approaches in the 
literature to study the lack of growth in Nigeria despite an abundance in oil 
wealth. For example, Akinlo (2012) employed oil output along with other 
variables to examine the impact of oil on economic growth in Nigeria.   
 
5.4.1.2 Manufacturing Output  
The justification behind the employment of manufacturing output as a variable is 
motivated by the literature review. Its use is also in line with the theoretical 
literature which suggests that oil production and exports leads to a deterioration 
of the manufacturing sector. According to the literature, the initial explanation 
for the resource curse of the Dutch disease was purely economic (Collier 2010). 
The employment of manufacturing output is also essential because of its key 
importance in determining economic performance as it provides forward and 
backward linkages to push other economic activities. For example, researchers 
such as Hirschman (1958), Seers (1964) and Baldwin (1966) suggested that 
backward linkages from the supply of primary product exports would be limited 
compared to manufactured exports. 
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The Dutch Disease hypothesis has been studied extensively due to the observed 
appreciation of the domestic currency of resource-rich exporters and the 
apparent decline of the manufacturing and/or the agricultural sector in resource-
rich countries. This outcome has been confirmed by some studies (Corden and 
Neary 1982 and Fardmanesh (1991). Also studies focusing solely on Nigeria such 
as those by Olusi and Olagunju (2005), Ogunleye (2008), Ogbonna et al. (2013) 
also confirmed the effect of Dutch Disease on the Nigerian economy. Studies 
such as that by Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian (2003), Aliyu (2009) and 
Iwayemi and Fawowe (2011) fail to find the effect of Dutch Disease in Nigeria. 
For example, Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian (2003) suggest that waste and 
corruption from oil rather than the Dutch Disease has been responsible for 
Nigeria’s weak long run economic performance. The lack of consensus in the 
literature on the effect of the Dutch Disease suggests that there is scope for 
more analysis to help find the channels that hinder economic growth.  
In addition, the Nigerian government after independence also targeted 
industrialisation of the economy through the First National Development Plan’s 
economic reform agenda and subsequent economic reforms, especially after a 
return to democratic rule in 1999. This period also saw the promotion of small 
and medium scale enterprises. Moreover, from Figure 5.4 it can be seen that 
Nigeria is showing significant evidence of manufacturing decline. Fardmanesh 
(1991), for example, estimates the effect of the Dutch Disease for five 
developing oil exporting countries (Algeria, Ecuador, Indonesia, Nigeria and 
Venezuela) with significant manufacturing and agricultural sectors using time 
series annual data for the period 1966 to 1986. 
  
5.4.1.3 Agricultural Output  
Furthermore, the use of agricultural output also reflects the theoretical literature 
which argued that oil endowed developing countries experience a decline in their 
manufacturing/agricultural sectors due to the appreciation the domestic currency 
and the enclave nature of the oil industry which requires high skilled labour (see, 
for example, Corden and Neary 1982 and Fardmanesh 1991).  
The use of agricultural output is also necessary because agriculture used to be 
the mainstay of the Nigerian economy. It is also the key source of livelihood for 
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the majority of the Nigerian population, especially in the rural areas (World Bank 
2016). According to World Bank (2016), the Nigerian labour force, like that of 
many African countries, is profoundly concentrated in agriculture and the sector 
grew by about 6.8 percent annually from 2005-2009. 
To reflect back, in 1960 the agricultural sector accounted for about 65 percent of 
total GDP. However, from the 1970s this sector saw a major decline as it only 
accounted for about 25 percent of GDP in 1975 and oil which accounted for 
about 0.5 percent in 1960 showed a contribution of more than 21 percent of 
total GDP (see, Figure 3.4 for the different developments of oil, manufacturing 
and agricultural output in GDP in Nigeria from 1960 to 2010). 
These three variables of oil, manufacturing and agricultural output constitute a 
significant share of GDP in Nigeria as shown in Figure 5.2 below. Figure 5.5 
depicts the output of oil, manufacturing, agriculture and other sources in GDP from 
1960 to 2010. From Figure 5.5 below it can be seen that the share of agriculture 
is large as it accounts for 41 percent of total GDP while oil accounts for 27 
percent and manufacturing 5 percent of total GDP in Nigeria. As such, the use of 
the three variables to depict the trajectory of economic performance over time 
will provide a more effective examination of the justification of the argument of 
this thesis.  
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Figure 5.4 Percentage Output of Oil, Manufacturing, Agriculture and  
  Other GDP in Nigeria (1960 – 2010) 
 
Source of Data: CBN Statistical Bulletin (2010) 
Note: The vertical axis shows the development of the oil, manufacturing and agriculture sectors in 
Nigeria, while the horizontal axis shows the period in years from 1960 to 2010. 
 
Figure 5.5 Output of Oil, Manufacturing, Agriculture and Other GDP 
 
Source of Data: CBN Statistical Bulletin (2010) 
Note:  (1). Other GDP means other components of Nigeria’s GDP and these include building 
and construction, wholesale and retail trade, services and other industrial activities. 
 (2). The data for the various components of GDP are from 1960 to 2010.  
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5.4.1.4 Government Expenditure  
This section presents the government expenditure variable which comprises of 
the two categories of recurrent and capital expenditure. The use of government 
expenditure in this study is motivated by the literature and also shows the oil 
sector’s contribution to economic performance in Nigeria due to the significant 
contribution of oil in total government revenue as shown previously.   
From a strand of literature in development economics which focuses on public 
spending and economic growth, it is evident that there is a plethora of studies 
on this relationship (see, for example, Landau 1983, Aschauer 1989, Easter and 
Rebelo 1993, Ramey and Shapiro 1998). Also, many economists cite fiscal policy 
as one of the most important tools in determining the growth performance of a 
country (Easterly and Rebelo 1993). However, there is no consensus on whether 
fiscal policy is productive due to differences in the theoretical frameworks 
adopted by researchers.  
Beside the significance of government expenditure in improving economic 
performance, it is evident that in Nigeria it has been on the increase which could 
be due to rises in oil revenue as illustrated in Figure 5.6 below. Figure 5.6 shows 
the evolution of oil revenue and government expenditure from 1970 to 1990 so 
as to provide evidence and the 1970s are years that witnessed the significant 
changes in the contribution of the oil sector in the Nigerian economy due to 
world increases in the oil price, especially in the mid-1970s (see also Figures 
5.2, 5.3 and 5.4 above for more evidence).  
As such, it is important to use government expenditure in the analysis of the 
relationship between oil and economic growth. This will help to show whether oil 
has contributed to the improvement of economic performance in Nigeria since 
the oil revenues are not distributed to the population directly. Instead it is used 
in the administration and management of the country as shown by the various 
categories of government spending in Nigeria. This comprises of recurrent and 
capital expenditure.  
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Figure 5.6 Evolution of Oil Revenue and Government Expenditure 
 
Source of Data: Central Bank of Nigeria (2010) 
Note: The vertical axis shows the evolution of oil revenue and government expenditure in Nigeria, 
while the horizontal axis shows the period in years from 1970 to 1990. 
 
Government expenditure in Nigeria comprises of administration, economic 
services, social and community services, transfers plus capital expenditure. 
These components are also disaggregated into other components. For example, 
administration entails spending on internal security, general administration, 
defence and national assembly while economic services are classified into 
agriculture, construction, transport and communication and other economic 
services. Expenditure on social and community services consists of health, 
education and other social and community services. Also, transfers comprises of 
categories such as public debt servicing, pension and gratuities and 
contingencies/subventions (CBN Statistical Bulletin 2010). 
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5.4.1.5 Economic Data  
Due to the nature of the economic data or variables employed which are time 
series in nature; this section describes the data statistically in order to 
summarize the information in a meaningful way as this could provide valuable 
insight into this group of economic variables selected for this study.  
Table 5.2 below presents the summary statistics for the measures of oil output 
(LOIL), manufacturing output (LMAN), agricultural output (LAGRIC), capital 
(LCAPEXP) and recurrent expenditure (LRECEXP). All the variables are in 
logarithmic form. The summary statistics of agriculture has a positive log mean 
of about 10.15, indicating that the output of the agricultural sector is larger than 
that of the other sectors. The manufacturing sector has the lowest mean log 
value of about 8.27 and the rest have a mean log value of at least 9.2. This 
shows that the mean log values of all the economic variables are not very 
different from each other.  
Also the highest maximum log value among the variables is 14.9 and this is 
recorded by recurrent expenditure; manufacturing has the lowest, with a 
maximum log value of 10.38. This also shows that the disparities between the 
maximum log values of the variables are close to one another as shown in Table 
5.2. The highest maximum log value recorded by recurrent expenditure is 
observed in 2010 and this can be seen in Figure 5.1 above. This outcome could 
also highlight rising recurrent expenditure fuelled by the oil sector as it has 
already become a dominant sector of government revenue.   
In terms of minimum log values, the agricultural sector recorded the highest log 
value of about 7.20 and oil has the least log value of 5.14. The minimum log 
value of the agricultural sector is observed in 1968 and may be due to the 
growing importance of the oil sector in comparison with agriculture as shown in 
Figure 5.4 above. Also, the minimum log value recorded by the oil sector 
appeared in 1961 after oil exports had just begun in 1960 and had not taken the 
lead in economic activities (see Figure 5.4).  
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Table 5.2 Descriptive Statistics of Variables in Logarithm Form 
 LOIL LCAPEXP LRECEXP LMAN LAGRIC 
 Mean  9.387  9.200  9.605  8.267  10.147 
 Median  11.169  8.909  8.941  9.436  11.122 
 Maximum  11.823  13.958  14.901  10.382  12.666 
 Minimum  3.1442  4.156  4.573  4.848  7.199 
 Std. Dev.  2.891  3.209  3.188  1.878  1.964 
 Observations  50  50  50  50  50 
      
Source: Created by author based on data from CBN Statistical Bulletin (2010) using Eviews 
Statistical Software  
 
It is obvious from Table 5.2 above that capital expenditure has the highest 
standard deviation with a log value of about 3.21 followed by recurrent 
expenditure which has a log value of about 3.19. From Figure 5.7 below it is 
clear that the annual rate of change in these two variables is characterised by 
high and continuous variability. This signifies high volatility in the two variables 
and may be linked to volatility in oil prices which are largely dictated by supply 
and demand conditions in the world or by government spending policies. In 
contrast, from Figure 5.8 below which illustrates the annual rate of change in oil, 
manufacturing and agriculture is not characterised by high and continuous 
volatility.  
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Figure 5.7 Percentage Change in Capital and Recurrent Expenditures 
 
Source of Data: CBN Statistical Bulletin (2010) 
Note: The vertical axis shows the annual rate of change in capital and recurrent expenditure in 
Nigeria, while the horizontal axis shows the period in years from 1961 to 2010. 
 
Figure 5.8 Percentage Change in Oil, Manufacturing and Agriculture 
 
Source of Data: CBN Statistical Bulletin (2010) 
Note: The vertical axis shows the annual rate of change in the output of oil, manufacturing and 
agriculture in Nigeria, while the horizontal axis shows the period in years from 1961 to 2010. 
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5.4.2 Justification of Political Variables 
Other measures in the form of dummy variables so as to depict a qualitative 
aspect of the study are also employed to reflect political and other institutional 
factors in Nigeria. The reason behind the use of the political variables is 
motivated by the literature and the evidence of political developments in Nigeria. 
Thus, there are key reasons for the inclusion of the dummy variables. 
The dummy variables are constructed based on evidence from the literature on 
natural resource endowment and economic growth and historical information 
about the development of Nigeria’s political economy (See, for example, Metz 
1991, Khan 1994, Bevan et al. 1999, Falola and Heaton 2008 and Lewis 2009). 
Also from Table 5.1 above, it can be seen that the Nigerian political landscape 
has been characterised by different regimes.   
In the spirit of studies on the political approach, such as that by Sachs and 
Warner (1997), Ross (2001), Smith (2004), Stijns (2005) , Ulfelder (2007), 
Oskarsson and  Ottosen (2010) and Alexeev and Conrad (2011), this research 
employs dummy variables representing institutional and political factors in order 
to examine the relationship between oil and economic performance in Nigeria. 
For example, Alexeev and Conrad (2011) in their study of the relationship 
between natural resource wealth and economic development in relation to the 
quality of institutions use dummy variables to represent membership of the 
Common Wealth of Independent States and countries in transition from a 
planned to a market economy.  
Likewise, Smith (2004) in his study of the relationship between natural resource 
wealth and political regime uses a dummy variable to represent different political 
regime periods.  Ross (2001) and Oskarsson and Ottosen (2010) also employed 
a dummy variable to capture countries that are members of the Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). In addition, Ulfelder (2007) 
used dummy variables to mark periods when an autocracy had a new head of 
government and for the post–cold war period. Also Grier and Munger (2006) 
examine a sample of 155 countries using a large unbalanced annual panel data 
over the period 1950-2003 and defining dictatorship simply as a dummy 
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variable. Grier and Munger examine the relationship between different political 
regimes and economic growth.  
 
5.4.2.1 Dummy Variable of Political Regime 
The first dummy variable represents political instability in Nigeria from 1966 to 
1998. First, in the analytical context, the relative influence of various political 
regimes (military and civilian) will reflect the opportunity cost of not having a 
stable and democratic political landscape which may undermine a coherent and 
lasting economic policy. Several empirical studies such as that by Wantchekon 
(1999), for instance, have argued that a 1% increase in natural resource 
dependence, as measured by the ratio of primary exports to GDP, increased the 
probability of authoritarian government by nearly 8%. Furthermore, he 
suggested that countries which were rich in natural resources were more likely 
to experience a failed or slow transition to democracy. Similarly, Jensen and 
Wantchekon (2004) argued that resource abundant countries in Africa were 
more likely to be authoritarian and experience breakdowns in democracy after a 
democratic transition. Ross (2001) also concluded that a state’s reliance on oil or 
mineral exports tends to make it less democratic.  
Thus, this reflects the Nigerian situation, where the oil sector provides a large 
share of government revenue and source of foreign exchange.56 Therefore, 
resource abundance encourages contests for the receipt of rental income that 
tend to engender factional or autonomous predatory political states. To stay in 
power, the governments of resource abundant countries need to find a way to 
redistribute rental income to favoured groups. They tend to do so at the expense 
of a coherent economic policy. Auty and Gelb (2000) suggested that factional 
and predatory states tend to encourage individual tribes or tribal coalitions to 
channel political energy into capturing the government. For example, Easterly 
and Levine (1997) find that ethnic diversity fosters rent-seeking behaviour that 
encourages the adoption of growth-retarding policies and inhibits consensus on 
investment in growth-promoting infrastructure.  
 
                                                          
56
 For example, the Nigerian economy is heavily dependent on its oil sector, which accounted for more than 95 
percent of export earnings and more than 75 percent of federal government revenue in 2011, according to the U.S. 
Energy Information Administration (EIA 2012). 
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5.4.2.2 Dummy Variable of Nationalisation of Oil Production 
Secondly, the inclusion of a variable for the period of nationalisation of the oil 
sector which coincided with Nigeria`s membership of OPEC is undertaken to 
target the ownership structure and examine the associated benefits to the 
leading sector (oil) and the consequences for other key sectors such as 
agriculture and manufacturing. The change in ownership structure in 1971 may 
also reflect reasons proposed by some studies in the literature such as those by 
McPherson 2003 and Luong and Weithal 2010. 
Similarly, one of the key reasons for establishing and joining OPEC by oil 
producing countries is a need to maximise benefits from the oil sector by 
nationalising oil production and establishing a national oil company. Thus, the 
time span of a change in ownership structure from 1971, which is more than a 
decade after the commencement of oil production and export, is a reasonable 
proxy to measure the economic benefits which accrued to the oil sector and in 
turn to other key sectors of the economy since then.  
Beavan et al. (1999), for example, examined the differing economic fortunes of 
Nigeria and Indonesia between the 1950s and the late 1990s and examined a 
number of country factors linked to their respective economic, political and social 
structures. For example, the role of external factors in influencing the 
development of resource-rich economies is recognised. A considerable part of 
the literature on the resource curse focuses on the influence of domestic political 
variables on economic outcomes, particularly the nature of the state and the 
behaviour of political elites (Rosser 2006a). Beavan et al. (1999) argued that 
Indonesia’s proximity to the East Asian Newly Industrialised Countries (NICs) is 
a significant reason for that country’s relative economic success compared to 
Nigeria; hence they suggested that the external environment is vital.  
In addition, the outcome for a country in relation to the natural resource curse 
may or may not occur depending upon the ownership structure chosen for the 
resource extraction and the endogenously determined fiscal regime which 
follows the ownership structure decision (Luong and Weinthal 2010). 
 
 
173 
 
Moreover, the period of nationalisation also saw the establishment of the 
Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) which reflects increased state 
intervention in oil sector management. The NNPC was established in 1977 and 
this was six years after nationalisation and nearly two decades after the 
discovery and export of oil in Nigeria. Therefore, we believe that capturing the 
period of nationalisation will be a reasonable proxy to measure the efficacy of 
the relationship between this period and subsequent reforms such as the 
establishment of NNPC with its subsidiaries and of the oil sector as well as other 
key activities such as agriculture and manufacturing. This line of argument has 
been provided by McPherson (2003), where he argued that political factors such 
as corruption and nationalism have weakened the efficiency and effectiveness of 
national oil companies in many oil rich countries and interrupted programs of 
national oil company reform.  
 
5.4.2.3 Dummy Variable of Return to Democratic Rule 
Finally, a dummy variable is included to reflect a period of stable democratic rule 
and the dominance of a single political party since 1999. Since returning to 
democracy in 1999, a single party has succeeded in winning all elections and has 
since then dominated the four year term for each president and for all the years 
since the return to democracy in 1999.57 In this period, economic reforms have 
been initiated which targeted, in particular, the oil sector and others such as 
financial services and manufacturing. The key agenda of the reform is the need 
to transform the oil sector into a viable vehicle that could enhance growth. The 
reform agenda includes the desire for transparency in oil extraction and oil 
revenues, deregulation of the downstream sector, improved governance in the 
management of NNPC, greater local content in the oil sector and wider corporate 
social responsibility, among others. Several narrative studies such as that by 
                                                          
57
 Several scholars have studied the issue of single party dominance and the effects on economic growth. Magoloni 
and Kricheli (2010) claimed that the second half of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty first century 
have witnessed an unprecedented increase of one party autocracies. Other studies such as that by Geddes (2003) and  
Magaloni (2008) argued that, compared to other types of dictatorships, one-party regimes last longer and suffer fewer 
coups (see, for example, Geddes 2008 and Kricheli 2008), have superior counterinsurgency abilities (Keefer 2008) 
and enjoy higher economic growth (Gandhi 2008 and Wright 2008). However, in the case of Nigeria, the return of 
democracy came with a multi-party system but the elections have consistently been won by one party despite claims 
of  violent ethnic and religious overtones 
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(Gboyega et al. 2011) documented the limited signs of multiplier effects in the 
oil industry on economic performance.  
Furthermore, to depict themes in the literature, the analysis of government 
policy, particularly for oil, has been examined by Bevan et al. (1999) and Rosser 
and Sheehan (1995) respectively. The latter, in their study of oil and 
institutions, employed a VAR model of the Saudi Arabian economy. Rosser and 
Sheehan’s results indicated that this economy was affected by world inflation 
and by Saudi oil policy. 
However, we cannot independently predict the effect of political instability, oil 
nationalisation/Nigeria`s membership of OPEC and the democratic period. It is 
still a subject of empirical investigation which is carried out in the subsequent 
chapters.   
 
5.5 Econometric Analysis  
The main purpose of this sub-section of the chapter is to present the 
econometric analysis employed so as to provide an additional layer of analysis 
by testing some of the hypotheses that are derived from the main argument.  
This gives the opportunity to re-examine the analysis made in Chapters 3 and 4 
with different analytical tools.  It has the advantage of providing a different 
perspective and deeper insights into the relationship between oil wealth and 
economic development in Nigeria. 
The econometric analysis helps to show the techniques employed and applied. 
This also helps to show the support and justification for the main argument of 
this study and the hypotheses developed from the argument in Chapters 3 and 
4.  
To give additional support for the choice of econometric model and data selected 
for this research, studies such as those by Rosser and Shehan (1995), 
Farzanegan and Markwardt (2009) and Farzanegan (2011) also employed a VAR 
model containing variables in their investigation of the impact of natural 
resource wealth in oil on economic performance. For example, Farzanegan and 
Markwardt (2009) in their study of the relationship between oil price changes 
and economic performance in Iran employed quarterly data for the period of 
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1975 to 2006 using the variables of real industrial production per capita, 
exchange rate, inflation by yearly changes in Iranian consumer prices, public 
consumption expenditure, imports and oil price.  
Focusing on Nigeria, studies by Olusi and Olagunju (2005), Ogunleye (2008), 
Aliyu (2009), Akpan (2009a and 2009b), Ogbonna et al. (2013) employed a 
vector autoregressive model or its variants such as the vector error correction 
model containing variables such as oil revenues, GDP per capita, household 
consumption, agricultural output, manufacturing output, industrial production, 
real effective exchange rate, real government expenditure, rate of inflation, 
agricultural exports, oil exports, oil price, money supply, short-term interest rate 
and consumer price index to study the relationship between oil and economic 
growth. For example, Ogunleye (2008) employed the variables of oil revenues, 
GDP per capita, consumption, infrastructural development (electricity output as 
a measure), agricultural and manufacturing output to examine the relationship 
between oil and economic growth using annual data from 1960 to 2004 and 
using a vector error correction model. Furthermore, Omolola and Adejumo 
(2006) also examined the impact of oil exports in Nigeria using variables of GDP, 
oil price changes, real exchange rate, money supply and the inflation rate using 
a VAR model. 
 
5.5.1 Estimation of the VAR Model 
This sub-section presents the second method employed in the empirical analysis 
of this study of an econometric model to examine the dynamic relationship 
between oil and economic growth in Nigeria. This technique incorporates both 
economic and political factors that characterise the trajectory of economic 
development in the country. The econometric method employed is the VAR 
model which uses time series data. 
Firstly, there are several different viewpoints on the estimation process of a VAR 
model. One specific area of the argument is whether all variables in the model 
should be stationary. If one approach is to interpret the estimated coefficients of 
a VAR model on different lag levels, then it would be important to work with 
stationary variables (Farzanegan 2011). According to Farzanegan many 
advocates of the VAR model do not support the differentiation of the non-
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stationary but cointegrated variables. However, this will lead to loss of valuable 
information (see, Sims 1980). Therefore, the decision to employ a VEC model in 
the case of non-stationary but cointegrated variables (see, Heij et al 2004 p. 
667) has to be examined.  
Another important issue in a VAR model is choosing the optimal lag length. In 
practice, researchers usually employ 12, 4 or 1 lags for the monthly, quarterly 
and annual data respectively. On the other hand, economic theory in general 
does not provide any conclusive guidelines on the suitable level of lag length to 
employ and the period for which changes in a variable should be taken into 
account (Farzanegan 2011). However, there are several statistical criteria used 
to find the optimal lag length and some are Akaike information criterion, 
Hannan– Quinn information criterion and Schwarz information criterion 
(Farzanegan 2011). The properties of the times series data used for this study 
will be analysed by employing a unit root test, a lag length test and a 
cointegration test as in the sub-sections below. 
 
5.5.2 Unit Root Tests  
Firstly, the endogenous variables of oil, manufacturing and agriculture are 
examined for the presence of unit roots. In the presence of unit roots, Johanson 
co-integration tests will be employed to investigate a possible long run co-
movement between the non-stationary variables. The direction of integration of 
the variables employed is examined using an ADF test (Dickey and Fuller 1979) 
and a PP test (Phillips and Perron 1988). The results of these tests are shown in 
Table 5.3 below. The two tests show that all the five variables are integrated in 
the same order I (1) and are not stationary. However, the variables are 
stationary after the first differentiation as shown in Table 5.3. This evidence 
suggests a possible long run relationship among the five variables as shown in 
Figure 5.1 above. To test for cointegration among the variables, a Johansen 
cointegration test is used (see, Johansen 1988, 1991, 1995). The cointegration 
test is presented in Table 5.5 below. 
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Table 5.3 Unit Root Tests 
              
Variable ADF   ADF   PP   PP  
 Levels  First difference  Levels  First difference  
  Constant  Constant + trend Constant  Constant + trend Constant  Constant +  trend Constant  Constant + trend 
LOil -2.48               -1.16 -6.79* -7.45* -4.50*    -0.55 -6.79* -15.95* 
LMan  -1.63 -0.99 -5.74* -5.87*  -1.59     -1.07 -5.68* -5.81* 
LAgric  -0.77 -1.90 -6.56* -6.49*  -0.72     -1.93 -6.59* -6.55* 
LCapexp -0.69                  -1.91 -7.38* -7.33*  -0.70     -2.28 -7.40*               -7.35* 
LRecexp -0.05 -3.08 -7.92*             -7.83*                   0.28     -3.09               -8.90*             -8.78* 
*Significance at 1% level       
**Significance at 5% level 
***Significance at 10% level 
      
Source: Created by author based on data from CBN Statistical Bulletin (2010) using Eviews 
Statistical Software  
After checking the integration of the variables, the next step is to select the 
optimal lag length of the underlying VAR model. The lag length test is presented 
in the next section. 
 
5.5.3 Lag Length Selection 
The optimum lag length to employ is determined using the lag length selection 
tests. The lag length of 1 is selected on the basis of the sequential modified LR 
test statistic (LR), Final prediction error (FPE), Akaike information criterion 
(AIC), Schwarz information criterion (SC) and Hannan-Quinn information 
criterion (HQ). Thus, the lag length of 1 is used for estimation of the VAR. The 
VAR lag order selection criteria are presented in Table 5.4 below. 
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Table 5.4 VAR Lag Order Selection Criteria 
Variables: Manufacturing, Oil, Agriculture, Capital Expenditure and Recurrent 
Expenditure 
 
Lag    LogL           LR              FPE             AIC              SC               HQ 
0       -210.5561               NA                  0.012504            9.806785               10.40308              10.03016 
1        18.78080          378.9044*           1.76e-06*            0.922574*              2.512697*             1.518244* 
2        35.26842           23.65615           2.71e-06              1.292678               3.876627               2.260641 
3        64.77944           35.92647           2.57e-06              1.096546               4.674323               2.436802 
4        93.60643           28.82698          2.86e-06                0.930155              5.501759              2.642705 
* Indicates lag order selected by the criterion 
LR: sequential modified LR test statistic (each test at 5% level) 
FPE: Final prediction criterion 
SC: Schwartz information criterion 
HQ: Hannan-Quinn information criterion 
 
Source: Created by author based on data from CBN Statistical Bulletin (2010) using Eviews 
Statistical Software  
 
 
The next section below presents the cointegration tests due to the presence of 
unit roots in the time-series variables employed for the analysis. The unit root 
tests indicated that the variables are not stationary in levels. This signifies that 
there is the presence of a long-run relationship among the variables. 
 
5.5.4 Cointegration Tests 
The cointegration tests according to Hamdi and Sbia (2011) is based on the 
multivariate Johansen approach (1988) which employs two statistical tests of the 
Trace and Max-Eigen values. Also, the Johansen’s (1991) method provides 
testing for cointegration in a multiple-equations system while Engle and Granger 
(1987) methods allows for a single-equation framework.  
The results of the cointegration tests from a system of equations are presented 
in Table 5.5 below. The two tests suggest the existence of one cointegrating 
vectors. This indicates the presence of a long-run relationship among the 
variables. The existence of disequilibrium in cointegrated variables is corrected 
using a VEC model. The VEC model also tests for long and short-run causality 
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among cointegrated variables (Hamdi and Sbia 2011). The numbers of 
cointegrating relations is employed on the basis of the Trace and Max-Eigenvalue 
statistics and are presented in Table 5.5 below. Table 5.5 shows the unrestricted 
cointegration rank tests for both trace statistic (panel 1) and max-eigen statistic 
(panel 2). Panel one show the trace statistic and the second panel presents the 
max-eigen statistic. The complete analysis of the cointegration tests are shown 
in the appendix.  
 
Table 5.5 Cointegration Tests for Trace and Max-Eigen Statistics 
Panel 1: Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace) 
     
     
Hypothesized  Trace 0.05  
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.** 
          
None *  0.520030  80.69037  69.81889  0.0053 
At most 1  0.348759  45.45689  47.85613  0.0826 
At most 2  0.290124  24.87088  29.79707  0.1661 
At most 3  0.158849  8.422994  15.49471  0.4213 
At most 4  0.002492  0.119747  3.841466  0.7293 
          
Panel 2: Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Maximum Eigenvalue) 
     
     
Hypothesized  Max-Eigen 0.05  
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.** 
          
None *  0.520030  35.23349  33.87687  0.0343 
At most 1  0.348759  20.58601  27.58434  0.3020 
At most 2  0.290124  16.44788  21.13162  0.1998 
At most 3  0.158849  8.303247  14.26460  0.3487 
At most 4  0.002492  0.119747  3.841466  0.7293 
Source: Created by author based on data from CBN Statistical Bulletin (2010) using Eviews 
Statistical Software  
Note:   (1). Both Trace test and Max-Eigenvalue indicates 1 cointegrating equation at 
  the 5 percent level 
 (2). *Denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 5 percent level 
 (3). **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values 
 (4). Variables observed Cointegration Tests: Manufacturing, Oil, capital  
  Expenditure, Recurrent Expenditure and Agriculture. Also the institutional 
  variables representing nationalisation of oil production, political instability 
  and return to a stable democratic rule are also embedded in the  
  cointegration  tests. 
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Due to the presence of non-stationarity and evidence of cointegration among the 
variables, this study will therefore adopt the variant of the VAR model which is 
the Vector Error Correction (VEC) model. This technique is used when there is 
evidence of cointegration and is presented below in section 5.5.5.  
 
5.5.5 Vector Error Correction (VEC) Model 
In this section, the empirical investigation of the relationship between oil and 
economic performance has three objectives. The first is to investigate the long-
run relationship between the variables employed. The second is to explore the 
short-run dynamic causal relationship among the variables. The third is to use 
OLS to estimate the individual VEC equations that can examine the validity of 
the hypotheses established in Chapter 6 which captures the impact of political 
and institutional factors on economic performance variables. 
To recap, the fundamental testing technique before using a VEC model needs 
three steps. The first is to examine whether the variables have a unit root to 
check the stationarity of each variable (Engle and Yoo 1987). This is achieved by 
employing the ADF and PP tests. The second procedure is to investigate whether 
there is a long-run association between the variables. This is achieved by the 
use of the Johansen Cointegration method. All these techniques have been 
conducted above. Lastly, if all variables are integrated of order one (I(1)) and 
cointegrated, short-run elasticities can be calculated using the VEC technique. In 
this instance, an error correction mechanism exists and changes in the 
dependent variables are analysed as a function of the level of the disproportion 
in the long-run association, which is captured by the ECT (Hamdi and Sbia 
2011). Moreover changes in the other explanatory variables will capture all 
short-term relationships between the variables (Pao and Tsai 2010). The VEC 
model in the five variables case is written as follows: 
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Where ECT is expressed as follows: 
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𝑬𝑪𝑻 =  𝑶𝒊𝒍𝒕 − 𝜷𝟎 − 𝜷𝟏𝒄𝒂𝒑𝒆𝒙𝒑𝒕 − 𝜷𝟐𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒆𝒙𝒑𝒕  − 𝜷𝟑𝒎𝒂𝒏𝒕 − 𝜷𝟒𝒂𝒈𝒓𝒊𝒄𝒕 
Where t = 1… T, denotes the time period. 
Source of the VEC Equation: Hamdi and Sbia (2013) 
According to Hamdi and Sbia (2011), an important advantage of the VEC model 
is that it can also be employed to confirm causality between the variables in the 
case of a long-run relationship. The VEC also helps to differentiate between 
short-run causality among the variables and each variable's continuing 
correction from the long-run equilibrium over a series of incomplete short-run 
changes (Fasano and Wang 2001). For that reason, a VEC model can present a 
more effective appreciation of the nature of non-stationarity between different 
variables in time series analysis (Hamdi and Sbia 2011).  
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CHAPTER 6 
PRESENTATION OF HYPOTHESES AND RESULTS 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents some hypotheses which are informed by Chapters 3 and 4. 
These hypotheses are tested using econometric techniques and their results are 
discussed in order to give additional support to the analysis made in Chapters 3 
and 4, which offer justification and support to the main argument of this study. 
The verification of the main argument with additional and sophisticated empirical 
analysis is important in order to understand the dynamic nature of the evolution 
of the historical political economy of Nigeria and the impact on economic sectors.  
However, the informed hypotheses will not cover all aspects of the historical 
political economy of Nigeria in relation to the main argument but they largely 
depict the main economic and political changes. The main argument is that a 
lack of national unity or identity in Nigeria has hindered the benefits associated 
with the abundance of oil reserves. This is a key factor in understanding the 
weak economic performance and low levels of development and it is necessary 
to look at the history of economic and political development in Nigeria.  
Also, before the discussion of the proposed hypotheses, this chapter first 
presents a correlation matrix of the economic variables considered for the 
further empirical analysis as discussed in Chapter 5.  The economic variables are 
also employed in conjunction with institutional variables for testing the proposed 
hypotheses.  
Section 6.2 of this chapter presents a correlation matrix of the variables 
considered for additional empirical analysis. While section 6.3 presents the 
hypotheses and discusses the link of each to the analysis in Chapters 3 and 4. 
Section 6.4 discusses each result obtained from the econometric analysis and its 
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relationship to the main argument and Section 6.5 presents the conclusion of 
this chapter.  
 
6.2 CORRELATION BETWEEN MAJOR ECONOMIC VARIABLES  
This section presents a correlation matrix between the key variables analysed in 
Chapter 3 and 4. This is important so as to show the nature of the relationship 
between the variables considered for an additional layer of empirical analysis 
which is shown below in this chapter.  
The variables to be employed for the correlation analysis are oil, manufacturing, 
agriculture and government expenditure (capital and recurrent) as shown in 
Table 6.1 below. These variables are employed to show the effect of the oil 
sector on economic performance. The government expenditure variable is 
selected because of the significant contribution of oil revenues in financing public 
expenditure as stated previously. This will help to show the contribution of the 
oil sector to the Nigerian economy as a whole. The remaining variables (oil, 
manufacturing and agriculture) are selected due to their significant contribution 
in GDP as shown in Chapters 3, 4 and 5 and also because they have been used 
in other studies in the literature as shown in Chapter 2. It is important to note 
that not all the variables examined will be included in the correlation analysis as 
the aim of the thesis is to examine the impact of oil on economic performance. 
As such, economic sectors that contribute significantly to GDP are considered. 
The variables are set out in time series from 1961 to 2010 and have been 
transformed into logarithmic form as this transformation will be used in the 
empirical analysis. From Table 6.1, LOIL means the log of oil output, LCAPEXP 
represents the log of public capital expenditure, LRECEXP signifies the log of 
public recurrent expenditure, LMAN indicates the log of manufacturing output 
and LAGRIC means the log of agricultural output.  
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Table 6.1 Correlation Matrix for Major Economic Variables 
 
 LOIL LCAPEXP LRECEXP LMAN LAGRIC 
LOIL  1.000     
LCAPEXP  0.903  1.000    
LRECEXP  0.877  0.985  1.000   
LMAN  0.984  0.919  0.897  1.000  
LAGRIC  0.945  0.935  0.933  0.977  1.000 
 
Source: Created by author based on data from CBN Statistical Bulletin (2010) using Eviews 
Statistical Software  
 
From Table 6.1 it can be seen that the variables employed are all highly 
correlated. For example, it shows that oil correlates with public capital and 
recurrent expenditure and also with oil and manufacturing as well. However, 
some of the correlations are higher or more positive between some variables. 
For instance, agricultural output is more effectively explained by manufacturing 
output as it has a correlation coefficient of 0.977 (97.7 %) which, is almost 1. 
Oil has a correlation coefficient of 0.945 (94.5 %), public capital expenditure has 
a value of 0.935 (93.5 %) and lastly public recurrent expenditure has a 
coefficient of 0.933 (93.3 %). In general, from Table 6.1, the variables are 
highly correlated with coefficients near 1. The lowest correlation is between 
public recurrent expenditure and oil which shows that recurrent expenditure is 
explained by oil output with a value of 0.877 or 87.7 percent.   
It is obvious that the degree of linear association between the variables in the 
correlation table above is high. The high evidence of linear association does not 
imply that changes in the variables causes changes in themselves. Rather, there 
is evidence of a linear relationship between the set of variables and that changes 
in them are on average related to an extent given by the correlation coefficient 
(see, Brooks 2008, p. 28). However, as correlation in statistical analysis does 
not mean causality, this study further employs a more rigorous and robust 
statistical analysis as discussed in Chapter 5 and carried out below. The 
regression techniques help to show whether these highly correlated variables 
have a causal relationship with each other. Regression as an analytical tool has 
more flexibility and power than correlation (Brooks 2008, p. 28). 
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6.3 PROPOSED HYPOTHESES  
The hypotheses are presented in this section. For clarity, this section will further 
present the hypotheses in different sub-sections.  
 
6.3.1 Presentation of Hypothesis 1 
As discussed in Chapter 3, Nigeria was originally a British colony that was 
created from the amalgamation of separate regions which were politically, 
economically and socially distinct, although they shared a commonality in 
agriculture for economic enhancement. After amalgamation in 1914 and political 
independence in 1960, the regions in Nigeria still relied on agriculture as the 
main source of both domestic and foreign earnings. However, the discovery of oil 
in the 1950s and the gradual and increasing dependence on oil, especially in the 
1970s which coincided with high oil prices in the world, brought immense wealth 
to Nigeria. These different and sudden outcomes, such as oil reserve discovery, 
political independence and rising oil revenues, coincided with and witnessed 
political upheavals that were tied to the regional and cultural differences in 
Nigeria. In turn, it was claimed that these outcomes led to the gradual neglect of 
basic and key economic sectors such as agriculture and manufacturing. In 
particular, agriculture was still the mainstay of the population and started to 
witness a significant declining trend in the 1970s as shown in Table 3.2 of 
Chapter 3.  
According to the theoretical literature reviewed in Chapter 2, the decline of 
manufacturing and/or agricultural sectors signify the effect of the Dutch Disease 
due to the appreciation of the domestic currency which makes exports of 
manufactures and food expensive. Several studies focusing on the economic 
effects of natural resource wealth, in particular oil or gas stated that the first 
disadvantage of resource abundance is through the impact of the Dutch Disease. 
For example, studies by Corden and Neary (1982) and Corden (1984) and 
Benjamin et al. (1989) explain that natural resource wealth hinders growth of 
the industrial sector, which is assumed to be the key driving force of the 
economy and this effect is caused either through an appreciation of the real 
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exchange rate or the absorption of factors of production by the natural resource 
sector.  
Likewise, other theoretical explanations of the adverse effect of resource 
abundance on economic growth have been partly considered to be symptoms of 
the Dutch Disease. For example, the explanations include a decrease in both 
savings and physical investment (Payrakis and Gerlagh 2007), impediments to 
entrepreneurship (Sachs and Warner 2001) and lower investment in education 
and human capital (Gylfason 2001).   
However, some studies in the literature argued that the empirical evidence 
concerning the relationship between natural resource wealth such as oil and gas 
and economic growth does not provide great support for the Dutch Disease 
hypothesis as an explanation of the negative effect of resource abundance on 
economic performance (Leite and Weidmann 1999 and Sala-i-Martin and 
Subramanian 2003). For example, Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian (2003) found 
no evidence of the Dutch Disease effect in Nigeria. This evidence is also 
consistent with the work of Spatafora and Warner (1995) who also reported no 
evidence of a Dutch Disease effect between oil wealth and economic 
performance variables among developing oil-exporting countries, which included 
Nigeria. According to Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian (2003) waste and 
corruption from oil rather than the Dutch Disease has been responsible for the 
weak economic performance in Nigeria. According to them, natural resources 
like oil exert a negative and asymmetric effect on economic performance 
through their damaging impact on institutional quality. 
The issue of institutional quality and other ideas that are not contingent on 
economic explanations started to offer more insight and this led to the 
development of the political economy approach which is concerned with issues 
beyond those explained by economic institutions. For example, this subsequent 
approach looked at the role of political, legal and social institutions in addition to 
economic institutions. As reviewed in Chapter 2, the political economy approach 
looked at the role of different institutions and their effect on economic growth in 
resource rich countries. A study by Collier and Hoeffler (2005) claimed that 
resource rich economies often depend on a system that is based on patronage 
and do not nurture a democratic system based on electoral competition, scrutiny 
and civil rights. Other studies such as those by Fearon and Laitin (2003), Jensen 
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and Wantchekon (2004) and Ross (2004) offered different institutional 
explanations. One of the frequently studied views is the theoretical positive 
relationship between oil abundance and civil war. However, this argument has 
been criticised both theoretically and empirically (Oskarsson and Ottosen, 2010).  
The divergent and often criticised theoretical and empirical explanations which 
are contingent on economic and political economy perspectives give room for 
further analysis in order to provide alternative and deeper investigation behind 
the adverse effect of natural resources on economic performance. As such, this 
study intends to offer a new hypothesis which is informed by the existing 
literature as reviewed in Chapter 2 and above. This seeks to validate the 
analysis conducted in Chapters 3 and 4 on the political economy development of 
Nigeria in relation to oil production and exports. 
To verify the development of the political economy before and after 
independence and in the 1970s when oil started to make a significant 
contribution in terms of revenue generation in Nigeria, the following hypothesis 
is presented.  
H1: The lack of national unity due to the amalgamation of the North and 
South regions in Nigeria and gradual importance of the oil sector 
should have a negative impact on the manufacturing and 
agricultural sectors.  
 
6.3.2 Presentation of Hypothesis 2 
This section presents a second hypothesis informed by Chapter 3. It will help to 
support the section and the argument that a lack of national unity and the 
gradual development of the oil sector with the inflow of oil rental income have 
further instigated political instability in Nigeria. Political instability started in 
1966 just six years after Nigeria achieved political independence from Britain. In 
January 1966, a coup occurred and claimed to be largely carried out by military 
officers of the Igbo tribe. The Igbo is among the three major tribes in Nigeria 
from the South-East region. Subsequently, there were several coups that 
occurred in July 1966, 1975, 1976, 1983, 1985 and 1993. Most were primarily 
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linked to ethnic and regional differences to avoid domination of one region by 
other local areas.  
The issue of an unstable political regime due to natural resource wealth, 
especially in oil, has been well documented in the literature. This is also 
underpinned by the political economy perspective as economic explanations 
alone such as the Dutch Disease could not offer deeper insights into the 
relationship between natural resource wealth and economic growth. Several 
studies such as those by Ross (2001), Wantchekon (2002), Lam and 
Wantchekon (2003) and Jensen and Wantchekon (2004) suggest that abundance 
in natural resources is linked to low levels of democracy. For example, Ross 
(2001) finds that oil and other minerals abundance are linked with considerably 
lower levels of democracy. Employing a similar framework but focusing on a 
single region and historical period in sub-Saharan Africa after the Cold War 
period, Jensen and Wantchekon (2004) also confirm this evidence (Ulfelder 
2007). Smith (2004) employs a different dependent variable but still confirms 
this relationship, which is an argument that is largely consistent with rentier 
state theory. In contrast to all of the evidence linking natural resource wealth 
and a lack of democracy, Herb (2005) finds weak support for the claim that 
natural resource rental income hinders the development of democracy and 
argues instead that income, geographic region and the religious composition of a 
country’s population are superior predictors of regime type (Ulfelder 2007).  
Similarly, Ulfelder (2007) revisited the argument on the effects of resource 
abundance on political development with a research design that offered a new 
look at the problem. Ulfelder’s argument here is the observation that much of 
the hypotheses developed about the relationship between resource wealth and 
democratisation convey a story about the survival of autocracy and not 
variations in all types of political regimes or reversals of democracy. He further 
raised concerns about the use of all-countries and all-year samples to examine 
theories of democratisation, suggesting that this framework can obscure 
significant differences in the forces driving stability and change among different 
types of political regimes.  
In line with previous studies such as those by Ross (2001), Herb (2005) and 
Ulfelder (2007) and in contrast to them, this study employs a research design 
that is historical in nature so as to examine the forces that contribute to the 
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creation of unstable political regime in Nigeria which is tied to a lack of national 
unity due to the amalgamation of different regions that comprises of different 
ethnic and religious backgrounds to form the entity of Nigeria. In addition to the 
analysis of the development of the political economy of Nigeria in Chapter 3, this 
study aims to test the impact of an unstable political regime on economic 
performance. Implicitly, it aims to empirically examine the impact of changes in 
political institutions on economic performance using the economic sectors of 
manufacturing and agriculture. 
Likewise, other studies have investigated the effect of political instability on 
savings (see, for example, Gyimah-Brempong and Traynor 1996) or investment 
(Gyimah-Brempong and Traynor 1999) in Sub-Saharan Africa. Alesina et al. 
(1996) also employed data on 113 countries from 1950 to 1982 to show that 
GDP growth is considerably lower in countries and time periods with a high 
tendency for government collapse. Chen and Feng (1996) suggest that regime 
instability, political polarization and government repression all have a negative 
effect on economic growth. More recently, Aisen and Veiga (2013) examined the 
effects of political instability on economic growth from 1960-2004 in 169 
countries and found that higher degrees of political instability are connected to 
lower growth rates of GDP per capita. In particular, political instability has been 
found to be one of the main reasons for the observed weak economic growth in 
Sub-Saharan Africa (Guillaumont et al., 1999). 
To portray the unstable political environment in Nigeria due to societal issues, 
the following hypothesis is presented below. 
H2: Political instability instigated by a lack of national unity and oil 
rental income should have a negative impact on economic 
performance in Nigeria 
 
6.3.3 Presentation of Hypothesis 3 
In Chapters 3 and 4, it is stated that the oil industry gradually became a leading 
sector in terms of revenue generation in Nigeria. In addition, as part of further 
control of economic activity by the Nigerian government after independence, the 
oil sector was nationalised to reduce foreign domination by international oil 
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companies (IOCs). This also highlights another political and economic 
development in Nigeria.  
As Nigeria developed from political independence, the oil sector was nationalised 
in 1971. This also coincided with Nigeria becoming a member of OPEC, which as 
a policy prescription requires its members to nationalise their respective oil 
sectors. In addition, the occurrence of a civil war (1967 – 1970) that originated 
in the oil producing region situated in the South-East of Nigeria influenced the 
government to seek greater control of the oil sector.  
Also, as discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, there are many problems in the oil 
sector such as a scarcity of refined oil products especially in the Northern part of 
Nigeria and a lack of transparency and accountability associated with the state 
owned national oil company. The national oil company was given more powers in 
1977 after its merger with Federal Ministry of Mines and Steel. This led to the 
establishment of the Nigerian National Petroleum Company (NNPC) which was 
saddled with the responsibility of the refining, transportation and marketing of 
oil products to provide sufficient energy in the domestic economy.  
On the other hand, there are arguments in the literature concerned with the 
ownership structure of the natural resource sector. For example, Luong and 
Weithal (2010) argued that the ultimate macroeconomic consequences of 
natural resources largely depend on the underlying ownership structure with 
which these countries choose to manage their resource wealth. In many 
developing countries rich in natural resource, mineral deposits are owned by the 
state, which is the first claimant on the rental income (Luong and Weithal 2010). 
In theory, natural resource wealth should serve to support the state’s influence 
over society by giving it a revenue gain that can insulate it from pressures 
coming from interest groups (Ross 1999).  
Also, empirical evidence from the literature suggested that the ownership 
structure of the resource sector affects the link between resource wealth and 
economic growth. This viewpoint suggests that private ownership is more 
effective than state ownership (Ross 2001 and Luong and Weithal 2010) in 
building effective governance institutions because domestic and foreign investors 
largely prefer such institutions that are sound and transparent and help to 
support accountability. For example, Ross (2001) suggested that privatisation 
may prevent the problem of rent-seizing. In addition, Luong and Weithal (2010) 
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argued that it is the ownership structure of natural resource wealth that 
determines economic outcomes in resource-rich countries rather than political, 
social or institutional structures. McPherson (2003) also argued that political 
factors such as nationalism and corruption have weakened the efficiency and 
effectiveness of national oil companies (NOCs) in many oil producing countries 
and disrupted programmes of national oil company reform. 
In the case of Nigeria, different oil company reforms took place prior to and after 
the return to a stable democratic rule. However, as discussed in Chapter 4, there 
are claims made about continuing problems in the oil sector which are seen to 
affect other sectors of the Nigerian economy such as transportation, 
manufacturing and agriculture. These adverse outcomes reflect the evidence 
provided by the literature which largely supports the existence of a private 
ownership structure to be more effective in contributing to economic 
performance.  
In this study, a political economy framework is adopted, which traces the 
historical development of economic and political outcomes in Nigeria. It is 
employed to examine subsequent change in ownership structure and economic 
performance.  
Therefore, the following hypothesis is established to support the analysis in 
Chapters 3 and 4.   
H3: Nationalisation of the Nigerian oil industry that coincided with OPEC 
membership and the subsequent establishment of a state oil 
company should lead to weak economic performance due to an 
inherent lack of national unity. 
 
6.3.4 Presentation of Hypothesis 4 
The hypothesis is informed by the historical development of the political 
economy examined in Chapter 4 which reflected the end of political instability 
and authoritarian rule in Nigeria by the military and the return of democracy in 
1999. As seen in Chapter 4 various economic reforms were introduced, 
especially to target the oil sector because of the problems in the industry which 
hindered its multiplier effect on other sectors of the Nigerian economy.  
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The stated hypothesis below supports the main argument because there appears 
to be further evidence of a lack of national unity since the return to democratic 
rule in Nigeria. This has presented itself in various forms such as fraudulent 
elections which people associated with ethnic, religious and regional differences 
and crises as discussed in Chapter 4. Furthermore, the period of stable 
democracy which began in 1999 was seen by many to be dominated by one 
political party which achieved power via the manipulation of the Nigerian political 
system due to an inherent and existing lack of unity that presented itself 
through ethnic, religion and regional rivalries.  
The change in the political landscape in Nigeria which is associated with negative 
outcomes such as political party dominance and ethnic and religious conflicts is 
consistent with some suggestions in the literature on natural resource wealth 
and economic growth and on democracy and economic development as well. For 
example, Easterly and Levine (1997) argued that ethnic diversity found in Sub-
Saharan African countries fosters rent-seeking behaviour that encourages the 
adoption of growth-retarding policies and inhibits consensus on capital 
investment in growth-promoting infrastructure.  
Likewise Eifert et al. (2003) argued that the type of political system in oil 
exporting countries affects the expenditure of oil revenue. Using tools from 
political science they classified economies into five main groups of mature 
democracies, factional democracies, paternalistic autocracies, predatory 
autocracies, or reformist autocracies. In their analysis they classified Nigeria as a 
predatory autocracy due to its succession of military rulers. Nigeria returned to a 
democratic rule in 1999 and since then the military has remained outside 
government.  
Another study in the literature by Collier and Hoeffler (2007) examined whether 
the adverse effect of natural resource wealth can be avoided by a democratic 
system.  According to them, their question is at the intersection of two large and 
active literature studies, one investigated the resource curse and the other 
examined the economic consequences of democracy. Also the rise in commodity 
prices has generated revenue booms for natural resource exporters that were 
last experienced in the 1970s and the widespread failure of these resource rich 
countries to take advantage of those booms in the form of sustained economic 
growth is the empirical basis for the resource curse literature (Collier and 
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Hoeffler 2007). According to Collier and Hoeffler, between these periods of 
natural resource booms a prominent institutional change ensued, as resource-
rich countries are now on average more democratic.  As such, the importance of 
institutions and the possibility for change are now essential debates in 
development economics. Thus, the analysis of the economic consequences of 
democratization in natural resource rich countries is situated within this larger 
argument (Collier and Hoeffler 2007). 
From the preceding analysis it would be interesting to examine the Nigerian 
situation in the presence of ethnic and regional rivalry that has shaped its 
political landscape prior to and after independence and the effect of these 
societal issues on the progress of a new democracy which also marked a 
significant institutional change. For example, Collier and Hoeffler (2007, p.2) 
stated that “The ‘neocon agenda’ of the United States, combined with two other 
influences, has increased the prevalence of resource-rich democracies. The 
agenda diagnosed the perceived ills of the Middle East as being due to its lack of 
democracy.” 
Likewise, Rachdi and Saidi (2015) stated that many countries in the last two 
decades experienced the introduction of many reforms to improve democracy. 
Moreover, the literature has provided evidence on the relationship between 
economic growth and democracy. For example, Przeworski and Limongi (1993) 
stated that there is no single answer to whether democracy fosters or hinders 
economic growth. There is mixed evidence on the relationship between economic 
growth and democracy and this led some studies such as those by Rachdi and 
Saidi (2015) to state that there is no consensus on the relationship.  
The absence of consensus on the relationship between economic growth and 
democracy may be due to a variety of factors that are distinct to countries or 
geographic regions. For example Ross (2001) argued that resource rich 
countries are less democratic. Also Collier and Hoeffler (2007) stated that the 
lack of democracy in the Middle East is due to the resource abundance in the 
region.  
Following on from these studies and from the analysis in Chapters 3 and 4 which 
depict the historical development of the political economy of Nigeria prior to and 
after its return to democratic rule in 1999 the following hypothesis is stated 
below so as to verify the main argument.  
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 H4: Reforms targeted to escape the resource curse that coincided with 
stable democracy and one ruling party should have a negative impact on 
economic performance due to an inherent lack of a national unity. 
 
6.4 DISCUSSION OF RESULTS IN RELATION TO THE HYPOTHESES 
This section discusses the results obtained from the econometric analysis which 
is reported in the appendices. For clarity this section also presents the results 
obtained from the testing of the proposed hypotheses above in sub-sections as 
below.  
 
6.4.1 Results from Econometric Analysis Using Vector Error Correction 
Model 
Due to the existence of unit roots or non-stationarity of the time series data and 
further evidence of cointegration in the variables as reported in Sub-sections 
5.5.2 and 5.5.4 of Chapter 5, the Vector Error Correction (VEC) model has been 
employed to analyse a possible long run co-movement among the five variables 
representing oil, capital expenditure, recurrent expenditure, manufacturing and 
agriculture. The results are also presented below. 
 
Results from VEC Model 
The VEC model is employed so as to examine the evidence of long-run and 
short-run relationships in the variables employed due to the fact that they are 
not stationary in their levels which means that there is evidence of a common 
trending and this is an indication that they move together in the long-run.  More 
information and description of the employment of the VEC model in this analysis 
is presented in Chapter 5. From the estimated VEC model there is evidence of 
three cointegration equations or of the variables having a long-run relationship 
in three ways as shown in Chapter 5.  
Since the objective of the study is to investigate the dynamic relationship 
between oil and economic performance (represented by components of GDP 
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such as manufacturing and agriculture), Tables 6.3 and 6.5 illustrate the results 
only where manufacturing and agriculture are the dependent variables 
respectively. Also as the optimal lag length is one, the short-run results are also 
presented for one lag of each variable. In the VEC model there are two scenarios 
to be reported which includes the short-run and long-run causality relationships. 
The long-run relationship is depicted by the Error Correction Term (ECT) as 
shown in Tables 6.3 and 6.5. In Tables 6.3 and 6.5, other specifications of the 
model are also reported. This is done because of the evidence of high correlation 
coefficients shown in Table 6.1.  
However, before reporting results from the VEC estimates, Table 6.2 below 
reports the 1 cointegrating equation and its adjustment coefficients where 
manufacturing is the dependent variable. The evidence of cointegration was 
earlier shown in Table 5.5 in Chapter 5. Both Trace test and Max-Eigenvalue 
indicates 1 cointegrating equation. The complete output of the cointergration 
tests are shown in the appendix. Table 6.2 presents information about the long-
run cointegrating relationship between the variables. Manufacturing is the 
dependent variable in this model and oil, capital expenditure, recurrent 
expenditure and agriculture are the independent variables. This long-run model 
from the cointegrtaion analysis also reveals long-run coefficients and it can be 
seen that oil and recurrent expenditure have negative coefficients suggesting 
that when either oil or recurrent expenditure increases manufacturing decreases 
in the long-run.  
The above finding supports Hypothesis 1 and is in line with the Dutch Disease 
hypothesis as shown in studies by Ellman (1981), Corden and Neary (1982), 
Olusi and Olagunju (2005) and Ogunleye (2008). For example, Ellman (1981) 
documented that, due to the exploitation of large deposits of natural gas in the 
North Sea in the Netherlands, the textile and clothing industries and others such 
as manufacturing, mechanical engineering, shipping, vehicles and construction 
industries deteriorated. Also, Ogunleye (2008) examined the long-run effect of 
oil revenues on GDP per capita, household consumption, infrastructural 
development, agricultural and manufacturing output using a vector error 
correction model (VECM) and argued that that a negative relationship exists for 
GDP per capita, agriculture and manufacturing in Nigeria.  
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Table 6.2 Results from Cointegrating Equation and its 
                 Adjustment Coefficients 
 
1 Cointegrating Equation(s): Log Likelihood 25.24852 
 
 
 
 
Normalized cointegrating coefficients (standard error in parentheses)  
LMAN LOIL LCAPEXP LRECEXP LAGRIC  
 1.000000 -0.769064  0.406960 -0.563474  0.228634  
  (0.12593)  (0.11229)  (0.12530)  (0.15990)  
      
Adjustment coefficients (standard error in parentheses)   
D(LMAN) -0.292132     
  (0.12659)     
D(LOIL)  0.035807     
  (0.25866)     
D(LCAPEXP) -0.611666     
  (0.18094)     
D(LRECEXP)  0.134681     
  (0.16349)     
D(LAGRIC) -0.018814     
  (0.17533)     
            
 
Source: Created by author based on data from CBN Statistical Bulletin (2010) using Eviews 
Statistical Software  
 
 
 
 
After the analysis of the cointegration tests, the next is to report the results from 
the estimates of the VEC model in Table 6.3 and 6.5.  As reported in Panel A of 
Table 6.3, there exist a long-run causality running from oil, capital expenditure, 
recurrent expenditure and agriculture to manufacturing. This is due to the 
negative sign of the ECT, which is statistically significant at the 1% level. This 
result also support findings from studies such as those by Corden and Neary 
(1982), Olusi and Olagunju (2005) and Ogunleye (2008).  
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Table 6.3 Vector Error Correction Estimates Examining the Effects of 
  Oil Wealth on Economic Performance using the   
  Manufacturing Sector as the Dependent Variable 
 
Regressor Coefficient t-value  
∆LOIL(1)  -0.269*** (0.146) -1.840 
∆LCAPEXP(1)   0.151(0.101)                                                 1.493
∆LRECEXP(1)  -0.034(0.135) -0.249 
∆LAGRIC(1)  -0.098(0.181) -0.543 
ECT  -0.292*(0.127) -2.308 
C   0.155  1.139 
Panel B: 
∆LCAPEXP(1)                       0.135(0.096)                       1.394 
∆LRECEXP(1)                      -0.060(0.126)                     -0.473 
∆LAGRIC(1)                        -0.083(0.169)                     -0.492 
ECT                                     0.056*(0.20)                      2.746 
C                                       -0.079                                 -0.887 
  
Panel C:  -1.840***(0.074) 
∆LCAPEXP(1)                       0.179*** (0.105)                  1.707   1.493(0.144) 
∆LRECEXP(1)                      -0.031(0.138)                       -0.225  -0.249(0.805) 
ECT                                    -0.052(0.041)                       -1.252  -2.308**(0.027) 
C                                        -0.077                                   0.787     1.139 
Source: Created by author based on data from CBN Statistical Bulletin (2010) using Eviews 
Statistical Software 
Note: (1). *Significance at 1% level, **Significance at 5% level, ***Significance at 10% level  
                Standard errors in parentheses 
         (2). ECT means the error correction term in the VEC model and this is also measures the 
speed of adjustment towards equilibrium level. Institutional dummy variables are also included in 
the specification and regression analysis of the VEC model. The discussions of the effects of the 
institutional variables are presented below in the subsequent sub-sections.  
 
 
The next step is to report whether there exist a short-run relationship between 
the variables in Panel A of Table 6.3. The estimates for short-run analysis also 
reveal a statistically significant negative relationship at the 10% level between 
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oil and manufacturing and none from the other variables. The evidence of a 
negative short-run causality from oil to manufacturing can also be examined 
using Wald Test as shown in Table 6.4. The Wald test shows the results of 
whether changes in oil in the short-run, which is after one year as shown by the 
lag length selection criteria in Table 5.4 in Chapter 5 affects manufacturing. The 
Null Hypothesis is that the effect of oil on manufacturing in the short-run is zero. 
From Table 6.4, the three probability values from the three test statistics show 
10% level of significance meaning that the Null Hypothesis can be rejected. This 
means that there is a negative short-run causality from oil to manufacturing. 
 
 
Table 6.4 Wald Test for the Effects of Changes in the Oil Sector on the    
  Manufacturing Sector 
    
    
Test Statistic Value Degrees of Freedom Probability 
        
t-statistic -1.840245***  38  0.0736 
F-statistic  3.386503*** (1, 38)  0.0736 
Chi-square  3.386503***  1  0.0657 
        
    
Null Hypothesis: C(oil)=0  
Null Hypothesis Summary:  
    
    
Normalized Restriction (= 0) Value Std. Err. 
    
    
C(oil) -0.268683  0.146004 
        
Source: Created by author based on data from CBN Statistical Bulletin (2010) using Eviews 
Statistical Software 
 
Note: (1).   Restrictions are linear in coefficients. 
          (2). *Significance at 1% level, **Significance at 5% level, ***Significance at 10% level 
 
 
The evidence of a negative short-run relationship between oil and manufacturing 
support Hypothesis 1 and is similar to the findings of Fardmanesh (1991), Sachs 
and Warner (1997), Brahmbhatt et al. (2010), Harding and Venables (2010) and 
Ismail (2010), who generally argue that that there is a negative relationship 
between natural resource wealth and economic growth. For example, Ismail 
(2010) employed detailed, disaggregated sectoral data for manufacturing to 
examine the implications of oil price changes from 1977 to 2004. His findings 
confirmed the negative relationship shown by earlier studies. 
Due to the lack of statistically significant relationship between manufacturing 
and other economic variables except oil in Panel A of Table 6.3, the analysis 
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specified additional models in a reduced form. Some variables are excluded to 
avoid misspecification as variables are jointly considered in the first model, 
which are highly correlated with each other. However, there appears to be high 
correlation in all the correlation matrices above, which consider variables jointly 
and in reduced forms. From Panel B, which considers all the variables in Panel A 
but excluding oil, there is evidence of a long-run relationship from capital 
expenditure, recurrent expenditure and agriculture to manufacturing. This is due 
to the negative sign of the ECT, which is statistically significant at the 1% level. 
From the ECT, the speed of adjustment towards equilibrium level in this model is 
5.6% which is lesser than 29.2% obtained in Panel A. The result support 
Hypothesis 1 and in conformity with findings such as those by Fardmanesh 
(1991), Usui (1998), Farzanegan and Markwardt (2009) and Harding and 
Venables (2010). For example, Harding and Venables (2010), argue that exports 
of natural resources have an adverse effect on non-resource exports.   
In contrast, there is no evidence of short-run relationship between the variables.  
The obtained results are also similar to the findings established in Panel A and in 
line with findings from Gelb (1988), Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian (2003) and 
Iwayemi and Fawowe (2011). For example, Gelb (1988) reported no significant 
evidence of Dutch Disease in manufacturing sectors of a group of oil exporting 
countries he examined in his study. Iwayemi and Fawowe (2011), who also 
examined Nigeria using variables such as oil price measure, government 
expenditure, inflation, real exchange rate and net export, argue that oil price 
volatility did not have a significant effect on most macroeconomic variables. 
Looking at the results in Panel C, there is evidence of lack of statistically 
significant relationship in the long-run as found in Panels A and B. The ECT is 
having the expected negative sign but the relationship is not significant from the 
t-statistics. The finding partly support Hypothesis 1 and also in support of 
studies such as Looney (1988) and Davis (1995). Looney (1988), who employed 
variables such as government expenditure, oil revenues, agriculture, non-oil 
manufacturing and real exchange rate also argued that in the long-run, effects 
linked with the Dutch Disease have been offset, leaving only short-run negative 
effects arising from appreciation of the real exchange rate. On the other hand, a 
positive and significant short-run relationship exists between capital expenditure 
and manufacturing at the 10% level. It is only in this model that capital 
expenditure which is largely financed by oil revenues as discussed in Chapter 5 
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affects manufacturing output. This finding is also in line with studies that argued 
on the lack of a negative relationship between natural resource wealth and 
economic performance as stated previously.  
However, some researchers attributed the difficulty of finding evidence of the 
Dutch Disease effect to a broad range of factors, which includes conventional 
means such as small samples (most oil-exporting economies’ key 
macroeconomic variables are measured annually and measurement bias in 
indices of aggregate manufacturing output (Ismail 2010). This is also the case in 
Nigeria where most economic data are measured annually and this can be seen 
in the data employed in the empirical analysis in this study. In addition, 
measurement bias in indices of aggregate output of economic data such as 
manufacturing, agriculture, government expenditure may have led to the high 
coefficient in the correlation analyses above.  
After examining the effects of natural resource wealth in oil on economic 
performance using the manufacturing sector, the next is to examine the 
relationship with the agricultural sector as discussed in Chapter 5 and above. In 
this analysis, another different specification of the variables was conducted and 
as such other tests before the VEC model analysis were carried out. For 
example, a lag length selection criteria test was employed to determine the 
number of lags needed in analysis of the VEC model. The model specification 
with agriculture as the dependent variable also showed that one year lag is the 
appropriate lag length as shown by the different selection criteria. This is also 
similar with the manufacturing model and the output of this test is reported in 
the appendix.  
After the lag length test, the next step is to examine evidence of cointegration 
among the variables due to the evidence of high R2 observed when a VAR 
analysis was conducted. The issue of high R2 was also observed in the 
manufacturing model specifications. The outputs of the VAR estimates are shown 
in the appendix. As such, further residual tests were conducted on the data 
before examining evidence of cointergration among the variables. This is also 
done due to lack of significance of some of the variables in the manufacturing 
model despite different specification and the high correlation coefficient in the 
correlation matrices above.  In addition, for stationery VAR to be correctly 
specified, the residuals should contain white noises.    
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The first test is to plot the residual graphs of the variables to examine whether 
residuals are white noises or not. In this case, they are largely not because of 
the considerable large residuals in all the five graphs.58 The large residuals 
observed may be related to some episodes, which could contain important 
information. For example, periods of significant changes in oil prices may have 
helped in producing these large residuals. From all the graphs, the years from 
1970s, 1980 and the 2000s showed evidence of large residuals and these 
periods coincided with oil price volatility. For example, in the mid-1970s, there 
was a significant increase in world oil price which also resulted in higher oil 
revenue for Nigeria. This outcome could also affected government expenditure 
as discussed in Chapter 5. Also, in 1986 there was a considerable decline in oil 
price which affected oil revenues in many oil producing countries. The 2000s also 
witnessed increases in oil price due to a surge in demand from the global 
economy, which was largely attributed to growth in the emerging economies like 
China and India. The demand for oil also translated to more revenues for Nigeria 
from oil export. Beside external events that affected the oil sector and the 
effects on other economic sectors like agriculture, there was a civil war in 
Nigeria, which originated from the oil producing region as discussed in Chapter 
3.  
Similarly, the correlation covariance matrix of the residuals can be examined, 
which is presented in Table B6 of the Appendix. From the covariance matrix of 
the residuals, it is evident that the off-diagonal elements are not having zero 
values and this means that the residuals are correlated among themselves. This 
is expected because model is an unrestricted VAR model unlike the Structural 
VAR, which has restrictions. In addition, more tests can be conducted to 
examine the properties of the residuals such as the autocorrelation test, which 
can be examined using a correlogram as shown in Figure B3 in the Appendix. 
Each of the graphs in Figure B3 reports the sample autocorrelations for the 
estimated VAR residuals for the specified number of lags, which shows from 1 to 
8. The dotted lines represents plus (+) or minus (-) two standard error bounds 
of the lag correlations.  The AR(1) coefficients are not having large values and 
this indicates lack of short-term correlations. If the residuals are completely 
random, then the correlations for any lags should be close to zero and most of 
                                                          
58
 See Appendix for plot of the residual graphs 
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the values in the autocorrelations graphs should lie within the dotted lines in the 
graph and this seems to be the case in Figure B3. 
Furthermore, an additional autocorrelation test of the residuals is employed in 
the form of an Autocorrelation LM test. The LM test can be applied to VAR in 
levels. The estimated output of this test is reported in Table B5 in the Appendix. 
The Null Hypothesis of the test indicates there is no serial correlation. To 
interpret the results, it is evident from the probability values, which are all more 
than 5% for all lags except for lag 6 that the Null Hypothesis of no serial can be 
rejected.  
The evidence of serial correlation can be attributed to the frequency of the data 
which is annual and also this can reflect the suggestion made by Ismail (2010) 
on the issue of lack of a negative relationship between natural resource wealth 
and economic performance due to a broad range of factors, which includes 
conventional means such as small samples of macroeconomic variables, which 
are measured annually and measurement bias in indices of aggregate economic 
variables. 
Also, a VAR stability condition check as shown in Table B3 and Figure B1 in 
section B of the Appendix was employed.  Table B3 and Figure B1 presents the 
AR table and graph respectively, which reports the inverse roots of the 
characteristic AR polynomial (see Lütkepohl, 1991). The estimated VAR model is 
stable (stationary) if all roots have modulus less than one and lies inside the unit 
circle. The Table and Figure shows that the VAR model is stable. If the VAR 
model is not stable, certain results (such as impulse response standard errors) 
are not valid (Lütkepohl 2005). In addition to stability test, this study also 
examined the properties of the residuals from our estimated VAR as discussed 
above. The autocorrelation LM test tests show evidence of auto-correlation of 
residuals. This outcome, could lead to invalid results such as impulse response 
analysis.  
However, the evidence of non-stationarity of the data as shown in Table 5.3 in 
Chapter 5 led this analysis to examine evidence of cointegration among the 
variables. The subject of whether the variables in a VAR model need to be 
stationary has been a recurring argument (see for example, Enders (2010). 
According to Enders (2010, p. 303) “Sims (1980) and Sims et al. (1990) 
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recommended against differencing even if the variables contain a unit root. They 
argued that the goal of the VAR analysis is to determine the interrelationships 
among the variables, not to determine the parameter estimates. The main 
argument against differencing is that it “throws away” information concerning 
the comovements in the data (such as the possibility of cointegrating 
relationships. Similarly, it is argued that the data need not to be detrended”. 
This issue has been discussed in Chapter 5 and the evidence of cointegration 
was found. As such, this chapter goes further to estimate the second model 
where agriculture is the dependent variable and in accordance with Enders 
(2010), who state that the aim of the VAR analysis is to determine the 
interrelationships among the variables, not to determine the parameter 
estimates.  
 
Table 6.5 Vector Error Correction Estimates Examining the Effects of 
  Oil Wealth on Economic Performance using the Agricultural 
  Sector as the Dependent Variable 
 
Regressor Coefficient t-value  
∆LOIL(1)  -0.147(0.202) -0.727 
∆LCAPEXP(1)   0.271*** (0.140)                                                 1.922
∆LRECEXP(1)   0.172(0.187) -0.922 
∆LMAN(1)   0.759* (0.336) 2.258 
ECT  -0.004(0.252) -0.107 
C  -0.207 -1.094 
Panel B: 
∆LCAPEXP(1)                       0.286* (0.136)                    2.101 
∆LRECEXP(1)                       0.121(0.179)                       0.671 
∆LMAN(1)                            0.560*** (0.327)                1.712 
ECT                                    -0.051(0.092)                      -0.559 
C                                        -0.250                                -1.975 
  
Source: Created by author based on data from CBN Statistical Bulletin (2010) using Eviews 
Statistical Software 
Note: *Significance at 1% level, **Significance at 5% level, ***Significance at 10% level  
            Probability value in ( ) 
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Dummies capturing institutional changes are included in model specification, but are not reported 
in the Granger Causality Test. 
 
It is clear from the two estimated models above that only short-run relationships 
exist between the variables. The ECTs are not statistically significant from Panels 
A and B of Table 6.5, although most of them have the negative expected signs. 
In the short-run, Panel A shows only capital expenditure and manufacturing 
have a positive and statically significant relationships at the 10% and 1% levels 
of significance respectively. The oil sector has the anticipated negative sign but 
the effect on agriculture in the short-run in not statistically significant. Also, 
recurrent expenditure is not having a significant impact in the short-run on the 
agricultural sector.  
Similarly, Panel B, which presents a slightly different specification of the model 
reports findings in line with Panel A as there is no evidence of a long-run 
comovement in the variables employed. However, there is evidence of a short-
run relationship running from capital expenditure and manufacturing to 
agriculture at the 1% and 10% levels of significance respectively. In is observed 
that recurrent expenditure displays the same results shown in Panel A as the 
relationship is positive but not statically significant.  
From the above two models, it is clear that there is lack of a statistically 
significant long-run relationships among the variables. The short-run 
relationships reports positive impacts on the agricultural sector and these 
findings did not support Hypothesis 1 and they are also in line with evidences 
from studies such as those by Gelb (1988), Looney (1988), Davis (1995), 
Spatafora and Warner (1995) and Aliyu (2009). Moreover, some of the findings 
established in the models where agriculture is the dependent variable are also 
similar to the findings reported by the manufacturing models above. In the 
manufacturing models some of the variables have a positive impact in the shot-
run and the coefficients of the long-run relationships have the negative expected 
sign in all the models.   
In summary, the above two models, partly support Hypothesis 1 and the main 
argument. The observed negative and positive evidence both in the short-run 
and long-run and the lack of a relationship in the short and long-run indicate 
mixed findings. These inconsistent results are in line with some findings 
established by studies in the literature as mentioned previously. For example, 
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Ogunleye (2008) examined the long-run effect of oil revenues on GDP per 
capita, household consumption, infrastructural development, agricultural and 
manufacturing output in Nigeria using a vector error correction model with 
annual data from 1960 to 2004. He reported that a negative relationship exists 
for GDP per capita, agriculture and manufacturing. However, the results further 
showed that even for variables with negative relationships in the current period, 
a positive relationship was established at subsequent time lags. Also, Looney 
(1988), in his study of the Saudi Arabian economy reported that in the long-run, 
effects linked with the Dutch Disease have been offset, leaving only short-run 
negative effects arising from appreciation of the real exchange rate. In addition, 
Davis (1995) found little corroborating evidence between natural resource 
wealth and economic performance indicators in mineral-based developing 
countries he employed in his study.  
The mixed findings in the above analysis can also be attributed to a broad range 
of factors, which includes low frequency of the data given in annual aggregates 
and high correlation among the variables.  The issue of high correlation is 
evident as shown above and this has led to different specifications of the 
correlation analysis but still there is a clear high correlation among the variables 
even in reduced form. Also, the various model specifications above yielded 
similar outcomes and it can be seen that the first specification, which included 
more variables in Table 6.3 showed more statistically significant relationships 
than the subsequent reduced form models. In Table 6.5, the results from the 
two specifications are almost the same. However, more reduced form 
specifications have been conducted to provide robustness and to avoid 
misspecification of the models.  But it appears that these alternatives model 
specifications show more statistical issues such as high R2 and lack of 
cointegration despite evidence of unit roots in the variables. The Appendix from 
section A to C contains the analysis of the different specifications of the models 
and their diagnostic tests. For example, the analysis of the different model 
specifications where agriculture is the dependent variable is found in section B of 
the Appendix. 
The different model specifications to examine the impact of economic variables 
and other institutional factors on the agricultural sector showed that only two 
models were found with evidence of long-run relationships among the variables 
as shown in Panels A and B of Table 6.5 above and further confirmation in 
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section B of the Appendix. In is seen in Tables B24, 22, 30 and 33 of the 
Appendix that there is no evidence of cointegration among the variables despite 
evidence of non-stationarity in the data. Also, VAR estimates of these reduced 
form models showed evidences of high R2. These VAR estimates are shown in 
Tables B23, 26, 29, 32 and 35 of the Appendix. The evidence of high R2 
suggests evidence of multicollinearity in the specified models. As such, these 
latter specifications could not be further estimated or applied. For example, a 
different specification of a three variable model was estimated but yet there was 
evidence of multicollinearity, which is caused by intercorrelations between the 
explanatory variables (Asteriou and Hall 2011). The evidence of intercorrelations 
among the variables was shown above and which may be the cause of the 
multicollinearity problem. 
The evidence of multicollinearity in the reduced form specifications resulted in 
the use of the two model specifications as shown in panels A and B of Table 6.5, 
which shows evidence of long-run comovement between the variables.  The 
estimates from the two VEC models present low R2 as shown in Tables B8 and 
B16 respectively. These models contained both economic and institutional 
variables, with the first having eight and the second seven. The first model 
showed evidence of cointegration from both Trace test and Maximum Eigenvalue 
test. While the second model only showed evidence of cointegraion from the Trace 
test.  
 
Results from Granger Causality Tests Obtained from the VEC Model 
After discussing the long-run and short-run dynamics, the next task is to 
examine the direction of causality between these variables. The results of the 
causality tests based on the VECM model are reported in Table 6.6 below. It 
shows the VEC Granger Causality/Block Exogeneity Wald Tests and show results 
for each equation in the VEC model. Since a five variable VEC model is used, five 
panels are also produced from the software output, with one for each dependent 
variable in the VEC system. However, for clarity and objective purposes, only 
two panels will be shown where manufacturing and agriculture are the 
dependent variables respectively. The results expectedly show no evidence of a 
lead-lag interaction between the variables separately or jointly.  
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All of the results show indication of non-causality. From the probability limit 
values in all panels, it is evident that, at a 95% significance level, there is no 
case for which we can reject the null hypothesis when probability value is (< 
0.05). The null hypothesis, which means a variable x does not Granger Cause Y; 
in all cases it is accepted, which mean no variable is causing another or jointly 
causing another. For example, from panel 1 it is clear that the probability value 
from oil is 19.76% which is more than 5%. This shows that oil is not causing 
manufacturing. Moreover, the joint variable causality effect in the equation 
where manufacturing is the dependent variable have a probability limit value of 
32.88%, which is also more than 5%. Impliedly, this is clear that jointly, the 
variables are not having an impact on the manufacturing sector.  
For statistical robustness purpose, the VEC model is specified in reduced form 
due to the high correlation observed in the variables as discussed above. As 
such, Table 6.6 also present additional panel from different model specification 
to check whether there is a difference in the results. From this reduced form 
model where oil is excluded in the analysis it is clear that there is no significant 
difference in the results from those obtained previously. The difference is only 
seen in the equation where agriculture is the dependent variable. From these 
results, it is observed that the joint probability value is 3.24%, which is less than 
5%. This implies that there is a joint causality from the variables observed on 
the agricultural sector.      
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Table 6.6 VEC Granger Causality/Block Exogeneity Wald Tests 
    Variable  Chi-square Degrees of Freedom     Probability 
 
 
 
 
   
Dependent variable: ∆(Manufacturing) 
∆Oil 1.660348 1  0.1976 
∆Capital Expend. 1.622221 1  0.2028 
∆Recurrent Expend. 0.128698 1  0.7198 
∆Agriculture 1.745788 1  0.1864 
 
All 4.618056 4  0.3288 
 
Dependent variable: ∆(Agriculture) 
∆Oil 0.110038 1  0.7401 
∆Capital Expend. 4.734881 1  0.0296 
∆Recurrent Expend. 0.630368 1  0.4272 
  
All 7.756622 4  0.1009 
    
    
Dependent variable: ∆(Manufacturing) 
   
∆Agriculture  0.242087 1  0.6227 
∆Capital Expend.  1.945391 1  0.1631 
∆Recurrent Expend.  0.223523 1  0.6364 
    
All  2.389038 3  0.4957 
   
 
Dependent variable: ∆(Agriculture) 
  
∆Capital Expend.  4.415305 1  0.0356 
∆Capital Expend.  0.450375 1  0.5022 
∆Manufacturing  2.932981 1  0.0868 
    
All  8.774250 3  0.0324 
 
Source: Created by author based on data from CBN Statistical Bulletin (2010) using Eviews 
Statistical Software  
Note: (1).  ∆(LCAPEXP) is change in capital expenditure, ∆(LRECEXP) is change recurrent 
expenditure, ∆(MAN) is change in manufacturing output and ∆(AGRIC) is change in agricultural 
output 
(2). Dummies capturing institutional changes are included in model specification, but are not 
reported in the Granger Causality Test. 
 
The results from the Granger causality tests can generally be concluded to 
support Hypothesis 1. From the Granger causality tests there appears to be no 
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connection between oil, capital expenditure, recurrent expenditure, 
manufacturing and agriculture except the joint effect that is seen in the last 
section of the second panel of Table 6.6. The Granger Causality Test results 
might be interpreted as suggesting that there is no linkage between government 
spending which comprises of capital and recurrent expenditure and the economic 
variables of manufacturing and agriculture or between the oil sector and 
manufacturing and agriculture 
In addition, the results of no evidence of causality between the sectors support 
Hypothesis 1 and also in line with studies that found lack of connection between 
oil and economic performance. For example, Akinlo (2012) found no evidence of 
causality between oil and agriculture in Nigeria. The lack of causality can reflect 
some of the suggestions made by studies in the political economy literature. 
These studies also recognise the importance of other economic assumptions 
such as the Dutch Disease effect, oil price volatility, linkage and declining terms 
of trade. But according to them, these explanations alone could not explain the 
lack of growth without looking at social factors such as ethnic and regional 
differences that could influence politics and institutions responsible for enforcing 
law and order, accountability and transparency and sound governance which 
could provide a sustainable atmosphere for economic enhancement. The 
literature has recognised the importance of effective institutions which some 
authors linked to the capacity of the state to have strong institutions that are 
essential for promoting economic growth in resource rich countries.59  
From the analysis in Chapters 3 and 4, it is evident that the lack of causality 
between the employed variables is not surprising as there is observed weak 
performance in economic variables such as non-oil trade balance, agriculture, 
GDP per capita, exports of manufactures and commercial bank loans to small 
scale enterprises in the midst of rising government expenditure and population. 
All these outcomes are observed as changes in the political, social and economic 
landscapes continue to occur in the form of political instability, ethnic and 
religious violence, nationalisation of oil production and single political party 
dominance after the return to democratic rule.  
 
                                                          
59 See, for example, Gylfason et al. (1999), Isham et al. (2005), Melhun (2006) and Robinson et al. (2006) for more 
explanation. 
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6.4.2 Discussion of Results Based On Hypotheses 2, 3 & 4 
The estimates of the individual VEC equations using the Least Squares method 
are presented below. This is done so as to estimate and examine the effects of 
each dummy variable employed in the analysis and their effects on the economic 
sectors of interest. The effects are important because they help to depict or 
account for institutional factors concerned with politics and economics used in 
constructing Hypotheses 2 to 4.  
The tables below present the various equations in the VEC models. In these, the 
economic sectors of oil, manufacturing and agriculture each takes turn in 
becoming the dependant variable while others are independent or explanatory 
variables. In all the models as shown in the tables below, unstable political 
regimes, OPEC membership/nationalisation, the establishment of the state oil 
company (NNPC) and oil sector reforms are also taken as the independent 
variables. Moreover, the variables of political instability, OPEC 
membership/nationalisation/establishment of the NNPC and democracy which 
saw the establishment of many reforms are most vital in this section in order to 
identify the effects of the development of the Nigerian political economy on the 
three economic sectors examined in this study.  
This section will only focus on explaining the results from institutional factors 
and their meaning, as those of the economic sectors have been explained and 
discussed above. The main aim of this study is to examine the impact of the oil 
sector on key economic sectors such as manufacturing and agriculture. However, 
because the oil sector has been targeted with some reforms in order to make it 
more efficient and to provide linkage to other sectors of the Nigerian economy, it 
is also necessary to examine the oil sector in addition to others. The analysis of 
the oil sector is presented first, followed by the manufacturing sector and finally 
the agricultural sector.  
The subsequent section examines the specific impact of institutional variables on 
economic performance variables. Before conducting the analysis a redundant 
variable test is employed. This is due to the high coefficients observed in the 
correlation analysis above, which led to the various specifications of the model in 
Tables 6.3 and 6.5 above. The aim of conducting a redundancy variable test is to 
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check whether the using the full specified model is more effective than the 
reduced specified models. From the analyses presented in Tables 6.3 and 6.5 it 
is clear that the full specified model, which contains oil shows higher evidence of 
statically significant relationships, especially in Table 6.3. In Table 6.5, there is 
no difference in the power of explanatory variables whether in full or reduced 
specification. In all models, two variables (capital expenditure and 
manufacturing) have statistically significant values.  
However, despite the clear evidence or no difference between the fully specified 
models and the reduced models, a redundancy test on oil sector variable is 
conducted in order to know which model specification to adopt in examining the 
specific impact of institutional variables on economic performance variables. This 
is shown in Panels A and B of Table 6.7 below.  
 
Table 6.7 Redundant Variable Test Results 
Panel A 
Redundant Variables: LOIL   
          
 Value  Probability  
t-statistic  6.798061   0.0000  
F-statistic  46.21363   0.0000  
Likelihood ratio  37.10459   0.0000  
          
     Test Equation:   
Dependent Variable: Manufacturing   
Method: Least Squares   
Included observations: 50   
          
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
          
C -0.960122 0.283520 -3.386440 0.0015 
Capital Expenditure 0.135824 0.081380 1.669020 0.1024 
Recurrent Expenditure -0.139863 0.103042 -1.357333 0.1818 
Agriculture 0.862309 0.061756 13.96315 0.0000 
Political Instability 0.009927 0.129456 0.076683 0.9392 
Nationalisation 0.808472 0.156095 5.179369 0.0000 
Democracy/Reforms -0.324540 0.258092 -1.257459 0.2154 
          
R-squared 0.984204    Mean dependent var 8.268852 
Adjusted R-squared 0.982000    S.D. dependent var 1.877589 
S.E. of regression 0.251907    Akaike info criterion 0.209663 
Sum squared resid 2.728654    Schwarz criterion 0.477346 
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Log likelihood 1.758436    Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.311598 
F-statistic 446.5305    Durbin-Watson stat 0.915360 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
          
Panel B 
Redundant Variables: Oil   
     
     
 Value  Probability  
t-statistic  0.073206   0.9420  
F-statistic  0.005359   0.9420  
Likelihood ratio  0.006379   0.9363  
          
Test Equation:   
Dependent Variable: LAGRIC   
Method: Least Squares   
Included observations: 50   
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
          
C 1.469130 0.248992 5.900315 0.0000 
Capital Expenditure -0.149357 0.085153 -1.753984 0.0866 
Recurrent Expenditure 0.285689 0.101500 2.814672 0.0073 
Manufacturing 0.950128 0.068045 13.96315 0.0000 
Political instability 0.125623 0.134540 0.933724 0.3557 
Nationalisation -0.727862 0.176848 -4.115759 0.0002 
Democracy/Reforms -0.068554 0.275653 -0.248697 0.8048 
     
     
R-squared 0.984088    Mean dependent var 10.14704 
Adjusted R-squared 0.981868    S.D. dependent var 1.963707 
S.E. of regression 0.264423    Akaike info criterion 0.306645 
Sum squared resid 3.006544    Schwarz criterion 0.574329 
Log likelihood -0.666133    Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.408581 
F-statistic 443.2342    Durbin-Watson stat 1.034552 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
Panel C 
Redundant Variables: Agriculture   
     
     
 Value df Probability  
t-statistic  0.073206  42  0.9420  
F-statistic  0.005359 (1, 42)  0.9420  
Likelihood ratio  0.006379  1  0.9363  
     
     
Test Equation:   
Dependent Variable: LOIL   
Method: Least Squares   
Included observations: 50   
          
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
          
C -2.021416 0.300448 -6.728004 0.0000 
Capital Expenditure 0.028537 0.102751 0.277728 0.7826 
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Recurrent Expenditure -0.044396 0.122476 -0.362487 0.7188 
Manufacturing 1.315597 0.082108 16.02283 0.0000 
Political instability -0.751433 0.162344 -4.628652 0.0000 
Nationalisation 1.070384 0.213395 5.015983 0.0000 
Democracy/Reforms 0.573199 0.332620 1.723286 0.0920 
     
     
R-squared 0.989314    Mean dependent var 9.386480 
Adjusted R-squared 0.987822    S.D. dependent var 2.891365 
S.E. of regression 0.319069    Akaike info criterion 0.682356 
Sum squared resid 4.377605    Schwarz criterion 0.950039 
Log likelihood -10.05889    Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.784291 
F-statistic 663.4628    Durbin-Watson stat 1.070476 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
          
Source of Table:  Dimitrios and Hall (2011) 
Source of data: Created by author based on data from CBN Statistical Bulletin (2010) and 
constructed dummy variables using Eviews Statistical Software.  
 
From Panel A of Table 6.7 above, the results give an F-statistic of 46.214, in 
comparison with the F-critical value of 6.798. As F-statistic is greater than the F-
critical value, the null hypothesis is rejected. Impliedly, it means that the 
coefficient of the variable oil is not zero, and therefore oil is not redundant; that 
is, it has a significant effect in determining manufacturing.  However, from Panel 
B, F-statistic is less than the F-critical value, the null hypothesis is accepted. 
Impliedly, it means that the coefficient of the variable oil is zero, and therefore 
oil is redundant; that is, it has no significant effect in determining agricultural 
output. 
From the above analyses, the examination of the effects of institutional variables 
on economic performance will adopt the fully specified model, which has 
manufacturing as the dependent variable, while the agricultural model will adopt 
the reduced form model that excludes oil in the analysis. These examinations are 
shown below in Tables 6.8 to 6.9. 
Similarly, as this analysis also examines the impact of institutional variables on 
the oil sector, which was also examined in Chapter 3 and 4, the redundancy test 
is also carried out for the oil model. From Panel C of Table 6.7, F-statistic is less 
than the F-critical value, the null hypothesis is accepted. Impliedly, this indicates 
that the coefficient of the variable agricultural variable is zero, and therefore 
agriculture is redundant; that is, it has no significant effect in determining oil 
output. The reduced form model is shown in Table 6.10 below.  
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6.4.2.1 Discussion of Results Based On Hypothesis 2 
The results from the VEC model capture the impact of political instability on the 
economic performance variables and these are shown on Tables 6.8, 6.9 and 
6.10 below. From Tables 6.8 and 6.9, political instability reveals statistically 
significant positive relationships at the 1% level on the manufacturing and 
agricultural sectors respectively. Also from the analysis between political 
instability and the oil sector as shown in table 6.10, the result indicates no 
impact and the results are statistically insignificant. These outcomes did not 
support Hypothesis 2, which states that Political instability instigated by a lack of 
national unity and oil rental income should have a negative impact on economic 
performance in Nigeria. The positive findings are in contrast to those of Gyimah-
Brempong and Traynor (1996, 1999), Chen and Feng (1996), Alesina et al., 
(1996) and Aisen and Veiga (2013), who argue that political instability, have a 
negative effect on economic growth. For example, Aisen and Veiga (2013) 
examined the effects of political instability on economic growth from 1960-2004 
in 169 countries and found that higher degrees of political instability are 
connected to lower growth rates of GDP per capita. Also, an earlier study by 
Alesina et al., (1996) argue that in countries and time periods with a high 
tendency of government collapse, economic growth is considerably lower than 
otherwise. 
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Table 6.8 Results for Economic and Institutional Variables of 
Regression Analysis Examining the Impact of Changes in the 
Manufacturing Sector 
Dependent Variable: Manufacturing 
     
     Variables Coefficient Standard Error t-Statistic Probability 
          
∆Oil     -0.269*** 0.146 -1.840 0.074 
∆Capital Expenditure   1.151 0.101 1.493 0.144 
∆Recurrent Expenditure 0.033 0.135 -0.249 0.805 
∆Agriculture -0.098 0.181 -0.543 0.591 
Political Instability   0.558*     0.142 3.925 0.000 
Nationalisation -0.123 0.144 -0.858 0.396 
Democracy/Reforms   -0.661* 0.182   -3.633 0.000 
     
𝑅2 0.396   
Log likelihood -10.414   
F-statistic 2.766   
     
     Source: Created by author based on data from CBN Statistical Bulletin (2010) and constructed 
dummy variables using Eviews Statistical Software.  
Note: (1).  ∆Oil is change in oil, ∆Capital Expenditure is change in capital expenditure, ∆Recurrent 
Expenditure is change in recurrent expenditure, ∆Agriculture is change in agriculture 
(2). *Significance at 1% level, **Significance at 5% level, ***Significance at 10% level 
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Table 6.9 Results for Economic and Institutional Variables of 
Regression Analysis Examining the Impact on Changes in the 
Agricultural Sector 
 
Dependent Variable: Agriculture 
     
     variable Coefficient Standard Error t-Statistic Probability   
          
∆Capital Expenditure  0.286* 0.136  2.101 0.042 
∆Recurrent Expenditure  0.121 0.179 0.671 0.506 
∆Manufacturing  0.560*** 0.327  1.713 0.095 
Political Instability  0.454* 0.158  2.873 0.006 
Nationalisation  0.234*** 0.136 1.721 0.093 
Democracy/Reforms -0.428* 0.196 -2.182 0.035 
     
     
𝑅2  0.381   
Log likelihood -5.417   
F-statistic  3.003   
          
Source: Created by author based on data from CBN Statistical Bulletin (2010) and constructed 
dummy variables using Eviews Statistical Software.  
Note: (1).  ∆Oil is change in oil, ∆Capital Expenditure is change in capital expenditure, ∆Recurrent 
Expenditure is change in recurrent expenditure, ∆Agriculture is change in agriculture 
(2). *Significance at 1% level, **Significance at 5% level, ***Significance at 10% level 
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Table 6.10 Results for Economic and Institutional Variables Regression 
Analysis Examining the Impact on Changes in the Oil Sector 
 
Dependent Variable: Oil 
          
Variable Coefficient Standard Error t-Statistic Probability   
          
∆Capital Expenditure 0.281 0.207 1.368 0.179 
∆Recurrent Expenditure 0.351 0.274 1.287 0.206 
∆Manufacturing 0.599 0.482 1.241 0.223 
Political Instability 0.293 0.302 0.968 0.339 
Nationalisation -0.060 0.283 -0.214 0.832 
Democracy/Reforms -0.355 0.393 -0.903 0.372 
     
     
𝑅2    0.292   
Log likelihood -24.141   
F-statistic    2.010   
     
     
Source: Created by author based on data from CBN Statistical Bulletin (2010) and constructed 
dummy variables using Eviews Statistical Software.  
Note: (1).  ∆Oil is change in oil, ∆Capital Expenditure is change in capital expenditure, ∆Recurrent 
Expenditure is change in recurrent expenditure, ∆Agriculture is change in agriculture 
 
 
6.4.2.2. Discussion of Results Based on Hypothesis 3 
Hypothesis 3 reflects the nationalisation of the oil industry after Nigeria joined 
OPEC in 1971 and the further empowerment of the Nigerian National Oil 
Company by its transformation into the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation 
in 1977 in order to give the Nigerian government a greater stake in, and more 
control of, the oil industry. The results from the VEC model which represents oil 
nationalisation and Nigeria`s OPEC membership as illustrated in Tables 6.8 to 
6.10 reveal mixed findings.  
For example in Table 6.9, which examine the impact of period of nationalisation 
on the agricultural sector reveal a statistically significant effect at the 10% level. 
The result indicates that nationalisation of the oil industry is positively related to 
agriculture and this did not support hypothesis 3. Also, the positive effect is in 
contrast with findings empirical evidence, which suggest that ownership 
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structure does matter in the relationship between natural resource wealth and 
economic growth. This perspective proposes that private ownership structure is 
more effective than state ownership structure (Ross 2001 and Luong and 
Weithal 2010). Also, a study by McPherson (2003) argued that political factors 
such as nationalism and corruption have weakened the efficiency and 
effectiveness of national oil companies (NOCs) in many oil producing countries 
and disrupted programmes of national oil company reform.  
In relation to the analyses of the impact of nationalisation on the manufacturing 
and oil sectors, the results are not statistically significant. However, the analysis 
on the manufacturing sector shows negative effect of nationalisation. This 
evidence support Hypothesis 3 and is similar to the findings in the literature 
cited above. Also, it can be argued that policies established to indigenise the oil 
sector so as to create a multiplier effect on the economy, especially on the oil 
sector and others such as manufacturing and agriculture are not showing any 
impact. By implication, there is a lack of a relationship between nationalisation 
and other key sectors of the Nigerian economy. This could also indicate there are 
other factors such as a lack of national unity limiting the expected positive 
outcomes of indigenisation policy of nationalisation and further control of the oil 
sector by the establishment of NNPC with more powers in both the upstream and 
downstream activities of the industry.  
 
6.4.2.3 Discussion of Results Based On Hypothesis 4 
Results from the VEC model as depicted in Tables 6.8 to 6.10 above show that 
the economic reforms which coincided with a return to democratic rule and the 
dominance by the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) have mixed effects on 
economic performance variables. As Table 6.8 reports, there is a statistically 
significant negative relationship on the manufacturing sector at the 1% level. 
However, there is a positive significant relationship for Tables 6.9, which 
analyses the impact of democracy on agriculture. In relation to Table 6.10, there 
is no evidence of a statistically significant effect to support the hypothesis 4 that 
there is a negative relationship between democracy/period of economic reforms 
and the oil sector performance.  However, the coefficient is negative, which 
means that the result have the expected sign. The results from the VEC models 
that capture democratic period and economic reforms geared to various sectors 
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of the Nigerian economy, especially oil, support Hypothesis 4 in the 
manufacturing model and oil. This reveal the expected sign of a negative effect 
that support the hypothesis, which states that Reforms targeted to escape the 
resource curse that coincided with stable democracy and one ruling party should 
have a negative impact on economic performance due to an inherent lack of a 
national unity. 
The statistically significant/insignificant and positive/negative relationships 
between a return to democracy/reforms and the economic sectors of oil, 
manufacturing and agriculture reflect the theoretical literature on economic 
growth and democracy. According to findings by some studies in this strand of 
the literature, there appears to be mixed evidence (see, for example, Przeworski 
et al., 2000; Brown and Mobarak, 2009; Aisen and Veiga, 2013).  Przeworski et 
al. (2000) find no long-run differences in economic growth between the effect of 
democratic and autocratic political regimes. Implicitly this means that it is not 
confirmed whether democracy hinders or promotes economic growth. For 
example, Rachdi and Saidi (2014) stated that Brunetti (1997) analysed 17 
studies focusing on the relationship between democracy and economic growth 
and found 9 studies reported no relationship, 1 study showed a positive impact, 
another study revealed a negative effect, 3 studies confirmed a weak negative 
association and 3 studies revealed a weak positive relationship. Rachdi and Saidi 
(2014) challenge this consensus of mixed conclusions on the link between 
democracy and economic growth and stated that economic growth requires 
“developmental democracy” as stated by Sklar (1987) in which legal and 
electoral limits on arbitrary power offer individuals the security to plan their 
economic futures.  
Sklar’s argument reflect Nigeria’s situation where there was lack of a 
developmental democracy that ensures legal and electoral limits, especially in 
2003 and 2011 elections as discussed in Chapter 4. Evidence of electoral 
manipulation and violence after electoral results prevailed. For example, the 
election that took place in 2011 was seen as corrupt as violence erupted in some 
parts of the country (The Economist 2014).  
On the other hand, the positive impact of democracy on agriculture showed in 
Table 6.9 support some of the findings in the literature. Papaioannou and 
Siourounis (2008a) examine the within impact of democratisation in countries 
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that abandoned authoritarianism and consolidated representative institutions. 
The results imply that on average democratisations are accompanied by an 
increase in annual GDP per capita growth. 
In summarising the results obtained from the three models depicting 
institutional factors it can be seen that economic ideas such as the Dutch 
Disease, oil price volatility and declining terms of trade, as shown by some 
studies in the literature are not sufficient to fully explain the lack of growth in 
Nigeria despite significant oil revenues and a return to democracy. Other ideas in 
the literature such as cognitive, societal and state-centered political economy 
perspectives may help give further explanations of the lack of growth.60 Such 
concepts could give additional explanation of the problem because they can 
underpin their arguments with assumptions such as the irrational behaviour of 
the political elite, the power of diverse social classes, strong institutions and 
economies that obtain regular and significant amounts of income from natural 
resource production. For example, Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian (2008, p. 2) 
argued that “waste and corruption from oil rather than Dutch Disease has been 
responsible for the poor long run economic performance” in Nigeria. According to 
them, natural resources like oil exert a negative and asymmetric effect on 
economic growth through their damaging impact on institutional quality. 
This later explanation depicts the Nigerian situation where a lack of a national 
unity due to diverse ethnic groups and regional differences coupled with a 
significant amount of oil rental income could lead to the establishment and 
promotion of policies by political leaders that will not benefit the wider 
population. For example in the case of Nigeria, the reforms initiated by the PDP 
from 1999, especially in terms of institutions established to curtail money 
laundering such as Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) and 
Independent Corrupt Practices Commission (ICPC) are seen as the means for 
any government in power to weaken its opponents because not all past 
government officials were investigated. Also the power of diverse social classes 
exists in Nigeria due to varied regional origin which has affected politics from the 
time of independence and this has influenced government administration and in 
turn the institutional quality concerned with politics, economics and legal 
                                                          
60 See, for example, Karl 1997, Ross (1999), Stiglz (2007), Isham et al. (2005) and Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian 
(2008) 
 
 
222 
 
institutions in Nigeria. For example, the three largest ethnic groups in Nigeria 
have more political power and influence than other minority tribes.  
Similarly, Nigeria obtained a significant amount of income from natural resource 
production and according to the literature such an economy becomes a rentier 
state.  This source of income that does not come from the wider population and 
is not earned by them could give political leaders the power and freedom to do 
as they wish by creating an environment that may only promote a struggle to 
gain oil rental income by the strongest and most politically influential tribe. This 
outcome may adversely affect economic growth and development in the long-
run. This may also weaken institutions established to provide an enabling 
environment for both public and private businesses to operate efficiently as 
regulations that deals with issues such as transparency and accountability are in 
place.   
Also, the literature on democracy and economic growth can explain why 
economic growth in Nigeria is still not sustainable after its return to democracy 
in 1999. The conclusions from the studies are mixed and yet some argued that a 
developmental democracy in which there are legal and electoral limits is 
important in promoting economic growth. In line with this idea, Collier and 
Hoeffler (2007) also argued that resource rich countries need a different form of 
democracy with particularly strong checks and balances. According to them, this 
is uncommon since checks and balances are public goods and so are likely to be 
underprovided in new democracies. Also, over time they become eroded by the 
influence of natural resource rental income. 
These various issues could have contributed to the results obtained above which 
largely showed no relationship between the economic sectors and the institutions 
responsible for enhancing economic growth in Nigeria. As such other factors 
such as a lack of checks and balances, transparency and accountability that 
cannot be captured by the models above could have contributed to the results 
obtained. However, as this study’s argument proposed a lack of a national unity 
as an inherent problem that impedes the working of various institutions in 
Nigeria due to regional power struggles, it is assumed that this captured many 
reasons behind institutional weakness and the deteriorating economic outcomes 
despite an abundance in oil. Power struggles due to a lack of national unity can 
create an uncertain environment and the consequences for major political, 
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economic and legal institutions, which are important in enhancing economic 
development.  
 
6.5 CONCLUSION 
The results presented in the above analysis show that in some instances the 
hypotheses informed by Chapters 3 and 4, which try to verify the main 
argument of this study were confirmed by the econometric analysis. In general, 
Hypothesis 1 was confirmed; to recap, this states that a lack of national unity 
has hindered the associated oil benefits from trickling down to other key sectors 
of manufacturing and agriculture in the Nigerian economy.  
The analysis of Hypothesis 2 shows that political instability has positive 
significant effect on the economic sectors of manufacturing and agriculture and 
an insignificant positive effect on the oil sector. This did not support the 
hypothesis. Furthermore, the results from the three models that captured 
Hypothesis 3, which depicts the impact of OPEC membership/nationalisation on 
economic performance, partly support the main argument discussed in Chapters 
3 and 4.  It shows evidence of a statistically positive relationship between 
nationalisation and the agricultural sector and an insignificant negative 
relationship for the manufacturing and oil sectors. Finally, the econometric 
analysis of Hypothesis 4 from the three models, reflecting the period of 
economic reforms that coincided with a return to democratic rule and political 
party dominance, show mixed findings. This result is also consistent with some 
studies in the literature on economic growth and democracy as stated above. 
However, reasons that could lead to a lack of full support for the hypotheses by 
some of the models may be due to differences in statistical techniques or the 
type of data employed in the analysis. From the literature review, there is mixed 
evidence from studies in relation to the hypotheses examined as shown in the 
studies on the relationship between economic growth and democracy, political 
instability and oil in general. Most of these differences as seen from the 
literature review may be due to different economic, political and social systems 
that affect institutional quality and government policies in the countries 
examined.   
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In addition, other statistical issues such as high correlation among the variables 
as shown above in Table 6.1 and evidence of serial correlation and 
heteroskedasticity as shown in sections A to C in the Appendix. The presence of 
heteroskedasticity in the specified models indicates violating one of the 
assumptions of the classical linear regression model. This assumption states that 
the disturbances should have a constant or equal variance independent of any 
observation. However, it is common in regression analysis for this assumption to 
be violated (Dimitrios and Hall 2011). For example, in Tables A9 and A10 in 
section A of the Appendix, which represent the OLS estimate of the fully 
specified model where manufacturing is the dependent variable, reveal the 
presence of serial correlation and heteroscedasticity respectively. In addition, 
subsequent OLS estimates of the reduced form models also show presence of 
serial correlation and heteroskedasticity. These evidences can be seen in the 
models where agriculture is the dependent variables as shown in Tables B12 and 
B13 in section B of the Appendix.  
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION 
 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
The lack of sustainable economic development in Nigeria despite significant 
revenues received from oil production and exports largely motivated this study. 
Since the discovery of oil in just one region of Nigeria in 1956 and the 
commencement of oil exports in 1958 followed by the attainment of political 
independence in 1960, economic development has followed a downward 
trajectory, particularly from the 1970s. The conceivable causes of this outcome 
could be traced to some factors such as the inherent lack of national unity that 
has characterised the path of politics and the behaviour of politicians in office 
and the neglect of agriculture that is practiced widely across the different 
regions, especially in rural areas where most of the population reside. Also, the 
concentration of public infrastructure in urban areas is seen as a major influence 
on economic outcomes because rural agricultural products could not be delivered 
to the urban areas at low cost, so affecting consumer prices. Another factor is 
the growing and continued dependence on oil when economic performance in 
terms of GDP and GDP per capita follows the upward or downward trajectory of 
oil prices that are determined exogenously.  
Moreover, there is also a theoretical rationale to this study. It is possible to 
examine the lack of economic development in Nigeria despite an abundance of 
oil wealth using an economic perspective that is largely contingent on theories of 
the Dutch Disease and the volatility of commodity prices. However, the gap 
identified by subsequent research in the inability of economic theories to capture 
the political process that also characterise the trajectory of economic 
performance has motivated the need to examine Nigeria under the influence of 
both economic and political factors. In addition, it is important to examine the 
situation in Nigeria in isolation and the impact of its economic and political 
transition on economic performance in relation to the oil sector. This is because 
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Nigeria has undergone changes economically and politically, especially after the 
discovery of oil and the achievement of independence in 1960.  
 
7.2 SUMMARY OF MAIN FINDINGS 
The significance of this research study comprises of an examination of the 
complex relationship between oil and economic growth in Nigeria. It attempts to 
present a broader picture of oil and the Nigerian economy using an analytical 
historical approach. The coming together of separate regions under the British 
colonial administration to form Nigeria in 1914 and the subsequent discovery 
and reliance on oil, coupled with the sudden attainment of political 
independence, all affected economic performance. The sectors of manufacturing 
and agriculture over the period 1960 – 2010 were analysed. The study showed 
that the major sectors of the economy behaved differently over time in response 
to the gradual development of the economic and political landscapes. The oil 
sector is seen to assume greater importance than manufacturing and 
agriculture, especially in terms of export income and revenue generation for the 
government. 
In general, the results presented from the analysis in Chapter 6 show that in 
some instances the hypotheses informed by Chapters 3 and 4, which attempts to 
verify the main argument of this study, were confirmed by the econometric 
analysis. In general, Hypothesis 1 was partly confirmed; to recap, this states 
that a lack of national unity has hindered the associated oil benefits from 
trickling down to other key sectors of manufacturing and agriculture in the 
Nigerian economy.  
For example, in the model where manufacturing is the dependent variable, there 
is evidence of a significant negative relationship both in the short-run and long-
run relationships. It is also obvious that the oil sector have a significant negative 
short-run relationship with the manufacturing sector. However, capital 
expenditure, which is largely financed by oil revenues, has an insignificant but 
positive short-run relationship with manufacturing in the fully specified model, 
which subsequently became positive and significant in the reduced form model 
of manufacturing. Moreover, there is no significant long-run relationship in the 
model where agriculture is the dependent variable.  However, the long-run 
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relationships have the negative expected sign, which supports Hypothesis 1. Also 
in the short-run oil has a negative but insignificant impact on the agricultural 
sector. 
Similarly, the results from the Granger Causality Tests show a lack of interaction 
between the variables of oil, capital expenditure, recurrent expenditure, 
manufacturing and agriculture. The results might be interpreted as suggesting 
that there is no linkage between government spending largely financed by the oil 
sector from oil rental income and the two sectors of manufacturing and 
agriculture. 
The analysis of Hypothesis 2 shows that political instability has a mixed impact 
on the economic sectors of manufacturing and agriculture. For example, there is 
significant negative effect on the manufacturing sector and significant and 
insignificant effects on the agricultural and oil sectors. These findings partly 
support the hypothesis. Furthermore, the results from the three models that 
captured Hypothesis 3, which depicts the impact of OPEC 
membership/nationalisation on economic performance, largely support the main 
argument discussed in Chapters 3 and 4 because it shows that there is a 
negative relationship although not significant between OPEC 
membership/nationalisation and the performance of the economic variables 
except for the agricultural sector where a significant positive relationship is 
observed.  
Finally, the econometric analysis of Hypothesis 4 from the three models (oil, 
manufacturing and agriculture), covering the period of reforms that coincided 
with a return to democratic rule and political party dominance, shows mixed 
findings. For example, there is a significant and insignificant negative effect on 
manufacturing and oil respectively. However, the relationship is positive and 
significant on the agricultural sector. As such, the presence of a significant 
negative effect and the lack of a relationship has helped to highlight the fact that 
the previous economic and political developments in Nigeria have shaped the 
current democratic period with negative consequences for economic growth in 
the country. 
Therefore, the evidence of negative and insignificant relationships obtained from 
the analysis in most instances has helped to further justify the narrative of the 
descriptive approach used in Chapters 3 and 4. This highlights the main 
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argument of the study and describes the importance of oil and politics to the 
path of economic growth in Nigeria during the past periods of unstable 
democracy and the consequences in the current period of stable democracy.  
 
7.3 THE THEORETICAL CONTRIBUTION OF THE RESEARCH 
In order to present a theoretical orientation to guide the examination of the 
relationship between oil and economic growth in Nigeria, this study reviewed the 
theoretical literature with respect to the adverse effects of natural resource 
wealth on economic performance and proposed a classification of resource curse 
theories according to each school of thought. The classification divided the 
resource curse concept into two main groups. These include explanations that 
are contingent on economic theories and those from a political point of view that 
attempt to employ a broader framework covering the role of political factors in 
addition to economic issues.  
The empirical analysis section of this study relied largely on the political 
economy approach, which captures the two-way interplay between political 
factors and oil. There exists some theoretical implications that can be inferred 
from the above empirical evidence with respect to this approach.  
First, it can be concluded that Hypothesis 1 is confirmed. This states that the 
lack of national unity due to the amalgamation of the North and South regions in 
Nigeria and the gradual importance of the oil sector had hindered the benefits 
from a positive multiplier effect associated with oil wealth on the key sectors of 
manufacturing and agriculture. This outcome complies with the economic 
explanation of the Dutch Disease concept and also with the political models that 
attempt to look at the role of social factors such as ethnicity and religion as well 
as political factors. The latter includes the capability of the nature of political 
regimes and the quality of public institutions to promote transparency and 
accountability.  
Secondly, it can be concluded that Hypothesis 2 is partly confirmed. This states 
that political instability instigated by a lack of national unity and the presence of 
oil rental income should have a negative impact on economic performance in 
Nigeria. Political instability, which may have been triggered by social factors 
such as ethnic and regional rivalry, coupled with the presence of oil rental 
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income, has a negative effect on the manufacturing sector. The explanation of 
the relationship between natural resource wealth and political regimes is largely 
based on whether natural resources promote unstable political regimes or hinder 
democratic transition. However, there is a strand of literature focusing on the 
effects of political instability and economic growth and evidence is found in the 
studies of Alesina and Perotti (1996), Feng (2001) and Aisen and Veiga (2006, 
2008 and 2013). However, most of these analyse a sample comprising of several 
countries. For example, Aisen and Veiga (2013) examined a sample of 169 
countries.  In contrast to such studies on natural resource wealth and economic 
growth and in line with those of Feng (2001), this analysis attempts to further 
investigate whether unstable political regimes triggered by natural resource 
wealth impede economic outcomes in Nigeria.  
Thirdly, Hypothesis 3 states that the nationalisation of the Nigerian oil sector, 
which coincided with OPEC membership should lead to weak economic 
performance due to an inherent lack of national unity. This is somehow 
confirmed because the empirical analysis shows that there is an insignificant 
negative relationship between OPEC membership/nationalisation of the oil sector 
and most of the variables observed, which are expected to respond positively to 
the policy action of oil nationalisation by creating a multiplier effect in the 
economy. Also, this analysis confirms the theoretical explanation contingent on 
the ownership structure of the resource sector offered by Ross (1999) and Luong 
and Weithal (2010). This proposed that a private ownership structure is more 
effective than a state ownership structure in building superior governance 
institutions because domestic and foreign investors largely prefer governance 
institutions that are sound and transparent and help to support accountability in 
order to provide a conducive environment for business. 
In addition, McPherson (2003) argued that political factors such as nationalism 
and corruption have weakened the efficiency and effectiveness of national oil 
companies (NOCs) in many oil producing countries and disrupted programmes of 
national oil company reform. This is also the case in Nigeria, where the 
establishment of a national oil company (NNPC) did not correspond with positive 
outcomes due to problems such as a lack of transparency and accountability by 
NNPC and a lack of sufficient refined oil products.  
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Fourthly, Hypothesis 4 states that reforms targeted to escape the resource 
curse, which coincided with stable democracy and a single ruling party should 
have a negative impact on economic performance due to an inherent lack of 
national unity. The evidence of a significant negative relationship on the 
manufacturing sector and the lack of a significant relationship on the oil sector 
support the arguments offered by some researchers that countries rich in natural 
resources often depend on a system that is based on patronage and do not 
support a democratic system based on electoral competition and transparency 
(Collier and Hoeffler, 2005 and Collier, 2010). Also, this depicts the literature on 
the effects of democracy on economic growth. The lack of a relationship between 
economic performance and a period of stable democratic rule reflect findings in 
the literature by, for example, Przeworski and Limongi (1997) and Robinson 
(2006). In addition, Collier and Hoeffler (2009) suggest that in developing 
economies, the combination of natural resource rental income and democracy 
has been considerably growth-retarding. 
The examination of changes in economic and institutional factors in previous 
periods and their impact on current or subsequent years, which witnessed a 
democratic transition with one ruling political party, can also be considered as a 
theoretical contribution. In addition, a negative or lack of impact on economic 
performance can also be considered as a theoretical contribution to the study of 
the relationship between oil wealth and economic growth in Nigeria and, in 
contrast, on the relationship between democracy and economic growth.  
 
7.4 THE EMPIRICAL CONTRIBUTION OF THE STUDY 
To add an additional layer of analysis to this study an empirical method has been 
employed so as to provide a wider and deeper understanding of the time trend 
effects of oil production and exports on economic performance in Nigeria. As 
such, this study contributes to the empirical literature in a number of ways and 
they are summarised below: 
 
1. The initial empirical analysis in Chapters 3 and 4 help to reveal the 
interaction between the political system and the oil sector and the 
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response of other economic performance indicators to this interaction over 
time.  
 
2. To avoid generalisation and to depict evidence from the literature on 
economic development in general, the study examine these effects of 
interaction between the oil sector and the Nigerian political system on 
economic performance in two periods of 1960 – 1999 and 1999 – 2010. 
 
3. To retain comparability with related literature, the research further 
investigates the impact of oil and institutions (political and economic) on 
sectors, especially on manufacturing and agriculture due to their level of 
contribution in GDP using an econometric model. This empirical analysis 
helps to examine the four hypotheses developed in a single model in order 
to see the impact of the interaction between oil and the political system 
on major economic sectors. This method of empirical analysis is in 
contrast to other studies, especially those focusing on Nigeria, which 
largely observed the interaction between economic factors such as oil 
price change and economic growth, oil price change and exchange rates 
and oil price and inflation rates.  
 
4. The empirical analysis has helped to show the impact of specific political 
developments in Nigeria, such as political instability, nationalisation of oil 
production and a return to democracy in 1999, which coincided with 
institutional reforms on the economic sectors of manufacturing and 
agriculture. For example, from the argument of this study as documented 
in Chapter 3, which states that the amalgamation of different socially and 
politically oriented regions in the period from 1914 to the discovery of oil 
in 1956 in just one part of the Southern region were not sufficient 
conditions to create an independent nation in 1960. The timing may not 
have allowed a sufficient period for the different regions to integrate, 
develop and achieve sustainable development. As such this has led to a 
lack of national unity due to ethnic, religion and regional differences and 
to the impact of the political landscape, which has been characterised by 
instability from 1966 until 1998. In particular, this study finds that the 
interaction between oil and agriculture is negative and oil and 
manufacturing is not significant in the long-run, suggesting that the 
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presence of oil wealth in Nigeria does not necessarily mean improved 
economic performance. However, from the argument of this study, it can 
be empirically inferred that the association between oil and economic 
performance is non-linear and depends on the structure and development 
of the social, political and economic systems. 
 
5. Another empirical contribution of this study is the examination of non-
linear channels of the effects of oil on economic growth. For example, 
from the analysis in Chapters 3 and 4, this study finds that the existing 
social conditions had influenced the political and economic institutions in 
Nigeria. This resulted in outcomes such as political instability, civil war 
and other conflicts between ethnic tribes or religious groups. From the 
empirical analysis of the hypotheses developed in Chapter 6, in some 
instances the study finds that the relationships between political instability 
and economic performance, nationalisation of oil production and economic 
performance and democracy and economic performance are negative. 
These findings suggest that existing social conditions also played a role in 
limiting the benefits of oil on economic performance. 
 
 
6. In addition, another empirical contribution of this research is that the 
mixed findings obtained on the relationship between political and 
economic institutions on economic performance either supports or is in 
contrast to the findings in the literature. For example, some panel data 
studies on the relationship between political instability and economic 
growth such as those by Feng (1996), Cheng and Feng (1996), Alesina et 
al. (1996), Devereux and Wen (1998) and Aisen and Veiga (2006, 2008) 
suggest a negative association. Devereux and Wen (1998), for example, 
claim that political instability leads to higher shares of government 
spending in GDP, which might imply a misallocation of resources and a 
slowdown in productivity growth. It is also suggested that political 
instability results in a high reliance on seigniorage revenues and leads to 
higher inflation particularly in developing, less democratic and socially-
polarized states (Aisen and Veiga (2006, 2008). However, De Mesquita 
and Root (2000), claim that the likelihood of government change or 
political instability creates competition over policy ideas, which results in 
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improved government policies and will enhance economic performance 
(Jong-A-Pin 2009). Also in some instances, Jong-A-Pin (2009) finds that 
the four political instability measurements, which he employed have 
different effects on long run economic growth. For example, he suggests 
that only instability in the political regime and civil protests are associated 
with a lower real per capita growth rate in the long-run. 
 
 
7.5 THE PRACTICAL RELEVANCE AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF 
 THE RESEARCH  
The empirical results of this study can be used to evaluate the effectiveness of 
the development plans and economic reforms initiated by the Nigerian 
government in the various political regimes after independence and to indicate 
the directions for future enhancement. This study provides some important 
recommendations for policy makers in Nigeria.  
Firstly, as there is a lack of a positive relationship between oil wealth and 
economic growth despite various development plans established to move the 
Nigerian economy forward since independence, it can be concluded that oil 
revenue distribution in Nigeria largely through government expenditure on 
various sectors may not be basically a process that leads to economic 
development. Economic reforms, especially those carried out in the democratic 
period from 1999, should be directed toward social and political issues of the 
country that could determine the level of transparency, accountability, security 
and justice, with the aim of equalising and promoting economic development 
across the different regions in Nigeria.  
In this study, various categories of government expenditure from independence 
in 1960 to 2010 have been used to describe and examine the influence of social 
and political factors on the behaviour of public spending largely financed by oil 
revenues. Also, social and political events in the preceding periods have helped 
to characterise the trajectory of the subsequent period and the consequences in 
economic sectors.  
It can be inferred from the descriptive approach employed in Chapters 3 and 4 
and the empirical analysis conducted in Chapter 6 that the cause of a lack of 
economic development in Nigeria, despite significant revenues received from oil 
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exports and rising government expenditure, may be linked to a range of factors. 
For example, the lack of national unity, which may have resulted from the 
amalgamation of separate regions to create Nigeria, may have contributed to the 
shape of the trajectory of economic and political outcomes in the country.  
Also the discovery of oil in just one region of Nigeria and the continued 
dependence of various governments on its revenues despite an inherent lack of 
national unity presented in the form of ethnic and regional rivalry, especially by 
coups and during political elections, could also have caused the lack of economic 
growth. 
Also, it can be inferred that the weak record of economic development in Nigeria 
is a direct influence of a lack of continuity of infrastructural investment due to 
societal issues such as ethnic, religion and regional rivalry, which helps to create 
an unstable political environment; for example, there has been political 
instability from 1966 to 1999.   
According to the empirical estimates of the variables for the output of the oil, 
manufacturing and agricultural sectors in the descriptive and econometric 
analysis, this study would propose the following policy recommendations to the 
Nigerian government.  
1. Use government institutions in existence to create awareness among 
Nigerian citizens of the need for national unity and its implication for 
economic outcomes. This could be undertaken either through 
organisations such as the National Orientation Agency (NOA) that has 
offices across the 36 states in Nigeria or by the use of academic and social 
institutions that have close contact with the younger generation.  
 
2. Increase capital expenditure, which has over time appeared to be below 
current expenditure from the depiction and description in Chapters 3 and 
4, especially in the recent decade that has witnessed a stable democratic 
period and a volatile oil price. Also, the analysis in Chapter 6 shows that 
capital expenditure has a positive effect on all economic sectors 
examined. Increased capital expenditure should be largely allocated to 
rural areas where most agricultural activities are carried out in the form of 
the building of infrastructural facilities such as roads, bridges, dams and 
electricity. This will enhance agricultural activity that could reduce rising 
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consumer prices and promote food manufacturing activities due to the 
close proximity of inputs, which could in turn provide further employment. 
A consequence of this recommendation will be multiplier effects that will 
reduce dependence on the oil sector income of, which is largely 
determined exogenously. 
 
3. Consider the future of Nigeria’s OPEC membership as this is not having a 
positive impact on economic performance. However, this may not be easy 
as membership may be purely political considering the history that led to 
the formation of OPEC and the period when Nigeria joined. Also, 
nationalisation of the oil sector and further empowerment of NNPC needs 
to be re-examined due to a lack of refined oil products and issues of 
inadequate accountability and transparency in the oil sector.     
 
4. Enhance existing public institutions such as judicial, legislative and 
political (i.e., electoral) established to promote justice, governance, 
transparency and accountability, especially during political elections and 
when government officials are found guilty of the abuse of public funds. 
For instance, the lack of capable electoral and legal institutions that 
promote a greater quality of elections may have resulted in the 
dominance of one political party from 1999 -2015 despite protest from the 
public.  
 
5. Enhance the military and police forces in charge of security of life and 
property. The weakness of such institutions could have resulted in the rise 
of terrorist activities in Nigeria, especially in the oil producing region and 
the North-East, which has witnessed a significant increase in a period of 
stable democracy and political party dominance despite a rise in 
government spending on the legislative arm of government as shown 
graphically in Chapter 5. This also coincided with a significant drop in 
spending on internal security, particularly in 2008 and 2009 and in 
contrast a rising trend in spending in 2007 and 2008 on the national 
assembly, which consists of the Senate and the House of Representatives.    
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7.6 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY AND DIRECTIONS FOR FURTHER 
 RESEARCH  
This study contributes to the theoretical and empirical literature on the 
relationship between natural resource wealth and economic development. For 
example, the argument proposed in this study, which states that the lack of 
national unity due to the amalgamation of the North and South regions in 
Nigeria and the gradual importance of the oil sector had hindered the benefits 
associated with oil wealth on economic performance is a theoretical contribution. 
In addition, the use of numerical data to examine the argument is also a 
contribution to the existing literature.   However it is limited by time, data and 
funding constraints among others. Yet, it provides some indicators for further 
research. The issues identified for future study are as follows. 
1. To study the relationship between oil and economic growth in Nigeria 
using regional data if available as there are claims of regional imbalances 
in terms of economic development.  
In examining the relationship between oil and economic performance in Nigeria 
this study used the aggregate output of the key economic sectors of oil, 
manufacturing and agriculture to empirically test the hypotheses established. 
Also, aggregate data such as that of GDP, GDP per capita and other social 
indicators such as poverty have been employed. However, it is possible to study 
the relationship between oil and economic growth using disaggregated data 
based on regional performance in Nigeria since the aggregate data could have 
been the summation of different regional data across the 36 states in Nigeria. 
This approach could help provide an in-depth analysis in relation to economic 
differences between the different regions and serve as a pointer for policy 
making. 
2. It would also be interesting to study the relationship between oil and 
economic development in Nigeria using qualitative methods in addition to 
the quantitative techniques used in this research. 
This study employed a quantitative approach due to time, funding and political 
elections constraints. The last political election, which saw the end of dominance 
by one political party dominance occurred in March, 2015. As such, the analysis 
 
 
237 
 
of the return to democratic rule, which coincided with political party dominance 
in relation to oil wealth and economic performance may result in biased 
responses from interviewers because of the opposition to the governing party 
shown by the majority of Nigerian citizens. For example, that period saw the rise 
of terrorist activities and election violence in Nigeria.   
3. To study more carefully the relationship between government spending 
behaviour and internal security.    
Another direction for further study emanates from the deteriorating state of 
internal security in Nigeria despite increases in government spending on issues 
of security and defence and also on the legislative arm of government that 
comprises of representatives from the 36 states in the country. It is necessary to 
examine this relationship in more detail and to find ways that can enhance 
security in order to safeguard life and property, which will in turn promote 
private consumption and investment expenditure.  
4. To consider other social factors in studying the relationship between oil 
and economic growth in Nigeria.  
This study only considers social factors such as ethnic and regional rivalry and 
their impact on politics in Nigeria. However, other social factors observed in the 
literature such as literacy levels could help identify more causes of Nigeria’s 
failure to escape the resource curse 
5. To examine the efficiency of government agencies established to manage 
economic reforms, particularly in the oil sector, after the return to 
democratic rule.  
Also, the lack of relationship shown between the economic reform period and 
democratic period from 1999 to 2010 and the performance of key economic 
sectors employed in this research is another important issue in Nigeria. As 
discussed in Chapter 4 some public agencies were established to help improve 
transparency and accountability and the pricing and delivery of refined oil 
products to the domestic economy. The inferior functioning of such offices could 
help deter the intended and anticipated government efforts in creating a 
multiplier effect from the oil sector to the rest of the economy. However, this 
research did not particularly examine the efficiency of these agencies established 
to manage economic reforms.   
 
 
238 
 
 
REFERENCES 
Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S. and Robinson, J.A., 2000. The colonial origins of 
comparative development: An empirical investigation (No. w7771). National 
bureau of economic research. [online]. Available from: 
http://web.mit.edu/daron/www/colonial8comp.pdf [Accessed 13 September 
2013] 
Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S. and Robinson, J.A., 2001. The colonial origins of 
comparative development: An empirical investigation. American Economic 
Review, 91, 5, pp. 1369–1401. 
Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., Robinson, J.A. and Yared, P., 2008. Income and 
democracy. The American Economic Review, 98(3), pp.808-842. 
 
Alesina, A., Özler, S., Roubini, N. and Swagel, P., 1996. Political instability and 
economic growth. Journal of Economic growth, 1(2), pp.189-211. 
Aisen, A. and Veiga, F.J., 2006. Does political instability lead to higher inflation? 
A panel data analysis. Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, 38(5), pp.1379-
1389. 
Aisen, A. and Veiga, F.J., 2008. The political economy of seigniorage. Journal of 
Development Economics, 87(1), pp. 29-50. 
Aisen, A. and Veiga, F.J., 2013. How does political instability affect economic 
growth?. European Journal of Political Economy, 29, pp. 151-167. 
Ajani, J., 2012. 14 years after Abiola’s death: Obasanjo seized MKO’s concession 
– Kola Abiola. Vanguard. [online]. 1 July. Available from: 
http://www.vanguardngr.com/2012/07/14-years-after-abiolas-death-obasanjo-
seized-mkos-oil-concession-kola-abiola/ [Accessed 28 April 2016]. 
Akinlo, A.E., 2012. How important is oil in Nigeria’s economic growth? Journal of 
Sustainable Development, 5(4), pp.165. 
AKPAN, E.O., 2009a. Oil price shocks and Nigeria’s macro economy. [online]. A 
Paper Presented at the Annual Conference of CSAE Conference, Economic 
Development in Africa, March. pp. 22-24. Available from: 
http://www.csae.ox.ac.uk/conferences/2009-EDIA/Papers/252-Akpan.Pdf 
[Accessed 12 September 2012]. 
AKPAN, E.O., 2009b. Oil resource management and food insecurity in Nigeria. 
[online]. European Report on Development (ERD) Conference in Accra, Ghana. 
pp. 21-23. Available from: http://www.csae.ox.ac.uk/conferences/2010-
EdiA/papers/085-Akpan.pdf [Accessed 23 June 2012]. 
Akpan, N.S., 2010. Kidnapping in Nigeria’s Niger Delta: an exploratory study. 
Journal of Social Science, 24(1), pp.33-42. 
 
 
239 
 
AKPAN, N.S., 2012. From Agriculture to Petroleum Oil Production: What Has 
Changed about Nigeria’s Rural Development? International Journal of Developing 
Societies, 1(3), pp. 97-106. 
Alesina, A. and Perotti, R., 1996. Income distribution, political instability, and 
investment. European economic review, 40(6), pp.1203-1228. 
Alesina, A., Özler, S., Roubini, N. and Swagel, P., 1996. Political instability and 
economic growth. Journal of Economic growth, 1(2), pp.189-211. 
ALEXEEV, M. and CONRAD, R., 2011. The natural resource curse and economic 
transition. Economic Systems, 35(4), pp. 445-461. 
ALIYU, S.U.R., 2009. Impact of oil price shock and exchange rate volatility on 
economic growth in Nigeria: an empirical investigation. [online]. Available from:  
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/16319/1/MPRA_paper_16319.pdf [Accessed 2 
March 2012]. 
Ansari, M.I., Gordon, D.V. and Akuamoah, C., 1997. Keynes versus Wagner: 
Public Expenditure and National Income for Three African countries. Applied 
Economics, 29(4), pp. 543-550. 
ANUGWOM, E.E., 2000. Ethnic conflict and democracy in Nigeria: The 
marginalisation question. Journal of Social Development in Africa, 15(1), pp. 61-
78. 
Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project, 2015. Conflict by type and 
actor. [online]. Available from: http://www.acleddata.com/data/ [Accessed 1 
October 2015] 
Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project, 2016. Codebook. [online]. 
Available from: http://www.acleddata.com/wp-
content/uploads/2016/01/ACLED_Codebook_2016.pdf [Accessed 4 March 2016] 
Aschauer, D.A., 1989. Is public expenditure productive? Journal of monetary 
economics, 23(2), pp.177-200. 
Ascher, W., 1999. Why governments waste natural resources: policy failures in 
developing countries. JHU Press. 
Asteriou, D. and Hall, S.G., 2011, Applied econometrics. 2nd ed. Hampshire: 
Palgrave Macmillan. 
Auty, R.M. and Gelb, A.H., 2001. Political economy of resource-abundant states. 
Resource abundance and economic development, pp.126-44. 
Auty, R.M., 1997. Natural resource endowment, the state and development 
strategy. Journal of International Development, 9(4), pp.651-663. 
AUTY, R.M., 1998. Social sustainability in mineral‐driven development. Journal of 
International Development, 10(4), pp. 487-500. 
AUTY, R.M., 2001. The political economy of resource-driven growth. European 
Economic Review, 45(4), pp. 839-846. 
 
 
240 
 
AYADI, O.F., 2005. Oil price fluctuations and the Nigerian economy. OPEC 
review, 29(3), pp. 199-217. [online]. Available from: 
https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Felix_Ayadi/publication/4778688_Oil_price
_fluctuations_and_the_Nigerian_economy/links/0fcfd50820daf77b69000000.pdf 
[Accessed 12 July 2013]. 
Ayansina C., 2015. Overhaul EFCC for efficiency, TMG tells new regime. 
Vanguard. [online]. 31 May. Available from: 
http://www.vanguardngr.com/2015/05/overhaul-efcc-for-efficiency-tmg-tells-
new-regime/ [Accessed 28 September 2012]. 
Baldwin, R.E., 1966. Economic development and export growth: a study of 
Northern Rhodesia, 1920-1960. Univ of California Press. 
Barnes, S.T., 2005. Global flows: Terror, oil & strategic philanthropy. Review of 
African Political Economy, 32(104-105), pp.235-252. 
Barro, R.J., 1989. Economic growth in a cross section of countries (No. w3120). 
National Bureau of Economic Research. [online].  Available from: 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w3120.pdf [Accessed 12 October 2016]. 
Barro, R.J., 1996. Democracy and growth. Journal of economic growth, 1(1), 
pp.1-27. 
Barsky, R. and Kilian, L., 2004. Oil and the Macroeconomy since the 1970s (No. 
w10855). [online]. National Bureau of Economic Research. Available from:  
http://down.cenet.org.cn/upfile/34/200611623918112.pdf [Accessed 12 April 
2011]. 
Baum, M.A. and Lake, D.A., 2003. The political economy of growth: democracy 
and human capital. American Journal of Political Science, 47(2), pp.333-347. 
BAUMEISTER, C. and PEERSMAN, G., 2013a. The Role of Time‐Varying Price 
Elasticities In Accounting For Volatility Changes In The Crude Oil Market. Journal 
of Applied Econometrics, 28(7), pp. 1087-1109. 
BAUMEISTER, C. and PEERSMAN, G., 2013b. Time-varying effects of oil supply 
shocks on the US economy. American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 5(4), 
pp. 1-28 
BBC Hausa, 2015. [online]. London BBC. Available from: 
http://www.bbc.com/hausa [Accessed 25 April 2015]. 
Beblawi, H. and Luciani, G., 1987. The Rentier State (vol. 2 of Nation, State and 
Integration in the Arab World). 
Behrman, J.R., 1987. Commodity price instability and economic goal attainment 
in developing countries. World Development, 15(5), pp.559-573. 
Bell, J.C. and Faria, T.M., 2007. Critical issues for a revenue management law. 
Escaping the resource curse (pp. 286-321). New York: Columbia University 
Press. 
 
 
241 
 
Benjamin, N.C., Devarajan, S. and Weiner, R.J., 1989. The ‘Dutch’disease in a 
developing country: Oil reserves in Cameroon. Journal of Development 
Economics, 30(1), pp.71-92. 
Berkeley Center for Religion, Peace and World Affairs, 2013. Olusegun Obasanjo. 
[online]. Available from:  http://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/people/olusegun-
obasanjo. [Accessed 28 January 2014]. 
BERNANKE, B.S. and MIHOV, I., 1998. Measuring monetary policy. The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 113(3), pp. 869-902. 
BEVAN, D.L., COLLIER, P. and GUNNING, J.W., 1999. Nigeria and Indonesia: The 
Political Economy of Poverty, Equity, and Growth. A World Bank comparative 
study. Oxford University Press, NY. 
Blas, J., 2014. Victim of shale revolution, Nigeria stops exporting oil to US. 
Financial Times [online]. 2 October Available from: http://blogs.ft.com/beyond-
brics/2014/10/02/victim-of-shale-revolution-nigeria-stops-exporting-oil-to-us/ . 
[Accessed 12 December 2014]. 
Blattman, C., Hwang, J. and Williamson, J.G., 2004. The impact of the terms of 
trade on economic development in the periphery, 1870-1939: Volatility and 
secular change (No. w10600). [online]. National Bureau of Economic Research.. 
Available from: http://www.nber.org/papers/w10600.pdf [Accessed 10 October 
2016]. 
Bloom, D.E., Sachs, J.D., Collier, P. and Udry, C., 1998. Geography, 
demography, and economic growth in Africa. Brookings papers on economic 
activity, 1998(2), pp.207-295. 
Brahmbhatt, M., Canuto, O. and Vostroknutova, E., 2010. Dealing with Dutch 
Disease. Economic Premise 16, World Bank, Washignton D.C. [online]. Available 
from: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPREMNET/Resources/EP16.pdf 
[Accessed 4 October 2016]. 
Bratton, M., 2008. Vote buying and violence in Nigerian election campaigns. 
Electoral studies, 27(4), pp.621-632. [online]. Available from: 
http://www.eldis.org/vfile/upload/1/document/1112/AfropaperNo99.pdf 
[Accessed 7 October 2016]. 
Brock, J., 2013. RPT-Nigeria’s NNPC hasn’t accounted for $50 bln in oil sales – 
cbank. Reuters. [online]. Available from:  
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/12/11/nigeria-oil-fraud-
idUSL6N0JQ16620131211 [Accessed 8 February 2014]. 
Brooks, C., 2014. Introductory econometrics for finance. 2nd ed. Cambridge: 
Cambridge university press. 
Brown, S.P. and Yucel, M.K., 1999. Oil prices and US aggregate economic 
activity: a question of neutrality. Economic & Financial Review, p.16. 
 
 
242 
 
Brunetti, A., 1997. Political Variables in Cross‐country Growth Analysis. Journal 
of Economic Surveys, 11(2), pp.163-190. 
Brunnschweiler, C.N. and Bulte, E.H., 2008. The resource curse revisited and 
revised: A tale of paradoxes and red herrings. Journal of environmental 
economics and management, 55(3), pp.248-264. 
Bulte, E.H., Damania, R. and Deacon, R.T., 2005. Resource intensity, 
institutions, and development. World development, 33(7), pp.1029-1044. 
Business Day. 2013. ‘Bankers’credit to small scale industry slumped to 0.4% in 
2012. Business Day.[online]. 16 August. Available from:  
http://businessdayonline.com/2013/08/banks-credit-to-small-scale-industry-
slumped-to-0-14-in-2012/ [Accessed 12 April 2014]. 
CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA, 2010. [online]. Available from: 
http://www.cenbank.org/OUT/2011/PUBLICATIONS/STATISTICS/2010/INDEX.H
TML [Accessed 4 November 2013]. 
CENTRAL INTELLEGENCE AGENCY, 2013. [online] Available from: 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ni.html 
[Accessed August 22, 2013]. 
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, 2014. The world FactBook - africa, Nigeria. 
[online] Available from: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/ni.html [Accessed 1 August 2014]. 
Chang, E.C. and Chu, Y.H., 2006. Corruption and trust: exceptionalism in Asian 
democracies?. Journal of Politics, 68(2), pp.259-271. 
Chen, B. and Feng, Y., 1996. Some political determinants of economic growth: 
Theory and empirical implications. European Journal of Political Economy, 12(4), 
pp.609-627. 
Clark, J., 1997. Petro-politics in Congo. Journal of Democracy, 8(3), pp.62-76. 
Collier, P. and Goderis, B., 2008. Commodity prices, growth, and the natural 
resource curse: Reconciling a conundrum. Growth and the Natural Resource 
Curse: Reconciling a Conundrum (June 5, 2008). [online]. Available from: 
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.163.6549&rep=rep1
&type=pdf [Accessed 28 March 2013] 
Collier, P. and Gunning, J.W., 1999. Why has Africa grown slowly?. The Journal 
of Economic Perspectives, 13(3), pp.3-22. 
COLLIER, P. and HOEFFLER, A., 1998. On economic causes of civil war. Oxford 
economic papers, 50(4), pp. 563-573. 
Collier, P. and Hoeffler, A., 2002. The political economy of secession. 
Development Research Group, World Bank, 23. 
COLLIER, P. and HOEFFLER, A., 2004. Greed and grievance in civil war. Oxford 
economic papers, 56(4), pp. 563-595.  
 
 
243 
 
Collier, P. and Hoeffler, A., 2004. Greed and grievance in civil war. Oxford 
economic papers, 56(4), pp.563-595. 
COLLIER, P. and HOEFFLER, A., 2005. Resource rents, governance, and conflict. 
Journal of Conflict Resolution, 49(4), pp. 625-633. 
Collier, P. and Hoeffler, A., 2009. Testing the neocon agenda: democracy in 
resource-rich societies. European Economic Review, 53(3), pp.293-308. 
COLLIER, P., 1988. Oil shocks and food security in Nigeria. Int'l Lab.Rev., 127, 
pp. 761. 
COLLIER, P., 2010. The political economy of natural resources. social research, , 
pp. 1105-1132. 
CORDEN, W.M. and NEARY, J.P., 1982. Booming sector and de-industrialisation 
in a small open economy. The economic journal, 92(368), pp. 825-848. 
CORDEN, W.M., 1984. Booming sector and Dutch disease economics: survey and 
consolidation. oxford economic Papers, 36(3), pp. 359-380. 
Country Reports on Terrorism, 2013. (online). U.S. Department of State.  
Available from: http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2013/224829.htm [Accessed 
28 August 2015]. 
CUDDINGTON, J., 1989. Commodity export booms in developing countries. The 
World Bank Research Observer, 4(2), pp. 143-165. 
Daniel, M.J., 2001. Hedging government oil price risk (No. 1-185). International 
Monetary Fund. 
Davis, G.A., 1995. Learning to love the Dutch disease: Evidence from the 
mineral economies. World development, 23(10), pp.1765-1779. 
DAVIS, J.M., OSSOWSKI, R. and FEDELINO, A., 2003. Fiscal policy formulation 
and implementation in oil-producing countries. International Monetary Fund. 
De Mesquita, B.B., Morrow, J.D., Siverson, R.M. and Smith, A., 2002. Political 
institutions, policy choice and the survival of leaders. British Journal of Political 
Science, 32(04), pp.559-590. 
DEATON, A. and MILLER, R.I., 1995. International commodity prices, 
macroeconomic performance, and politics in Sub-Saharan Africa. [online]. 
International Finance Section, Department of Economics, Princeton University. 
Available from: 
http://www.princeton.edu/rpds/papers/Deaton_Miller_International_Commodity
_Prices_Macroeconomic_Performance_and_Politics_PUISF1995.pdf [Accessed 9 
November 2013]. 
Devereux, M.B. and Wen, J.F., 1998. Political instability, capital taxation, and 
growth. European Economic Review, 42(9), pp.1635-1651. 
 
 
244 
 
Dickey, D.A. and Fuller, W.A., 1979. Distribution of the estimators for 
autoregressive time series with a unit root. Journal of the American statistical 
association, 74(366a), pp.427-431. 
Easterly, W. and Levine, R., 1997. Africa's growth tragedy: policies and ethnic 
divisions. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, pp.1203-1250. 
Easterly, W. and Rebelo, S., 1993. Fiscal policy and economic growth. Journal of 
monetary economics, 32(3), pp.417-458. 
EIFERT, B., GELB, A. and TALLROTH, N.B., 2003. The political economy of fiscal 
policy and economic management in oil-exporting countries. Fiscal Policy 
Formulation and Implementation in Oil-Producing Countries.Washington DC: 
IMF, pp. 82-122. 
EKUNDARE, R., 1971. Nigeria's second national development plan as a weapon 
of social change. African affairs, 70(279), pp. 146-158. 
Ellman, M., 1981. Natural Gas, restructuring and re-industrialisation: the Dutch 
experience of industrial policy. Oil or industry, pp.149-166. 
ENDERS, W., ed., 2010, Applied Econometric Time Series. 3rd ed. New Jersey: 
John Willey &Sons, Inc. 
Energy information Administration, 2014. [online]. Available from: 
https://www.eia.gov/petroleum/data.cfm#prices [Accessed 12 December 2014).  
Energy information Administration, 2016. [online]. Nigeria. Available from: 
http://www.eia.gov/beta/international/country.cfm?iso=NGA [Accessed 12 May 
2016).  
Engle, R.F. and Granger, C.W., 1987. Co-integration and error correction: 
representation, estimation, and testing. Econometrica: journal of the 
Econometric Society, pp.251-276. 
Falola, T. and Heaton, M.M., 2008. A history of Nigeria. Cambridge University 
Press.  
FARDMANESH, M., 1991. Dutch disease economics and oil syndrome: An 
empirical study. World Development, 19(6), pp. 711-717. 
FARZANEGAN, M.R. and MARKWARDT, G., 2009. The effects of oil price shocks 
on the Iranian economy. Energy Economics, 31(1), pp. 134-151. 
FARZANEGAN, M.R., 2011. Oil revenue shocks and government spending 
behavior in Iran. Energy Economics, 33(6), pp. 1055-1069. 
Fasano, U. and Wang, Q., 2001. Fiscal expenditure policy and non-oil economic 
growth: Evidence from GCC countries (No. 2001-2195). International Monetary 
Fund. 
 
 
245 
 
Federal Character Commission, 2014. Establishment of the commission. [online]. 
Available from: http://www.federalcharacter.gov.ng/ [Accessed 9 January 
2015).  
Feng, Y., 1997. Democracy, political stability and economic growth. British 
Journal of Political Science, 27(03), pp.391-418. 
Feng, Y., 2001. Political freedom, political instability, and policy uncertainty: A 
study of political institutions and private investment in developing countries. 
International Studies Quarterly, 45(2), pp.271-294. 
Forrest, T.G., 1995. Politics and economic development in Nigeria. Oxford: 
Westview Press. 
FORSYTH, P.J. and KAY, J.A., 1980. The economic implications of North Sea oil 
revenues. Fiscal Studies, 1(3), pp. 1-28. 
Fosu, A.K. and Gyapong, A., 2011. Terms of trade and growth of resource 
economies: A tale of two countries. United Nations University, World Institute for 
Development Economics Research. 
Gandhi, J., 2008. Political institutions under dictatorship (p. xvii). Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Garaibeh, H., 1987. Government income sources and the development of the 
taxation system: The case of Jordan, Egypt and Kuwait. The Rentier State, 2, 
pp.194-210. 
GBOYEGA, A. et al., 2011. Political economy of the petroleum sector in Nigeria. 
World Bank Policy Research Working Paper Series, Vol. [online]. Available from: 
https://core.ac.uk/download/files/153/6266144.pdf [Accessed 12 March 2012]. 
Geddes, B., 2003. Paradigms and sand castles: Theory building and research 
design in comparative politics. University of Michigan Press. 
Geddes, B., 2008, April. Party creation as an autocratic survival strategy. In 
Dictatorships: Their Governance and Social Consequences” Conference at 
Princeton University. 
GELB, A.H., 1988. Oil windfalls: Blessing or curse? Oxford University Press. 
Gerring, J., Bond, P., Barndt, W.T. and Moreno, C., 2005. Democracy and 
economic growth: A historical perspective. World Politics, 57(03), pp.323-364. 
Glaeser, E.L., La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F. and Shleifer, A., 2004. Do 
institutions cause growth?. Journal of economic Growth, 9(3), pp.271-303. 
Granger, C.W., 1988. Causality, cointegration, and control. Journal of Economic 
Dynamics and Control, 12(2), pp.551-559. 
Grier, K.B. and Munger, M.C., 2006. On democracy, regime duration, and 
economic growth. Unpublished paper, Duke University. [online]. Available from: 
http://s3.amazonaws.com/academia.edu.documents/30696730/GrierRegimeDur
 
 
246 
 
ation.pdf?AWSAccessKeyId=AKIAIWOWYYGZ2Y53UL3A&Expires=1485907901&S
ignature=UtkaG6bCPN267Pfmsb9BKZln5eI%3D&response-content-
disposition=inline%3B%20filename%3DOn_Democracy_Regime_Duration_and_
Economi.pdf [Accessed 17 August 2016]. 
Grier, K.B. and Tullock, G., 1989. An empirical analysis of cross-national 
economic growth, 1951–1980. Journal of monetary economics, 24(2), pp.259-
276. 
 
Griffin, J.M. and Teece, D.J., 1982. OPEC Behavior and World Oil Prices. London: 
Allen and Unwin, First Edition. 
Grindle, M.S. and Thomas, J.W., 1989. Policy makers, policy choices, and policy 
outcomes: The political economy of reform in developing countries. Policy 
Sciences, 22(3-4), pp.213-248. 
GYLFASON, T., 2001. Natural resources, education, and economic development. 
European Economic Review, 45(4), pp. 847-859. 
Gylfason, T., 2006. Natural resources and economic growth: From dependence 
to diversification (pp. 201-231). Springer Berlin Heidelberg. 
Gylfason, T., Herbertsson, T.T. and Zoega, G., 1999. A mixed blessing. 
Macroeconomic dynamics, 3(02), pp.204-225. 
Hall, R.E. and Jones, C.I., 1999. Why do some countries produce so much more 
output per worker than others? (No. w6564). Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
114, 1, pp. 83–116. 
Hall, R.E. and Jones, C.I., 1999. Why do some countries produce so much more 
output per worker than others? (No. w6564). National bureau of economic 
research. 
HAMDI, H. and SBIA, R., 2013. Dynamic relationships between oil revenues, 
government spending and economic growth in an oil-dependent economy. 
Economic Modelling, 35, pp. 118-125. 
HAMILTON, J.D., 1983. Oil and the macroeconomy since World War II. The 
Journal of Political Economy, pp. 228-248. 
Hamilton, J.D., 2011. Historical oil shocks (No. w16790). National Bureau of 
Economic Research. [online]. Available from: 
http://www.perpustakaan.kemenkeu.go.id/FOLDERJURNAL/sejarah%20gejolak
%20minyak.pdf [Accessed 12 March 2012]. 
Harberger, A.C., 1993. Secrets of success: a handful of heroes. The American 
Economic Review, 83(2), pp.343-350. 
Harding, T. and Venables, A.J., 2010. Exports, imports and foreign exchange 
windfalls. Oxcarre Research Paper, University of Oxford. 
 
 
247 
 
Hartwick, J.M., 1977. Intergenerational equity and the investing of rents from 
exhaustible resources. The American economic review, 67(5), pp.972-974. 
Hausmann, R. and Rigobon, R., 2003. An alternative interpretation of the 
‘resource curse': Theory and policy implications (No. w9424). National Bureau of 
Economic Research. [online]. Available from: 
http://web.mit.edu/rigobon/www/Robertos_Web_Page/policy_IS_files/is.pdf 
[Accessed 17 March 2012]. 
Heal, G., 2007. Are oil producers rich? Escaping the resource curse (pp. 155-
72). New York: Columbia University Press. 
Hellmanzik, C., 2013. Democracy and economic outcomes: Evidence from the 
superstars of modern art. European Journal of Political Economy, 30, pp.58-69. 
Heij, C., De Boer, P., Franses, P.H., Kloek, T. and Van Dijk, H.K., 2004. 
Econometric methods with applications in business and economics. Oxford 
University Press. 
Heine, B. and Nurse, D., 2000. African languages: An introduction. Cambridge 
University Press. 
Helliwell, J.F., 1994. Empirical linkages between democracy and economic 
growth. British journal of political science, 24(02), pp.225-248. 
Herb, M., 2005. No representation without taxation? Rents, development, and 
democracy. Comparative Politics, pp.297-316. 
Hirschman, A.O., 1958. The Strategy of Economic Development. New Haven: 
Yale University Press. 
Hubbard, R.G., 1997. Capital-market imperfections and investment (No. 
w5996). Journal of economic literature, 36(3), pp.193-225. 
Humphreys, M., Sachs, J. and Stiglitz, J.E. eds., 2007. Escaping the resource 
curse (pp. 11-13). New York: Columbia University Press. 
Huntington, S.P., 2006. Political order in changing societies. New Haven: Yale 
University Press. 
Ibekwe, N., 2015. Nigeria scraps fuel subsidy, cuts petrol price to N85 per liter. 
Premium Times. [online]. 26 December. Available from:  
http://www.premiumtimesng.com/business/195743-nigeria-scraps-fuel-subsidy-
cuts-petrol-price-to-n85-per-litre.html [Accessed 2 March 2016]. 
Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2014). Nigeria House of Representatives. [online]. 
Available from:  http://www.ipu.org/parline/reports/2363_arc.htm [Accessed 3 
September 2014]. 
ISHAM, J. et al., 2005. The varieties of resource experience: natural resource 
export structures and the political economy of economic growth. The World Bank 
Economic Review, 19(2), pp. 141-174. 
 
 
248 
 
Ismail, K., 2010. The Structural Manifestation of the'Dutch Disease’: The Case of 
Oil Exporting Countries. IMF Working Papers, pp.1-36. 
Iwayemi, A. and Fowowe, B., 2011. Impact of oil price shocks on selected 
macroeconomic variables in Nigeria. Energy policy, 39(2), pp.603-612. 
Jazayeri, A., 1986. Economic adjustment, prices, and output in two oil exporting 
countries: The case of Iran and Nigeria (No. 0486). Department of Economics, 
University of Sussex. ideas.repec.org. 
JAZAYERI, A., 1986. Prices and Output in Two Oil‐Based Economies: The Dutch 
Disease in Iran and Nigeria. IDS Bulletin, 17(4), pp. 1-8. 
Jensen, N. and Wantchekon, L., 2004. Resource wealth and political regimes in 
Africa. Comparative political studies, 37(7), pp.816-841. 
JIMÉNEZ-RODRÍGUEZ, R. and SÁNCHEZ, M., 2005. Oil price shocks and real GDP 
growth: empirical evidence for some OECD countries. Applied Economics, 37(2), 
pp. 201-228. 
Johansen, S. and Juselius, K., 1990. Maximum likelihood estimation and 
inference on cointegration—with applications to the demand for money. Oxford 
Bulletin of Economics and statistics, 52(2), pp.169-210. 
Johansen, S., 1988. Statistical analysis of cointegration vectors. Journal of 
economic dynamics and control, 12(2), pp.231-254. 
Johansen, S., 1991. Estimation and hypothesis testing of cointegration vectors in 
Gaussian vector autoregressive models. Econometrica: Journal of the 
Econometric Society, pp.1551-1580. 
Johansen, S., 1995. Identifying restrictions of linear equations with applications 
to simultaneous equations and cointegration. Journal of econometrics, 69(1), 
pp.111-132. 
JONES LUONG, P. andWEINTHAL, E., 2004. Rethinking the resource curse: 
ownership structure and institutional capacity. Conference on Globalization and 
Self-Determination, Yale University. pp. 14-15. 
Jong-A-Pin, R., 2009. On the measurement of political instability and its impact 
on economic growth. European Journal of Political Economy, 25(1), pp.15-29. 
KARL, T.L., 1997. The paradox of plenty: Oil booms and petro-states. Univ of 
California Press. 
KARL, T.L., 1999. The perils of the petro-state: reflections on the paradox of 
plenty. JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS-COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY, 53(1), 
pp. 31-52. 
KARL, T.L., 2007. Oil-led development: social, political, and economic 
consequences. Encyclopedia of energy, 4, pp. 661-672. 
 
 
249 
 
Keefer, P. and Khemani, S., 2005. Democracy, public expenditures, and the 
poor: understanding political incentives for providing public services. The World 
Bank Research Observer, 20(1), pp.1-27. 
Keefer, P., 2008. Insurgency and credible commitment in autocracies and 
democracies. The World Bank Economic Review, 22(1), pp.33-61. 
Khan, S.A., 1994. Nigeria: The political economy of oil (Political  Economies of 
Oil Exporting Countries). Oxford University Press 
Kilian, L., 2010. Oil price volatility: Origins and effects (No. ERSD-2010-02). 
WTO Staff Working Paper. [online]. Available from 
http://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/57602/1/639727123.pdf [Accessed 28 
February 2012]. 
Kirk-Greene, A.H.M., 1971. Crisis and Conflict in Nigeria: A Documentary 
Sourcebook 1966-1969. Vol. 2. Oxford University Press. 
Knutsen, C.H., 2013. Democracy, state capacity, and economic growth. World 
Development, 43, pp.1-18. 
Krause, L.B., 1995. Social capability and long term economic growth. St. 
Martin's Press, New York. 
Kremers, J., 1986. The Dutch disease in the Netherlands. Natural Resources and 
the Macroeconomy, pp. 96–136. The MIT Press, Cambridge. 
Kricheli, R., 2008. Information aggregation and electoral autocracies: an 
information-based theory of authoritarian leaders’ use of elections. Work paper., 
Dep. Polit. Sci., Stanford University. 
Kutan, A.M. and Wyzan, M.L., 2005. Explaining the real exchange rate in 
Kazakhstan, 1996–2003: Is Kazakhstan vulnerable to the Dutch disease?. 
Economic Systems, 29(2), pp.242-255. 
Lake, D.A. and Baum, M.A., 2001. The invisible hand of democracy political 
control and the provision of public services. Comparative political studies, 34(6), 
pp.587-621. 
Lam, R. and Wantchekon, L., 2003. ‘Dictatorship as Political Dutch Disease’, 
unpublished manuscript. [online]. Available from:  http://www.nyu. 
edu/gsas/dept/politics/faculty/wantchekon /research/lr-04-10.pdf) [Accessed  5 
March 2013]. 
Landau, D., 1983. Government expenditure and economic growth: a cross-
country study. Southern Economic Journal, pp.783-792. 
Larsen, E.R., 2006. Escaping the resource curse and the Dutch disease?. 
American Journal of Economics and Sociology, 65(3), pp.605-640. 
Le Billon, P., 2001. The political ecology of war: natural resources and armed 
conflicts. Political geography, 20(5), pp.561-584. 
 
 
250 
 
Leblang, D.A., 1996. Property rights, democracy and economic growth. Political 
Research Quarterly, 49(1), pp.5-26. 
LEITE, C.A. and WEIDMANN, J., 1999. Does mother nature corrupt? Natural 
resources, corruption, and economic growth. Natural Resources, Corruption, and 
Economic Growth (June 1999).IMF Working Paper, (99/85). 
Levin, J.V., 1960. The export economies. Harvard University Press. 
Levine, R. and Renelt, D., 1992. A sensitivity analysis of cross-country growth 
regressions. The American economic review, pp.942-963. 
LEWIS, J.P., 1974. Oil, other scarcities, and the poor countries. World Politics, 
27(1), pp. 63-86. 
Lewis, P., 2009. Growing apart: Oil, politics, and economic change in Indonesia 
and Nigeria. University of Michigan Press. 
Lewis, S.R., 1989. Primary exporting countries. Handbook of development 
economics, 2, pp.1541-1600. 
Libman, A., 2012. Democracy, size of bureaucracy, and economic growth: 
evidence from Russian regions. Empirical economics, 43(3), pp.1321-1352. 
Lindert, P.H., 2004. Growing public: Volume 1, the story: Social spending and 
economic growth since the eighteenth century (Vol. 1). Cambridge University 
Press. 
Looney, R.E., 1988. Oil revenues and viable development: impact of the Dutch 
disease on Saudi Arabian diversification efforts. American Arab Affairs, pp.25-35. 
LOONEY, R.E., 1988. Oil revenues and viable development: impact of the Dutch 
disease on Saudi Arabian diversification efforts. American Arab Affairs, pp. 25-
35. 
Looney, R.E., 1991. Diversification in a small oil exporting economy: The impact 
of the Dutch disease on Kuwait's industrialization. Resources Policy, 17(1), 
pp.31-41. 
LUONG, P.J. and WEINTHAL, E., 2006. RETHINKING THE RESOURCE CURSE: 
Ownership Structure, Institutional Capacity, and Domestic Constraints. 
Annu.Rev.Polit.Sci., 9, pp. 241-263. 
LUONG, P.J. and WEINTHAL, E., 2010. Oil is not a curse: Ownership structure 
and institutions in soviet successor states. Cambridge University Press. 
Lütkepohl, H., 1991. Systems of Dynamic Simultaneous Equations. In 
Introduction to Multiple Time Series Analysis (pp. 323-345). Springer Berlin 
Heidelberg. 
Lütkepohl, H., 2005. New introduction to multiple time series analysis. Springer 
Science & Business Media. 
 
 
251 
 
Mabro, R. and Monroe, E., 1974. Arab wealth from oil: problems of its 
investment. International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), 
50(1), pp.15-27. 
MacBean, A., 1966. Export Instability and Economic Development (Vol 45). 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Magaloni, B. and Kricheli, R., 2010. Political order and one-party rule. Annual 
Review of Political Science, 13, pp.123-143. 
MAGALONI, B. and KRICHELI, R., 2010. Political order and one-party rule. 
Annual Review of Political Science, 13, pp. 123-143. 
Magaloni, B., 2006. Voting for autocracy: Hegemonic party survival and its 
demise in Mexico. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
MAGALONI, B., 2008. Credible power-sharing and the longevity of authoritarian 
rule. Comparative Political Studies, 41(4-5), pp. 715-741. 
Mahon Jr, J.E., 1992. Was Latin America too rich to prosper? Structural and 
political obstacles to export‐led industrial growth. The Journal of Development 
Studies, 28(2), pp.241-263. 
Mauro, P., 1995. Corruption and growth. The quarterly journal of economics, 
110(3), pp.681-712. 
Marenin, O., 1990. Implementing Deployment Policies in the National Youth 
Service Corps of Nigeria Goals and Constraints. Comparative Political Studies, 
22(4), pp. 397-436. 
Mark, M., 2014. Nigerian abducted girls’ families fast losing hope of rescue. 
Theguardian. [online]. 25 April. Available from: 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/apr/25/nigeria-schoolgirls-families-
hopes-fade [Accessed 17 April 2016]. 
MCPHERSON, C., 2003. National oil companies: evolution, issues, outlook. Fiscal 
Policy Formulation and Implementation in Oil-Producing Countries, pp. 184-203. 
[online]. Available from: 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTOGMC/Resources/NOCPaperMcPherson.p
df [Accessed 18 December 2013]. 
Meade, J.E. and Russell, E.A., 1957. Wage Rates, The Cost of Living, And The 
Balance of Payments. Economic Record, 33(64), pp.23-28. 
Mehlum, H., Moene, K. and Torvik, R., 2006. Institutions and the resource curse. 
The economic journal, 116(508), pp.1-20. 
MEHLUM, H., MOENE, K. and TORVIK, R., 2006. Institutions and the Resource 
Curse. The Economic Journal, 116(508), pp. 1-20. 
 
 
252 
 
Melhun, H. and Moene, K., R. Torvik, 2006, “Institutions and the Resource 
Curse,”. The Economic Journal, 116. 
Metz, H.C., 1991, Nigeria: A Country Study: “Emergence of Nigerian 
Nationalism”. Library of Congress: US Country Studies. 
Mikesell, R.F., 1997. Explaining the resource curse, with special reference to 
mineral-exporting countries. Resources Policy, 23(4), pp.191-199. 
Mitra, P., 1994. Adjustment in oil-importing developing countries: A comparative 
economic analysis. Cambridge University Press. 
Moore, M., 2004. Revenues, state formation, and the quality of governance in 
developing countries. International Political Science Review, 25(3), pp.297-319. 
Moore, P.W., 2002. Rentier fiscal crisis and regime stability: Business-state 
relations in the Gulf. Studies in comparative international development, 37(1), 
pp.34-56. 
Muhammad, Z., Suleiman, H. and Kouhy, R., 2012. Exploring oil price—
exchange rate nexus for Nigeria. OPEC Energy Review, 36(4), pp.383-395. 
Muller, E.N., 1995. Economic determinants of democracy. American Sociological 
Review, pp.966-982. 
Naka, A. and Tufte, D., 1997. Examining impulse response functions in 
cointegrated systems. Applied Economics, 29(12), pp.1593-1603. 
Narayan, P.K., Narayan, S. and Smyth, R., 2011. Does democracy facilitate 
economic growth or does economic growth facilitate democracy? An empirical 
study of Sub-Saharan Africa. Economic Modelling, 28(3), pp.900-910. 
National Assembly of Nigeria, 2014. [online]. NASS. Available from: 
http://www.nassnig.org/ [Accessed 7 January 2015]. 
National Assembly of Nigeria, 2016. [online]. Available from: 
http://www.nassnig.org/ [Accessed 13 March 2016]. 
Nicolson, I.F., 1970. The administration of Nigeria, 1900-1960: men, methods 
and myths. Clarendon Press. 
Nigerian Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, 2015. NEITI staff list. 
[online]. Available from: 
http://neiti.org.ng/sites/default/files/documents/uploads/staff-list.pdf [Accessed 
19 July 2014]. 
Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation 2016. [online]. Available from: 
http://nnpcgroup.com/AboutNNPC/CorporateInfo.aspx [Accessed  2 March 
2016]. 
Norman, C.S., 2009. Rule of law and the resource curse: abundance versus 
intensity. Environmental and Resource Economics, 43(2), pp.183-207. 
 
 
253 
 
North, D.C., 1995. The new institutional economics and third world 
development. In The new institutional economics and third world development 
(Vol. 21). Routledge, London and New York. 
Nossiter, A., 2011. Nigerians vote in presidential election. The New York Times. 
[online]. 16 April. Available from: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/17/world/africa/17nigeria.html?pagewanted=
1&_r=2&hp [Accessed 22 January 2015]. 
Nurkse, R., 1958. Trade fluctuations and buffer policies of low‐income countries. 
Kyklos, 11(2), pp.141-154. 
Nurudeen, A. and Usman, A., 2010. Government expenditure and economic 
growth in Nigeria, 1970-2008: A disaggregated analysis. Business and 
Economics Journal, 2010, pp.1-11. 
Odularu, G.O., 2008. Crude oil and the Nigerian economic performance. Oil and 
Gas business, pp.1-29. [online]. Available from: 
http://ogbus.ru/eng/authors/Odularo/Odularo_1.pdf [Accessed 22 January 
2013]. 
Ogbonna, I.C. et al., 2013. Oil Exploitation and Agricultural Commodity Export in 
Nigeria: An Empirical Evaluation of the Extent and Impact of the Dutch Disease. 
Journal of Humanities and Social Science, 14(1), pp.01-09. 
OGUNLEYE, E.K., 2008. Natural resource abundance in Nigeria: From 
dependence to development. Resources Policy, 33(3), pp. 168-174. 
OKPANACHI, E., 2011. Confronting the Governance Challenges of Developing 
Nigeria's Extractive Industry: Policy and Performance in the Oil and Gas Sector1. 
Review of Policy Research, 28(1), pp. 25-47. 
Okruhlik, G., 1999. Rentier wealth, unruly law, and the rise of opposition: the 
political economy of oil states. Comparative Politics, pp.295-315. 
Olomola, P.A. and Adejumo, A.V., 2006. Oil price shock and macroeconomic 
activities in Nigeria. International Research Journal of Finance and Economics, 
3(1), pp.28-34. 
OLUSI, J. and OLAGUNJU, M., 2005. The primary sectors of the economy and 
the Dutch disease in Nigeria. The Pakistan Development Review, pp. 159-175. 
Oskarsson, S. and Ottosen, E., 2010. Does oil still hinder democracy? The 
Journal of Development Studies, 46(6), pp.1067-1083. 
Oyejide, T.A., 1986. The effects of trade and exchange rate policies on 
agriculture in Nigeria (Research Report). International Food Policy Research 
Institute.  
Pande, R., 2003. Can mandated political representation increase policy influence 
for disadvantaged minorities? Theory and evidence from India. The American 
Economic Review, 93(4), pp.1132-1151. 
 
 
254 
 
PAO, H. and TSAI, C., 2010. CO2 emissions, energy consumption and economic 
growth in BRIC countries. Energy Policy, 38(12), pp. 7850-7860. 
Papaioannou, E. and Siourounis, G., 2008a. Democratisation and growth. The 
Economic Journal, 118(532), pp.1520-1551. 
Papaioannou, E. and Siourounis, G., 2008b. Economic and social factors driving 
the third wave of democratization. Journal of comparative Economics, 36(3), 
pp.365-387. 
Papyrakis, E. and Gerlagh, R., 2007. Resource abundance and economic growth 
in the United States. European Economic Review, 51(4), pp.1011-1039. 
Peacock, A.T. and Wiseman, J., 1961. Front matter, The Growth of Public 
Expenditure in the United Kingdom. In The growth of public expenditure in the 
United Kingdom (pp. 32-0). Princeton University Press. 
Phillips, P.C. and Perron, P., 1988. Testing for a unit root in time series 
regression. Biometrika, 75(2), pp.335-346. 
Piątek, D., Szarzec, K. and Pilc, M., 2013. Economic freedom, democracy and 
economic growth: a causal investigation in transition countries. Post-Communist 
Economies, 25(3), pp.267-288. 
Pinho, C. and Madaleno, M., 2015. Political Regimes and Economic Growth. 
Revista Enfoques, 7(11), pp.473-492. [online]. Available from: 
http://www.revistaenfoques.cl/index.php/revista-uno/article/viewFile/175/153 
[Accessed 31 September 2016]. 
Prebisch, R., 1950. The economic development of Latin America and its principal 
problems. United Nations. 
Prebisch, R., 1964. Center and Periphery. Leading Issues in Development 
Economics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Premium Times. 2014. Missing $20 billion: Jonathan never nailed NNPC – Abati. 
Premium Times. [online]. 25 March. Available from: 
http://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/157411-missing-20-billion-jonathan-
never-nailed-nnpc-abati.html [Accessed 8 May 2014]. 
Premium Times. 2015. Kaduna refinery restarts production. Premium Times. 
[online]. 20 December. Available from:  
http://www.premiumtimesng.com/business/business-interviews/195494-
kaduna-refinery-restarts-production.html [Accessed 27 April 2016]. 
Premium Times. 2016. Pipeline Sabotage: NNPC shuts Port Harcourt, Kaduna 
refineries. Premium Times. [online]. 20 January. Available from: 
http://www.premiumtimesng.com/business/business-news/197075-pipeline-
sabotage-nnpc-shuts-port-harcourt-kaduna-refineries.html  [Accessed 27 April 
2016]. 
Przeworski, A. and Limongi, F., 1993. Political regimes and economic growth. 
The journal of economic perspectives, 7(3), pp.51-69. 
 
 
255 
 
Przeworski, A. and Limongi, F., 1997. Modernization: Theories and facts. World 
politics, 49(02), pp.155-183. 
Przeworski, A., 2000. Democracy and development: Political institutions and 
well-being in the world, 1950-1990 (Vol. 3). Cambridge University Press. 
Przeworski, A., 2004. Democracy and economic development. Mansfield & R. 
Sisson (Eds.), The evolution of political knowledge. democracy, autonomy, and 
conflict in comparative and international politics, pp.300-324. 
Przeworski, A., Limongi, F. and Giner, S., 1995. Political regimes and economic 
growth. In Democracy and Development (pp. 3-27). Palgrave Macmillan UK. 
Rachdi, H. and Saidi, H., 2015. Democracy and Economic Growth: Evidence in 
MENA countries. Procedia-Social and Behavioral Sciences, 191, pp.616-621. 
Ramey, V.A. and Shapiro, M.D., 1998, June. Costly capital reallocation and the 
effects of government spending. In Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on 
Public Policy (Vol. 48, pp. 145-194). North-Holland. 
Robinson, J.A., 2006. Economic development and democracy. Annu. Rev. Polit. 
Sci., 9, pp.503-527. 
Robinson, J.A., Torvik, R. and Verdier, T., 2006. Political foundations of the 
resource curse. Journal of development Economics, 79(2), pp.447-468. 
Rodrik, D., Subramanian, A. and Trebbi, F., 2004. Institutions rule: the primacy 
of institutions over geography and integration in economic development. Journal 
of economic growth, 9(2), pp.131-165. 
Roemer, M., 1970. Fishing for growth: export-led development in Peru, 1950-
1967. Harvard University Press. 
Roemer, M., 1995. Dutch disease and economic growth: the legacy of Indonesia 
(No. 489). [online]. Available from: ttps://ideas.repec.org/p/fth/harvid/489.html 
[Accessed 18 March 2013]. 
Rosenberg, N. and LE Jr, B., 2008. How the West grew rich: The economic 
transformation of the industrial world. Basic books. 
ROSS, A.C., 1986. The United Kingdom's Experience with North Sea Oil and Gas. 
IDS Bulletin, 17(4), pp. 1-6. 
ROSS, M., 2003a. How does mineral wealth affect the poor? UCLA Department of 
Political Science. 
ROSS, M.L., 1999. The political economy of the resource curse. World Politics, 
51, pp. 297-322. 
ROSS, M.L., 2001. Does oil hinder democracy? World Politics, 53(3), pp. 325-
361. 
Ross, M.L., 2003b. Nigeria’s oil sector and the poor. Position Paper for DFID-
Nigeria, UCLA, Los Angeles. [online]. Available from: 
 
 
256 
 
http://nigerianrc.org/sites/default/files/Nigeria%20Oil%20(ROSS%20-
%20UCLA).pdf  [Accessed 12 FEBRUARY 2012]. 
Ross, M.L., 2004. How do natural resources influence civil war? Evidence from 
thirteen cases. International organization, 58(01), pp.35-67. 
ROSS, M.L., 2007. How mineral-rich states can reduce inequality. Escaping the 
resource curse (pp. 237-255). New York: Columbia University Press. 
ROSSER JR, J.B. and SHEEHAN, R.G., 1995. A vector autoregressive model of 
the Saudi Arabian economy. Journal of economics and business, 47(1), pp. 79-
90. 
ROSSER, A., 2006a. Escaping the resource curse. [online]. Available from: 
http://50.57.111.125/revenuewatch_archive/training/Rosser%20-
%20Escaping%20the%20Resource%20Curse.pdf [Accessed 15 January 2013]. 
ROSSER, A., 2006b. The political economy of the resource curse: A literature 
survey. [online]. Available from: 
http://mobile.opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/bitstream/handle/123456789/4061/
Wp268.pdf?sequence=1 [Accessed 19 June 2013]. 
Sachs, J.D. and Warner, A.M., 1995. Natural resource abundance and economic 
growth (No. w5398). National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA. 
Sachs, J.D. and Warner, A.M., 1997. Sources of slow growth in African 
economies. Journal of African economies, 6(3), pp.335-376. 
Sachs, J.D. and Warner, A.M., 1997. Sources of slow growth in African 
economies. Journal of African economies, 6(3), pp.335-376. 
SACHS, J.D. and WARNER, A.M., 1999. The big push, natural resource booms 
and growth. Journal of Development Economics, 59(1), pp. 43-76. 
Sachs, J.D. and Warner, A.M., 2001. The curse of natural resources. European 
economic review, 45(4), pp.827-838. 
SACHS, J.D., 2007. How to handle the macroeconomics of oil wealth. 
Humphreys, M./Sachs, JD/Stiglitz, JE (Ed.), , pp. 173-193. 
Salahodjaev, R., 2015. Democracy and economic growth: The role of intelligence 
in cross-country regressions. Intelligence, 50, pp.228-234. 
Sala-i-Martin, X. and Subramanian, A., 2008. Addressing the natural resource 
curse: An illustration from Nigeria (pp. 61-92). Palgrave Macmillan UK. online]. 
Available from: 
http://repositori.upf.edu/bitstream/handle/10230/344/685.pdf?sequence=1 
[Accessed 22 May 2012]. 
Sanusi, L. S., 2011. Lamido Sanusi: Bankers ‘should have remorse’. London: 
BBC HARDtalk. [online]. Available from: 
http://www.bing.com/videos/search?q=BBC+HARDtalk-
 
 
257 
 
+Sanusi+Lamido+Sanusi&view=detail&mid=3774163B55C1E6A7A9633774163B
55C1E6A7A963&FORM=VIRE [Accessed 5 March 2013]. 
Sayne, A., Mahdavi, P., Heller, P.R.P. and Schreuder, J., 2012. The Petroleum 
Industry Bill and the Future of NNPC. [online]. Available from:  
http://www.resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/rwi_bp_nnpc_synth_rev2
.pdf [Accessed 11 February 2016]. 
Seers, D., 1964. The stages of economic development of a primary producer in 
the middle of the twentieth century. Yale University, Economic Growth Center. 
Shafer, D.M., 1994. Winners and losers: How sectors shape the developmental 
prospects of states. Cornell University Press. 
Sims, C.A., 1980. Macroeconomics and reality. Econometrica: Journal of the 
Econometric Society, pp.1-48. 
Singer, H.W., 1950. The distribution of gains between investing and borrowing 
countries. The American Economic Review, 40(2), pp.473-485. 
Skocpol, T., 1982. Rentier state and Shi'a Islam in the Iranian revolution. Theory 
and society, 11(3), pp.265-283. 
SMITH, B., 2004. Oil wealth and regime survival in the developing world, 1960–
1999. American Journal of Political Science, 48(2), pp. 232-246. 
SPATAFORA, N. and WARNER, A.M., 1995. Macroeconomic effects of terms-of-
trade shocks: the case of oil-exporting countries. World Bank Publications. . 
[online]. Available from: 
https://books.google.co.uk/books?hl=en&lr=&id=SkDijfKCYAsC&oi=fnd&pg=PA1
&dq=Macroeconomic+effects+of+terms-of-trade+shocks:+the+case+of+oil- 
[Accessed 6 December 2013]. 
STEVENS, P., 2003. Resource impact: curse or blessing? A literature survey. 
Journal of Energy Literature, 9(1), pp. 1-42. 
STIGLITZ, J., 2007. What is the Role of the State? Escaping the resource curse 
(pp. 23-52). New York: Columbia University Press. 
STIJNS, J.C., 2005. Natural resource abundance and economic growth revisited. 
Resources Policy, 30(2), pp. 107-130. 
Stijns, J.P., 2003. An empirical test of the Dutch disease hypothesis using a 
gravity model of trade. [online]. Available from: 
https://core.ac.uk/download/files/153/9310813.pdf [Accessed 17 October 
2014]. 
Stock, J.H. and Watson, M.W., 2001. Vector autoregressions. The Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, 15(4), pp.101-115. 
 
 
258 
 
The Economist, 2011. Violence in Nigeria. Things turn Nasty. [online]. Boabab 
Africa. Available from: 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/baobab/2011/04/violence_nigeria [Accessed 
28 June 2013]. 
This Day Live. 2013. Sanusi: Four years of banking reforms. This Day Live. 
[online].2 June. Available from: http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/sanusi-
four-years-of-banking-reforms/149136/ [Accessed 6 August 2014]. 
Tijerina–Guajardo, J.A. and Pagán, J.A., 2003. Government spending, taxation, 
and oil revenues in Mexico. Review of Development Economics, 7(1), pp.152-
164. 
Tsui, K.K., 2011. More oil, less democracy: Evidence from worldwide crude oil 
discoveries. The Economic Journal, 121(551), pp.89-115. 
Ulfelder, J., 2007. Natural-resource wealth and the survival of autocracy. 
Comparative political studies, 40(8), pp.995-1018. 
Usui, N., 1997. Dutch disease and policy adjustments to the oil boom: a 
comparative study of Indonesia and Mexico. Resources policy, 23(4), pp.151-
162. 
VAN DER PLOEG, F., 2011. Natural resources: curse or blessing? Journal of 
Economic Literature,  pp. 366-420. 
Vandewalle, D., 1998. Libya Since Independence: Oil and State-Building, Ithaca 
and London: Cornell University Press. 
Vandewalle, D.J. and Vandewalle, D., 1998. Libya since independence: oil and 
state building. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornel Univeristy Press. 
Vincent, J.R., Panayotou, T. and Hartwick, J.M., 1997. Resource depletion and 
sustainability in small open economies. Journal of Environmental Economics and 
Management, 33(3), pp.274-286. 
Wantchekon, L., 2002. Why do resource dependent countries have authoritarian 
governments? Journal of African Finance and Economic  Development, 2, 
pp.57-7.  
Watkins, M.H., 1963. A staple theory of economic growth. Canadian Journal of 
Economics and Political Science, 29(02), pp.141-158. 
Wood, A. and Berge, K., 1997. Exporting manufactures: human resources, 
natural resources, and trade policy. The Journal of Development Studies, 34(1), 
pp.35-59. 
World Bank 2014 Nigeria - Agriculture and rural poverty : a policy note 
World Bank Development Indicators, 2015. [online]. Available from: 
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=2&country=NGA&seri
es=&period= [Accessed 2 February 2015]. 
 
 
259 
 
WORLD BANK, 2013. Nigeria overview. [online] World Bank. Available from: 
http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/nigeria/overview [Accessed  4 November 
2013]. 
WORLD BANK, 2015. Nigeria overview. [online]. World Bank. Available from: 
http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/nigeria/overview [Accessed 25 June 
2015]. 
WORLD BANK, 2016. Gross Domestic Product, 2014 PPP. [online]. World Bank 
Development Indicators Database. Available from:  
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/download/GDP_PPP.pdf [Accessed 27 April 
2016]. 
WORLD BANK, 2016. Nigeria overview. [online]. World Bank. Available from: 
http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/nigeria/overview [Accessed 25 April 
2016]. 
Wright, J., 2008. Do authoritarian institutions constrain? How legislatures affect 
economic growth and investment. American Journal of Political Science, 52(2), 
pp.322-343. 
Yang, B., 2008. Does democracy lower growth volatility? A dynamic panel 
analysis. Journal of Macroeconomics, 30(1), pp.562-574. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
260 
 
 
 
APPENDIX I 
Econometric Analysis  
The appendix presents the estimates of the Vector Error Correction (VEC) model 
used in the econometric techniques to provide an additional layer of analysis as 
shown in Chapters 5 and 6. Also, the diagnostic tests for the estimated models 
are included. The VEC model estimates show the basis for the source of the 
results obtained in Chapter 6. Sections A to C below gives the VEC model 
estimates of the outputs of manufacturing, agriculture and oil as the dependent 
variables respectively.  
Each of the section presents the raw output obtained from the statistical 
software used in analysing the various models specified. Moreover, each section 
starts by presenting the analysis of the fully specified models and subsequently 
presents the reduced form models with their diagnostic tests.   
 
Section A.  VEC estimates and Diagnostic Tests for the Models  
    where Manufacturing is the Dependent Variable 
 
Table A1. VAR Lag Order Selection Criteria for Eight Variables  
  Specified Model 
     
       
       
 Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
              
0 -210.5561 NA   0.012504  9.806785  10.40308  10.03016 
1  18.78080   378.9044*   1.76e-06*   0.922574*   2.512697*   1.518244* 
2  35.26842  23.65615  2.71e-06  1.292678  3.876627  2.260641 
3  64.77944  35.92647  2.57e-06  1.096546  4.674323  2.436802 
4  93.60643  28.82698  2.86e-06  0.930155  5.501759  2.642705 
              
 * indicates lag order selected by the criterion    
 LR: sequential modified LR test statistic (each test at 5% level)   
 FPE: Final prediction error     
 AIC: Akaike information criterion     
 SC: Schwarz information criterion     
 HQ: Hannan-Quinn information criterion    
 VAR Lag Order Selection Criteria 
 Endogenous variables: LMAN LOIL LCAPEXP LRECEXP LAGRIC  
 Exogenous variables: POLREG OPECM DEMOC  
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Source: Created by author based on data from CBN Statistical Bulletin (2010) and constructed 
dummy variables using Eviews Statistical Software 
 
Table A2. Cointergration Tests for Eight Variables Specified Model 
 
Trend assumption: Linear deterministic trend 
Series: LMAN LOIL LCAPEXP LRECEXP LAGRIC  
Exogenous series: POLREG OPECM DEMOC  
Lags interval (in first differences): 1 to 1 
  
  
  
  
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace) 
  
  
            
Hypothesized  Trace 0.05   
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.**  
            
None *  0.520030  80.69037  69.81889  0.0053  
At most 1  0.348759  45.45689  47.85613  0.0826  
At most 2  0.290124  24.87088  29.79707  0.1661  
At most 3  0.158849  8.422994  15.49471  0.4213  
At most 4  0.002492  0.119747  3.841466  0.7293  
            
 Trace test indicates 1 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level  
      
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Maximum Eigenvalue)  
            
Hypothesized  Max-Eigen 0.05   
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.**  
            
None *  0.520030  35.23349  33.87687  0.0343  
At most 1  0.348759  20.58601  27.58434  0.3020  
At most 2  0.290124  16.44788  21.13162  0.1998  
At most 3  0.158849  8.303247  14.26460  0.3487  
At most 4  0.002492  0.119747  3.841466  0.7293  
            
 Max-eigenvalue test indicates 1 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level 
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level  
 **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values   
      
Source: Created by author based on data from CBN Statistical Bulletin (2010) and constructed 
dummy variables using Eviews Statistical Software 
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Table A3. VEC Estimates for Eight Variables Specified Model 
 
 Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ]   
            
Cointegrating Eq:  CointEq1     
            
LMAN(-1)  1.000000     
      
LOIL(-1) -0.769064     
  (0.12593)     
 [-6.10685]     
      
LCAPEXP(-1)  0.406960     
  (0.11229)     
 [ 3.62433]     
      
LRECEXP(-1) -0.563474     
  (0.12530)     
 [-4.49714]     
      
LAGRIC(-1)  0.228634     
  (0.15990)     
 [ 1.42985]     
      
C -1.675242     
            
Error Correction: D(LMAN) D(LOIL) D(LCAPEXP) D(LRECEXP) D(LAGRIC) 
      
      
CointEq1 -0.292132  0.035807 -0.611666  0.134681 -0.018814 
  (0.12659)  (0.25866)  (0.18094)  (0.16349)  (0.17533) 
 [-2.30778] [ 0.13843] [-3.38042] [ 0.82380] [-0.10731] 
      
D(LMAN(-1))  0.445306  0.865973  0.298534 -0.207401  0.759584 
  (0.24292)  (0.49638)  (0.34724)  (0.31374)  (0.33647) 
 [ 1.83311] [ 1.74458] [ 0.85974] [-0.66106] [ 2.25753] 
      
D(LOIL(-1)) -0.268683 -0.283304  0.022280  0.093552 -0.146981 
  (0.14600)  (0.29834)  (0.20870)  (0.18857)  (0.20223) 
 [-1.84025] [-0.94961] [ 0.10676] [ 0.49612] [-0.72682] 
      
D(LCAPEXP(-1))  0.151371  0.280017 -0.111545  0.062880  0.269941 
  (0.10141)  (0.20722)  (0.14496)  (0.13097)  (0.14046) 
 [ 1.49264] [ 1.35131] [-0.76950] [ 0.48010] [ 1.92181] 
      
D(LRECEXP(-1)) -0.033530  0.313156 -0.319946 -0.156210  0.172126 
  (0.13474)  (0.27532)  (0.19260)  (0.17402)  (0.18662) 
 [-0.24885] [ 1.13742] [-1.66120] [-0.89766] [ 0.92231] 
      
D(LAGRIC(-1)) -0.098333 -0.309534 -0.252788  0.117635 -0.379812 
  (0.18119)  (0.37023)  (0.25899)  (0.23401)  (0.25096) 
 [-0.54271] [-0.83605] [-0.97604] [ 0.50269] [-1.51344] 
      
C  0.155266  0.090173  0.561229  0.219685 -0.206543 
  (0.13628)  (0.27847)  (0.19480)  (0.17601)  (0.18876) 
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 [ 1.13931] [ 0.32382] [ 2.88102] [ 1.24815] [-1.09422] 
      
POLREG  0.558278  0.401388  0.273875 -0.187590  0.432160 
  (0.14224)  (0.29064)  (0.20332)  (0.18370)  (0.19701) 
 [ 3.92496] [ 1.38104] [ 1.34703] [-1.02116] [ 2.19360] 
      
OPECM -0.123399 -0.095630 -0.271593  0.012040  0.174936 
  (0.14377)  (0.29378)  (0.20551)  (0.18568)  (0.19913) 
 [-0.85830] [-0.32552] [-1.32157] [ 0.06484] [ 0.87849] 
      
DEMOC -0.661375 -0.491322 -0.641450  0.271861 -0.401057 
  (0.18203)  (0.37195)  (0.26020)  (0.23509)  (0.25212) 
 [-3.63333] [-1.32093] [-2.46525] [ 1.15639] [-1.59071] 
            
 R-squared  0.395804  0.299407  0.384880  0.081738  0.386237 
 Adj. R-squared  0.252704  0.133477  0.239194 -0.135745  0.240872 
 Sum sq. resids  1.821022  7.603338  3.720774  3.037501  3.493495 
 S.E. equation  0.218910  0.447312  0.312914  0.282726  0.303206 
 F-statistic  2.765939  1.804418  2.641846  0.375838  2.657018 
 Log likelihood  10.41422 -23.88632 -6.734589 -1.865068 -5.221892 
 Akaike AIC -0.017259  1.411930  0.697275  0.494378  0.634245 
 Schwarz SC  0.372574  1.801764  1.087108  0.884211  1.024079 
 Mean dependent  0.112415  0.174006  0.198673  0.213764  0.110092 
 S.D. dependent  0.253233  0.480530  0.358747  0.265293  0.348001 
      
      
 Determinant resid covariance (dof 
adj.)  7.73E-07    
 Determinant resid covariance  2.40E-07    
 Log likelihood  25.24852    
 Akaike information criterion  1.239645    
 Schwarz criterion  3.383729    
            
Source: Created by author based on data from CBN Statistical Bulletin (2010) and constructed 
dummy variables using Eviews Statistical Software 
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Figure A1. Residuals Graphs for the Five Economic Variables Employed 
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Table A4. Residual Covariance Matrix 
 
 
  LMAN LOIL LCAPEXP LRECEXP LAGRIC 
LMAN   0.048  0.076 -0.009  0.012  0.050 
LOIL   0.076  0.200 -0.011  0.031  0.097 
LCAPEXP  -0.009 -0.011  0.098  0.036 -0.006 
LRECEXP   0.012  0.031  0.036  0.079  0.016 
LAGRIC   0.050  0.097 -0.006  0.016  0.092 
 
 
 
Table A5. Residual Correlation Matrix 
 
  LMAN LOIL LCAPEXP LRECEXP LAGRIC 
LMAN   1.000  0.779 -0.128  0.196  0.754 
LOIL   0.779  1.000 -0.076  0.248  0.7162 
LCAPEXP  -0.129 -0.076  1.000  0.412 -0.059 
LRECEXP   0.196  0.248  0.412  1.000  0.183 
LAGRIC   0.754  0.716 -0.0589  0.183  1.000 
 
 
 
Table A6. VEC Residual Portmanteau Tests for Autocorrelations 
 
Null Hypothesis: no residual autocorrelations up to lag h  
      
      
Lags Q-Stat Prob. Adj Q-Stat Prob. df 
            
1  6.797 NA*  6.941 NA* NA* 
2  25.949  0.989  26.927  0.985 45 
            
*The test is valid only for lags larger than the VAR lag order. 
df is degrees of freedom for (approximate) chi-square distribution 
*df and Prob. may not be valid for models with exogenous variables 
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Table A7. VEC Residual Serial Correlation LM Tests 
 
Null Hypothesis: no serial correlation at lag order h 
      
Lags LM-Stat Probability 
   
   1  26.13501  0.4004 
2  18.89275  0.8022 
      
Probability from chi-square with 25 degrees of freedom  
 
 
Table A8. Dependent Variable: LMAN  
 
 
D(LMAN) = C(1)*( LMAN(-1) - 0.769063784838*LOIL(-1) + 0.406960385488 
        *LCAPEXP(-1) - 0.563474439195*LRECEXP(-1) + 0.228633579107 
        *LAGRIC(-1) - 1.67524153049 ) + C(2)*D(LMAN(-1)) + C(3)*D(LOIL(-1)) 
        + C(4)*D(LCAPEXP(-1)) + C(5)*D(LRECEXP(-1)) + C(6)*D(LAGRIC(-1))  
        + C(7) + C(8)*POLREG + C(9)*OPECM + C(10)*DEMOC 
          
 Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
          
C(1) -0.292132 0.126586 -2.307783 0.0266 
C(2) 0.445306 0.242924 1.833112 0.0746 
C(3) -0.268683 0.146004 -1.840245 0.0736 
C(4) 0.151371 0.101411 1.492643 0.1438 
C(5) -0.033530 0.134740 -0.248851 0.8048 
C(6) -0.098333 0.181189 -0.542707 0.5905 
C(7) 0.155266 0.136281 1.139307 0.2617 
C(8) 0.558278 0.142238 3.924964 0.0004 
C(9) -0.123399 0.143771 -0.858301 0.3961 
C(10) -0.661375 0.182030 -3.633332 0.0008 
          
R-squared 0.395804    Mean dependent var 0.112415 
Adjusted R-squared 0.252704    S.D. dependent var 0.253233 
S.E. of regression 0.218910    Akaike info criterion -0.017259 
Sum squared resid 1.821022    Schwarz criterion 0.372574 
Log likelihood 10.41422    Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.130059 
F-statistic 2.765939    Durbin-Watson stat 2.454176 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.013582    
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Residual Diagnostic Tests 
 
Table A9. Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test 
 
 
          
F-statistic 4.776059    Prob. F(2,36) 0.0145 
Obs*R-squared 10.06543    Prob. Chi-Square(2) 0.0065 
          
     
Test Equation:    
Dependent Variable: RESID   
Method: Least Squares   
Presample missing value lagged residuals set to zero. 
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
          
C(1) 0.046938 0.116627 0.402462 0.6897 
C(2) 0.614473 0.303710 2.023225 0.0505 
C(3) 0.057773 0.135203 0.427306 0.6717 
C(4) -0.081884 0.096724 -0.846578 0.4028 
C(5) 0.124881 0.129614 0.963489 0.3417 
C(6) -0.080461 0.173381 -0.464069 0.6454 
C(7) -0.092831 0.128047 -0.724978 0.4732 
C(8) -0.186966 0.143359 -1.304179 0.2004 
C(9) 0.038622 0.132019 0.292551 0.7715 
C(10) 0.192404 0.178225 1.079556 0.2875 
RESID(-1) -0.895507 0.289748 -3.090644 0.0038 
RESID(-2) -0.048450 0.161778 -0.299484 0.7663 
          
R-squared 0.209696    Mean dependent var -2.69E-16 
Adjusted R-squared -0.031785    S.D. dependent var 0.196838 
S.E. of regression 0.199942    Akaike info criterion -0.169264 
Sum squared resid 1.439160    Schwarz criterion 0.298536 
Log likelihood 16.06234    Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.007518 
F-statistic 0.868374    Durbin-Watson stat 1.748347 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.577492    
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Table A10. Heteroskedasticity Test: Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey 
 
          
F-statistic 2.088624    Prob. F(13,34) 0.0426 
Obs*R-squared 21.31245    Prob. Chi-Square(13) 0.0670 
Scaled explained SS 44.29046    Prob. Chi-Square(13) 0.0000 
          
     
Test Equation:    
Dependent Variable: RESID^2   
Method: Least Squares   
Included observations: 48   
          
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
          
C 0.387710 0.186026 2.084172 0.0447 
LMAN(-1) 0.140696 0.105495 1.333672 0.1912 
LOIL(-1) -0.054762 0.061231 -0.894360 0.3774 
LCAPEXP(-1) 0.008554 0.047108 0.181588 0.8570 
LRECEXP(-1) 0.028984 0.055534 0.521917 0.6051 
LAGRIC(-1) -0.190604 0.078180 -2.438015 0.0201 
LMAN(-2) 0.152775 0.131998 1.157397 0.2552 
LOIL(-2) -0.008941 0.060969 -0.146654 0.8843 
LCAPEXP(-2) -0.031198 0.046810 -0.666488 0.5096 
LRECEXP(-2) 0.012214 0.055955 0.218277 0.8285 
LAGRIC(-2) -0.046385 0.085008 -0.545653 0.5889 
POLREG 0.043728 0.066057 0.661967 0.5125 
OPECM 0.030631 0.105275 0.290960 0.7728 
DEMOC 0.011514 0.096249 0.119631 0.9055 
          
R-squared 0.444009    Mean dependent var 0.037938 
Adjusted R-squared 0.231425    S.D. dependent var 0.098732 
S.E. of regression 0.086557    Akaike info criterion -1.817545 
Sum squared resid 0.254729    Schwarz criterion -1.271778 
Log likelihood 57.62107    Hannan-Quinn criter. -1.611299 
F-statistic 2.088624    Durbin-Watson stat 2.301333 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.042565    
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Table A11. VAR Lag Order Selection Criteria for the Reduced Form Model 
  Containing Manufacturing, Capital and Recurrent   
  Expenditures and Agriculture 
 
Endogenous variables: LMAN LCAPEXP LRECEXP LAGRIC 
Exogenous variables: POLREG OPECM DEMOC  
 
              
 Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
              
0 -191.2681 NA   0.081023  8.837744  9.314781  9.016445 
1  6.663944   335.6239*   3.00e-05*   0.927655*  2.040741*  1.344623* 
2  20.18572  20.57661  3.44e-05  1.035404  2.784539  1.690640 
3  33.03368  17.31682  4.19e-05  1.172449  3.557633  2.065953 
4  44.65998  13.64827  5.66e-05  1.362610  4.383843  2.494382 
              
 * indicates lag order selected by the criterion    
 LR: sequential modified LR test statistic (each test at 5% level)   
 FPE: Final prediction error     
 AIC: Akaike information criterion     
 SC: Schwarz information criterion     
 HQ: Hannan-Quinn information criterion 
    
       
 
Table A12. Cointegration Tests for the Reduced Form Model Containing 
  Manufacturing, Capital and Recurrent Expenditures and  
  Agriculture  
Series: LMAN LCAPEXP LRECEXP LAGRIC    
Exogenous series: POLREG OPECM DEMOC    
Lags interval (in first differences): 1 to 1  
     
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace)  
          
Hypothesized  Trace 0.05  
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.** 
          
None *  0.415993  53.07673  47.85613  0.0149 
At most 1  0.323328  27.26033  29.79707  0.0954 
At most 2  0.159275  8.513056  15.49471  0.4123 
At most 3  0.003858  0.185525  3.841466  0.6667 
          
 Trace test indicates 1 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level 
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Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Maximum Eigenvalue) 
          
Hypothesized  Max-Eigen 0.05  
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.** 
          
None  0.415993  25.81640  27.58434  0.0827 
At most 1  0.323328  18.74727  21.13162  0.1044 
At most 2  0.159275  8.327530  14.26460  0.3464 
At most 3  0.003858  0.185525  3.841466  0.6667 
          
 Max-eigenvalue test indicates no cointegration at the 0.05 level 
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level 
 **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values  
 
 
 
  
    
  
 
 
A13. VEC Estimates for Seven Variables Specified Model 
 
 Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ] 
 
 
          
Cointegrating Eq:  CointEq1    
          
LMAN(-1)  1.000000    
     
LCAPEXP(-1) -1.749747    
  (0.63617)    
 [-2.75043]    
     
LRECEXP(-1)  3.134345    
  (0.76414)    
 [ 4.10179]    
     
LAGRIC(-1) -3.182255    
  (0.55531)    
 [-5.73059]    
     
C  10.04116    
          
Error Correction: D(LMAN) D(LCAPEXP) D(LRECEXP) D(LAGRIC) 
          
CointEq1  0.056242  0.089879 -0.010769  0.016182 
  (0.02049)  (0.03234)  (0.02706)  (0.02894) 
 [ 2.74551] [ 2.77955] [-0.39792] [ 0.55916] 
     
D(LMAN(-1))  0.009112  0.018302 -0.105669  0.560176 
  (0.23153)  (0.36547)  (0.30588)  (0.32709) 
 [ 0.03935] [ 0.05008] [-0.34546] [ 1.71259] 
     
D(LCAPEXP(-1))  0.134530 -0.240922  0.068205  0.286322 
  (0.09645)  (0.15225)  (0.12742)  (0.13626) 
 [ 1.39477] [-1.58240] [ 0.53527] [ 2.10126] 
     
D(LRECEXP(-1)) -0.059779 -0.190147 -0.174318  0.119876 
  (0.12644)  (0.19959)  (0.16704)  (0.17863) 
 [-0.47278] [-0.95271] [-1.04357] [ 0.67110] 
     
D(LAGRIC(-1)) -0.082610  0.028774  0.147556 -0.410652 
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  (0.16790)  (0.26503)  (0.22181)  (0.23719) 
 [-0.49202] [ 0.10857] [ 0.66524] [-1.73130] 
     
C -0.079493  0.203305  0.323383 -0.250175 
  (0.08966)  (0.14154)  (0.11846)  (0.12667) 
 [-0.88655] [ 1.43643] [ 2.73000] [-1.97499] 
     
POLREG  0.430814 -0.105864 -0.110851  0.454612 
  (0.11200)  (0.17680)  (0.14797)  (0.15823) 
 [ 3.84644] [-0.59879] [-0.74917] [ 2.87311] 
     
OPECM  0.185955  0.224814 -0.110098  0.234288 
  (0.09637)  (0.15211)  (0.12731)  (0.13614) 
 [ 1.92969] [ 1.47795] [-0.86482] [ 1.72097] 
     
DEMOC -0.526296 -0.277101  0.166794 -0.428367 
  (0.13895)  (0.21932)  (0.18356)  (0.19629) 
 [-3.78779] [-1.26343] [ 0.90867] [-2.18230] 
          
 R-squared  0.414477  0.273069  0.068904  0.381221 
 Adj. R-squared  0.294369  0.123955 -0.122090  0.254292 
 Sum sq. resids  1.764742  4.397107  3.079956  3.522047 
 S.E. equation  0.212720  0.335777  0.281022  0.300514 
 F-statistic  3.450884  1.831277  0.360765  3.003419 
 Log likelihood  11.16766 -10.74295 -2.198191 -5.417241 
 Akaike AIC -0.090319  0.822623  0.466591  0.600718 
 Schwarz SC  0.260531  1.173473  0.817441  0.951569 
 Mean dependent  0.112415  0.198673  0.213764  0.110092 
 S.D. dependent  0.253233  0.358747  0.265293  0.348001 
          
 Determinant resid covariance (dof adj.)  1.29E-05   
 Determinant resid covariance  5.61E-06   
 Log likelihood  17.74030   
 Akaike information criterion  0.927487   
 Schwarz criterion  2.486822   
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Residual Tests 
 
Table A14. VEC Residual Portmanteau Tests for Autocorrelations 
  
Null Hypothesis: no residual autocorrelations up to lag h  
      
Lags Q-Stat Prob. Adj Q-Stat Prob. Df 
      
      
1  2.866100 NA*  2.927081 NA* NA* 
2  12.12537  0.9960  12.58893  0.9946 28 
3  28.61116  0.9649  30.17377  0.9443 44 
4  46.61022  0.8971  49.80911  0.8231 60 
5  59.62465  0.9166  64.33684  0.8275 76 
6  85.23746  0.6779  93.60863  0.4337 92 
7  110.9735  0.4029  123.7386  0.1428 108 
8  125.8477  0.4368  141.5877  0.1335 124 
9  139.2607  0.5018  158.0959  0.1406 140 
10  152.2267  0.5705  174.4740  0.1481 156 
11  162.5926  0.6846  187.9218  0.1924 172 
12  175.0351  0.7422  204.5118  0.1944 188 
            
*The test is valid only for lags larger than the VAR lag order. 
df is degrees of freedom for (approximate) chi-square distribution 
*df and Probability. may not be valid for models with exogenous variables 
      
 
 
Table A15. VEC Residual Serial Correlation LM Tests 
 
Null Hypothesis: no serial correlation at lag order h 
      
Lags LM-Stat Prob 
   
   
1  14.30940  0.5757 
2  9.075281  0.9103 
3  16.34918  0.4289 
4  16.71883  0.4040 
5  12.83397  0.6849 
6  26.19697  0.0513 
7  28.73302  0.0258 
8  15.85599  0.4631 
9  13.30431  0.6504 
10  13.83753  0.6108 
11  11.65915  0.7671 
12  12.82229  0.6857 
   
   Probs from chi-square with 16 df. 
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Table A16. Dependent Variable: D(LMAN) 
   
Method: Least Squares   
D(LMAN) = C(1)*( LMAN(-1) - 1.74974671666*LCAPEXP(-1) + 
        3.13434461966*LRECEXP(-1) - 3.18225535707*LAGRIC(-1) + 
        10.0411636695 ) + C(2)*D(LMAN(-1)) + C(3)*D(LCAPEXP(-1)) + C(4) 
        *D(LRECEXP(-1)) + C(5)*D(LAGRIC(-1)) + C(6) + C(7)*POLREG + C(8) 
        *OPECM + C(9)*DEMOC   
          
 Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
          
C(1) 0.056242 0.020485 2.745512 0.0091 
C(2) 0.009112 0.231533 0.039353 0.9688 
C(3) 0.134530 0.096453 1.394773 0.1710 
C(4) -0.059779 0.126441 -0.472782 0.6390 
C(5) -0.082610 0.167898 -0.492024 0.6255 
C(6) -0.079493 0.089665 -0.886553 0.3808 
C(7) 0.430814 0.112003 3.846441 0.0004 
C(8) 0.185955 0.096365 1.929691 0.0609 
C(9) -0.526296 0.138946 -3.787787 0.0005 
          
R-squared 0.414477    Mean dependent var 0.112415 
Adjusted R-squared 0.294369    S.D. dependent var 0.253233 
S.E. of regression 0.212720    Akaike info criterion -0.090319 
Sum squared resid 1.764742    Schwarz criterion 0.260531 
Log likelihood 11.16766    Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.042268 
F-statistic 3.450884    Durbin-Watson stat 2.296910 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.004263    
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Residual Diagnostic Tests 
 
Table A17. Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test 
          
F-statistic 2.441775    Prob. F(2,37) 0.1009 
Obs*R-squared 5.596717    Prob. Chi-Square(2) 0.0609 
     
     
     
Test Equation:    
Dependent Variable: RESID   
Method: Least Squares   
Included observations: 48   
Presample missing value lagged residuals set to zero. 
          
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
          
C(1) -0.025260 0.023057 -1.095512 0.2804 
C(2) 0.646597 0.394733 1.638059 0.1099 
C(3) -0.080886 0.100481 -0.804993 0.4260 
C(4) 0.140757 0.137878 1.020884 0.3139 
C(5) -0.120874 0.178265 -0.678059 0.5020 
C(6) -0.028842 0.087566 -0.329376 0.7437 
C(7) -0.162920 0.132905 -1.225843 0.2280 
C(8) -0.041470 0.096434 -0.430032 0.6697 
C(9) 0.207989 0.167987 1.238128 0.2235 
RESID(-1) -0.741650 0.344138 -2.155095 0.0377 
RESID(-2) -0.045480 0.167280 -0.271880 0.7872 
     
     
R-squared 0.116598    Mean dependent var 3.91E-16 
Adjusted R-squared -0.122159    S.D. dependent var 0.193772 
S.E. of regression 0.205267    Akaike info criterion -0.130961 
Sum squared resid 1.558976    Schwarz criterion 0.297856 
Log likelihood 14.14307    Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.031089 
F-statistic 0.488355    Durbin-Watson stat 1.775810 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.886744    
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Table A18. Heteroskedasticity Test: Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey 
     
     F-statistic 3.178238    Prob. F(11,36) 0.0042 
Obs*R-squared 23.64846    Prob. Chi-Square(11) 0.0143 
Scaled explained SS 46.65106    Prob. Chi-Square(11) 0.0000 
          
     
Test Equation:    
Dependent Variable: RESID^2   
Method: Least Squares   
Included observations: 48   
          
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
          
C 0.445796 0.135063 3.300656 0.0022 
LMAN(-1) 0.070340 0.080374 0.875162 0.3873 
LCAPEXP(-1) 0.017065 0.038300 0.445556 0.6586 
LRECEXP(-1) 0.030901 0.045604 0.677584 0.5024 
LAGRIC(-1) -0.184574 0.058928 -3.132203 0.0034 
LMAN(-2) 0.120750 0.095170 1.268780 0.2127 
LCAPEXP(-2) -0.052388 0.037996 -1.378771 0.1765 
LRECEXP(-2) 0.014907 0.046228 0.322479 0.7490 
LAGRIC(-2) -0.024041 0.066203 -0.363146 0.7186 
POLREG 0.101060 0.040725 2.481529 0.0179 
OPECM -0.019481 0.063865 -0.305040 0.7621 
DEMOC -0.035142 0.073245 -0.479795 0.6343 
          
R-squared 0.492676    Mean dependent var 0.036765 
Adjusted R-squared 0.337661    S.D. dependent var 0.090831 
S.E. of regression 0.073922    Akaike info criterion -2.159298 
Sum squared resid 0.196720    Schwarz criterion -1.691498 
Log likelihood 63.82316    Hannan-Quinn criter. -1.982516 
F-statistic 3.178238    Durbin-Watson stat 2.451488 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.004242    
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Table A19. VAR Lag Order Selection Criteria for the Reduced Form Model 
  Containing Six Variables 
 
Endogenous variables: LMAN LCAPEXP LRECEXP     
Exogenous variables: POLREG OPECM DEMOC     
              
 Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
              
0 -185.0925 NA   0.928421  8.438805  8.796583  8.572831 
1 -6.983198   309.7553*  0.000597*  1.086226*  1.801781*  1.354277* 
2 -1.857716  8.245341  0.000715  1.254683  2.328016  1.656760 
3  3.931827  8.558454  0.000840  1.394268  2.825379  1.930371 
4  10.20690  8.457702  0.000981  1.512744  3.301632  2.182872 
       
       
 * indicates lag order selected by the criterion    
 LR: sequential modified LR test statistic (each test at 5% level)   
 FPE: Final prediction error     
 AIC: Akaike information criterion     
 SC: Schwarz information criterion     
 HQ: Hannan-Quinn information criterion 
 
    
       
Table A20. Cointegration Tests for the Reduced Form Model   
  Containing Six Variables 
 
Trend assumption: Linear deterministic trend  
Series: LMAN LCAPEXP LRECEXP    
Exogenous series: POLREG OPECM DEMOC    
Lags interval (in first differences): 1 to 1  
     
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace)  
          
Hypothesized  Trace 0.05  
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.** 
     
     
None  0.356513  28.39328  29.79707  0.0719 
At most 1  0.135812  7.232276  15.49471  0.5508 
At most 2  0.004697  0.225971  3.841466  0.6345 
     
     
 Trace test indicates no cointegration at the 0.05 level 
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Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Maximum Eigenvalue) 
          
Hypothesized  Max-Eigen 0.05  
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.** 
          
None *  0.356513  21.16100  21.13162  0.0495 
At most 1  0.135812  7.006305  14.26460  0.4884 
At most 2  0.004697  0.225971  3.841466  0.6345 
          
 Max-eigenvalue test indicates 1 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level 
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level 
 **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values  
     
 
 
Table A21. VEC Estimates for the Reduced Form Model    
  Containing Six Variables 
 
 Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ] 
        
Cointegrating Eq:  CointEq1   
        
LMAN(-1)  1.000000   
    
LCAPEXP(-1)  0.979740   
  (0.38465)   
 [ 2.54711]   
    
LRECEXP(-1) -1.667740   
  (0.42575)   
 [-3.91719]   
    
C -1.310686   
        
Error Correction: D(LMAN) D(LCAPEXP) D(LRECEXP) 
    
    CointEq1 -0.051519 -0.197134  0.054813 
  (0.04114)  (0.05698)  (0.04872) 
 [-1.25214] [-3.45959] [ 1.12502] 
    
D(LMAN(-1)) -0.014956  0.166201  0.031777 
  (0.14950)  (0.20704)  (0.17703) 
 [-0.10004] [ 0.80275] [ 0.17950] 
    
D(LCAPEXP(-1))  0.178641 -0.218820  0.059338 
  (0.10467)  (0.14497)  (0.12395) 
 [ 1.70663] [-1.50946] [ 0.47872] 
    
D(LRECEXP(-1)) -0.031027 -0.217593 -0.138696 
  (0.13766)  (0.19065)  (0.16301) 
 [-0.22539] [-1.14134] [-0.85085] 
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C -0.077129  0.140842  0.326205 
  (0.09806)  (0.13580)  (0.11612) 
 [-0.78657] [ 1.03711] [ 2.80932] 
    
POLREG  0.410831 -0.040844 -0.137537 
  (0.12560)  (0.17394)  (0.14873) 
 [ 3.27104] [-0.23482] [-0.92477] 
    
OPECM  0.161097  0.347108 -0.144040 
  (0.11367)  (0.15742)  (0.13460) 
 [ 1.41728] [ 2.20500] [-1.07014] 
    
DEMOC -0.507807 -0.582378  0.288615 
  (0.18243)  (0.25265)  (0.21603) 
 [-2.78352] [-2.30504] [ 1.33601] 
        
 R-squared  0.274677  0.306826  0.073310 
 Adj. R-squared  0.147746  0.185520 -0.088861 
 Sum sq. resids  2.186092  4.192916  3.065381 
 S.E. equation  0.233778  0.323764  0.276829 
 F-statistic  2.163980  2.529366  0.452055 
 Log likelihood  6.029005 -9.601741 -2.084347 
 Akaike AIC  0.082125  0.733406  0.420181 
 Schwarz SC  0.393992  1.045273  0.732048 
 Mean dependent  0.112415  0.198673  0.213764 
 S.D. dependent  0.253233  0.358747  0.265293 
        
 Determinant resid covariance (dof adj.)  0.000365  
 Determinant resid covariance  0.000211  
 Log likelihood -1.214917  
 Akaike information criterion  1.175622  
 Schwarz criterion  2.228172  
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Residual Tests 
Table A22. VEC Residual Portmanteau Tests for Autocorrelations 
 
 
Null Hypothesis: no residual autocorrelations up to lag h  
            
Lags Q-Stat Prob. Adj Q-Stat Prob. df 
            
1  2.513065 NA*  2.566535 NA* NA* 
2  5.671809  0.9847  5.862615  0.9820 15 
3  16.29478  0.8771  17.19378  0.8403 24 
4  27.49495  0.7376  29.41215  0.6465 33 
5  32.44727  0.8553  34.94032  0.7717 42 
6  48.52945  0.5723  53.31996  0.3851 51 
7  69.17342  0.1953  77.48851  0.0639 60 
8  74.24761  0.3113  83.57753  0.1115 69 
9  83.56313  0.3127  95.04279  0.0920 78 
10  91.22092  0.3574  104.7158  0.0949 87 
11  95.41041  0.4978  110.1508  0.1533 96 
12  98.80182  0.6518  114.6727  0.2439 105 
            
*The test is valid only for lags larger than the VAR lag order. 
df is degrees of freedom for (approximate) chi-square distribution 
*df and Prob. may not be valid for models with exogenous variables 
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Table A23. VEC Residual Serial Correlation LM Tests 
 
Null Hypothesis: no serial correlation at lag order h 
Included observations: 48 
   
   Lags LM-Stat Prob 
   
   
1  11.06497  0.2713 
2  3.252106  0.9535 
3  9.652863  0.3793 
4  10.64455  0.3009 
5  4.535148  0.8728 
6  16.38521  0.0593 
7  22.63736  0.0071 
8  5.801635  0.7596 
9  8.960840  0.4409 
10  8.793110  0.4566 
11  4.719959  0.8580 
12  3.684438  0.9309 
   
   Probabilities from chi-square with 9 degrees of freedom. 
 
 
 
Table A24. Dependent Variable: D(LMAN) 
   
D(LMAN) = C(1)*( LMAN(-1) + 0.979740201681*LCAPEXP(-1) - 
        1.6677396815*LRECEXP(-1) - 1.31068649346 ) + C(2)*D(LMAN(-1)) + 
        C(3)*D(LCAPEXP(-1)) + C(4)*D(LRECEXP(-1)) + C(5) + C(6)*POLREG  
        + C(7)*OPECM + C(8)*DEMOC  
     
      Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C(1) -0.051519 0.041145 -1.252138 0.2178 
C(2) -0.014956 0.149496 -0.100042 0.9208 
C(3) 0.178641 0.104675 1.706629 0.0956 
C(4) -0.031027 0.137659 -0.225393 0.8228 
C(5) -0.077129 0.098058 -0.786567 0.4362 
C(6) 0.410831 0.125596 3.271044 0.0022 
C(7) 0.161097 0.113667 1.417276 0.1641 
C(8) -0.507807 0.182433 -2.783525 0.0082 
          
R-squared 0.274677    Mean dependent var 0.112415 
Adjusted R-squared 0.147746    S.D. dependent var 0.253233 
S.E. of regression 0.233778    Akaike info criterion 0.082125 
Sum squared resid 2.186092    Schwarz criterion 0.393992 
Log likelihood 6.029005    Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.199980 
F-statistic 2.163980    Durbin-Watson stat 2.098400 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.058514    
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Residual Diagnostics Tests 
Table A25. Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test: 
  
          
F-statistic 0.291647    Prob. F(2,38) 0.7487 
Obs*R-squared 0.725654    Prob. Chi-Square(2) 0.6957 
          
     
Test Equation:    
Dependent Variable: RESID   
Presample missing value lagged residuals set to zero. 
          
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C(1) 0.004124 0.042275 0.097554 0.9228 
C(2) 0.210095 0.317206 0.662329 0.5118 
C(3) -0.007381 0.107251 -0.068816 0.9455 
C(4) 0.024229 0.143848 0.168436 0.8671 
C(5) -0.015722 0.102710 -0.153067 0.8792 
C(6) -0.042401 0.140237 -0.302353 0.7640 
C(7) -0.010899 0.117794 -0.092524 0.9268 
C(8) 0.053786 0.199585 0.269487 0.7890 
RESID(-1) -0.263336 0.347266 -0.758311 0.4529 
RESID(-2) -0.026242 0.165578 -0.158485 0.8749 
          
R-squared 0.015118    Mean dependent var 4.34E-18 
Adjusted R-squared -0.218144    S.D. dependent var 0.215668 
S.E. of regression 0.238032    Akaike info criterion 0.150225 
Sum squared resid 2.153043    Schwarz criterion 0.540058 
Log likelihood 6.394602    Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.297544 
F-statistic 0.064810    Durbin-Watson stat 1.897038 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.999918    
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Table A26. Heteroskedasticity Test: Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey 
 
          
F-statistic 1.126837    Prob. F(9,38) 0.3684 
Obs*R-squared 10.11172    Prob. Chi-Square(9) 0.3415 
Scaled explained SS 27.66517    Prob. Chi-Square(9) 0.0011 
          
     
Test Equation:    
Dependent Variable: RESID^2   
Method: Least Squares   
Included observations: 48   
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C 0.146319 0.128687 1.137019 0.2626 
LMAN(-1) -0.052869 0.088464 -0.597632 0.5536 
LCAPEXP(-1) 0.077162 0.063820 1.209046 0.2341 
LRECEXP(-1) -0.024824 0.077176 -0.321650 0.7495 
LMAN(-2) 0.029041 0.084062 0.345477 0.7316 
LCAPEXP(-2) -0.055630 0.065152 -0.853850 0.3985 
LRECEXP(-2) 8.49E-05 0.077265 0.001099 0.9991 
POLREG 0.121878 0.070283 1.734102 0.0910 
OPECM 0.131824 0.083754 1.573941 0.1238 
DEMOC -0.109933 0.124818 -0.880741 0.3840 
          
R-squared 0.210661    Mean dependent var 0.045544 
Adjusted R-squared 0.023712    S.D. dependent var 0.129196 
S.E. of regression 0.127655    Akaike info criterion -1.095917 
Sum squared resid 0.619241    Schwarz criterion -0.706084 
Log likelihood 36.30202    Hannan-Quinn criter. -0.948599 
F-statistic 1.126837    Durbin-Watson stat 2.508856 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.368373    
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Table A27. VAR Lag Order Selection Criteria for the Reduced Form Model 
  Containing Four Variables 
Endogenous variables: LMAN LCAPEXP  
Exogenous variables: POLREG OPECM 
       
        Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
              
0 -176.4951 NA   8.775533  7.847612  8.006624  7.907179 
1 -17.03152   291.1943*  0.010188  1.088327   1.406352*  1.207461* 
2 -12.78076  7.392627  0.010099  1.077424  1.554461  1.256125 
3 -7.217332  9.191750   0.009474*  1.009449*  1.645498  1.247717 
4 -4.058690  4.943960  0.009896  1.046030  1.841091  1.343865 
       
       
 * indicates lag order selected by the criterion    
 LR: sequential modified LR test statistic (each test at 5% level)   
 FPE: Final prediction error     
 AIC: Akaike information criterion     
 SC: Schwarz information criterion     
 HQ: Hannan-Quinn information criterion    
       
Table A28. Cointegration Tests for the Reduced Form Model   
  Containing Four Variables 
 
 
Trend assumption: Linear deterministic trend  
Series: LMAN LCAPEXP    
Exogenous series: POLREG OPECM    
Lags interval (in first differences): 1 to 1  
     
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace)  
          
Hypothesized  Trace 0.05  
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.** 
          
None  0.231215  13.36825  15.49471  0.1020 
At most 1  0.015441  0.746928  3.841466  0.3874 
          
 Trace test indicates no cointegration at the 0.05 level 
     
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Maximum Eigenvalue) 
          
Hypothesized  Max-Eigen 0.05  
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.** 
          
None  0.231215  12.62132  14.26460  0.0894 
At most 1  0.015441  0.746928  3.841466  0.3874 
          
 Max-eigenvalue test indicates no cointegration at the 0.05 level 
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level 
 **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values  
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Table A29. VAR Lag Order Selection Criteria for the Reduced Form Model 
  Containing Three Variables 
 
 
Endogenous variables: LMAN LCAPEXP     
Exogenous variables:  POLREG      
              
 Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
              
0 -230.2473 NA   83.25999  10.09771  10.17721  10.12749 
1 -19.45633   394.0875*  0.010373  1.106797   1.345315*  1.196147* 
2 -14.70880  8.462981  0.010055  1.074296  1.471827  1.223213 
3 -10.48036  7.169977   0.009985*  1.064363*  1.620906  1.272848 
4 -8.147330  3.753128  0.010795  1.136840  1.852396  1.404892 
       
        * indicates lag order selected by the criterion    
 LR: sequential modified LR test statistic (each test at 5% level)   
 FPE: Final prediction error     
 AIC: Akaike information criterion     
 SC: Schwarz information criterion     
 HQ: Hannan-Quinn information criterion    
       
 
Table A30. Cointegration Tests for the Reduced Form Model   
  Containing Four Variables 
 
Trend assumption: Linear deterministic trend  
Series: LMAN LCAPEXP    
Exogenous series: POLREG    
Lags interval (in first differences): 1 to 1  
     
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace)  
          
Hypothesized  Trace 0.05  
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.** 
          
None  0.087247  5.214043  15.49471  0.7857 
At most 1  0.017186  0.832120  3.841466  0.3617 
          
 Trace test indicates no cointegration at the 0.05 level 
     
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Maximum Eigenvalue) 
          
Hypothesized  Max-Eigen 0.05  
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.** 
     
     
None  0.087247  4.381923  14.26460  0.8170 
At most 1  0.017186  0.832120  3.841466  0.3617 
          
 Max-eigenvalue test indicates no cointegration at the 0.05 level 
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level 
 **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values  
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Table A31. VAR Lag Order Selection Criteria for the Reduced Form Model 
  Containing Three Variables 
 
Endogenous variables: LMAN LCAPEXP     
Exogenous variables:  DEMOC      
              
 Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
       
       
0 -220.2084 NA   53.81177  9.661233  9.740739  9.691016 
1 -21.53204   371.4383*  0.011352*  1.197045*  1.435564*  1.286396* 
2 -18.96087  4.583387  0.012096  1.259168  1.656699  1.408086 
3 -16.93467  3.435736  0.013220  1.344986  1.901529  1.553470 
4 -13.26840  5.897919  0.013487  1.359495  2.075051  1.627547 
              
 * indicates lag order selected by the criterion    
 LR: sequential modified LR test statistic (each test at 5% level)   
 FPE: Final prediction error     
 AIC: Akaike information criterion     
 SC: Schwarz information criterion     
 HQ: Hannan-Quinn information criterion    
       
 
Table A32. Cointegration Tests for the Reduced Form Model   
  Containing Three Variables 
 
Trend assumption: Linear deterministic trend  
Series: LMAN LCAPEXP    
Exogenous series: DEMOC    
Lags interval (in first differences): 1 to 1  
     
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace)  
     
     Hypothesized  Trace 0.05  
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.** 
          
None  0.080819  4.405301  15.49471  0.8682 
At most 1  0.007477  0.360222  3.841466  0.5484 
     
     
 Trace test indicates no cointegration at the 0.05 level 
 
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Maximum Eigenvalue) 
     
     
Hypothesized  Max-Eigen 0.05  
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.** 
          
None  0.080819  4.045078  14.26460  0.8546 
At most 1  0.007477  0.360222  3.841466  0.5484 
          
 Max-eigenvalue test indicates no cointegration at the 0.05 level 
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level 
 **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values  
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Section B. VEC estimates and Diagnostic Tests for the Models   
   where Agriculture is the Dependent Variable 
 
 
Table B1 VAR Lag Order Selection Criteria for the Specified Model  
  Containing Eight Variables 
 
Endogenous variables: LAGRIC LOIL LCAPEXP LRECEXP LMAN  
Exogenous variables: POLREG OPECM DEMOC  
       
        Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
              
0 -210.5561 NA   0.012504  9.806785  10.40308  10.03016 
1  18.78080   378.9044*   1.76e-06*   0.922574*  2.512697*  1.518244* 
2  35.26842  23.65615  2.71e-06  1.292678  3.876627  2.260641 
3  64.77944  35.92647  2.57e-06  1.096546  4.674323  2.436802 
4  93.60643  28.82698  2.86e-06  0.930155  5.501759  2.642705 
              
 * indicates lag order selected by the criterion    
 LR: sequential modified LR test statistic (each test at 5% level)   
 FPE: Final prediction error     
 AIC: Akaike information criterion     
 SC: Schwarz information criterion     
 HQ: Hannan-Quinn information criterion    
 
 
Table B2. VAR Estimates for the Specified Model Containing Eight  
  Variables 
     
 Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ]   
      
       LAGRIC LOIL LCAPEXP LRECEXP LMAN 
      
      
LAGRIC(-1)  0.431970 -0.587887  0.032774  0.039466 -0.214504 
  (0.14535)  (0.20238)  (0.16896)  (0.14102)  (0.11024) 
 [ 2.97194] [-2.90490] [ 0.19397] [ 0.27987] [-1.94583] 
      
LOIL(-1) -0.403046  0.239371  0.139813 -0.099094 -0.266028 
  (0.12140)  (0.16904)  (0.14112)  (0.11779)  (0.09208) 
 [-3.31988] [ 1.41608] [ 0.99072] [-0.84131] [-2.88919] 
      
LCAPEXP(-1) -0.013369  0.003449  0.687517  0.078196 -0.002128 
  (0.09467)  (0.13181)  (0.11004)  (0.09184)  (0.07180) 
 [-0.14122] [ 0.02617] [ 6.24774] [ 0.85139] [-0.02964] 
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LRECEXP(-1)  0.091473  0.102147  0.378732  0.858044  0.061743 
  (0.10932)  (0.15222)  (0.12708)  (0.10606)  (0.08291) 
 [ 0.83673] [ 0.67107] [ 2.98029] [ 8.08988] [ 0.74466] 
      
LMAN(-1)  1.037169  1.413968 -0.266535  0.155946  1.457894 
  (0.26952)  (0.37527)  (0.31330)  (0.26149)  (0.20442) 
 [ 3.84816] [ 3.76785] [-0.85073] [ 0.59638] [ 7.13202] 
      
POLREG  0.105162 -0.144629  0.197489 -0.218500  0.165662 
  (0.17380)  (0.24200)  (0.20203)  (0.16862)  (0.13182) 
 [ 0.60506] [-0.59765] [ 0.97751] [-1.29579] [ 1.25675] 
      
OPECM  0.363815  0.757134  0.111687  0.084223  0.499823 
  (0.23722)  (0.33029)  (0.27575)  (0.23015)  (0.17991) 
 [ 1.53368] [ 2.29233] [ 0.40503] [ 0.36595] [ 2.77813] 
      
DEMOC -0.067110  0.052856 -0.718498  0.427431 -0.205020 
  (0.29072)  (0.40479)  (0.33794)  (0.28206)  (0.22049) 
 [-0.23084] [ 0.13058] [-2.12610] [ 1.51542] [-0.92983] 
            
 R-squared  0.981612  0.982560  0.990621  0.993367  0.988097 
 Adj. R-squared  0.978472  0.979582  0.989019  0.992235  0.986065 
 Sum sq. resids  3.327493  6.450849  4.496198  3.132081  1.914041 
 S.E. equation  0.284883  0.396658  0.331155  0.276391  0.216065 
 F-statistic  312.6723  329.9788  618.6147  877.1800  486.2271 
 Log likelihood -3.632764 -19.85158 -11.00758 -2.149980  9.915798 
 Akaike AIC  0.474807  1.136799  0.775820  0.414285 -0.078196 
 Schwarz SC  0.783675  1.445668  1.084688  0.723154  0.230673 
 Mean dependent  10.20415  9.513874  9.302230  9.707750  8.338647 
 S.D. dependent  1.941645  2.775930  3.160208  3.136479  1.830340 
            
 Determinant resid covariance 
(dof adj.)  6.71E-07    
 Determinant resid covariance  2.75E-07    
 Log likelihood  22.46817    
 Akaike information criterion  0.715585    
 Schwarz criterion  2.259928    
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Table B3. VAR STABILITY TESTS 
(1)  Roots of Characteristic Polynomial 
Endogenous variables: LAGRIC LOIL LCAPEXP LRECEXP LMAN  
Exogenous variables: POLREG OPECM DEMOC  
Lag specification: 1 1 
    
     Root Modulus 
    
 0.993597  0.993597 
 0.907416  0.907416 
 0.783287  0.783287 
 0.553839  0.553839 
 0.436657  0.436657 
    
 No root lies outside the unit circle. 
 VAR satisfies the stability condition. 
 
 
 
(2) Figure B1.  Inverse Roots of AR Characteristic Polynomial 
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Table B4. VAR Residual Portmanteau Tests for Autocorrelations 
Null Hypothesis: no residual autocorrelations up to lag h  
            
Lags Q-Stat Prob. Adj Q-Stat Prob. df 
      
      
1  22.04737 NA*  22.50669 NA* NA* 
2  45.20924  0.0079  46.65417  0.0054 25 
3  74.30150  0.0145  77.64375  0.0074 50 
4  102.2534  0.0200  108.0802  0.0074 75 
5  125.3251  0.0441  133.7738  0.0136 100 
6  176.8490  0.0016  192.4871  0.0001 125 
7  209.5670  0.0010  230.6580  0.0000 150 
8  231.1867  0.0028  256.4962  0.0001 175 
9  249.4200  0.0100  278.8320  0.0002 200 
10  271.8809  0.0177  307.0522  0.0002 225 
11  285.5042  0.0608  324.6190  0.0010 250 
12  316.2333  0.0441  365.3143  0.0002 275 
      
      *The test is valid only for lags larger than the VAR lag order. 
df is degrees of freedom for (approximate) chi-square distribution 
*df and Prob. may not be valid for models with exogenous variables 
 
 
 
Table B5. VAR Residual Serial Correlation LM Tests 
 
Null Hypothesis: no serial correlation at lag order h 
      
Lags LM-Stat Prob 
   
   
1  25.77584  0.4196 
2  27.36273  0.3380 
3  27.99451  0.3081 
4  28.05238  0.3054 
5  22.64034  0.5986 
6  53.03289  0.0009 
7  34.81545  0.0916 
8  21.14165  0.6847 
9  17.14192  0.8766 
10  23.86579  0.5271 
11  14.57096  0.9508 
12  35.56642  0.0784 
      
Probabilities from chi-square with 25 degrees of freedom. 
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Figure B2. Residual Graphs of the variables in the VAR model 
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Table B6. Covariance Correlation Matrix for the Residuals of the  
  Economic Variables  
 
 LAGRIC LOIL LCAPEXP LRECEXP LMAN 
LAGRIC  0.081158  0.081814 -0.000905  0.009752  0.045010 
LOIL  0.081814  0.157338 -0.012647  0.024343  0.060681 
LCAPEXP -0.000905 -0.012647  0.109663  0.039393  0.003096 
LRECEXP  0.009752  0.024343  0.039393  0.076392  0.009007 
LMAN  0.045010  0.060681  0.003096  0.009007  0.046684 
Source: Created by author based on economic performance data from CBN Statistical Bulletin 
(2010) using Eviews Statistical Software 
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Figure B3 Correlograms for Autocorrelations in the Residuals of the  
  Estimated VAR Model  
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Table B7. Cointegration Tests for the Specified Model Containing Eight 
  Variables 
 
Trend assumption: Linear deterministic trend 
Series: LAGRIC LOIL LCAPEXP LRECEXP LMAN  
Exogenous series: POLREG OPECM DEMOC  
Warning: Critical values assume no exogenous series 
Lags interval (in first differences): 1 to 1 
  
  
  
  
  
      
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace)   
            
Hypothesized  Trace 0.05   
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.**  
            
None *  0.520030  80.69037  69.81889  0.0053  
At most 1  0.348759  45.45689  47.85613  0.0826  
At most 2  0.290124  24.87088  29.79707  0.1661  
At most 3  0.158849  8.422994  15.49471  0.4213  
At most 4  0.002492  0.119747  3.841466  0.7293  
      
      
 Trace test indicates 1 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level  
      
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Maximum Eigenvalue)  
            
Hypothesized  Max-Eigen 0.05   
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.**  
      
      
None *  0.520030  35.23349  33.87687  0.0343  
At most 1  0.348759  20.58601  27.58434  0.3020  
At most 2  0.290124  16.44788  21.13162  0.1998  
At most 3  0.158849  8.303247  14.26460  0.3487  
At most 4  0.002492  0.119747  3.841466  0.7293  
            
 Max-eigenvalue test indicates 1 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level  
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level  
 **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values   
      
      Source: Created by author based on data from CBN Statistical Bulletin (2010) and constructed 
dummy variables using Eviews Statistical Software 
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Table B8. VEC Estimates for the Specified Model Containing Eight  
   Variables 
 
    
 Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ]   
            
Cointegrating Eq:  CointEq1     
            
LAGRIC(-1)  1.000000     
      
LOIL(-1) -3.363739     
  (0.85344)     
 [-3.94140]     
      
LCAPEXP(-1)  1.779968     
  (0.45852)     
 [ 3.88195]     
      
LRECEXP(-1) -2.464531     
  (0.47134)     
 [-5.22876]     
      
LMAN(-1)  4.373811     
  (1.09150)     
 [ 4.00715]     
      
C -7.327189     
            
Error Correction: D(LAGRIC) D(LOIL) D(LCAPEXP) D(LRECEXP) D(LMAN) 
            
CointEq1 -0.004302  0.008187 -0.139847  0.030793 -0.066791 
  (0.04009)  (0.05914)  (0.04137)  (0.03738)  (0.02894) 
 [-0.10731] [ 0.13843] [-3.38042] [ 0.82380] [-2.30778] 
      
D(LAGRIC(-1)) -0.379812 -0.309534 -0.252788  0.117635 -0.098333 
  (0.25096)  (0.37023)  (0.25899)  (0.23401)  (0.18119) 
 [-1.51344] [-0.83605] [-0.97604] [ 0.50269] [-0.54271] 
      
D(LOIL(-1)) -0.146981 -0.283304  0.022280  0.093552 -0.268683 
  (0.20223)  (0.29834)  (0.20870)  (0.18857)  (0.14600) 
 [-0.72682] [-0.94961] [ 0.10676] [ 0.49612] [-1.84025] 
      
D(LCAPEXP(-1))  0.269941  0.280017 -0.111545  0.062880  0.151371 
  (0.14046)  (0.20722)  (0.14496)  (0.13097)  (0.10141) 
 [ 1.92181] [ 1.35131] [-0.76950] [ 0.48010] [ 1.49264] 
      
D(LRECEXP(-1))  0.172126  0.313156 -0.319946 -0.156210 -0.033530 
  (0.18662)  (0.27532)  (0.19260)  (0.17402)  (0.13474) 
 [ 0.92231] [ 1.13742] [-1.66120] [-0.89766] [-0.24885] 
      
D(LMAN(-1))  0.759584  0.865973  0.298534 -0.207401  0.445306 
  (0.33647)  (0.49638)  (0.34724)  (0.31374)  (0.24292) 
 [ 2.25753] [ 1.74458] [ 0.85974] [-0.66106] [ 1.83311] 
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C -0.206543  0.090173  0.561229  0.219685  0.155266 
  (0.18876)  (0.27847)  (0.19480)  (0.17601)  (0.13628) 
 [-1.09422] [ 0.32382] [ 2.88102] [ 1.24815] [ 1.13931] 
      
POLREG  0.432160  0.401388  0.273875 -0.187590  0.558278 
  (0.19701)  (0.29064)  (0.20332)  (0.18370)  (0.14224) 
 [ 2.19360] [ 1.38104] [ 1.34703] [-1.02116] [ 3.92496] 
      
OPECM  0.174936 -0.095630 -0.271593  0.012040 -0.123399 
  (0.19913)  (0.29378)  (0.20551)  (0.18568)  (0.14377) 
 [ 0.87849] [-0.32552] [-1.32157] [ 0.06484] [-0.85830] 
      
DEMOC -0.401057 -0.491322 -0.641450  0.271861 -0.661375 
  (0.25212)  (0.37195)  (0.26020)  (0.23509)  (0.18203) 
 [-1.59071] [-1.32093] [-2.46525] [ 1.15639] [-3.63333] 
      
      
 R-squared  0.386237  0.299407  0.384880  0.081738  0.395804 
 Adj. R-squared  0.240872  0.133477  0.239194 -0.135745  0.252704 
 Sum sq. resids  3.493495  7.603338  3.720774  3.037501  1.821022 
 S.E. equation  0.303206  0.447312  0.312914  0.282726  0.218910 
 F-statistic  2.657018  1.804418  2.641846  0.375838  2.765939 
 Log likelihood -5.221892 -23.88632 -6.734589 -1.865068  10.41422 
 Akaike AIC  0.634245  1.411930  0.697275  0.494378 -0.017259 
 Schwarz SC  1.024079  1.801764  1.087108  0.884211  0.372574 
 Mean dependent  0.110092  0.174006  0.198673  0.213764  0.112415 
 S.D. dependent  0.348001  0.480530  0.358747  0.265293  0.253233 
      
      
 Determinant resid covariance (dof 
adj.)  7.73E-07    
 Determinant resid covariance  2.40E-07    
 Log likelihood  25.24852    
 Akaike information criterion  1.239645    
 Schwarz criterion  3.383729    
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Diagnostic Tests  
Table B9. VEC Residual Portmanteau Tests for Autocorrelations 
Null Hypothesis: no residual autocorrelations up to lag h  
            
Lags Q-Stat Prob. Adj Q-Stat Prob. df 
            
1  6.796564 NA*  6.941172 NA* NA* 
2  25.94972  0.9898  26.92707  0.9850 45 
3  52.52506  0.9411  55.27410  0.9009 70 
4  76.64355  0.9161  81.58519  0.8350 95 
5  99.27215  0.9162  106.8450  0.7992 120 
6  133.1710  0.7502  145.5866  0.4707 145 
7  170.8380  0.4675  189.6846  0.1435 170 
8  190.8538  0.5705  213.7034  0.1706 195 
9  211.0637  0.6554  238.5772  0.1858 220 
10  225.2059  0.8130  256.4411  0.2949 245 
11  238.4368  0.9171  273.6054  0.4273 270 
12  264.7392  0.8968  308.6753  0.2803 295 
            
*The test is valid only for lags larger than the VAR lag order. 
df is degrees of freedom for (approximate) chi-square distribution 
*df and Prob. may not be valid for models with exogenous variables 
      
 
Table B10. VEC Residual Serial Correlation LM Tests 
 
Null Hypothesis: no serial correlation at lag order h 
   
   Lags LM-Stat Prob 
   
   
1  26.13501  0.4004 
2  18.89275  0.8022 
3  26.07756  0.4035 
4  22.40211  0.6124 
5  21.70872  0.6525 
6  33.66911  0.1152 
7  44.06552  0.0107 
8  26.38459  0.3873 
9  20.51235  0.7195 
10  15.30387  0.9340 
11  14.92409  0.9431 
12  27.85334  0.3146 
      
Probabilities from chi-square with 25 degrees of freedom. 
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Table B11. Estimated Model where Agriculture is the Dependent  
  Variable  
 
Dependent Variable: D(LAGRIC)   
Method: Least Squares   
D(LAGRIC) = C(1)*( LAGRIC(-1) - 3.36373942901*LOIL(-1) + 1.779967698 
        *LCAPEXP(-1) - 2.46453054445*LRECEXP(-1) + 4.37381072328 
        *LMAN(-1) - 7.32718937015 ) + C(2)*D(LAGRIC(-1)) + C(3)*D(LOIL(-1)) 
        + C(4)*D(LCAPEXP(-1)) + C(5)*D(LRECEXP(-1)) + C(6)*D(LMAN(-1)) + 
        C(7) + C(8)*POLREG + C(9)*OPECM + C(10)*DEMOC 
     
      Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
          
C(1) -0.004302 0.040086 -0.107306 0.9151 
C(2) -0.379812 0.250960 -1.513437 0.1384 
C(3) -0.146981 0.202226 -0.726817 0.4718 
C(4) 0.269941 0.140462 1.921811 0.0622 
C(5) 0.172126 0.186624 0.922315 0.3622 
C(6) 0.759584 0.336467 2.257529 0.0298 
C(7) -0.206543 0.188759 -1.094218 0.2807 
C(8) 0.432160 0.197010 2.193597 0.0345 
C(9) 0.174936 0.199133 0.878490 0.3852 
C(10) -0.401057 0.252124 -1.590711 0.1200 
     
     
R-squared 0.386237    Mean dependent var 0.110092 
Adjusted R-squared 0.240872    S.D. dependent var 0.348001 
S.E. of regression 0.303206    Akaike info criterion 0.634245 
Sum squared resid 3.493495    Schwarz criterion 1.024079 
Log likelihood -5.221892    Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.781564 
F-statistic 2.657018    Durbin-Watson stat 2.214855 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.017003    
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Diagnostic Tests 
Table B12. Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test: 
 
  
     
     F-statistic 1.128964    Prob. F(2,36) 0.3345 
Obs*R-squared 2.832892    Prob. Chi-Square(2) 0.2426 
          
     
Test Equation:    
Dependent Variable: RESID   
Method: Least Squares   
Presample missing value lagged residuals set to zero. 
          
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C(1) -0.001153 0.040053 -0.028776 0.9772 
C(2) 0.316495 0.333471 0.949091 0.3489 
C(3) -0.043706 0.204063 -0.214181 0.8316 
C(4) -0.028288 0.141796 -0.199500 0.8430 
C(5) 0.072205 0.192107 0.375858 0.7092 
C(6) -0.019385 0.338558 -0.057257 0.9547 
C(7) 0.025574 0.188900 0.135382 0.8931 
C(8) -0.114389 0.210602 -0.543155 0.5904 
C(9) -0.048770 0.202762 -0.240526 0.8113 
C(10) 0.098801 0.259803 0.380293 0.7060 
RESID(-1) -0.395033 0.295118 -1.338560 0.1891 
RESID(-2) -0.146629 0.178211 -0.822781 0.4160 
     
     
R-squared 0.059019    Mean dependent var 6.64E-17 
Adjusted R-squared -0.228504    S.D. dependent var 0.272635 
S.E. of regression 0.302183    Akaike info criterion 0.656747 
Sum squared resid 3.287314    Schwarz criterion 1.124547 
Log likelihood -3.761926    Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.833529 
F-statistic 0.205266    Durbin-Watson stat 1.944812 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.996151    
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Table B13. Heteroskedasticity Test: Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey 
          
F-statistic 4.885503    Prob. F(13,34) 0.0001 
Obs*R-squared 31.26352    Prob. Chi-Square(13) 0.0031 
Scaled explained SS 102.6581    Prob. Chi-Square(13) 0.0000 
          
     
Test Equation:    
Dependent Variable: RESID^2   
Method: Least Squares   
Included observations: 48   
          
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
          
C 1.095353 0.355251 3.083319 0.0040 
LAGRIC(-1) -0.497139 0.149299 -3.329823 0.0021 
LOIL(-1) -0.066245 0.116931 -0.566527 0.5748 
LCAPEXP(-1) 0.114634 0.089962 1.274258 0.2112 
LRECEXP(-1) 0.121704 0.106053 1.147578 0.2592 
LMAN(-1) 0.232776 0.201463 1.155428 0.2560 
LAGRIC(-2) -0.160898 0.162339 -0.991123 0.3286 
LOIL(-2) 0.017106 0.116431 0.146919 0.8841 
LCAPEXP(-2) -0.185121 0.089393 -2.070879 0.0460 
LRECEXP(-2) -0.012615 0.106856 -0.118057 0.9067 
LMAN(-2) 0.461430 0.252075 1.830525 0.0759 
POLREG 0.333475 0.126148 2.643515 0.0123 
OPECM -0.165052 0.201042 -0.820980 0.4174 
DEMOC -0.093484 0.183805 -0.508603 0.6143 
          
R-squared 0.651323    Mean dependent var 0.072781 
Adjusted R-squared 0.518006    S.D. dependent var 0.238090 
S.E. of regression 0.165296    Akaike info criterion -0.523668 
Sum squared resid 0.928972    Schwarz criterion 0.022099 
Log likelihood 26.56803    Hannan-Quinn criter. -0.317422 
F-statistic 4.885503    Durbin-Watson stat 2.533360 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000098    
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Table B14. VAR Lag Order Selection Criteria for the Reduced Form Model 
  Containing Seven Variables 
 
Endogenous variables: LAGRIC LCAPEXP LRECEXP LMAN  
Exogenous variables: POLREG OPECM DEMOC  
              
 Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
            
0 -191.2681 NA   0.081023  8.837744  9.314781  9.016445 
1  6.663944   335.6239*   3.00e-05*   0.927655*  2.040741*  1.344623* 
2  20.18572  20.57661  3.44e-05  1.035404  2.784539  1.690640 
3  33.03368  17.31682  4.19e-05  1.172449  3.557633  2.065953 
4  44.65998  13.64827  5.66e-05  1.362610  4.383843  2.494382 
       
       
 * indicates lag order selected by the criterion    
 LR: sequential modified LR test statistic (each test at 5% level)   
 FPE: Final prediction error     
 AIC: Akaike information criterion     
 SC: Schwarz information criterion     
 HQ: Hannan-Quinn information criterion    
       
 
Table B15. Cointegration Tests for the Reduced Form Model Containing 
  Seven Variables 
 
 
Trend assumption: Linear deterministic trend  
Series: LAGRIC LCAPEXP LRECEXP LMAN    
Exogenous series: POLREG OPECM DEMOC    
Warning: Critical values assume no exogenous series  
Lags interval (in first differences): 1 to 1  
     
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace)  
          
Hypothesized  Trace 0.05  
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.** 
          
None *  0.415993  53.07673  47.85613  0.0149 
At most 1  0.323328  27.26033  29.79707  0.0954 
At most 2  0.159275  8.513056  15.49471  0.4123 
At most 3  0.003858  0.185525  3.841466  0.6667 
          
 Trace test indicates 1 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level 
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Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Maximum Eigenvalue) 
          
Hypothesized  Max-Eigen 0.05  
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.** 
     
     
None  0.415993  25.81640  27.58434  0.0827 
At most 1  0.323328  18.74727  21.13162  0.1044 
At most 2  0.159275  8.327530  14.26460  0.3464 
At most 3  0.003858  0.185525  3.841466  0.6667 
     
      Max-eigenvalue test indicates no cointegration at the 0.05 level 
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level 
 **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values  
     
 
Table B16. VEC Estimates for the Reduced Form Model Containing Seven 
  Variables 
 
 Vector Error Correction Estimates   
 Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ]  
          
Cointegrating Eq:  CointEq1    
          
LAGRIC(-1)  1.000000    
     
LCAPEXP(-1)  0.549845    
  (0.20966)    
 [ 2.62250]    
     
LRECEXP(-1) -0.984944    
  (0.22341)    
 [-4.40876]    
     
LMAN(-1) -0.314243    
  (0.17520)    
 [-1.79361]    
     
C -3.155361    
          
Error Correction: D(LAGRIC) D(LCAPEXP) D(LRECEXP) D(LMAN) 
          
CointEq1 -0.051495 -0.286018  0.034269 -0.178978 
  (0.09209)  (0.10290)  (0.08612)  (0.06519) 
 [-0.55916] [-2.77955] [ 0.39792] [-2.74551] 
     
D(LAGRIC(-1)) -0.410652  0.028774  0.147556 -0.082610 
  (0.23719)  (0.26503)  (0.22181)  (0.16790) 
 [-1.73130] [ 0.10857] [ 0.66524] [-0.49202] 
     
D(LCAPEXP(-1))  0.286322 -0.240922  0.068205  0.134530 
  (0.13626)  (0.15225)  (0.12742)  (0.09645) 
 [ 2.10126] [-1.58240] [ 0.53527] [ 1.39477] 
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D(LRECEXP(-1))  0.119876 -0.190147 -0.174318 -0.059779 
  (0.17863)  (0.19959)  (0.16704)  (0.12644) 
 [ 0.67110] [-0.95271] [-1.04357] [-0.47278] 
     
D(LMAN(-1))  0.560176  0.018302 -0.105669  0.009112 
  (0.32709)  (0.36547)  (0.30588)  (0.23153) 
 [ 1.71259] [ 0.05008] [-0.34546] [ 0.03935] 
     
C -0.250175  0.203305  0.323383 -0.079493 
  (0.12667)  (0.14154)  (0.11846)  (0.08966) 
 [-1.97499] [ 1.43643] [ 2.73000] [-0.88655] 
     
POLREG  0.454612 -0.105864 -0.110851  0.430814 
  (0.15823)  (0.17680)  (0.14797)  (0.11200) 
 [ 2.87311] [-0.59879] [-0.74917] [ 3.84644] 
     
OPECM  0.234288  0.224814 -0.110098  0.185955 
  (0.13614)  (0.15211)  (0.12731)  (0.09637) 
 [ 1.72097] [ 1.47795] [-0.86482] [ 1.92969] 
     
DEMOC -0.428367 -0.277101  0.166794 -0.526296 
  (0.19629)  (0.21932)  (0.18356)  (0.13895) 
 [-2.18230] [-1.26343] [ 0.90867] [-3.78779] 
          
 R-squared  0.381221  0.273069  0.068904  0.414477 
 Adj. R-squared  0.254292  0.123955 -0.122090  0.294369 
 Sum sq. resids  3.522047  4.397107  3.079956  1.764742 
 S.E. equation  0.300514  0.335777  0.281022  0.212720 
 F-statistic  3.003419  1.831277  0.360765  3.450884 
 Log likelihood -5.417241 -10.74295 -2.198191  11.16766 
 Akaike AIC  0.600718  0.822623  0.466591 -0.090319 
 Schwarz SC  0.951569  1.173473  0.817441  0.260531 
 Mean dependent  0.110092  0.198673  0.213764  0.112415 
 S.D. dependent  0.348001  0.358747  0.265293  0.253233 
          
 Determinant resid covariance (dof adj.)  1.29E-05   
 Determinant resid covariance  5.61E-06   
 Log likelihood  17.74030   
 Akaike information criterion  0.927487   
 Schwarz criterion  2.486822   
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Diagnostic Tests  
 
Table B17. VEC Residual Portmanteau Tests for Autocorrelations 
 
  
Null Hypothesis: no residual autocorrelations up to lag h  
            
Lags Q-Stat Prob. Adj Q-Stat Prob. df 
      
      
1  2.866100 NA*  2.927081 NA* NA* 
2  12.12537  0.9960  12.58893  0.9946 28 
3  28.61116  0.9649  30.17377  0.9443 44 
4  46.61022  0.8971  49.80911  0.8231 60 
5  59.62465  0.9166  64.33684  0.8275 76 
6  85.23746  0.6779  93.60863  0.4337 92 
7  110.9735  0.4029  123.7386  0.1428 108 
8  125.8477  0.4368  141.5877  0.1335 124 
9  139.2607  0.5018  158.0959  0.1406 140 
10  152.2267  0.5705  174.4740  0.1481 156 
11  162.5926  0.6846  187.9218  0.1924 172 
12  175.0351  0.7422  204.5118  0.1944 188 
            
*The test is valid only for lags larger than the VAR lag order. 
df is degrees of freedom for (approximate) chi-square distribution 
*df and Prob. may not be valid for models with exogenous variables 
      
 
Table B18. VEC Residual Serial Correlation LM Tests 
 
 
Null Hypothesis: no serial correlation at lag order h 
      
Lags LM-Stat Prob 
   
   
1  14.30940  0.5757 
2  9.075281  0.9103 
3  16.34918  0.4289 
4  16.71883  0.4040 
5  12.83397  0.6849 
6  26.19697  0.0513 
7  28.73302  0.0258 
8  15.85599  0.4631 
9  13.30431  0.6504 
10  13.83753  0.6108 
11  11.65915  0.7671 
12  12.82229  0.6857 
   
   Probabilities from chi-square with 16 degrees of freedom. 
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Table B19. Dependent Variable: D(LAGRIC) 
 
D(LAGRIC) = C(1)*( LAGRIC(-1) + 0.549844849117*LCAPEXP(-1) - 
        0.984944408279*LRECEXP(-1) - 0.31424253801*LMAN(-1) - 
        3.15536075609 ) + C(2)*D(LAGRIC(-1)) + C(3)*D(LCAPEXP(-1)) + C(4) 
        *D(LRECEXP(-1)) + C(5)*D(LMAN(-1)) + C(6) + C(7)*POLREG + C(8) 
        *OPECM + C(9)*DEMOC   
     
      Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
          
C(1) -0.051495 0.092094 -0.559158 0.5793 
C(2) -0.410652 0.237193 -1.731296 0.0913 
C(3) 0.286322 0.136262 2.101263 0.0421 
C(4) 0.119876 0.178625 0.671100 0.5061 
C(5) 0.560176 0.327092 1.712595 0.0947 
C(6) -0.250175 0.126672 -1.974988 0.0554 
C(7) 0.454612 0.158230 2.873114 0.0065 
C(8) 0.234288 0.136137 1.720967 0.0932 
C(9) -0.428367 0.196292 -2.182301 0.0352 
     
     
R-squared 0.381221    Mean dependent var 0.110092 
Adjusted R-squared 0.254292    S.D. dependent var 0.348001 
S.E. of regression 0.300514    Akaike info criterion 0.600718 
Sum squared resid 3.522047    Schwarz criterion 0.951569 
Log likelihood -5.417241    Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.733305 
F-statistic 3.003419    Durbin-Watson stat 2.172938 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.010059    
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Diagnostic Tests 
Table B20. Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test: 
 
  
          
F-statistic 0.737782    Prob. F(2,37) 0.4851 
Obs*R-squared 1.840832    Prob. Chi-Square(2) 0.3984 
          
     
Test Equation:    
Dependent Variable: RESID   
Method: Least Squares   
Included observations: 48   
Presample missing value lagged residuals set to zero. 
          
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
          
C(1) 0.037719 0.097784 0.385740 0.7019 
C(2) 0.218605 0.306008 0.714376 0.4795 
C(3) -0.029100 0.139471 -0.208646 0.8359 
C(4) 0.085682 0.193227 0.443426 0.6600 
C(5) 0.001609 0.334948 0.004805 0.9962 
C(6) 0.010788 0.127861 0.084373 0.9332 
C(7) -0.100947 0.179766 -0.561546 0.5778 
C(8) -0.045260 0.143891 -0.314545 0.7549 
C(9) 0.117954 0.220772 0.534282 0.5963 
RESID(-1) -0.352329 0.312407 -1.127788 0.2667 
RESID(-2) -0.097495 0.178657 -0.545709 0.5885 
          
R-squared 0.038351    Mean dependent var -1.31E-16 
Adjusted R-squared -0.221555    S.D. dependent var 0.273747 
S.E. of regression 0.302556    Akaike info criterion 0.644946 
Sum squared resid 3.386974    Schwarz criterion 1.073763 
Log likelihood -4.478711    Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.806997 
F-statistic 0.147556    Durbin-Watson stat 1.934482 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.998593    
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Table B21. Heteroskedasticity Test: Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey 
 
          
F-statistic 6.405539    Prob. F(11,36) 0.0000 
Obs*R-squared 31.76869    Prob. Chi-Square(11) 0.0008 
Scaled explained SS 116.2527    Prob. Chi-Square(11) 0.0000 
          
     
Test Equation:    
Dependent Variable: RESID^2   
Method: Least Squares   
Included observations: 48   
          
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C 1.190026 0.299734 3.970270 0.0003 
LAGRIC(-1) -0.532184 0.130774 -4.069496 0.0002 
LCAPEXP(-1) 0.136086 0.084995 1.601102 0.1181 
LRECEXP(-1) 0.110042 0.101206 1.087309 0.2841 
LMAN(-1) 0.157696 0.178367 0.884113 0.3825 
LAGRIC(-2) -0.139819 0.146918 -0.951680 0.3476 
LCAPEXP(-2) -0.222182 0.084322 -2.634909 0.0123 
LRECEXP(-2) 0.012295 0.102589 0.119849 0.9053 
LMAN(-2) 0.491737 0.211203 2.328271 0.0256 
POLREG 0.404394 0.090378 4.474490 0.0001 
OPECM -0.216441 0.141730 -1.527140 0.1355 
DEMOC -0.145159 0.162546 -0.893030 0.3778 
          
R-squared 0.661848    Mean dependent var 0.073376 
Adjusted R-squared 0.558523    S.D. dependent var 0.246899 
S.E. of regression 0.164049    Akaike info criterion -0.564988 
Sum squared resid 0.968832    Schwarz criterion -0.097188 
Log likelihood 25.55972    Hannan-Quinn criter. -0.388206 
F-statistic 6.405539    Durbin-Watson stat 2.568672 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000009    
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Table B22. VAR Lag Order Selection Criteria for the Reduced Form Model 
  Containing  Six Variables  
 
Endogenous variables: LAGRIC LCAPEXP LRECEXP 
Exogenous variables: POLREG OPECM DEMOC 
       
        Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
              
0 -195.1289 NA   1.436333  8.875168  9.232946  9.009194 
1 -22.16117   300.8134*  0.001156*  1.746138*  2.461693*  2.014189* 
2 -15.66936  10.44335  0.001303  1.855189  2.928522  2.257266 
3 -11.59363  6.024979  0.001649  2.069288  3.500399  2.605391 
4 -4.452620  9.624846  0.001856  2.150114  3.939002  2.820242 
       
       
 * indicates lag order selected by the criterion    
 LR: sequential modified LR test statistic (each test at 5% level)   
 FPE: Final prediction error     
 AIC: Akaike information criterion     
 SC: Schwarz information criterion     
 HQ: Hannan-Quinn information criterion    
   
 
 
    
Table B23. VAR Estimates for the Reduced Form Model    
  Containing  Six Variables  
 
 Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ] 
    
     LAGRIC LCAPEXP LRECEXP 
        
LAGRIC(-1)  0.922388 -0.071121  0.089691 
  (0.05242)  (0.05281)  (0.04394) 
 [ 17.5956] [-1.34682] [ 2.04124] 
    
LCAPEXP(-1)  0.028006  0.701901  0.057842 
  (0.09108)  (0.09175)  (0.07634) 
 [ 0.30749] [ 7.65007] [ 0.75765] 
    
LRECEXP(-1)  0.041635  0.373583  0.869625 
  (0.11675)  (0.11761)  (0.09786) 
 [ 0.35662] [ 3.17655] [ 8.88656] 
    
POLREG  0.445375  0.071445 -0.126327 
  (0.15223)  (0.15335)  (0.12760) 
 [ 2.92568] [ 0.46590] [-0.99004] 
    
OPECM  0.250537  0.223428 -0.020585 
  (0.19827)  (0.19972)  (0.16619) 
 [ 1.26363] [ 1.11869] [-0.12387] 
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DEMOC -0.598356 -0.553203  0.316990 
  (0.28755)  (0.28966)  (0.24102) 
 [-2.08087] [-1.90982] [ 1.31518] 
        
 R-squared  0.974925  0.990395  0.993249 
 Adj. R-squared  0.972009  0.989278  0.992464 
 Sum sq. resids  4.537574  4.604457  3.187950 
 S.E. equation  0.324846  0.327231  0.272284 
 F-statistic  334.3696  886.7494  1265.235 
 Log likelihood -11.23201 -11.59050 -2.583152 
 Akaike AIC  0.703347  0.717979  0.350333 
 Schwarz SC  0.934999  0.949631  0.581984 
 Mean dependent  10.20415  9.302230  9.707750 
 S.D. dependent  1.941645  3.160208  3.136479 
    
    
 Determinant resid covariance (dof adj.)  0.000668  
 Determinant resid covariance  0.000452  
 Log likelihood -19.86808  
 Akaike information criterion  1.545636  
 Schwarz criterion  2.240590  
    
     
 
 
Table B24. Cointegration Tests for the Reduced Form Model Containing 
  Six Variables 
 
Trend assumption: Linear deterministic trend  
Series: LAGRIC LCAPEXP LRECEXP    
Exogenous series: POLREG OPECM DEMOC    
Warning: Critical values assume no exogenous series  
Lags interval (in first differences): 1 to 1  
     
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace)  
     
     Hypothesized  Trace 0.05  
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.** 
     
          
None  0.344712  23.65811  29.79707  0.2153 
At most 1  0.064364  3.369487  15.49471  0.9476 
At most 2  0.003662  0.176118  3.841466  0.6747 
     
     
 Trace test indicates no cointegration at the 0.05 level 
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Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Maximum Eigenvalue) 
          
Hypothesized  Max-Eigen 0.05  
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.** 
          
None  0.344712  20.28862  21.13162  0.0653 
At most 1  0.064364  3.193369  14.26460  0.9330 
At most 2  0.003662  0.176118  3.841466  0.6747 
     
      Max-eigenvalue test indicates no cointegration at the 0.05 level 
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level 
 **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values  
     
 
 
 
Table B25. VAR Lag Order Selection Criteria for the Reduced Form Model 
    Containing  Five Variables 
 
Endogenous variables: LAGRIC LCAPEXP LRECEXP 
Exogenous variables: POLREG OPECM 
       
 Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
       
       
0 -222.1984 NA   4.088603  9.921670  10.16019  10.01102 
1 -29.69875   343.1516*  0.001405*  1.943424*  2.539720*  2.166800* 
2 -22.92619  11.18944  0.001561  2.040269  2.994343  2.397671 
3 -18.72507  6.393016  0.001957  2.248916  3.560767  2.740343 
4 -11.42569  10.15566  0.002174  2.322856  3.992485  2.948309 
       
       
 * indicates lag order selected by the criterion    
 LR: sequential modified LR test statistic (each test at 5% level)   
 FPE: Final prediction error     
 AIC: Akaike information criterion     
 SC: Schwarz information criterion     
 HQ: Hannan-Quinn information criterion    
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Table B26. VAR Estimates for the Reduced Form Model Containing  
  Five Variables 
 
 Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ] 
    
     LAGRIC LCAPEXP LRECEXP 
        
LAGRIC(-1)  1.011643  0.011399  0.042407 
  (0.03126)  (0.03126)  (0.02547) 
 [ 32.3664] [ 0.36468] [ 1.66505] 
    
LCAPEXP(-1)  0.075304  0.745630  0.032786 
  (0.09148)  (0.09148)  (0.07454) 
 [ 0.82320] [ 8.15057] [ 0.43984] 
    
LRECEXP(-1) -0.114131  0.229571  0.952145 
  (0.09292)  (0.09293)  (0.07572) 
 [-1.22826] [ 2.47046] [ 12.5752] 
    
POLREG  0.242314 -0.116292 -0.018752 
  (0.12118)  (0.12118)  (0.09874) 
 [ 1.99965] [-0.95963] [-0.18991] 
    
OPECM  0.344307  0.310122 -0.070262 
 (0.20025)  (0.20026)  (0.16317) 
[ 1.71937] [ 1.54858] [-0.43060] 
    
    
 R-squared  0.972400  0.989580  0.992977 
 Adj. R-squared  0.969891  0.988633  0.992339 
 Sum sq. resids  4.994498  4.995022  3.316187 
 S.E. equation  0.336914  0.336932  0.274532 
 F-statistic  387.5490  1044.669  1555.317 
 Log likelihood -13.58265 -13.58522 -3.549375 
 Akaike AIC  0.758475  0.758580  0.348954 
 Schwarz SC  0.951518  0.951623  0.541997 
 Mean dependent  10.20415  9.302230  9.707750 
 S.D. dependent  1.941645  3.160208  3.136479 
        
 Determinant resid covariance (dof adj.)  0.000863  
 Determinant resid covariance  0.000625  
 Log likelihood -27.81840  
 Akaike information criterion  1.747690  
 Schwarz criterion  2.326818  
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Table B27. Cointegration Tests for the Reduced Form Model   
  Containing  Five Variables 
 
 
Trend assumption: Linear deterministic trend  
Series: LAGRIC LCAPEXP LRECEXP    
Exogenous series: POLREG OPECM    
Warning: Critical values assume no exogenous series  
Lags interval (in first differences): 1 to 1  
     
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace)  
          
Hypothesized  Trace 0.05  
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.** 
     
     
None  0.207610  20.02662  29.79707  0.4211 
At most 1  0.167666  8.856936  15.49471  0.3788 
At most 2  0.000998  0.047927  3.841466  0.8267 
          
      Trace test indicates no cointegration at the 0.05 level 
     
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Maximum Eigenvalue) 
          
Hypothesized  Max-Eigen 0.05  
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.** 
     
     
None  0.207610  11.16968  21.13162  0.6303 
At most 1  0.167666  8.809009  14.26460  0.3024 
At most 2  0.000998  0.047927  3.841466  0.8267 
     
      Max-eigenvalue test indicates no cointegration at the 0.05 level 
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level 
 **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values  
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Table B28. VAR Lag Order Selection Criteria for the Reduced Form Model 
   Containing  Three Variables 
      
Endogenous variables: LAGRIC LCAPEXP     
Exogenous variables: POLREG     
              
 Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
       
       
0 -239.8979 NA   126.6670  10.51730  10.59681  10.54709 
1 -34.28603   384.4049*  0.019766  1.751566   1.990085*   1.840917* 
2 -29.45615  8.609780   0.019091*   1.715485*  2.113015  1.864402 
3 -27.29012  3.672834  0.020738  1.795223  2.351766  2.003707 
4 -24.67493  4.207039  0.022146  1.855432  2.570987  2.123483 
       
       
 * indicates lag order selected by the criterion    
 LR: sequential modified LR test statistic (each test at 5% level)   
 FPE: Final prediction error     
 AIC: Akaike information criterion     
 SC: Schwarz information criterion     
 HQ: Hannan-Quinn information criterion    
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Table B29. VAR Estimates for the Reduced Form Model Containing  
  Three Variables 
 
 Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ] 
      
 LAGRIC LCAPEXP 
      
LAGRIC(-1)  0.992998  0.044047 
  (0.02899)  (0.02976) 
 [ 34.2584] [ 1.47990] 
   
LCAPEXP(-1)  0.012798  0.978509 
  (0.03204)  (0.03290) 
 [ 0.39947] [ 29.7442] 
   
POLREG  0.123167 -0.160035 
  (0.11026)  (0.11322) 
 [ 1.11707] [-1.41351] 
      
 R-squared  0.969240  0.987756 
 Adj. R-squared  0.967902  0.987224 
 Sum sq. resids  5.566361  5.869237 
 S.E. equation  0.347862  0.357200 
 F-statistic  724.7172  1855.532 
 Log likelihood -16.23856 -17.53664 
 Akaike AIC  0.785247  0.838230 
 Schwarz SC  0.901073  0.954056 
 Mean dependent  10.20415  9.302230 
 S.D. dependent  1.941645  3.160208 
   
   
 Determinant resid covariance (dof adj.)  0.015440 
 Determinant resid covariance  0.013607 
 Log likelihood -33.77506 
 Akaike information criterion  1.623472 
 Schwarz criterion  1.855123 
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
314 
 
 
Table B30. Cointegration Tests for the Reduced Form Model Containing 
  Three Variables 
 
Trend assumption: Linear deterministic trend  
Series: LAGRIC LCAPEXP    
Exogenous series: POLREG    
Warning: Critical values assume no exogenous series  
Lags interval (in first differences): 1 to 1  
     
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace)  
     
     Hypothesized  Trace 0.05  
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.** 
     
     
None  0.069397  3.640782  15.49471  0.9304 
At most 1  0.003920  0.188510  3.841466  0.6642 
     
     
 Trace test indicates no cointegration at the 0.05 level 
     
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Maximum Eigenvalue) 
          
Hypothesized  Max-Eigen 0.05  
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.** 
          
None  0.069397  3.452272  14.26460  0.9121 
At most 1  0.003920  0.188510  3.841466  0.6642 
     
      Max-eigenvalue test indicates no cointegration at the 0.05 level 
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level 
 **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values  
     
Table B31. VAR Lag Order Selection Criteria for the Reduced Form Model 
   Containing  Three Variables 
 
Endogenous variables: LAGRIC LCAPEXP     
Exogenous variables: DEMOC      
       
       
 Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
       
       
0 -234.0326 NA   98.15484  10.26229  10.34179  10.29207 
1 -34.35395   373.3122*   0.019824*   1.754520*   1.993038*   1.843870* 
2 -31.82271  4.512221  0.021160  1.818379  2.215909  1.967296 
3 -28.73435  5.236774  0.022082  1.858015  2.414558  2.066500 
4 -25.93662  4.500696  0.023395  1.910288  2.625843  2.178339 
       
       
 * indicates lag order selected by the criterion    
 LR: sequential modified LR test statistic (each test at 5% level)   
 FPE: Final prediction error     
 AIC: Akaike information criterion     
 SC: Schwarz information criterion     
 HQ: Hannan-Quinn information criterion    
       
 
 
315 
 
 
 
Table B32. VAR Estiamtes for the Reduced Form Model Containing  
  Three Variables 
 
 Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ] 
      
 LAGRIC LCAPEXP 
      
LAGRIC(-1)  0.961342  0.027190 
  (0.03587)  (0.03728) 
 [ 26.7980] [ 0.72938] 
   
LCAPEXP(-1)  0.058592  0.995559 
  (0.04184)  (0.04347) 
 [ 1.40055] [ 22.9008] 
   
DEMOC -0.206290 -0.184668 
  (0.16972)  (0.17637) 
 [-1.21546] [-1.04707] 
      
 R-squared  0.969388  0.987522 
 Adj. R-squared  0.968057  0.986979 
 Sum sq. resids  5.539455  5.981601 
 S.E. equation  0.347020  0.360603 
 F-statistic  728.3490  1820.244 
 Log likelihood -16.11985 -18.00125 
 Akaike AIC  0.780402  0.857194 
 Schwarz SC  0.896228  0.973020 
 Mean dependent  10.20415  9.302230 
 S.D. dependent  1.941645  3.160208 
   
   
 Determinant resid covariance (dof adj.)  0.015595 
 Determinant resid covariance  0.013744 
 Log likelihood -34.02005 
 Akaike information criterion  1.633471 
 Schwarz criterion  1.865123 
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Table B33. Cointegration Tests for the Reduced Form Model Containing 
  Three Variables 
 
Trend assumption: Linear deterministic trend  
Series: LAGRIC LCAPEXP    
Exogenous series: DEMOC    
Warning: Critical values assume no exogenous series  
Lags interval (in first differences): 1 to 1  
     
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace)  
     
     Hypothesized  Trace 0.05  
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.** 
          
None  0.100032  5.140852  15.49471  0.7937 
At most 1  0.001703  0.081816  3.841466  0.7748 
          
 Trace test indicates no cointegration at the 0.05 level 
     
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Maximum Eigenvalue) 
          
Hypothesized  Max-Eigen 0.05  
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.** 
     
     
None  0.100032  5.059036  14.26460  0.7344 
At most 1  0.001703  0.081816  3.841466  0.7748 
     
      Max-eigenvalue test indicates no cointegration at the 0.05 level 
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level 
 **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values  
     
Table B34. VAR Lag Order Selection Criteria for the Reduced Form Model 
   Containing  Three Variables 
     
Endogenous variables: LAGRIC LCAPEXP     
Exogenous variables: OPECM     
              
 Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
              
0 -197.8080 NA   20.31913  8.687303  8.766809  8.717087 
1 -33.66268   306.8803*   0.019237*   1.724464*   1.962983*   1.813815* 
2 -30.78888  5.122871  0.020230  1.773429  2.170960  1.922347 
3 -26.85477  6.670876  0.020350  1.776294  2.332837  1.984779 
4 -23.21537  5.854681  0.020784  1.791973  2.507528  2.060024 
       
       
 * indicates lag order selected by the criterion    
 LR: sequential modified LR test statistic (each test at 5% level)   
 FPE: Final prediction error     
 AIC: Akaike information criterion     
 SC: Schwarz information criterion     
 HQ: Hannan-Quinn information criterion    
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Table B35. VAR Estimates for the Reduced Form Model Containing  
  Three Variables 
 
 Vector Autoregression Estimates 
 Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ] 
   
    LAGRIC LCAPEXP 
      
LAGRIC(-1)  0.986348  0.048556 
  (0.02865)  (0.02910) 
 [ 34.4240] [ 1.66847] 
   
LCAPEXP(-1)  0.007506  0.938179 
  (0.03396)  (0.03449) 
 [ 0.22101] [ 27.1975] 
   
OPECM  0.198011  0.319622 
  (0.18179)  (0.18464) 
 [ 1.08923] [ 1.73107] 
      
 R-squared  0.969200  0.988006 
 Adj. R-squared  0.967861  0.987484 
 Sum sq. resids  5.573607  5.749615 
 S.E. equation  0.348088  0.353542 
 F-statistic  723.7451  1894.616 
 Log likelihood -16.27043 -17.03215 
 Akaike AIC  0.786548  0.817639 
 Schwarz SC  0.902374  0.933464 
 Mean dependent  10.20415  9.302230 
 S.D. dependent  1.941645  3.160208 
      
 Determinant resid covariance (dof adj.)  0.015052 
 Determinant resid covariance  0.013266 
 Log likelihood -33.15271 
 Akaike information criterion  1.598070 
 Schwarz criterion  1.829721 
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Table B36. Cointegration Tests for the Reduced Form Model Containing 
  Three Variables 
 
Trend assumption: Linear deterministic trend  
Series: LAGRIC LCAPEXP    
Exogenous series: OPECM    
Warning: Critical values assume no exogenous series  
Lags interval (in first differences): 1 to 1  
     
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace)  
          
Hypothesized  Trace 0.05  
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.** 
          
None  0.129348  9.001917  15.49471  0.3652 
At most 1  0.047844  2.353269  3.841466  0.1250 
          
 Trace test indicates no cointegration at the 0.05 level 
     
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Maximum Eigenvalue) 
     
     
Hypothesized  Max-Eigen 0.05  
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.** 
          
None  0.129348  6.648648  14.26460  0.5315 
At most 1  0.047844  2.353269  3.841466  0.1250 
          
 Max-eigenvalue test indicates no cointegration at the 0.05 level 
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level 
  
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
319 
 
 
 
Section C. VEC estimates and Diagnostic Tests for the Models   
   where Oil is the Dependent Variable 
 
Table C1 VAR Lag Order Selection Criteria for the Specified Model  
  Containing Eight Variables 
 
Endogenous variables:  LOIL LCAPEXP LRECEXP LMAN LAGRIC 
 
Exogenous variables: POLREG OPECM DEMOC  
 
              
 Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
              
0 -210.5561 NA   0.012504  9.806785  10.40308  10.03016 
1  18.78080   378.9044*   1.76e-06*   0.922574*   2.512697*   1.518244* 
2  35.26842  23.65615  2.71e-06  1.292678  3.876627  2.260641 
3  64.77944  35.92647  2.57e-06  1.096546  4.674323  2.436802 
4  93.60643  28.82698  2.86e-06  0.930155  5.501759  2.642705 
              
 * indicates lag order selected by the criterion    
 LR: sequential modified LR test statistic (each test at 5% level)   
 FPE: Final prediction error     
 AIC: Akaike information criterion     
 SC: Schwarz information criterion     
 HQ: Hannan-Quinn information criterion    
       
 
Table C2. Cointegration Tests for the reduced form Model   
  Containing  Three Variables 
 
Trend assumption: Linear deterministic trend  
Series: LOIL LCAPEXP LRECEXP LMAN LAGRIC   
Exogenous series: POLREG OPECM DEMOC    
Warning: Critical values assume no exogenous series  
Lags interval (in first differences): 1 to 1  
     
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace)  
          
Hypothesized  Trace 0.05  
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.** 
          
None *  0.520030  80.69037  69.81889  0.0053 
At most 1  0.348759  45.45689  47.85613  0.0826 
At most 2  0.290124  24.87088  29.79707  0.1661 
At most 3  0.158849  8.422994  15.49471  0.4213 
At most 4  0.002492  0.119747  3.841466  0.7293 
          
 Trace test indicates 1 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level 
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Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Maximum Eigenvalue) 
          
Hypothesized  Max-Eigen 0.05  
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.** 
     
     
None *  0.520030  35.23349  33.87687  0.0343 
At most 1  0.348759  20.58601  27.58434  0.3020 
At most 2  0.290124  16.44788  21.13162  0.1998 
At most 3  0.158849  8.303247  14.26460  0.3487 
At most 4  0.002492  0.119747  3.841466  0.7293 
          
 Max-eigenvalue test indicates 1 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level 
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level 
 **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values  
 
 
Table C3. VEC Estimates for Oil Model  
 
 Vector Error Correction Estimates    
 Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ]   
      
      Cointegrating Eq:  CointEq1     
            
LOIL(-1)  1.000000     
      
LCAPEXP(-1) -0.529163     
  (0.13547)     
 [-3.90611]     
      
LRECEXP(-1)  0.732676     
  (0.15895)     
 [ 4.60945]     
      
LMAN(-1) -1.300282     
  (0.29615)     
 [-4.39059]     
      
LAGRIC(-1) -0.297288     
  (0.29401)     
 [-1.01114]     
      
C  2.178287     
      
      
Error Correction: D(LOIL) D(LCAPEXP) D(LRECEXP) D(LMAN) D(LAGRIC) 
            
CointEq1 -0.027538  0.470410 -0.103579  0.224668  0.014469 
  (0.19893)  (0.13916)  (0.12573)  (0.09735)  (0.13484) 
 [-0.13843] [ 3.38042] [-0.82380] [ 2.30778] [ 0.10731] 
      
D(LOIL(-1)) -0.283304  0.022280  0.093552 -0.268683 -0.146981 
  (0.29834)  (0.20870)  (0.18857)  (0.14600)  (0.20223) 
 [-0.94961] [ 0.10676] [ 0.49612] [-1.84025] [-0.72682] 
      
D(LCAPEXP(-1))  0.280017 -0.111545  0.062880  0.151371  0.269941 
  (0.20722)  (0.14496)  (0.13097)  (0.10141)  (0.14046) 
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 [ 1.35131] [-0.76950] [ 0.48010] [ 1.49264] [ 1.92181] 
      
D(LRECEXP(-1))  0.313156 -0.319946 -0.156210 -0.033530  0.172126 
  (0.27532)  (0.19260)  (0.17402)  (0.13474)  (0.18662) 
 [ 1.13742] [-1.66120] [-0.89766] [-0.24885] [ 0.92231] 
      
D(LMAN(-1))  0.865973  0.298534 -0.207401  0.445306  0.759584 
  (0.49638)  (0.34724)  (0.31374)  (0.24292)  (0.33647) 
 [ 1.74458] [ 0.85974] [-0.66106] [ 1.83311] [ 2.25753] 
      
D(LAGRIC(-1)) -0.309534 -0.252788  0.117635 -0.098333 -0.379812 
  (0.37023)  (0.25899)  (0.23401)  (0.18119)  (0.25096) 
 [-0.83605] [-0.97604] [ 0.50269] [-0.54271] [-1.51344] 
      
C  0.090173  0.561229  0.219685  0.155266 -0.206543 
  (0.27847)  (0.19480)  (0.17601)  (0.13628)  (0.18876) 
 [ 0.32382] [ 2.88102] [ 1.24815] [ 1.13931] [-1.09422] 
      
POLREG  0.401388  0.273875 -0.187590  0.558278  0.432160 
  (0.29064)  (0.20332)  (0.18370)  (0.14224)  (0.19701) 
 [ 1.38104] [ 1.34703] [-1.02116] [ 3.92496] [ 2.19360] 
      
OPECM -0.095630 -0.271593  0.012040 -0.123399  0.174936 
  (0.29378)  (0.20551)  (0.18568)  (0.14377)  (0.19913) 
 [-0.32552] [-1.32157] [ 0.06484] [-0.85830] [ 0.87849] 
      
DEMOC -0.491322 -0.641450  0.271861 -0.661375 -0.401057 
  (0.37195)  (0.26020)  (0.23509)  (0.18203)  (0.25212) 
 [-1.32093] [-2.46525] [ 1.15639] [-3.63333] [-1.59071] 
            
 R-squared  0.299407  0.384880  0.081738  0.395804  0.386237 
 Adj. R-squared  0.133477  0.239194 -0.135745  0.252704  0.240872 
 Sum sq. resids  7.603338  3.720774  3.037501  1.821022  3.493495 
 S.E. equation  0.447312  0.312914  0.282726  0.218910  0.303206 
 F-statistic  1.804418  2.641846  0.375838  2.765939  2.657018 
 Log likelihood -23.88632 -6.734589 -1.865068  10.41422 -5.221892 
 Akaike AIC  1.411930  0.697275  0.494378 -0.017259  0.634245 
 Schwarz SC  1.801764  1.087108  0.884211  0.372574  1.024079 
 Mean dependent  0.174006  0.198673  0.213764  0.112415  0.110092 
 S.D. dependent  0.480530  0.358747  0.265293  0.253233  0.348001 
            
 Determinant resid covariance 
(dof adj.)  7.73E-07    
 Determinant resid covariance  2.40E-07    
 Log likelihood  25.24852    
 Akaike information criterion  1.239645    
 Schwarz criterion  3.383729    
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Table C4. Dependent Variable: D(Oil) 
 
 
D(LOIL) = C(1)*( LOIL(-1) - 0.529163371766*LCAPEXP(-1) + 
        0.732675820008*LRECEXP(-1) - 1.3002822649*LMAN(-1) - 
        0.297288188073*LAGRIC(-1) + 2.17828685152 ) + C(2)*D(LOIL(-1)) + 
        C(3)*D(LCAPEXP(-1)) + C(4)*D(LRECEXP(-1)) + C(5)*D(LMAN(-1)) + 
        C(6)*D(LAGRIC(-1)) + C(7) + C(8)*POLREG + C(9)*OPECM + C(10) 
        *DEMOC    
          
 Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
          
C(1) -0.027538 0.198926 -0.138434 0.8906 
C(2) -0.283304 0.298338 -0.949607 0.3483 
C(3) 0.280017 0.207219 1.351306 0.1846 
C(4) 0.313156 0.275321 1.137419 0.2625 
C(5) 0.865973 0.496380 1.744576 0.0891 
C(6) -0.309534 0.370234 -0.836050 0.4084 
C(7) 0.090173 0.278471 0.323815 0.7479 
C(8) 0.401388 0.290643 1.381035 0.1753 
C(9) -0.095630 0.293775 -0.325520 0.7466 
C(10) -0.491322 0.371952 -1.320928 0.1944 
     
     
R-squared 0.299407    Mean dependent var 0.174006 
Adjusted R-squared 0.133477    S.D. dependent var 0.480530 
S.E. of regression 0.447312    Akaike info criterion 1.411930 
Sum squared resid 7.603338    Schwarz criterion 1.801764 
Log likelihood -23.88632    Hannan-Quinn criter. 1.559249 
F-statistic 1.804418    Durbin-Watson stat 2.359450 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.099441    
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Residual Diagnostic Tests 
 
Table C5. Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test 
 
          
F-statistic 4.993803    Prob. F(2,36) 0.0122 
Obs*R-squared 10.42466    Prob. Chi-Square(2) 0.0054 
     
     
     
Test Equation:    
Dependent Variable: RESID   
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
          
C(1) 0.066037 0.183279 0.360310 0.7207 
C(2) 0.877087 0.402960 2.176612 0.0361 
C(3) 0.036809 0.191359 0.192358 0.8485 
C(4) 0.099433 0.255127 0.389738 0.6990 
C(5) 0.115364 0.458511 0.251607 0.8028 
C(6) -0.249047 0.360522 -0.690795 0.4941 
C(7) -0.241831 0.267506 -0.904022 0.3720 
C(8) -0.191983 0.271220 -0.707850 0.4836 
C(9) 0.089937 0.269145 0.334158 0.7402 
C(10) 0.274135 0.351618 0.779639 0.4407 
RESID(-1) -1.069206 0.344866 -3.100349 0.0037 
RESID(-2) -0.111903 0.164231 -0.681377 0.5000 
          
R-squared 0.217180    Mean dependent var 8.43E-17 
Adjusted R-squared -0.022014    S.D. dependent var 0.402210 
S.E. of regression 0.406613    Akaike info criterion 1.250410 
Sum squared resid 5.952042    Schwarz criterion 1.718211 
Log likelihood -18.00985    Hannan-Quinn criter. 1.427193 
F-statistic 0.907964    Durbin-Watson stat 1.841316 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.542615    
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Table C6. VAR Lag Order Selection Criteria 
 
Endogenous Variables: LOIL LCAPEXP LRECEXP LMAN 
Exogenous Variables: POLREG OPECM DEMOC 
       
        Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
              
0 -206.1738 NA   0.154904  9.485818  9.962855  9.664519 
1 -3.101516   344.3400*   4.59e-05*   1.352240*   2.465326*   1.769209* 
2  4.162751  11.05432  6.90e-05  1.732054  3.481190  2.387291 
3  19.17423  20.23286  7.65e-05  1.775034  4.160218  2.668538 
4  34.06322  17.47839  8.98e-05  1.823338  4.844572  2.955110 
       
       
 * indicates lag order selected by the criterion    
 LR: sequential modified LR test statistic (each test at 5% level)   
 FPE: Final prediction error     
 AIC: Akaike information criterion     
 SC: Schwarz information criterion     
 HQ: Hannan-Quinn information criterion    
 
      
 
Table C7.  Cointegration Tests 
 
Trend assumption: Linear deterministic trend  
Series: LOIL LCAPEXP LRECEXP LMAN    
Exogenous series: POLREG OPECM DEMOC    
Warning: Critical values assume no exogenous series  
Lags interval (in first differences): 1 to 1  
     
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace)  
     
     Hypothesized  Trace 0.05  
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.** 
          
None *  0.506374  53.95161  47.85613  0.0120 
At most 1  0.236540  20.06467  29.79707  0.4185 
At most 2  0.134692  7.109722  15.49471  0.5649 
At most 3  0.003443  0.165554  3.841466  0.6841 
     
      Trace test indicates 1 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level 
 
    
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Maximum Eigenvalue) 
     
     
Hypothesized  Max-Eigen 0.05  
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.** 
          
None *  0.506374  33.88694  27.58434  0.0068 
At most 1  0.236540  12.95495  21.13162  0.4564 
At most 2  0.134692  6.944168  14.26460  0.4958 
At most 3  0.003443  0.165554  3.841466  0.6841 
          
 Max-eigenvalue test indicates 1 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level 
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level 
 **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values  
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Table C8. Vector Error Correction Estimates 
    
 Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ]  
          
Cointegrating Eq:  CointEq1    
          
LOIL(-1)  1.000000    
     
LCAPEXP(-1) -0.456214    
  (0.10869)    
 [-4.19723]    
     
LRECEXP(-1)  0.601205    
  (0.11536)    
 [ 5.21177]    
     
LMAN(-1) -1.510059    
  (0.08804)    
 [-17.1526]    
     
C  1.490428    
          
Error Correction: D(LOIL) D(LCAPEXP) D(LRECEXP) D(LMAN) 
     
     
CointEq1 -0.124384  0.592264 -0.160095  0.208626 
  (0.22093)  (0.15679)  (0.13895)  (0.11229) 
 [-0.56300] [ 3.77753] [-1.15220] [ 1.85794] 
     
D(LOIL(-1)) -0.321923 -0.156490  0.171135 -0.301134 
  (0.26712)  (0.18956)  (0.16799)  (0.13576) 
 [-1.20518] [-0.82553] [ 1.01870] [-2.21808] 
     
D(LCAPEXP(-1))  0.281314 -0.086596  0.054854  0.159651 
  (0.20567)  (0.14596)  (0.12935)  (0.10453) 
 [ 1.36779] [-0.59331] [ 0.42408] [ 1.52728] 
     
D(LRECEXP(-1))  0.350713 -0.321827 -0.148006 -0.011343 
  (0.27251)  (0.19339)  (0.17139)  (0.13850) 
 [ 1.28697] [-1.66414] [-0.86358] [-0.08190] 
     
D(LMAN(-1))  0.598979  0.336133 -0.205191  0.412657 
  (0.48238)  (0.34232)  (0.30337)  (0.24517) 
 [ 1.24173] [ 0.98192] [-0.67636] [ 1.68315] 
     
C  0.062808  0.684824  0.157009  0.148165 
  (0.26360)  (0.18707)  (0.16578)  (0.13398) 
 [ 0.23827] [ 3.66082] [ 0.94707] [ 1.10590] 
     
POLREG  0.292694  0.348569 -0.225114  0.530713 
  (0.30225)  (0.21449)  (0.19009)  (0.15362) 
 [ 0.96840] [ 1.62510] [-1.18427] [ 3.45478] 
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OPECM -0.060321 -0.413091  0.081198 -0.118699 
  (0.28246)  (0.20045)  (0.17765)  (0.14356) 
 [-0.21355] [-2.06078] [ 0.45708] [-0.82681] 
     
DEMOC -0.355435 -0.795870  0.343522 -0.637565 
  (0.39347)  (0.27923)  (0.24746)  (0.19998) 
 [-0.90333] [-2.85023] [ 1.38819] [-3.18810] 
          
 R-squared  0.291972  0.360243  0.081195  0.341415 
 Adj. R-squared  0.146735  0.229011 -0.107278  0.206321 
 Sum sq. resids  7.684032  3.869805  3.039298  1.984946 
 S.E. equation  0.443877  0.315001  0.279161  0.225602 
 F-statistic  2.010317  2.745078  0.430805  2.527236 
 Log likelihood -24.13969 -7.677122 -1.879266  8.345570 
 Akaike AIC  1.380820  0.694880  0.453303  0.027268 
 Schwarz SC  1.731671  1.045730  0.804153  0.378118 
 Mean dependent  0.174006  0.198673  0.213764  0.112415 
 S.D. dependent  0.480530  0.358747  0.265293  0.253233 
          
 Determinant resid covariance (dof adj.)  2.31E-05   
 Determinant resid covariance  1.01E-05   
 Log likelihood  3.704678   
 Akaike information criterion  1.512305   
 Schwarz criterion  3.071639   
          
 
Table C9. Dependent Variable: D(LOIL) 
   
D(LOIL) = C(1)*( LOIL(-1) - 0.456214259785*LCAPEXP(-1) + 
        0.601204873889*LRECEXP(-1) - 1.51005909561*LMAN(-1) + 
        1.49042750569 ) + C(2)*D(LOIL(-1)) + C(3)*D(LCAPEXP(-1)) + C(4) 
        *D(LRECEXP(-1)) + C(5)*D(LMAN(-1)) + C(6) + C(7)*POLREG + C(8) 
        *OPECM + C(9)*DEMOC   
          
 Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
          
C(1) -0.124384 0.220931 -0.563001 0.5767 
C(2) -0.321923 0.267117 -1.205175 0.2354 
C(3) 0.281314 0.205670 1.367792 0.1792 
C(4) 0.350713 0.272510 1.286974 0.2057 
C(5) 0.598979 0.482376 1.241726 0.2218 
C(6) 0.062808 0.263603 0.238266 0.8129 
C(7) 0.292694 0.302245 0.968400 0.3388 
C(8) -0.060321 0.282464 -0.213552 0.8320 
C(9) -0.355435 0.393471 -0.903331 0.3719 
          
R-squared 0.291972    Mean dependent var 0.174006 
Adjusted R-squared 0.146735    S.D. dependent var 0.480530 
S.E. of regression 0.443877    Akaike info criterion 1.380820 
Sum squared resid 7.684032    Schwarz criterion 1.731671 
Log likelihood -24.13969    Hannan-Quinn criter. 1.513407 
F-statistic 2.010317    Durbin-Watson stat 2.254897 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.070740    
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Table C10. Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test 
  
     
     
F-statistic 2.758102    Prob. F(2,37) 0.0765 
Obs*R-squared 6.227691    Prob. Chi-Square(2) 0.0444 
          
     
Test Equation:    
Dependent Variable: RESID   
Presample missing value lagged residuals set to zero. 
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
          
C(1) 0.178600 0.224855 0.794288 0.4321 
C(2) 0.514674 0.350219 1.469580 0.1501 
C(3) 0.137796 0.206395 0.667631 0.5085 
C(4) -0.030726 0.262858 -0.116893 0.9076 
C(5) 0.146733 0.466268 0.314696 0.7548 
C(6) -0.068848 0.254546 -0.270474 0.7883 
C(7) -0.023623 0.289660 -0.081553 0.9354 
C(8) -0.071699 0.272605 -0.263013 0.7940 
C(9) 0.032437 0.377865 0.085842 0.9321 
RESID(-1) -0.810920 0.360964 -2.246536 0.0307 
RESID(-2) -0.147847 0.164554 -0.898469 0.3747 
          
R-squared 0.129744    Mean dependent var 5.20E-17 
Adjusted R-squared -0.105461    S.D. dependent var 0.404339 
S.E. of regression 0.425126    Akaike info criterion 1.325186 
Sum squared resid 6.687078    Schwarz criterion 1.754003 
Log likelihood -20.80447    Hannan-Quinn criter. 1.487237 
F-statistic 0.551620    Durbin-Watson stat 1.912238 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.841581    
     
      
 
 
 
